

# Freemen

**Armageddon s  
Prophets of Hate  
And Terror**

(Third Edition June 1999)

The Kitsap County Prosecuting Attorney's Office

Presentation On

# Freemen

## Armageddon's Prophets of Hate And Terror

A Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys Lecture  
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# **Part I**

# **Introduction**

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*U.S.U.S. v. Greenstreet*, 912 F.Supp. 224, 230 (N.D. 912 F.Supp. 224, 230 (N.D. Tex. 912 F.Supp. 224, 230 (N.D. Tex. 1996) )  
Home Administration for declaratory and injunctive relief in response to UCC-1 Home Administration for declaratory and  
by borrower by borrowers by borrowers against federal employees who were named as debtors by Common Law court b  
borrowers borrowers were never provided with lawful money under the origiborrowers were never provided with lawful mo  
gold or silver; Held: financing statements fraudulent and void ab initio).

There is a community scattered among us with its own law, its own court

AA significant number of members in this community are arma significant number of members in this community are rightsrights as conceived in their law and others have brights as conceived in their law and others have been killed orights as law but their own. In the name of their law, the community is willing to risk death as well as murder.

1 We use the term Freemen throughout these materials to describe members of the Common Law anti-government movement. We reject the terms Patriots, Constitutionalists, or othersimilar misnomers to describe this group. Their actions and beliefs have nothing to do with patriotism or the United States Constitution as we define those terms. The following quote is oftencited by members ofthis group to describe themselves

In the Roman law, it denoted one who was either born free or emancipated, and was the opposite of slave. In feudal law, it designated an allodial proprietor, as distinguished from a fassal or feudal tenant...In old English law, the word described a freeholder or tenant by free services; one who was not a villein. In modern legal phraseology, it is the appellation of a member of a city or borough having the right to suffrage, or a member of any municipal corporation invested with full civic rights.

|         |   |   |
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| FREEMAN | ARMAGEDDON'S PROPHETS OF HATE AND TERROR (3d ed. June 1999) | 2 |
|---------|---|---|

Stephenson s, Stephenson s, Knowles and subsequent criminal Stephenson s, Knowles and subsequent criminal abilities to research and understand their Sovereign Citizen and Common Law theories. understanding of the Freeman movement and their beliefs expanded, though, we came to realize understanding of failure of prosecutors to respond to initial Freeman criminal activity resulted failure of prosecutors to respond to initial response by Freeman against public employees.

We are pleased to note that since our office made necessary to prosecute Freeman who chose to commit criminal new threats or lien filings against public servants (of which we are aware, anyway). Th new threats or lien filings Freeman with whom we currently engage is but a handful, and their identities are well known to us.

We certainly did not know at the time that our preparation of any manual on Freeman, much less lead us with many different groups of public employees, including the Washington prosecutor s association, Washington auditor s association, Washington ass legislative committees, and court personnel.

We are amazed with the pervasiveness of contacts members of t have had with Freeman sympathizers. It is obvious that have had with Freeman of in Washington State, and will continue to be a criminal threat requiring a respoof in Washington State, and will excessive amounts of public servant time and taxpayer s dollars.

The vast majority of Washington s gov assessor) are elected to their posts by the citizenry, who expect the department dedicated staff. The Freeman movement s decision to target public employees to further their agenda nothing short of a direct attack on the citizenry s democratically elected government. While certainly entitled to their religious and political tolerated. We will continue to be ever vigilant against this threat, and will assist you in your similar efforts.

## Freemen Prosecutions in Kitsap County

Over the past three years, our county has experienced to their law as the only legitimate law. We have prosecuted Freeman defendant to their law as the only legitimate law. myriad of crimes, including

theft (purchasing a \$40,000 vehicle with a document appearing to be a check that was drawn off a non-existent debt allegedly owed to the defendant by the federal government), Defendant convicted;<sup>2</sup> intimidating a judge (documents issued from one supreme Court of Washington, Kitsap County, indicating the judge would be in contempt of their court and a \$300 million fine levied and secured by a lien to be filed against judge s property if Defendant not released from custody and theft charges were not dismissed, and threatened the judge with prosecution under 42 USC § 1983), Defendant convicted;<sup>3</sup> intimidating a public servant (\$7,914,100.00 in liens and UCC -2 fixture filings filed against judges

<sup>2</sup> A somewhat humorous description of a Seattle area Freeman couple using a similar fraudulent check scam is made in the book DALE AND CONNIE JAKES WITH CLINT RICHMOND, FALSE PROPHETS THE FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT OF A HUSBAND-WIFE TEAM WORKING FOR THE FBI AND LIVING IN DEEPEST COVER WITH THE MONTANA FREEMEN (Dove Books 1998), at 175-76. Dubbed the Odd Couple, the book describes how the couple bragged to Montana Freeman followers about their new Ford crew-cab pickup obtained with fraudulent checks. The Freeman were not impressed with the pushy and brazen girlfriend, which is not surprising given their views that they could barely tolerate vocal women in general. One of the Montana Freeman believed that the woman might have been a witch since she claimed to be a clairvoyant who could read the Freeman s auras. As the book notes, this far-right, far-out Samantha tormented the Montana Freeman while she was at the Freeman complex.

<sup>3</sup> Division II affirmed the intimidating a judge conviction in *State v. Knowles*, 91 Wn. App. 367, 957 P.2d 797, review denied, 136 Wn.2d 1029 (Div. 2 1998). The court held that the retaliation prong of the crime does not violate the First Amendment

