

De Jure People's Grand Jury Administration in Colorado
c/o post office box 441756
Aurora, Colorado [80044]

Office of the Attorney General
Cynthia H. Coffman
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver CO, 80203

Certified Mail No. 7016 0340 0000 7098 8326

Office of the District Attorney
Stanley L. Garnett
1777 6th Street
Boulder CO, 80302

Certified Mail No. 7016 0340 0000 7098 8302

CAVEAT

You, as the Attorney General for the State of Colorado, have the first opportunity to handle and manage this situation. Moreover, as an action concerning matters of general public welfare by reason of C.R.S. 24-31-101(1)(a) (2016), it is your duty in your official capacity to ably remedy this matter.¹ If you fail to act on this complaint, it will show your intent pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4 Misprision of felony to aid and abet the criminal activity reported herein; and if you fail to notify us that you are going to act responsibly in this matter within 21 days, the quo warranto will be moved directly to the Colorado Supreme Court.²

The People of the State of Colorado Ex Rel.
Charlene – ann: von Schlesien and others similarly situated.

v.

Karolyn Moore et al., David Archuleta, Noel E. Blum, Elizabeth Brodsky, Jonathon P. Martin, Stanley L. Garnett, Joseph K. Pelle, Raina Bayas, John David Gifford, Elise Jones, Cindy Domenico, Deb Jeanne Gardner, in their private capacity and other unknown defendant(s)

INFORMATION IN THE NATURE OF A QUO WARRANTO

I. Current Conditions Justifying a Remedy

A diligent search of county and state records demonstrates that defendant Karolyn Moore is impersonating a Boulder County Court Judge, active BAR Registration No. 20685; and the other above-named defendants are in actual possession and use of a public office that are unlawfully held and

1. C.R.S. 24-31-101(1)(a) (2016): "The attorney general of the state shall be the legal counsel and advisor of each department, division, board, bureau, and agency of the state government other than the legislative branch. The attorney general shall attend in person at the seat of government during the session of the general assembly and term of the supreme court and shall appear for the state and prosecute and defend all actions and proceedings, civil and criminal, in which the state is a party or is interested when required to do so by the governor, and he shall prosecute and defend for the state all causes in the appellate courts in which the state is a party or interested." (Emphasis supplied).
2. By reason of *The People of the State of Colorado Ex Rel. Jerome v. The Regents of the State University*, 24 Colo. 175; 49 P. 286, (1897 Colo.) "If, upon request, he refuses to act, a private person, as relator, may in a proper case institute the proceeding without obtaining leave of court in the first instance."

exercised. "Quo Warranto proceedings have been held proper to challenge and determine the right or title to various public offices," *State Civil Service Commission V. Cummings*, 83 Colo. 379, (1928 Colo.), *People Ex Rel. Beardsley v. Harl*, 109 Colo. 223, (1942 Colo.), *People ex rel. v. Londoner*, 13 Colo. 303, (1889 Colo.), and *Kepley v. People ex rel.*, 76 Colo. 233, (1924 Colo.)

Constitutional and statutory provisions were not complied with; hence, a de facto authority was established. Karolyn Moore and other above-named defendants' failure to qualify for public office by failing to file a personal recognizance bond, failing in a timely manner to take an oath of office, failing to have the oath administered by a competent public official, or failing record properly the oath are grounds for ouster by quo warranto. The general rule is that none but the state through the Attorney General may challenge a de facto judge's authority and that only quo warranto would lie. See International Commercial Recording Office Public Access Portal, <https://icropa.wordpress.com> >>> click on Colorado >>> Notices.

To explain this criminal activity, let's consider the proper constitutional procedure for one to enter public office and be bound to the promises contained in the statutory oath of office with a latent but legal force. Article VI, Clause 3, Constitution for the United States of America and the §§ 2 and 22, Schedule, Constitution for the State of Colorado, ratified in 1876, mandate that all public officers be bound by an oath of office with a valid and verifiable fidelity or recognizance bond; in other words, consummate a contract binding one to the promises sworn to and contained in the oath of office.

The oath taker makes certain promises contained in the constitutional oath (Article XII, Section 8, Colorado Constitution) to the public at-large in exchange for the public trust; as the public's consideration, the oath taker gives a recognizance bond payable to the People (not to be confused with a liability bond payable to the injured party for abuse of office) binding him/her to those promises as his/her consideration. Accordingly, the giving of a recognizance bond as consideration acquires the public's trust as its consideration which then, and only then, enables the oath taker the essential contract authority to enter the public office and exercise the duties of the office with public trust. Exercising the public trust cannot be accomplished in any other way. The contract is then given legal effect, evidence of which is then filed and recorded within a prescribed period of time in a pertinent public office available for public viewing. Failure to do so within the time prescribed vacates the office and denies the offender's entry to the public office (Article XII, Sections 4 and 10, Colorado Constitution).

