IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Laurence R. Goodman, et al.,
Plaintiff, 					Civil Action No. 17-cv-01680-KLM (MIX)

John W. Hickenlooper, et al., and
Cynthia H. Coffman, et al.

Defendants.
							
IMPERATIVE AND DEMAND FOR EMERGENCY NIHIL DICIT JUDGMENT
This matter having come before this court on Plaintiff’s application under entry of a Nihil Dicit Judgment against Defendants John W. Hickenlooper, et al. and Cynthia H. Coffman, et al. under Rule 55 (a) and (b)(1)(2)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  After having considered the premise and authorities submitted by the Plaintiff the court finds as follows:  
1.	A default was entered by the Clerk of Court against Defendants John W. Hickenlooper, et al. and Cynthia H. Coffman, et al. on June 4, 2018.
2.	Defendants are not minors, not incompetent persons.
3.	Defendants did not respond or otherwise rebut the SECOND COMMERCIAL AFFIDAVIT – NOTICE OF INTEREST within the three-week Jewish International Law, (21 day) statutory Grace Period.  The defendants have accepted, as Truth in Commerce, the uncontested assertion by silent acquiescence. 
4.	The imperative and demand that the Court take judicial notice of the Judgment in Commerce under a Nihil Dicit Judgment.  Plaintiff is demanding that our civil servants in the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO do your duties to assist in facilitating a justice that has been obtained through the universally applicable principals of the default process that generated a Judgment in Commerce.
Fed. R. Civil P. 55 Default Judgement
“(a) Entering a Default. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default.”
While this plaintiff is apprehensive that Federal Rule of Civil-Procedure 55 may be designed to secure Judgements through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; this plaintiff further argues, that, even if that apprehension is true, still, the over-arching “Interests of Justice” Mandate that the Civil-Servants in these Federal Courts Apply Similar Principles to Default Judgements which have been secured through Foreign Jurisdictions, such as that of the International Commercial Process up-on which this plaintiffs previously submitted Commercial Nihil-Dicit Default Judgement has been secured.

						_____________________________________________

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Laurence R. Goodman, et al.,
Plaintiff, 					Civil Action No. 17-cv-01680-KLM (MIX)

John W. Hickenlooper, et al., and
Cynthia H. Coffman, et al.

Defendants.
PROPOSED ORDER
THEREFORE, IT IS ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that:
1. This court declares that the defendants failed to put in a plea or answer to the plaintiff's SECOND COMMERCIAL AFFIDAVIT – NOTICE OF INTEREST by the day assigned; and in this case judgment is given against the defendants of course, as they say nothing why it should not.

2. Defendants are enjoined from proceeding in Denver District Court Case No. 17CR10088 and this case is removed to United States District Court Case No. 17-cv-01680-RM-KLM.  See South Carolina v. Moore, 447 F.2d 1067, 1072-73 (4th Cir. 1971) in accord with Polyplastics, Inc. v. Transconex, 713 F.2d 875, 880 (1st Cir. 1983), and Ackerman v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 734 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2013) that states:
Because § 1446(d) explicitly states that "the State court shall proceed no further" once removal is effected, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), we agree with the Defendants that the statute deprives the state court of further jurisdiction over the removed case and that any post-removal actions taken by the state court in the removed case action are void ab initio. See South Carolina v. Moore, 447 F.2d 1067, 1072-73 (4th Cir. 1971); accord Polyplastics, Inc. v. Transconex, Inc., 713 F.2d 875, 880 (1st Cir. 1983).  Emphasis added.  
Kansas Public Employees v. Reimer & Koger Associates, Inc., 77 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 1996); that states: 
The statute governing removal procedures, 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1994), provides that after the defendant has given notice of removal and filed the notice with the state court, the state court “shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). This language has been considered express authorization to stay state court proceedings; therefore, injunctions to stay state proceedings in removed cases come within the first exception to the Anti–Injunction Act. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 234 & n. 12, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 2157–58 & n. 12, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972); Lektro–Vend. Corp., 433 U.S. at 640, 97 S.Ct. at 2892.

3.  This Court shall award such lawful remedy and relief as the Court deems justified and proper and this all, as is within its limited jurisdiction.
IT IS SO ORDERED this ________ day of ___________________, 2018.
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							United States District Judge