and prosecutors' properties due to their failure to dismiss 1993 theft charges), Defendant convicted;<sup>4</sup>  
obstructing a public servant (traffic infraction defendant who repeatedly falsely gave his name as  
*Brown v. Texas*, 443 U.S. 47, 61 L.Ed.2d 357, 99 S.Ct. 2637 (1979)), Defendant convicted;  
intimidating a public servant (threat to shoot officers if they tried to enter home made during fresh  
pursuit after traffic law violations); Defendant convicted;  
barratry (traffic infraction defendant who served officer with lengthy documents that compelled a  
response from the officer under threat of monetary judgment), case dismissed, pending appeal with oral  
argument held in Division II on June 15, 1999. *See State v. Timothy Charles, Duffey*, COA No. 23602-  
8-II.;  
barratry (writ of habeas corpus from ecclesiastical court requiring Kitsap County Superior Court to  
transfer theft prosecution to common law court), Defendant convicted;  
unlawful practice of law (attempting to represent child in juvenile court proceedings both in court and  
through filed pleadings despite repeated admonitions from court), Defendant acquitted;  
malicious prosecution (defendant filed citizen complaint under CrRLJ 2.1(c) attempting to charge both  
Jeff and Kitsap County Prosecutor Russell D. Hauge with unlawful practice of law in retaliation for  
charges brought against defendant), Defendant convicted;  
tax evasion (prosecution under city code for chiropractor's refusal to pay city taxes because the city  
lacked jurisdiction over him and his business), Defendant convicted;  
unlawful practice of law for filing habeas corpus writ on behalf of girlfriend who was being detained  
pending trial on felony drug charges and represented by a public defender, Defendant acquitted; and  
unlawful possession of a machine gun (AR-15 that was modified with M-16 parts to allow full  
automatic fire) by gun shop owner who also teaches NRA gun courses, case is pending.

Dealing with Freeman defendants takes an extraordinary amount of a prosecutor's time.  
Freemen goal. Their modus operandi is to file as much paperwork as possible. Their modus operandi is to  
as permitted in an effort to bring our system to a screeching halt by giving  
can be an especially effective strategy in a court of limited jurisdiction that is trying its best to deal with  
high volume caseloads. Freeman refuse representation high volume caseloads. Freeman refuse representation  
mandatory membership in a bar association of a political entity.

Judges who have not dealt with such defendants are likely to try to understand Judges who have not dealt with such  
questions of the Freeman defendant. This inevitably questions of the Freeman defendant. This inevitably  
plethora of questions to the judge. Important court time is often reduced to a plethora of questions to the judge.  
dialogue between the Freeman defendant and the court dialogue between the Freeman defendant and the court  
result of this through-the-looking-glass experience is that the prosecution is result of this through-the-looking-glass experi  
of particulars since this appears to be what the Freeman defendant is seeking. At the next cou of particulars since this ap  
this process begins anew.

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<sup>4</sup> Division II affirmed the intimidating a public servant convictions in *State v. Stephenson*, 89 Wn.App. 794, 950 P.2d 38, review  
denied, 136 Wn.2d 1018 (Div. 2 1998). The court held that the intimidating a public servant statute was not unconstitutionally  
overbroad and did not violate free speech protections of the First Amendment, and that superior court judges were public servants  
within the meaning of the statute.

## Why Care About Freeman?

[illegible]

FrFreemeFreemenFreemen consist of a loose coalition of many groups. It is unfair to paint a particular member in this coalitioncoalition with one brush scoalition with one brush since eacoalition with one brush since each group often rejects s  
ppersonspersons certainly do not advocate violence nor the politics of hate. Yet, one only needs persons certainly do no  
newspapernewspaper to learn of bombings, armed battles with governnewspaper to learn of bombings, armed battles  
indictments ofFreemen sympathizers to quickly recognize the increasingly violent nature ofthis coalition.

While membership is probably small, it is a widespread geographical area within a widespread geographical area within a random method of instantaneous communication.

We do not pretend to be experts in their law. There are many parts of their law that we do not pretend to be experts in their law. It is complex, and so divergent from conventional legal doctrine. It is complex, and so divergent from conventional legal doctrine. In law is often an impediment to our understanding.

Our research oOur research of Our research of their law, which is permeated with racism, anti-Semitism and to a less RomanRoman Catholicism, reveals a biblical calling to an especially violent responseRoman Catholicism, reveals a bibl officials.officials. Their law is both personally and professionally frightening. While we are coofficials. Their law is both person is doomed in our system, we believe that prosecutors cannot ignore the potential fis doomed in our system, we believe that of their law who are seeking martyrdom through often violent means.

AsAs the Freeman movement evolves, it is becoming increasingly complex andAs the Freeman movement evolves, it bebeginningbeginning to take the form of a government in which different branches of the movement perform separate tasks.tasks. Common Lawtasks. Common Law cotasks. Common Law courts have joined forces with the militias for the obvious courts to hand out judcourts to hand out judgments and secourts to hand out judgments and sentences and the militias to o their system are not prison terms, but death sentences.

## Freemen Actions Nationally    You Better Pay Attention!

While we hope that we are simply over-reacting to a threat that is no greater than peaceful resolution as we approach a new millennium. Examples include

Gordon Kahl's death in a shoot-out with FBI and U.S. Marshal agents on June 3, 1983 (Kahl and police officer dead, after two federal marshals and state officer killed in shoot-out with Kahl two and a half years earlier wherein Kahl escaped), depicted in the film *DEATH AND TAXES: GORDON KAHL'S STORY* and discussed in JAMES CORCORAN, *BITTER HARVEST, GORDON KAHL AND THE POSSE COMITATUS: MURDER IN THE HEARTLAND* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1990).

Robert Jay Matthews December 8, 1984 death in a fire started by FBI flares after a 35-hour stand off on Whidbey Island near Seattle. Matthews was the leader of The Order, a Christian Identity group engaged in a series of bombings, robberies from armored cars (\$4 million taken) and attacks on federal officers modeled after THE TURNER DIARIES, *infra*.

Randy Weaver's siege with the FBI and ATF at Ruby Ridge, Idaho in August 1992 (14 year old son, and wife Vicki Weaver who was shot on August 22, 1992, dead).

Rocky Mountain Rendezvous, October 22, 1992, with 160 attendees (a virtual Who's Who of the radical Right, including the Montana Militia, the Aryan Nations, tax protesters, mainstream Baptist and Mennonite fundamentalists, gun rights followers, and Christian Identity believers) of various groups

who would never normally sit down together met to discuss the Weaver incident, and left with an understanding of a common enemy the federal government. And a common goal a new Christian government. This meeting may have been the birthplace of the modern Freeman movement.

David Koresh and the Branch Davidian siege and conflagration in Waco, Texas involving FBI and ATF, from February through April 19, 1993 (80 dead).

July 20, 1993 bombing of an NAACP office in Tacoma by three white supremacists as part of an aborted series of commando raids planned by the neo-Nazi group Church of the Creator. The next targets the trio had planned were rap music figures Ice-T and Ice Cube.

Timothy McVeigh, Terry Nichols and the April 19, 1995 Murrah Federal Building bombing in Oklahoma City, in which some of the ATF and FBI officials involved in the Waco incident had their offices (in response to death sentence ordered by Common Law court for deaths of its followers in Waco?) (168 dead, over 500 injured).