II. Evidence of Injuries Being Inflicted

An example of one of the People injured by Karolyn Moore and the other above-named defendants, an elderly divorced woman, age 62, *Charlene – ann: von Schlesien* who is disabled by pyroluria, a matter of public record described on her web site. Therefore, having a unique susceptibility, she was targeted as a "more vulnerable victim" described in the *United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual*, U.S.S.G. § 3A1, 1(b) and further defined in: *United States v. Jackson*, 95 F.3d 500, (7th Cir. 1996), *United States v. Ram Singh*, 54 F.3d 1182, (4th Cir 1995), *United States v. Moree*, 897 F.2d 1329, (5th Cir. 1990), and *United States v. Widney*, 913 F.2d 870, (10th Cir. 1990), other citations omitted.

As a result, Ms. von Schlesien is one of many victims of the pandemic practice of banks manufacturing false and fraudulent foreclosure documents; that is to say, self-dealing feeder documents prepared, executed, and recorded by the bank under false pretenses. By enlisting robo-signers to execute them, the bank could institute a non-judicial foreclosure action and seize Ms von Schelsien's property. The bank and its alleged principal, whomever that may be, never established themselves as a real party in interest pursuant to Colorado Court Rules.

In the case of Ms. von Schlesien, this particular scheme was instigated by Premier Members Federal Credit Union. The objective of the scheme was to fleece her out of her property - a home on a 2.7 acre lot located on 6170 N. 79th Street, Boulder, Colorado, and other items of value - by means of the improper adjudication of justice in Colorado.

On or about September 1, 2015, Ms. von Schlesien was assaulted, battered, kidnapped, and imprisoned by armed might by persons, impersonating Boulder County officers with abandon and impunity near her place of domicile at 7435 Mt. Sherman Road in Boulder County. Ms. von Schlesien was taken to Boulder County Jail, 3200 Airport Road, Boulder, Colorado, and imprisoned against her free will under a system of peonage imposed upon her by those who deny the power of the United States Constitution, ratified 1789, and defy the second 13th Amendment enforced by the authorities of 14 Stat. 27, 17 Stat. 3, and 14 Stat. 546 now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1994 and 18 U.S.C. § 1581 *et seq.* As a result of Ms. von Schlesien's intent to expose the bank fraud, she is now a political prisoner without bail. The criminal oligarchy comprised of Karolyn Moore, et al., in collusion with Stanley L. Garnett, and the other above-named defendants by reason of C.R.S. 18-8-105 (1),(2)(d) (2015) are attempting to prevent discovery of the Premier Members Federal Credit Union fraudulent scheme.

The extrinsic fraud in Boulder County Case Number 2011C 000157 before Karolyn Moore, impersonating a County Court judge, goes to the jurisdiction of the court to hear a case and amounts to a subversion of the legal process itself. During the bogus hearings in said case, Karolyn Moore was challenged several times for proof of jurisdiction and failed to produce any written evidence of jurisdiction.

Further evidence of fraud by an imposter demonstrating lack of jurisdiction in the case was reviewed by the de Jure People's Grand Jury in Colorado. A Boulder County charge sheet dated 11/16/15 shows that Ms. von Schlesien was tried pursuant to C.R.S. 13-14-102 (2015) a statute repealed 6/05/13 - two and a half years prior. See True Bill by the Grand Jury plus two pages attached hereto. Also see International Commercial Recording Office Public Access Portal, <https://icropa.wordpress.com> >>> click on Colorado >>> Boulder for more documentation.

Nowhere can it be found that Karolyn Moore was given authority to act outside the terms of Boulder County Court's franchise with the State of Colorado. By reason of the terms of that franchise, Moore's authority is limited to jurisdiction over licensed corporations, licensed bankers, licensed BAR Association members, and licensed government officials; the said Boulder County franchise with the State of Colorado never gave the Boulder County's public servants authority or jurisdiction over a living man, woman, or private property; and the said Boulder County franchise with the State of Colorado never gave the Boulder County's public servants the right to embezzle public funds for personal gain or to commit crimes against the People (Article X, Section 13, Colorado Constitution; see text on page 7).

Nowhere can it be found that the People gave their public servants, permission, consent, or authority to wage a mixed war by force of arms against the People in Colorado, harass them, subject them to extrajudicial punishments, kidnappings and unjust imprisonment, enslave them, indebt them, mischaracterize them, dehumanize them, change their political status, seize upon their property, defraud them, trespass upon them, or engage in any other criminal activity whatsoever.

One of the People by whom and for whom all government exists and acts, *Charlene - ann: von Schlesien*, is a Coloradoan and lives in Colorado state. A DNA analysis of Karolyn Moore's blood will prove that she is not Ms. von Schlesien's creator or mother and has no authority over any living man or woman.

Ms. von Schlesien is not a person, a U.S. citizen, government employee, or a corporation.

Ms. von Schlesien did not ever willingly or knowingly consent to be a surety for the national debt.

Ms. von Schlesien has never willingly or knowingly promised, consented, or agreed to perform under statutes, ordinances, or codes.

It has been reported that Ms. von Schlesien has been incarcerated for 18 months without any valid official document signed by either the impersonators Karolyn Moore or Joseph K. Pelle, signifying an intent to avoid incrimination. While being held in said condition of peonage in the Boulder County jail, her Cestui Que Vie account is very likely being used by the members of the said criminal oligarchy for personal gain. Requests for evidence of these account records have not been responded to or provided. By reason of C.R.S. 18-8-105 (1),(2)(e) (2015) unknown parties are hiding or suppressing material facts that they are legally or morally bound to disclose, once again signaling an intent to avoid incrimination.

Ms. von Schlesien is being subjected to the most hideous, cruel, and inhumane form of punishment imaginable; that is to say, Moore is attempting to dominate and control Ms. von Schlesien through prolonged stress to break down her physical and mental defenses. Using systematic and forcible pressure based on methods of isolation in a mold-infested cell, sleeplessness, hunger, serving no meals or uncooked meals, extreme discomfort by keeping room temperatures 13 to 19 degrees below normal without adequate clothing or shoes, humiliation, deprivation of proper medical treatments, deprivation of medication, mail tampering, and the alteration of kindness and cruelty without allowing access to the outside world. This form of torture is designed to impair autonomy and an ability to think independently; thereby, attempting to compel Ms. von Schlesien to give up her religious beliefs, values, and attitudes and to accept radically different beliefs, ideas, and affiliations. These repeated injuries and usurpations are all having the direct objective to establish an absolute Tyranny over Ms von Schlesien.

In another incident involving Boulder County jail, Stephanie Anderson, a 29-year-old mother of two was arrested on Thursday, May 26, 2016, on an alleged shoplifting charge. During and after booking she complained of being sick, she could not keep food down, and she complained of a headache and chest pains. After some time in a jail cell, she was finally taken to Boulder Community Health's Foothills Hospital by Boulder County Sheriff's deputies.

A review of a 156-page report released on June 22, 2016, by Boulder County Sheriff reveals at least 85 false statements or contradicting statements contained in the report. Careful study of the report implicates a cover-up that the Sheriff's deputies were intent on taking Anderson back to jail even though her primary problem of chest pains and high blood pressure had not been resolved. The report claimed Anderson was refusing treatment. It is inconceivable that someone of ordinary intelligence with a known heart condition and suffering from the symptoms she displayed would want to go back to a jail cell without proper diagnose and treatment.

The Boulder County Sheriff or his deputies do not have a license to practice medicine.

The Boulder County franchise with the State of Colorado does not give the county sheriff or his deputies authority to overrule any medical protocols. When Anderson was taken to Boulder County hospital, she was under authority and jurisdiction of the medical facility; and by reason of the forgoing, the authority of sheriff was null and void over the hospital staff.

Hospital doctors and/or nurses had a duty/moral obligation pursuant to their Hippocratic oath, their medical license, and as an advocate for their patient, not to discharge Anderson without the two life-threatening conditions of chest pains and high blood pressure being resolved. A doctor or the staff of a medical facility simply cannot discharge someone with chest pain and high blood pressure and not be held harmless. The 156-page report released by Boulder County Sheriff shows no evidence of a signed waiver that Anderson was leaving against medical advice or any entry into the medical record that she left against medical advice. It laughable to think that a doctor would prescribe Ibuprofen (Motrin) for chest

pains and high blood pressure as the said 156-page report claims. It is considered negligence, malpractice, and murder to discharge someone with said life-threatening conditions.

On Friday, May 27, 2016, Anderson, while in her jail cell, plead for medical help to which the deputy on duty replied "no hablo Ingle`s." Later that afternoon she was found unresponsive and pronounced dead at 4:30 PM. On the next business day, Tuesday, May 31, 2016, the negligence surrounding the death of Stephanie Anderson was reported for the record by one of the People at the end of a regular meeting of the Boulder County commissioners. Commissioners Elise Jones, Cindy Domenico, and Deb Jeanne Gardner were all present and had a duty to report the criminal activity to District Attorney Stanley L. Garnett for prosecution. However, an article in the Daily Camera on July 28, 2016, indicates that the commissioners joined in a cover up, passing the report over to Joseph K. Pelle, impersonating a Boulder County Sheriff, who was responsible for the negligent behavior. It appears that there was buy out, and no one was prosecuted for the murder of Stephanie Anderson. Her death should also be treated as murder by reason that none of the above-named defendants are lawfully holding office. As a result of this incident, it has been reported that Ms. von Schlesien is in fear for her life.

By reason of the mandates of Article I, of the Constitution for the United States of America, ratified in 1789, and the Principles of the Declaration of Independence, Anderson's unalienable rights were violated and she paid for it with her life.

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. — That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."

III. Duty Obligations of Local Authority and Aggrieved People in Colorado

By reason of the *General Laws of the State of Colorado*, ratified in 1877, Chapter LXXI, 1936 Sec. 6, Boulder County commissioners have the duty at each regular term to examine and inquire into the sufficiency of the official bonds of county officers. A search of county records demonstrates that Boulder County commissioners Elise Jones, Cindy Domenico, and Deb Jeanne Gardner failed to verify the sufficiency of the official bonds of any county officer. The aforementioned commissioners were served several written notices by certified mail and oral testimony, as well as written notices at public hearings, the latest one was on 8/17/16 of the criminal activity in Boulder County. It is self-evident that there must be a "meeting of the minds" to act in concert to conceal and cover up their crimes. Boulder County commissioners have failed to remove themselves or the other impostors from office.