Justus<sup>5</sup> Township's 81-day standoff from March 25 through June 13, 1996 between the FBI and the Montana Freeman, who had issued Common Law bounties, indictments, liens, fraudulent checks and various execution warrants, including one for Nickolas Murnion, the part-time prosecutor in Garfield County, Montana.

Murnion's Murnion's first experience with the Freeman was a \$500 million lien owed and paid. Murnion's first experience silver. Shortly after the lien, Murnion found his name posted on silver. Shortly after the lien, Murnion found his million bounty for his arrest. The posters read

The sum of one million dollars The sum of one million dollars of money person person who successfully causes the arrest and subsequent conviction of the suspects.

Also named in the poster was the Garfield County Sheriff, who along with Murnion were foreclosed of the Freeman's property. While the poster did not mention foreclosure of the Freeman's property, inquiry disclosed that upon capture both men were to be hanged.

LeRoy LeRoy Schweitzer, leader of the Montana Freeman, and his disciples gave birth to the modern Freeman movement. Schweitzer taught his antigovernment movement. Schweitzer taught his antigovernment students to set up Common Law courts, and create pseudo Common Law courts, and create pseudo-banking up Common Law justice into cash. It is believed that over 1800 people attended Schweitzer's course and took their newfound wisdom back to their own communities where it is still more people today. For an excellent see DALE AND CONNIE JAKES WITH CLINT LINT RICHMOND, FALSE PROPHETS THE FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT OF A HUSBAND-WIFE TEAM WORKING FOR THE FBI AND LIVING IN DEEPEST COVER WITH THEM OVER WITH THE MONTANA FREEMEN (Dove Books 1998).

Murnion Murnion received the prestigious 1998 John F. Kennedy Profile in Courage Award on May 29 for enforcing the law despite death threats from antigovernment militants. Garfield County has a prosecutor, Murnion, his secretary, Murnion, his secretary, the Sheriff's judicial subcommittee in 1998 on crime: I think there's a greater chance that the Unjudicial subcommittee in 1998 send 20,000 troops to help the people of Bosnia than that I get any help to protect the people of my county. See Appendix, at 3-5 for articles about Murnion.

<sup>5</sup> Although the media perpetuated the myth that the Montana Freeman were a bunch of dimwitted but harmless Bubbas by citing to the Freeman's perceived misspelling of Justice, the name Justus had a far more serious meaning.

The name Justus was symbolic to the Freeman cause. Justus was an obscure biblical character in *Colossians* 4:11. He was a follower of Christ. Because his name was also Jesus, he took the name Justus, which means righteous in Hebrew. The man was also a converted Jew.

The Freeman misinterpreted the verse, though. They thought that this person was Christ. A careful reading of this passage makes it clear that Justus was another biblical figure entirely. Ironically, the anti-Semitic Freeman actually named their capital after a converted Jew. But they liked the sound of the name Justus and referred to their township as just-us.

April 29, 1996, a pipe-bomb goes off outside the Spokane City Hall set by Chevie Kehoe and Daniel Lewis Lee.

In May 1997, a six-day siege between Texas law enforcement and a Freeman group called the Republic of Texas ended in the arrest of leader Richard McLaren and five of his followers. More than 100 officers surrounded the remote compound at Fort Davis after the group shot at a neighbor's home and kidnapped the man and his wife (to be tried by a Common Law court?) for their protests of years of paper terrorism and threats of violence against citizens in the resort community. One armed insurrectionist was killed and another escaped. Indictments alleging \$1.8 billion in bank and mail fraud were returned against the Republic of Texas members.

July 1997 arrest of nine members of the Washington State Militia on explosives and conspiracy charges.

July 1997 convictions of Charles Barbee, Robert Berry, and Veme Jay Merrell for twice robbing a U.S. Bank branch (April 1 and July 12, 1996) and for bombing a Planned Parenthood abortion clinic in the Spokane area. The men left literature about the Phineas Priesthood (a description used by some white supremacists based on a skewed reading of various biblical passages justifying violence against Jews and minorities) at each crime scene, signed with the capital letter P superimposed on a cross.

AfterAfter After an April 1997After an April 1997 hung jury (one juror), the three were convicted at their second trial in Ju Barbee sBarbee s defense in the second trial was that he read a book detailingBarbee s defense in the second trial was convertedconverted tconverted to thconverted to the Christian Identity doctrine. All three men are members of the Idaho m associationsassociations with Amassociations with America s Passociations with America s Promise Ministries (APM), Idaho.

May 14, 1998 dismissal (pending appeal) by U.S. District Court Judge Edward J. Lodge of involuntary manslaughter charges filed by the Boundary County, Idaho special prosecutor (after the Justice Department concluded no prosecutable offenses were committed) against Lon Horiuchi, the FBI sharp-shooter who shot and killed Vicki Weaver on August 22, 1992 at Ruby Ridge, Idaho. Judge Lodge ruled that the agent was properly performing within the scope of his duties and accordingly was constitutionally protected from prosecution. The effect of this ruling on Freeman followers is unknown, but likely will be considered further proof of the need for Freeman action against an unholy government which has declared war on the Chosen People.

On July 1, 1998, Jason McVean and Alan Monte Pilon were seen near Montezuma Creek, Utah after months of hiding in the southeast Utah desert after their alleged killing in a blaze of automatic gunfire on May 29, 1998 of Dale Claxton, a Cortez, Colorado police officer, during the officer's stop of a stolen water truck outside town. They and a third man, Robert Mason, reportedly wounded sheriff's deputies as they fled into a maze of canyons along the Colorado-Utah border. Mason killed himself a week later after wounding a Utah deputy near the town of Bluff, Utah, about 20 miles from where McVean and Pilon were seen. The two men are both wilderness survivalists with Freeman views and are believed to be living off provisions stashed in desert caches.

On July 8, 1998, a federal jury convicted LeRoy Schweitzer and three top comrades (Dale Jacobi, Daniel Petersen, and Russell Landers) of conspiracy and bank fraud for a massive scheme involving issuing billions of dollars in bogus checks. Twelve defendants were charged in a 41 count indictment with a total of 126 charges including conspiracy to commit bank fraud, mail and wire fraud, theft, false claims to the IRS, interstate transportation of stolen property, threatening to murder a federal judge, armed robbery of two television news crews, and firearms violations. The jury deadlocked on 63 other charges. The remaining counts were streamlined and retried in November, 1998, with guilty verdicts on 36 counts delivered against nearly all involved.