"The doctrine in Colorado at common law is that a private person could not, as a matter of right, bring an action for wrongs done to the public. Private persons could represent the people as a relator only where the injury, in addition to affecting the public, peculiarly affected them." *People ex rel. Byers v. Grand River Bridge Co.*, 13 Colo. 11, (1889 Colo.), *People ex rel. Jerome v. Regents of State University*, 24 Colo. 175 (1897 Colo.), *People ex rel. v. Blake*, 128 Colo. 111, (1953 Colo.)

Petitioners/relators qualify as "aggrieved" persons entitled to judicial review of final agency action if the petitioners/relators have presented a sufficient "case or controversy" to import justiciability between the petitioners/relators and the respondent within the meaning of Article III of the United States Constitution. As defined in *Mountain States Legal Foundation, et al., Petitioners, v. Douglas M. Costle, et al., Respondents. State of Colorado ex rel. J.D. MacFarlane, Petitioner-Intervenor*, 630 F.2d 754; (10th Cir. 1980) that quotes: "A private litigant, whether he is a legislator, a citizen or a taxpayer must, in order to have "standing" to sue, demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome, and demonstrate that he is the proper party to request adjudication of the particular issue. *Flast v. Cohen*, 392 U.S. 83, (1968)."

The question of standing involves "whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues." *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975). In *Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group*, 438 U.S. 59, 98 S. Ct. 2620, 57 L. Ed. 2d 595 (1978), the Supreme Court recognized "injury in fact" as the one constant element in judicial statements concerning standing:

The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the parties seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (82 S. Ct. 691, 703, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663) (1962). As refined by subsequent reformulation, this requirement of a "personal stake" has come to be understood to require not only a "distinct and palpable injury," to the plaintiff, *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (95 S. Ct. 2197, 2206, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343) (1975), but also a "fairly traceable" causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. *Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.*, 429 U.S. 252, 261 (97 S. Ct. 555, 561, 50 L. Ed. 2d 450) (1977).

SUMMARY

Persons holding public office under oath without a recognizance bond are free to ignore the promises contained in the oath of office as they desire and without consequence. They do not constitutionally or lawfully hold public office; no decision made by such impostor office holders has any validity whatsoever in a competent court of law; and all decisions and judgments are null, void, and without legal effect at their inception. An impostor unconstitutionally and unlawfully holding public office denies the power of both constitutions and engages in an insurrection against the applicable constitutions. Said insurgencies inextricably creates and inextinguishably imposes a system of peonage upon those populations without recourse either constitutionally or statutorily at any level of either the state governments or the federal government. Such perversion of judicial power is defined as a "crime against humanity" by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Explanatory Memorandum and is a particularly odious offense in that it constitutes a serious attack on human dignity or grave humiliation or a degradation of human beings.

All those imposters throughout Colorado and Boulder County who are holding public office without a fiduciary bond, personal recognizance bond, or valid oath of office on record are embezzling public funds and by virtue of the Colorado Constitution are felons.

Colorado Constitution, Article 10, Section 13, ratified 1876: "The making of profit, directly or indirectly, out of State, county, city, town or school district money, or using the same for any purpose not authorized by law, by any public officer, shall be deemed a felony, and shall be punished as provided by law."

Colorado Constitution, Article 18, Section 4, ratified 1876: "The term felony, wherever it may occur in this Constitution, or the laws of the State, shall be construed to mean any criminal offense punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary, and none other."

By reason of C.R.S.18-8-407 (2014). Embezzlement of public property:

"(1) Every public servant who lawfully or unlawfully comes into possession of any public moneys or public property of whatever description, being the property of the state or of any political subdivision of the state, and who knowingly converts any of such public moneys or property to his own use or to any use other than the public use authorized by law is guilty of embezzlement of public property. Every person convicted under the provisions of this section shall be forever thereafter ineligible and disqualified from being a member of the general assembly of this state or from holding any office of trust or profit in this state."

"(2) Embezzlement of public property is a class 5 felony."

Karolyn Moore, et al., in collusion with David Archuleta, Noel E. Blum, Elizabeth Brodsky, Jonathon P. Martin, Stanley L. Garnett, Joseph K. Pelle, Raina Bayas, John David Gifford, Elise Jones, Cindy Domenico, Deb Jeanne Gardner, and other Boulder County government officials all did the same thing. They failed to get a personal recognizance bond binding them to the promises contained in the oath of office. This constitutes a criminal conspiracy, rendering assistance, to conceal, disguise, intimidate, or other thing used in avoiding discovery of that fact, for the mutual protection of one another's wrongdoings of embezzling public funds for personal benefit and to commit crimes.

Furthermore, Karolyn Moore, et al., in collusion with Stanley L. Garnett, and other said Boulder County government officials are holding *Charlene – ann: von Schlesien*, in a condition of peonage using her Cestui Que Vie account for their personal profit and gain.

By reason of the Separation of Powers Doctrine Articles I - III and Article IV, § 4, of the Constitution for the united States of America, ratified in 1789, and the Principles of the Declaration of Independence, the People of Boulder County and Colorado state have been denied a Republican form of government; thereby, altering the form and administration of government with the intent to pervert the minds of the People and creating a general dissatisfaction towards government which is calculated to disturb the tranquility of the state and lead ignorant persons to the endeavor to subvert the government.

By reason of the foregoing, each and every one of the People in the State of Colorado can demonstrate a "distinct and palpable injury," fairly traceable between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct; can demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the particular issues presented; and can demonstrate that he or she has "standing" to sue as a proper party to request adjudication.

**NOTICE TO PRINCIPALS IS NOTICE TO AGENTS
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Any retaliating, threatening, or intimidating actions against any involved in preparing or witnessing this document or their families will be in violation of C.R.S. 18-8-105 and 18 U.S.C. § 1513.

Prepared by: Laurence R. Goodman, de Jure People's Grand Jury Administrator in Colorado
Wilfred P. Adams, Major USAF Retired, Presidential Commission, Durango, Colorado
Clarence Young, US Army SSG, Retired LPN, Colorado

Witnessed by: Luanne R. Fleming, 8:45 PM, 3/13/2017, Aurora, Colorado
Leah R. Fleming, 7:00 PM, 3/13/2017, Aurora, Colorado
Ruth Sadler, 9:30 AM, 3/13/2017, Aurora, Colorado
Esther J. Williams, 10:03 PM, 3/2/2017, Pueblo, Colorado
Robert S. Whittall, US Army/RA, SFC, 10:03 PM, 3/2/17, Colorado Springs, Colorado
Harlan Smith, 1:14 PM, 3/3/2017, Boulder, Colorado
Lorraine Moller, 1:23 PM, 3/3/2017, Boulder, Colorado
Janet Shapan, 1:46 PM, 3/3/2017, Longmont, Colorado
Jacqui Hildebrandt, 2:16 PM, 3/3/2017, Boulder, Colorado
Ted McDade, 6:01 PM, 3/3/2017, Boulder, Colorado
Shaeliya Sage, 3:14 PM, 3/4/2017, Lyons, Colorado
Michael Makuh, US Army, 3:43 PM, 3/5/2017, Boulder County, Colorado
Sara Deleon, US Army SSG Combat Medic, 6:10 PM, 3/5/2017, Aurora, Colorado
Dr. Kevin F. Reichlin, 1:25 PM, 3/8/2017, Boulder, Colorado

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Witnessed by: Continued from page 7

James Keller, 3:33 PM, 3/8/2017, Monte Vista, Colorado
Jina Keller, 3:34 PM, 3/8/2017, Monte Vista, Colorado
Jared Keller, 5:25 PM, 3/8/2017, Monte Vista, Colorado
Joshua Keller, 5:26 PM, 3/8/2017, Monte Vista, Colorado
Michael Chacon, 4:43 PM, 3/9/2017, Monte Vista, Colorado
Tara Bailon, 7:09 PM, 3/8/2017, Alamosa, Colorado
Yvonne Duran, 4:43 PM, 3/9/2017, Romeo, Colorado
Andrew Atencio, 4:44 PM, 3/9/2017, Romeo, Colorado
Delrae Atencio, 4:45 PM, 3/9/2017, Romeo, Colorado
Melissa Atencio, 4:46 PM, 3/9/2017, Romeo, Colorado
Michael Atencio, 4:47 PM, 3/9/2017, Romeo, Colorado
Joyce Fuentes, 4:43 PM, 3/9/2017, Del Norte, Colorado
Shawn Greenwell, 4:43 PM, 3/9/2017, Del Norte, Colorado
Pete Trujillo, 5:39 PM, 3/10/2017, Alamosa, Colorado
Angie Chacon, 5:41 PM, 3/10/2017, Alamosa, Colorado
Kim Munoz, 4:13 PM, 3/11/2017, Denver, Colorado
Mary Severance, 1:48 PM, 3/12/2017, Pueblo, Colorado
Carol Burnett, 1:49 PM, 3/12/2017, Antonito, Colorado
John Charles Harrison, 1:50 PM, 3/12/2017, Pueblo, Colorado
Robin Austin, 8:50 PM, 3/13/2017, Aurora, Colorado
Cindy Trujillo, 9:00 PM, 3/13/2017, La Madera, New Mexico
Margaret R. Rice, 10:00 AM, 3/14/2017, Aurora, Colorado
Sara Millar, 9:56 AM, 3/15/2017, Colorado
Rocky Hutson, US Army, 5:03 PM, 3/15/2017, Clifton, Colorado

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I/we certify that on March 16TH, 2017, a document: INFORMATION IN THE NATURE OF A QUO WARRANTO (eight pages), an Exhibit (three pages), and this CERTIFICATE OF MAILING (one page) a total of twelve pages was served by Certified Mail, postage prepaid in a securely sealed envelope addressed to:

Office of the Attorney General
Cynthia H. Coffman
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver CO, 80203

Certified Mail No. 7016 0340 0000 7098 8326

Office of the District Attorney
Stanley L. Garnett
1777 6th Street
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Witness




Witness

includes any emergency protection order, as described in section 13-14-103, any restraining order entered prior to July 1, 2003, and any foreign protection order as defined in section 13-14-110.