ProsecutoProsecutorsProsecutors called the conspiracy a fraud of epic proportions saying the Freeman created and issuedPro 3,432,432 bogus checks totaling \$15.5 billion on a Norwest Bank Butte Anaconda savings account 3,432 bo

nevermore contained more than \$116. Losses from those checks totaled \$724never contained more than \$116. Losses from losses from the conspiracy to disrupt the nation s banking system totaled \$1.8 million..

The Kehoe Gang of Colville, Washington. Father Kirby Kehoe, and sons Chevie and Cheyne, have been convicted of multiple federal offenses for their scheme to overthrow the federal government and set up a whites-only nation in the Pacific Northwest. An article on the family from the INTELLIGENCE REPORT is in the Appendix, at 6-14.

ChevieChevie and Cheyne first came tChevie and Cheyne first came to the natChevie and Cheyne first came to the nation policepolice was cpolice was caughtpolice was caught on videotape and broadcast nationwide. There was a second exchange with other officers minutes later. Both brothers have been sentenced.

Prosecutors argued that the enterprise to overthrow tProsecutors argued that the enterprise to overthrow Washington couple Washington couple JiWashington couple Jill and Malcolm Friedman; the 1995 murder o robberyrobbery of Mueller; the 1996 robbery and murderrobbery of Mueller; the 1996 robbery and murders of the Muell SpokaneSpokane City Hall; the August 1996 murder in Idaho of Jon Cox ofSpokane City Hall; the August 1996 murder of police officers Robert Martin and Rick Wood in a February 15, 1997 shootout in Ohio.

<sup>6</sup> The 1998 incidents occurring in Washington listed by community are

Bellingham May 21, 1998  
National Socialist Vanguard and Aryan Nations literature was distributed to high school students.

Everett Feb. 12, 1998  
Racist, threatening fliers were posted on bulletinboards at Everett Community College.

Aryan Nations member Michael R. Nelson, 35, surrendered to police on a first-degree murder charge after being sought for allegedly murdering a man in June.

Everett "Sept. 24, 1998

Donald Richards, a 44-year-old white man, was charged with malicious harassment for allegedly scrawling the letters "KKK" on the car of a white woman who was dating a black man. He was convicted in December of malicious harassment and ordered to perform 120 hours of community service.

Issaquah "June 8, 1998

White Aryan Resistance literature was allegedly sent to a white woman who was dating a black man.

Lamont "March 18, 1998

A swastika and the letters "KKK" were written on a minister's car door.

Langley "Dec. 5, 1998

Two swastikas were burned outside a residence.

Medina "Feb. 19, 1998

World Church of the Creator literature was sent to several residences.

Pullman "Feb. 17, 1998

Swastikas were scrawled on a Black History Month display at Washington State University.

Pullman "Feb. 22, 1998

Anti-Semitic graffiti was written at a residence hall at Washington State University.

Pullman "March 18, 1998

A racial slur was spray-painted on a car owned by a man of Chinese descent. Christopher J. Bean, 15, was charged with malicious harassment.

Rosalia "March 18, 1998

A Native American woman was allegedly threatened and run off the road by three men who wore Klan-like outfits.

Seattle "Sept. 28, 1998

National Socialist Movement and European American Educational Association literature was mailed to a man's residence.

Spokane "Oct. 24, 1998

A Gonzaga University gay activist allegedly received a threatening letter.

Spokane "Dec. 5, 1998

A lynched doll was left at a black family's residence.

Vancouver "March 17, 1998

Reported white supremacist Mathew M. Bracken, 25, was arrested on suspicion of auto theft, possessing explosives and being a felon in possession of a loaded firearm after being pulled over at a rest area. Police found bomb-making materials in the car.

Wallace "June 18, 1998

Alleged white supremacist Edward D. Pope, 43, was arrested for allegedly assaulting a police officer, burglary, being a felon in possession of a firearm and destruction of jail property. Pope had Aryan Nations literature in his possession during the arrest.

Yelm "Nov. 7, 1998

A 21-year-old white man was charged with malicious harassment for allegedly placing a cross in an interracial couple's yard.

In January and February, 1999, magazines targeting blacks and Jews have been found in Issaquah and Bellevue mailboxes.

From March through June, 1999, white supremacist fliers have been found in the Enumclaw area inviting white residents to Enumclaw City Hall for a White Power rally on July 4, 1999. The purpose, one flier reads, is to fight for the survival of our white heritage, the purity of our white families.

In early May, 1999, Lonnie Joe Goolie, at 15 year old, was being detained and charged with burning a cross in the yard of a multi-racial family in Spokane. Goolie is one of three juvenile males identified by police as participants in cross burnings February 14 and April 13, 1999 at the same northeast Spokane home. A married black man and white woman with three children live at the home. Goolie, who has a Nazi swastika carved into his arm, told authorities that he was a member of the white-supremacist Aryan Nations.

existexist in textist in the United Stateexist in the United States. Washington State currently has 12 known active Patriot Appendix, at 15-16, for a listing by state of the SPLC's Active Hate Groups in the United States in 1998.

TheThe Southern PoThe Southern PovertyThe Southern Poverty Law Center web site also lists 17 Washington hate groups 1998.<sup>8</sup> A map of the active hate groups in the United States taken from the Southern Poverty Law Center's INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Winter 1999 (Issue 93), at 38-39, is included in the Appendix to these materials.

LawLaw enforcement and government agencies may subscribe to thLaw enforcement and government agencies may subscribe costcost by contacting the SPLC at Southern Poverty Law Center, P.O. Box 548, Montgomery, cost by contacting the SPLC 0548.