(2.8) "Restrained person" means a person identified in a protection order as a person prohibited from doing a specified act or acts.

(2.9) "Sexual assault or abuse" means any act, attempted act, or threatened act of unlawful sexual behavior, as described in section 16-11.7-102 (3), C.R.S., by any person against another person regardless of the relationship between the actor and the petitioner.


(3) "Stalking" means any act, attempted act, or threatened act of stalking as described in section 18-3-602, C.R.S.


Source: L. 99: Entire article added, p. 495, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2000: (3) amended, p. 1012, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2003: IP(1) amended and (2.3), (2.4), and (2.8) added, p. 995, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2004: (1.5) and (2.2) added and (2.4) amended, p. 544, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2010: (1)(e), (2), IP(2.4)(a), and (2.4)(a)(IV) amended and (1)(f) added, (SB 10-080), ch. 78, p. 264, § 1, effective July 1; (3) amended, (HB 10-1233), ch. 88, p. 295, § 3, effective August 11. L. 2013: (1.7) and (2.9) added and (2), IP(2.4)(a), (2.4)(a)(IV), (2.4)(b), and (3) amended, (HB 13-1259), ch. 218, p. 1002, § 6, effective July 1.

ANNOTATION

Law reviews. For article, "Statutes Consolidate Civil Restraining Orders", see 28 Colo. Law. 39 (October 1999). For article, "Crisis Intervention to Prevent Elder Abuse: Emergency Guardianships and Other Legal Procedures", see 33 Colo. Law. 91 (July 2004). For article,

"Practical Solutions to Elder Financial Abuse and Fiduciary Theft", see 41 Colo. Law. 61 (December 2012). For article, "Animal-Related Legal Disputes: Litigation, ADR, and Court Appointments", see 42 Colo. Law. 43 (December 2013).

13-14-102. Civil protection orders - legislative declaration (Repealed) 

Source: L. 99: Entire article added, p. 496, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2000: IP(1), (5), and (6) amended, (2.5) added, and (19) repealed, pp. 1012, 1013, §§ 4, 5, 6, effective July 1; (16) and (17) amended, p. 1538, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2002: (4) amended, p. 323, § 1, effective April 19; (9)(b) amended and (17.5) added, p. 491, § 1, effective July 1; (11) amended and (21) added, p. 1143, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2003: IP(1), (1)(c), (2), (3) to (9), (12), (13), (14), IP(15), (17.5), (18), and (21) amended, p. 996, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2004: (1), (5), (7), (8)(b), (8)(c), (9), (10), IP(15), (15)(e), and (20) amended and (1.5), (3.3), and (3.7) added, p. 545, § 2, effective July 1; (17.5)(b)(II) amended, p. 74, § 1, effective September 1. L. 2007: (1) amended and (15)(g) added, pp. 940, 941, §§ 1, 2, effective July 1. L. 2010: (15)(f.2) and (15)(f.4) added, (SB 10-080), ch. 78, p. 265, § 2, effective July 1; (17.5)(e)(III) amended, (HB 10-1422), ch. 419, p. 2068, § 22, effective August 11; (21)(a) and (21)(b) amended, (HB 10-1233), ch. 88, p. 296, § 4, effective August 11. L. 2013: (22) amended added, (SB 13-197), ch. 366, p. 2130, § 3, effective June 5; entire section repealed, (HB 13-1259), ch. 218, p. 1002, § 6, effective July 1. 

13-14-103. Emergency protection orders. (1) (a) Any county or district court shall have the authority to enter an emergency protection order pursuant to the provisions of this subsection (1).

(b) An emergency protection order issued pursuant to this subsection (1) may include:

(I) Restraining a party from contacting, harassing, injuring, intimidating, threatening, molesting, touching, stalking, sexually assaulting or abusing any other party, a minor child of either of the parties, or a minor child who is in danger in the reasonably foreseeable future of being a victim of an unlawful sexual offense or domestic abuse;

(II) Excluding a party from the family home or from the home of another party upon a showing that physical or emotional harm would otherwise result;

(III) Awarding temporary care and control of any minor child of a party involved;

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Municipal Court County Court District Court Denver Juvenile Denver Probate
 County Court Boulder County, Colorado
 Court Address: Boulder Justice Center
 1777 Sixth St. P.O.
 Boulder, CO 803064249

Plaintiff/Petitioner: SCHLESSEN, PIERCE VON
 Address: 6915 PEPPERTREE LANE
 NIWOT, CO. 80503

Defendant/Respondent: SCHLESSEN, CHARLENE VON
 Address: 6170 NORTH 79TH STREET
 PO BOX 146
 NIWOT, CO. 80503

ATTEST TRUE COPY
 DATED 11/16/11
 DEBRA L. CROSSEY
 CLERK OF COMBINED COURT
 BOULDER COUNTY, COLORADO
 BY [Signature]
 DEPUTY

COURT USE ONLY
 Case Number: 1007201100010
 Division: 7 Courtroom

PERMANENT CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER ISSUED PURSUANT TO §13-14-102, C.R.S.

Full Name of Restrained Person	Date of Birth	Sex	Race	Weight	Height	Hair Color	Eye Color
<input type="checkbox"/> Protected Person alleges Weapon involved		<input type="checkbox"/> M <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> F	W	110	504	BLK	BLK

Full Name of Protected Person	Date of Birth	Sex	Race	Full Name of Protected Person	Date of Birth	Sex	Race
SCHLESSEN, PIERCE VON	9/06/1992	M	W				

The Court finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; that the Restrained Person was personally served and given reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard; that the Restrained Person constitutes a credible threat to the life and health of the Protected Persons named in this action; and sufficient cause exists for the issuance of a Civil Protection Order.

The Court finds that the Restrained Person is is not governed by the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. §922 (d)(8) and (g)(8).

This Protection Order DOES NOT EXPIRE and only the Court can change this Order.
 A violation of a Protection Order is a crime and may be prosecuted as a misdemeanor, municipal ordinance violation, or a delinquent act (if committed by a juvenile) pursuant to §18-6-803.5, C.R.S., and municipal ordinance.

The Court Orders that you, the Restrained Person, shall not contact, harass, stalk, injure, intimidate, threaten, or molest the Protected Persons named in this action, or threaten, molest, injure, kill, take, transfer, encumber, conceal, or dispose of an animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by any other party, a minor child of any other party, or otherwise violate this Order. You shall not use, attempt to use, or threaten to use physical force against the Protected Persons that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury. You shall not engage in any conduct that would place the Protected Persons in reasonable fear or bodily injury.

- Contact.**
 It is ordered that you, the Restrained Person, shall have no contact of any kind with the Protected Persons and you shall not attempt to contact said Protected Persons through any third person, except your attorney.
 except as follows
 NONE

People's Grand Jury in Colorado
Post Office Box 21233
Denver, Colorado [80221]

INDICTMENT KAROLYN MOORE A.K.A. KAROLYN QUEVLI, STANLEY L. GARNETT,
RAINA BAYAS, JOHN DAVID GIFFORD, AND JOSEPH PELLE

FRAUD ON THE COURT AND BY THE COURT

Information at Common
Law for Fraud on the Court
and by the Court

The jurors upon their oath present that as to the offense fraud on the court and by the court, in Boulder County Case Number 2011C000157. The evidence shows that Karolyn Moore a.k.a. Karolyn Quevli, BAR Registration No. 20685, impersonating a Boulder County Court judge as a member of an immoral, unethical criminal oligarchy, did with evil intent and wicked mind commit fraud contrary to the true intent and meaning both constitutions in collusion with Stanley L. Garnett, Active BAR Registration No. 12282, Raina Bayas, Active Bar Registration No. 45505, John David Gifford, Active Bar Registration No. 40416, and Joseph Pelle.

Evidence Notices

Writ of Quo Warranto, 1-8-2015, 6 pages
Public Notice to Law Enforcement, 4-5-2015, 4 pages
To all Police Officers, Sheriffs, FBI agents et al, 4-6-2015, 2 pages
Notice 6-04-2015, 09:48 AM, City and City of Denver, 2015072777, 6 pages
Unified United States Common Law Grand Jury, 5-27-2015, 6 pages
Notice of Fraud filed 6-25-2015, 08:10AM, City and City of Denver, 2015084369, 6 pages
Notice to Commissioners filed 6-30-2015, 08:19AM, City and City of Denver, 2015087694, 2 pages
Notice of Fraud filed 10-2-2015, 11:02AM, Boulder Cty Clerk and Recorder, 03477315, 11 pages

Evidence

Boulder County Court Document dated 11/16/15 and C.R.S. 13-14-102 (2015) 2 pages

Indictment at Common Law
for Forging and Publishing


And the jurors do further present that Karolyn Moore a.k.a. Karolyn Quevli, Stanley L. Garnett, Raina Bayas, John David Gifford, and Joseph Pelle of late, in Boulder County are not being bound by any bond or personal recognizance by those who are lawfully required to swear absolutely. Contrary to the form of the General Laws of the State of Colorado, ratified in 1877, Chapter XXIV, 668 Section 73. The punishment by confinement in the penitentiary for a term not less than one year nor more than fourteen years will be found set forth in the recital of the aforesaid General Law which regulates the offense. Whereupon that being said, that due process of law may be awarded against them.

Indictment at Common Law
for Fraud on the Court and
by the Court

And the jurors do further present that Karolyn Moore a.k.a. Karolyn Quevli, Stanley L. Garnett, Raina Bayas, John David Gifford, and Joseph Pelle, in Boulder County were conducting a sham proceedings unlawfully and wickedly devising, contriving, and intending, unjustly, maliciously, and injuriously to aggrieve, oppress, impoverish and imprison charlene-ann: von schlesien against the peace and dignity of the people in Colorado. Contrary to the form of the General Laws of the State of Colorado, ratified in 1877, Chapter XXIV, 686 Section 91. The punishment by confinement in the penitentiary for a term not less than one year nor more than seven years will be found set forth in the recital of the aforesaid General Law which regulates the offense. Whereupon that being said, that due process of law may be awarded against them.