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<sup>7</sup> The Intelligence Project identified 523 "Patriot" groups that were active in 1997. Of these groups, 221 were militias, 53 were "common-law courts" and the remainder fit into a variety of categories such as publishers, ministries, citizens groups and others. Generally, Patriot groups define themselves as opposed to the "New World Order" or advocate or adhere to extreme antigovernment doctrines. Listing here does not imply that the groups advocate or engage in violence or other criminal activity. The list was compiled from field reports, Patriot publications, the Internet, law enforcement sources and news reports. When known, groups are identified by the city, town or county where they are located. The following Washington groups were identified

Citizens for Liberty, Bellingham  
Lake Chelan Citizens Militia, Chelan  
Washington State Constitutional Rangers, Chelan  
National Citizens Alliance, Mountlake Terrace  
Citizens for a Constitutional Washington, Puyallup  
Washington State Unorganized Militia, Republic  
Populist Party of Washington State, Seattle  
Right Way L.A.W., Seattle  
Jural Society, Snohomish County  
Populist Party of Washington State, Tacoma  
Wenatchee Minutemen Militia, Wenatchee  
Yakima County Militia, Yakima County

<sup>8</sup> The following Washington groups were identified

World Church of the Creator, Bremerton  
Christian Israel Covenant Church, Colville  
World Church of the Creator, Everett  
World Church of the Creator, Federal Way  
National Socialist Vanguard, Goldendale  
Remnant of Israel, Opportunity  
Nation of Islam, Seattle  
Northwest Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Seattle  
World Church of the Creator, Seattle  
National Socialist White People's Party, Spokane  
World Church of the Creator, Spokane  
World Church of the Creator, Sumas  
Northwest Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Tacoma  
World Church of the Creator, Tacoma  
International Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan  
Machine Skinheads

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

While we have spent hours reading anWhile we have spent hours reading and reWhile we have spent hours reading seminar materials would not be possible without information from the following works

The website on links to extremist websites, with over 400 links. *The Militia Watchdog* (visited June 5, 1999) <<http://www.militia-watchdog.org>>

The Southern Poverty Law Center web site (visited June 5, 1999) <<http://splcenter.org>>

Susan P. Koniak, *When Law Risks Madness*, CARDOZO STUDIES IN LAW AND LITERATURE, spring/summer 1996 (vol. 8, no. 1)

JOEL DYER, *HARVEST OF RAGE: WHY OKLAHOMA CITY IS ONLY THE BEGINNING* (Westview Press 1997)

DALE AND CONNIE JAKES WITH CLINT RICHMOND, FALSE PROPHET THE FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT OF A HUSBAND-WIFE TEAM WORKING FOR THE FBI AND LIVING IN DEEPEST COVER WITH THE MONTANA FREEMEN (Dove Books 1998)

Institute for Jewish Policy Research, *Antisemitism in the World Today: the United States of America* (visited June 5, 1999) <<http://www.jpr.org.uk/antisem/americas/usa/index.html>>

Kingdom Identity Ministries, *Doctrinal Statement of Beliefs* (visited June 5, 1999) <<http://www.kingidentity.com/doctrine.htm>>

The World Church of the Creator Home page (visited June 5, 1999) <<http://www.creator.org>>

The Order website on the 14 Word ( We must secure the existence of our people and a future for White children. ) Press Homepage (visited June 5, 1999) <<http://www.14words.com>>

America's Promise Ministries (located in Sandpoint, ID) Homepage (visited June 5, 1999)  
<<http://amprom.org>>

*The Right Way ... l.a.w. (learn and win!)*, a continuing legal education project (visited June 5, 1999) <<http://www.rightwaylaw.org>> (Members receive discounts on seminars and materials on Common Law topics; membership is \$150 per year)

*The Civil Rights Task Force for the people of the united States of America* (visited June 5, 1999) <<http://www.crtf.org>> (a Pacific Northwest study and activist group and members of The Right Way ... l.a.w study club ). The CRTF, in conjunction with The International Bar Association, North American Chapter, conducts continuing legal education seminars in the Pacific Northwest by instructors and tutors recognized by The International Bar Association. This website has a pretty useful links section.

*Mission to Israel* (visited June 5, 1999) <<http://www.missiontoisrael.org>>. The website includes discussion on Israel's Modern Identity, The Jewish Question, The Antichrist, The Two Seedline Issue, Miscegenation, The Phinehas Priesthood, Ruby Ridge, Waco, Oklahoma City Bombing, The Women's Liberation Movement, Communism, and The New World Order.

*Hebraic Heritage Ministries Int l* (visited June 5, 1999) <<http://www.geocities.com/Heartland/2175/babylon.html>>. The website includes discussion on Hebraic/Jewish Roots and the Babylon Mystery (The Illuminati, Trilateral Commission, Federal Reserve, Smart Cards, One World Government, Constitution for the Federation of the Earth, One World Religion, The Pope and One World Religion/Government, Ecumenicalism Between Catholics and Protestants, The Babylon ia Worship Day From Sabbath to Sunday, Babylonian Holidays of Christmas and Easter, multiple topics

Patrick Minges, *Apocalypse Now! The Realized Eschatology of the Christian Identity Movement*, Paper Presented at the March 1994 Meeting of the Mid-Atlantic Region of the American Academy of Religion (March 1994), reprinted on the internet (visited May 18, 1999) <<http://www.cc.columbia.edu/~w127/aarlong.html>>

Devin Burghart and Robert Crawford, *Vigilante Justice: Common Law Courts*, CovertAction Quarterly (visited June 5, 1999) <<http://caq.com/CAQ/CAQ57 ComnLaw.html>>

Massachusetts LawyerViews, *Lawyer Views Legal History* (visited June 5, 1999) <<http://www.lawyerviews.com/lawsite/history.html>>

Since our materials are not intended to be the treatise on the Free even possible), we have chosen to not heavily footnote or endnote the authorities for the statements herein. If you are interested in a more sources and visiting your favorite bookstore and/or the internet.

# **Part II**

# **Their Theories**

# FREEMEN ROOTS E CONOMIC CRISIS

## A Synopsis of Their World

Our examination of and experience with the Freemen movement has shown our examination of and experience with the anan entirely different world than we do. From our world, thean entirely different world than we do. From our world, the centralcentral tenet of that law is that their members are Freemen or Sovercentral tenet of that law is that their members are lacklack any jurilack any jurisdiction. A fundlack any jurisdiction. A fundamental move in this group s practice is the filing ourour system against those in our system who are charged with your system against those in our system who are charged conceivedconceived by their law. While our cconceived by their law. While our courts unconceived by their law. While our filingfiling of further liens, the burden on our system is tremendous. Infiling of further liens, the burden on our system is t activities look bizarre, but in their world these actions make logical sense.