Endorsement of Finding of
"A TRUE BILL"

Be it remembered, that at the session of oyer and terminer of the People's Grand Jury in Colorado, upon the oaths of twelve jurors, good and lawful men and women of the said Colorado state, then and there impaneled, pursuant to the General Laws of the State of Colorado, ratified in 1877, Chapter LIV, 1477 Section 18 sworn, and charged to inquire for the People of the City and County of Boulder and the People of Colorado which said bill of indictment is by the jurors against Karolyn Moore a.k.a. Karolyn Quevli, Stanley L. Garnett, Raina Bayas, John David Gifford, and Joseph Pelle, and is returned to the court before the justices and others their fellows aforesaid, thus endorsed "A TRUE BILL."


Foreman, People's Grand Jury
Deliberated February 14, 2016

18 USC 1513: Retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant

Text contains those laws in effect on April 22, 2017

From Title 18-CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PART I-CRIMES

CHAPTER 73-OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

Jump To:

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§1513. Retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant

(a)(1) Whoever kills or attempts to kill another person with intent to retaliate against any person for-

(A) the attendance of a witness or party at an official proceeding, or any testimony given or any record, document, or other object produced by a witness in an official proceeding; or

(B) providing to a law enforcement officer any information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation, supervised release, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings,

shall be punished as provided in paragraph (2).

(2) The punishment for an offense under this subsection is-

(A) in the case of a killing, the punishment provided in sections 1111 and 1112; and

(B) in the case of an attempt, imprisonment for not more than 30 years.

→ (b) Whoever knowingly engages in any conduct and thereby causes bodily injury to another person or damages the tangible property of another person, or threatens to do so, with intent to retaliate against any person for-

(1) the attendance of a witness or party at an official proceeding, or any testimony given or any record, document, or other object produced by a witness in an official proceeding; or

(2) any information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation, supervised release, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings given by a person to a law enforcement officer;

or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

(c) If the retaliation occurred because of attendance at or testimony in a criminal case, the maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for the offense under this section shall be the higher of that otherwise provided by law or the maximum term that could have been imposed for any offense charged in such case.

→ (d) There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section.

(e) Whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes any action harmful to any person, including interference with the lawful employment or livelihood of any person, for providing to a law enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the commission or possible commission of any Federal offense, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

(f) Whoever conspires to commit any offense under this section shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.

(g) A prosecution under this section may be brought in the district in which the official proceeding (whether pending, about to be instituted, or completed) was intended to be affected, or in which the conduct constituting the alleged offense occurred.

(Added Pub. L. 97-291, §4(a), Oct. 12, 1982, 96 Stat. 1250 ; amended Pub. L. 103-322, title VI, §60017, title XXXIII, §330016(1)(U), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 1975 , 2148; Pub. L. 104-214, §1(1), Oct. 1, 1996, 110 Stat. 3017 ; Pub. L. 107-204, title XI, §1107(a), July 30, 2002, 116 Stat. 810 ; Pub. L. 107-273, div. B, title III, §3001(b), (c)(2), title IV, §4002(b)(4), Nov. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 1804 , 1807; Pub. L. 110-177, title II, §§204, 206, Jan. 7, 2008, 121 Stat. 2537 .)

AMENDMENTS

2008-Subsec. (a)(1)(B). Pub. L. 110-177, §206(1), inserted comma after "probation" and struck out comma after "release,".

Subsec. (a)(2)(B). Pub. L. 110-177, §206(2), substituted "30 years" for "20 years".

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 110-177, §206(3)(B), substituted "20 years" for "ten years" in concluding provisions.

Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 110-177, §206(3)(A), inserted comma after "probation" and struck out comma after "release,".

Subsecs. (e), (f). Pub. L. 110-177, §206(4), redesignated subsec. (e) relating to conspiracy to commit any offense under this section as (f).

Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 110-177, §204, added subsec. (g).

2002-Subsecs. (a)(1)(B), (b)(2). Pub. L. 107-273, §3001(c)(2), inserted "supervised release," after "probation".

Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 107-273, §4002(b)(4), transferred subsec. (d) to appear after subsec. (c).

Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 107-273, §3001(b), added subsec. (e) relating to conspiracy to commit any offense under this section.

Pub. L. 107-204 added subsec. (e) relating to taking of action harmful to any person for providing law enforcement officer truthful information relating to commission of offense.

1996-Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 104-214, §1(1)(B), added subsec. (c) at end.

Pub. L. 104-214, §1(1)(A), redesignated subsec. (c) as (d).

Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 104-214, §1(1)(A), redesignated subsec. (c) as (d).

1994-Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 103-322, §60017(2), added subsec. (a). Former subsec. (a) redesignated (b).

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 103-322, §330016(1)(U), substituted "fined under this title" for "fined not more than \$250,000" in concluding provisions.

Pub. L. 103-322, §60017(1), redesignated subsec. (a) as (b). Former subsec. (b) redesignated (c).

Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 103-322, §60017(1), redesignated subsec. (b) as (c).

EFFECTIVE DATE

Section effective Oct. 12, 1982, see section 9(a) of Pub. L. 97-291, set out as a note under section 1512 of this title.