TheThe connection is the land. To become a Sovereign Citizen one files a Quiet Title Action The connection is the la court.court. The person must appear and present a birth certificate showing court. The person must appear and present a birth thethe the union and not Washington, D.C., which is considered under the legitimate control of the fethe union and not government.

InIn our legal system, a In our legal system, a quiet In our legal system, a quiet title action is an action brought by the own on the title. It declares property, not people, free from the holon the title. It declares p property, not people, free from the h intointo a method of setting people free suggests a strong identifinto a method of setting people free suggests a strong ident existence.existence. existence. Additionally, the use of liens to penalize those who deny the group s identification.

InIn our world, these liens are viewed as troubling nuisanceIn our world, these liens are viewed as troubling nuisa prosecuprosecutorsprosecutors who are cprosecutors who are called upon by our government officials to do something about t hashas labeled these liens soft or paper terrorism, but there is reason to believe has labeled these liens soft or paper liens are much more potent and accordingly we believe prosecutors should avoid describing them as soft.

## An Historical Perspective The 1980 s Farm Crisis

BeforeBefore we discuss the specific beliefs and tenets of their world, an historical background is iBefore we discuss the WhileWhile Norman Rockwell s version of rural America is dead, if it evWhile Norman Rockwell s version of rural America of of tof the Unof the United States denominated as rural is massive poverty and despair. For decades, farmers and their familiesfamilies families have families have pleaded for help with little if any response from our government. As we shall neglect provided a perfect vacuum which was filled by Freemen and their beliefs.

InIn the 1970 s, the Department of Agriculture, bankers and university extension offices told farmers that theythey must get big or get out. The rate othey must get big or get out. The rate of inthey must get big or get out. Th banksbanks and government lenders were encouraging farmers to banks and government lenders were encouraging farmer additionaladditional farmland. As a direct result of this new money enteradditional farmland. As a direct result of this skyrocketedskyrocketed askyrocketed as farmerskyrocketed as farmers tried to outbid each other. Lenders would actually call farmer eveneven more money because many lenders were at the time beieven more money because many lenders were at the time they could loan.

ButBut all this chBut all this changed But all this changed in 1979. Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker decided that in control,control, and madecontrol, and made the decontrol, and made the decision to shrink the money supply by raising in heights. He succeeded in halting runaway inflation, but there was a side effect the farm crisis.

FarmlFarmlandFarmland property Farmland property values collapsed at the same time the interest rates on farmers loans c sight.sight. Bankers began to take a more realistic look at the value of a fsight. Bankers began to take a more realistic look thethe items would bring at auction. Ththe items would bring at auction. The farthe items would bring at auction. The farm

lost everything when the loans were called, often prior to any default by the farmer under the Commercial Code (more on the UCC later).

At the peak of this crisis in 1986-1987, nearly 1 million people were forced to leave their land annually. The number of dispossessed farmers. For the roughly 20 percent of the United States this continuing loss is a crisis that compares with the Great Depression.

Farmers had but two lawful options: leave voluntarily or proceed through bankruptcy. Either option shamed any farmer, and ended in the same results: the loss of the family farm over generations, and a loss of a way of life.

For a farmer, losing the land is much more than an economic loss. It is his connection with identity. It is his connection with God. It is his connection with his children. Not surprisingly, the suicide rate among farmers during this crisis was a staggering three times the rate of the general population. Many of the suicides in rural America are a reflection of times the rate of the general culture and belief system. A farmer who killed himself to allow his culture and belief system. A farmer who killed himself to save the farm is often thought to be honorable in the subculture of rural America.

The loss of the family farm was cultural and spiritual as well as economic. At such moments, farmers seek out new understandings, and new interpretations of reality to make sense of this experience. Rural farmers would often rather die than give up the farm to evil forces that have taken over. Many will kill before they give it up.

And not only farmers and ranchers have been effected by the globalization of the United States economy. Industries such as mining, oil, and timber have government regulation and dwindling resources at home have made it more profitable for government regulated multinational corporations to take their business to Third World countries. Small businesses in rural towns have withered away, often being replaced by large discount stores. This trend of consolidation has resulted in tremendous suffering, anxiety and depression for rural Americans.

The psychological effect of foreclosure and the concurrent economic depression is underestimated. Foreclosure often takes months, and it is only a matter of time before the pressure and stress of fighting the inevitable loss of the farm, and death by heart attack or stroke significantly increased in rural America.

A 1989 Nebraska study of 500 farmers determined that the average farm woman was introverted, sensing, feeling, and judging. thinking, whereas the typical farm woman was introverted, sensing, feeling, and judging. thinking, the known sixteen personality types, farm people scored as the most conservative and hardworking.

What better place for a message of the destruction of the farm? And worse, the message includes a belief that this destruction was planned and orchestrated by an evil force that has taken over our government. Why not convict bankers, judges, prosecutors and police with crimes since they caused the financial stress that resulted in the farm by our system's liens, quiet title actions and bankruptcies, and the death of the farmer by suicides, heart attacks and other illnesses? Our government officials who caused this death are viewed as murderers. Quite naturally, their courts should sentence these criminals with death by hanging.

## The Land

The Freeman message was carried into rural America by extremist apostles who called themselves Christians, Patriots, Constitutionalists, and Freeman. As we will see, their message is anti-Semitic, racist, and hateful. It was ludicrous, but some farmers listened. Sure the message was crazy, but was it crazier than the cataclysmic events destroying the farmer's world?

And the message had one centralizing tenet the land. It is natural to find that the quiet title action is transformed into a path to freedom. It makes sense that liens, the ca and a tool of the bankers, are seen as a powerful weapon to be turned against one s enemies.

For their community, foreclosures, clouded tFor their community, foreclosures, cloud world and the new. But what this grworld and the new. But what this grou liens cannot be understood without stepping into their world.

In our world, these legal devices are not similarIn our world, these legal divide in their world, these tools have real meaning backed by divine guidance.

## The Posse Comitatus

Today s Common Law court system is an expanded version of the PToday s Common Law court system is an power of the county ) system created in the 1970 s and 198 power of the county ) system created in the 19 antigovernment groups to incorporate Common Lawantigovernment groups to incorporate Common Law Law philosophy on a combination of old English common law, the Magna Carta, and a belief that pLaw philosophy on a are born with certain God-given rights.

The core of the Posse belief was that The core of the Posse belief was that the supreme power only legal law enforcement office in the United States. The sheriff only legal law enforcement office in the United State which is based upon a which is based upon a particular county s local custom and precedent. If perform his or her duties under the Common Law, it was the Posse s duty to remove the sheriff and/or enforce the Common Law.

Any government official who attempted to enforce unconAny government official who attempted to enforce uncon was subject to arrest by the Posse and trial by a Citizens jury. This jury was to bwas subject to arrest by the Posse and trial sheriff from citizens of the local jurisdiction because the present method of impaneling juries by the Courts was unlawful and was to be repudiated.

In the Posse s court system, no crime had been committed unless there was In the Posse s court system, no crime had been was free to do anything he or swas free to do anything he or she pleased provided another s person or was injured ( trespassed against ) [note reference to The Lord s Prayer], the complaining perswas injured ( trespassed again to the Sheriff and sign a formal Complaint against the perpetrator, thereby to the Sheriff and sign a formal Complaint Sheriff was then to take this sworn Complaint to a juSheriff was then to take this sworn Complaint to a judge Complaint upon the person who committed the trespass.

At this point, the Common Law could compel the trespasser to answer. The pAt this point, the Common Law could Complaint had two choices defend or confess. If the party knew he was guilComplaint had two choices defend or demur and suffer the civil penalties, or he could confess and subject him trial, the perpetrator had to be proven guilty by the evidence alone. He could not be compelltrial, the perpetrator had to be (see the 5th Amendment). The Sheriff could do nothing without a swom Complaint signed by the inj(see the 5th party.

On the one hand, the Posse system would eliminate our On the one hand, the Posse system would eliminate offenses involving drugs, alcohol, and droffenses involving drugs, alcohol, and driving. Buoffenses involving drugs, al of violence and abuse.

The Posse s courts met infrequently in only a few staThe Posse s courts met infrequently in only a few states and early Common Law courts would send out arrest warrants to public officials who theyearly Common Law courts would send of a crime (usually related to farm foreclosure), but that was the extent of it.

The sentences given out by the CThe sentences given out by the Christian IdentThe sentences given out by the Christ carried out. The Posse s code of carried out. The Posse s code of justicecarried out. The Posse s code of justice, laid out THE BLUE BOOK, spelled out the basic sen spelled out the basic sentence for nearly all crimes He s

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<sup>9</sup> For a more detailed discussion of the Posse Comitatus movement, see *Roots of Common Law, An Interview With An Expert On The Posse Comitatus*, INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Spring 1998 (Issue 90), at 29-31, a copy of which is in the Appendix, at 17-20.

to the most populated intersection of streets in the township and at high noon hung by the neck, the body remaining until sundown as an example to those who would subvert the law.

Today's Common Law courts are different. Today's Common Law courts are considerably more widespread, in great part due to LeRoy Schweitzer's dissemination of information over the internet. Common Law courts have added a new function unknown to the Posse's system: the grant of sovereignty to citizens. Common Law practitioners claim that the Posse's system, that their courts grant sovereign status to someone, that person can legally stop their courts grant sovereign status to someone, state laws, and act in essence as if he or she was a separate sovereign entity.

Our experience shows that the Posse's justice world, albeit with some fine tuning.

## Gordon Kahl, a Posse Hero

Gordon Kahl was a farmer. He fought in World War II, earned medals, a presidential unit citation, nine battle stars and two Purple Heart medals. He joined the Christian Identity movement in the 1950s. He joined the Constitutional Party in North Dakota that advocated Common Law principles. In 1967 he wrote to the Internal Revenue Service to inform it that he could no longer pay tithes to the Synagogue of Satan &.

In 1973, Kahl joined Posse Comitatus. He thereafter reclaimed his driver's license and his airplane pilot's license. In 1976 Kahl refused to pay taxes. Not surprisingly, the IRS thereafter charged Kahl with willful failure to pay taxes for 1973 and 1974. Kahl refused to enter a plea of guilty to the IRS's jurisdiction over him. Nonetheless, his lawyer contended that Kahl was expressing his views on television about the income tax and not for his failure to file. Kahl was convicted. Addressing the court before it imposed sentence, Kahl spoke the language of martyrdom:

I felt I had a choice to make. I realized I could be cast into prison here or I could be cast into an eternity in the Lake of Fire. It seems to me that the choice of the two would have to be whatever punishment I have to receive here. That's all I have to say.

With those words, Kahl pronounced the supreme violation of State violence to kill off his law. It is the martyr at prayer that these words suggest, the martyr's very submission to State violence mocks State law by demonstrating its inability to coerce compliance.

Kahl was sentenced to one year in prison and five years probation. While his case was pending, Kahl transferred ownership of his farm to Gospel Doctrine Church of Jesus Christ, Alter Kahl transferred ownership of his farm to Kahl, Kahl, an attempt to fend off State law (the income tax) with State law (the exemption from religious institutions).

This move is somewhat more intelligible in our system that recognizes that the exemption relied upon is relevant to the question of State law: must pay taxes. However, the idea that income tax is different enough from State doctrine to lead to the obvious result that such an exemption does not exist.

Nonetheless, the move was nonviolent, as was Kahl's reaction to the conviction. He entered Leavenworth prison where he served eight months of his sentence.

Kahl's martyrdom began to change when he learned that a friend, following Kahl's advice from television, had similarly been imprisoned for tax evasion and died of a heart attack in prison. That the government had induced the heart attack to silence the law both he and his friend would speak. Kahl the martyr made the transition to rebel.

After his release from prison, Kahl continued to refuse to pay taxes. In 1981, the IRS seized his land. The IRS then tried to seize his land. While law enforcement officers do not usually respond to misdemeanor warrants (this is not a crime), the IRS did.



excluded evidence because of a violation of the statute. Nor is prosecution was pursued for violation of the act. In applying the statute, we must examine whether a violation occurred and, if so, whether evidence examine whether a violation occurred and, evidence.

In determining what military involvement is forbidden, we look to the historical underpinnings of the act. Congress underpinnings of the act. Congress excessive use of federal troops to preserve order and maintain Republican carpetbaggers in the southern states. While protecting civilians from be Republican carpet subjects subject to the exercise of regulatory or proscriptive military authority, the act also subject to the aimed to protect the military from overuse by local civil law enforcement authorities.

In *Casper*, [United States v. *Casper*, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970, 97 S.Ct. 1654, 52 L.Ed.2d 362 (1977)] the court had to determine whether military involvement in law enforcement activities during the 1973 Wounded Knee military involvement uprising violated the act. Setting a standard to determine whether the act had occurred, the court stated at 1278:

Were Army or Air Force personnel used by the civilian law enforcement officers at Wounded Knee in such a manner that military personnel subjected the citizens to the use of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, either presently or prospectively?

Accordingly, when these concepts are evaluated, military involvement does not violate the act. Military involvement does not regulate, forbids, or compels some conduct on the part of military personnel, cameras and planes to fly surveillance of military personnel, cameras and advice to those dealing with the disorder does not connote the active participation proscribed by the act.

Based upon the language, history and apparent purposes of the act, which is to have local authorities handle local matters, particularly in policing state elections, and to particularly power, power, power, we find no violation of the act here. Officer Anderson transported Mr. Dilley to the Fairchild Air Force Base front gate for testing because Fairchild is the most convenient place to administer the breathalyzer test in the same way a civilian technician would have. Officer Anderson did not force Mr. Dilley to take the test. Thus, it cannot be said that the act was violated, given the practically nonexistent military force to enforce civilian law, it is wrong to engage military force to enforce civilian law alone does not violate the act. Since Airman Garcia was merely operating the machine and not forcing Mr. Dilley to take the test, her conduct is not dispositive of the issue, hence we do not address whether evidence seized in violation of the act must be suppressed.

*Dilley*, 45 Wn.App. at 89-92. (Citations omitted.) See also

*State v. Short*, 113 Wn.2d 35, 38-40, 775 P.2d 458 (1989) (Naval Investigative Service agent, while acting undercover in Kitsap County, purchased drugs from defendants. Court held that even if the Posse Comitatus Act was violated, it only applies to Army and Air Force personnel, and not to Navy personnel.)

*State v. Valdobinos*, 122 Wn.2d 270, 276-77, 858 P.2d 199 (1993) (even if Posse Comitatus Act violated by national guardsmen's search, the preferred remedy under the Act is a fine and not suppression).

## **Ruby Ridge, the Rocky Mountain Rendezvous, Waco and Oklahoma City**

The historical significance of these places and events was discussed. The historical significance of these places and events along with the bombing that rocked the Atlanta Olympic Games (seen as proof of a one world movement) and its followers are not afraid to advocate and use biblical support. The arson fires against black churches, and violence at abortion clinics, send a clear message. The movement and its followers are not afraid to advocate and use biblical support.

# THE CONSPIRACY

## A ONE WORLD GOVERNMENT

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### One World Government

The antigovernment movement has been in existence for decades. Christians such as the Ku Klux Klan first appeared such as the Ku Klux Klan first appeared in the Birch Birch Society came along in the 1950 s, followed by Posse Comitatus in the 1970 s. But until the last few years, these groups, predicting that the sky was falling, existed in relative obscurity with few members.

But then the sky did fall for farmers in the 1980 s. But then the sky did fall for farmers in the 1980 s. And Rub But the scenario prophesized by these unsuccessful groups fit the scenario prophesized by these unsuccessful groups fit the events. With the lack of a better explanation, many converted to and became anti. While the groups have new names, the conspiracy theories are being created and carefully controlled by the radical leaders of the old guard.

Paramount to today's Freeman movement is the rather complex nature of the one world government theory. The roots of a one world government conspiracy theory can be traced directly to the Bible. Old and New Testaments contain many prophecies that have been the end of the world will be the result of the end of the world will be Antichrist. The Freemasons and Illuminati are such perceived examples.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Adam Weishaupt, a Catholic priest, joined the Freemasons in Germany in the late 1770 s hoping to create a powerful secret organization to support him in the conflict with his adversaries and in the execution of his rationalistic schemes along ecclesiastical and political lines. Upon closer inquiry, though, Weishaupt determined that a new secret society would be needed, and in 1776 organized the Illuminated Freemasons in Ingolstadt, Bavaria. The Illuminati, as they were known, propagated a new religion and a universal democratic republic wherein man would be enlightened through secret tutelage to outgrow the religious and political needs of the Church and nation state. These secret schools of wisdom would lead to the fall of princes and nations so that the human race would become one family. This redemption of mankind by the restoration of the original freedom and equality through illumination and universal charity, fraternity, and tolerance could only be accomplished, though, to members who progressed through various degrees of teachings.

In 1783, though, the anarchistic tendencies of the order provoked public demonstrations which led the Bavarian government in 1789 to ban the order and any recruitment by its members, upon penalty of death. Some in the order claimed responsibility for the French Revolution in 1789, but the claims lack proof and often conflict with known facts. Weishaupt renounced all secret societies in 1787 and reconciled with the Catholic Church by his death on November 18, 1830.

Source: *The Catholic Encyclopedia, Illuminati* (visited June 4, 1999) <<http://www.knight.org/advent/cathen/07661b.htm>>.

Freemasons claim, though, that Weishaupt was funded by international bankers and started the Illuminati as a satanic plot in order to establish a one world government. The order, which exists today, is allegedly composed of wealthy Jews whose main goal is to own all the land and wealth in the world, relegating everyone else to slavery in one form or another. Churches would also be transformed into synagogues. The Illuminati is alleged by some in the Freeman movement to have taken over the American government, banks and legal system. The sect is also credited with creating the conspiracy that led to the French Revolution.

Weishaupt's plan of operation required the Illuminati to perform the following tasks to accomplish their purpose

1. Monetary and sex bribery was to be used to obtain control of men already in high places in the various levels of all governments and other fields of endeavor. Once influential persons had fallen for the lies, deceits, and temptations of the Illuminati, they were to be held in bondage by application of political and other forms of blackmail, threats of financial ruin, public exposure, and physical harm, even death to themselves and loved members of their families.
2. The Illuminati who were on the faculty of colleges and universities were to cultivate students possessing exceptional mental ability and who belonged to well-bred families with international leanings, and recommend them for special training in Internationalism. Such training was to be provided by granting scholarships, like the Rhodes Scholarship, to those selected by the Illuminati. All such scholars were to be first persuaded and then convinced that men of special talent and brains had the right to rule those less gifted on the grounds that the masses do not know what is best for them physically, mentally, and spiritually.
3. All influential people who were tapped to come under the control of the Illuminati, plus the students who had been

This one world biblical theory has been enhanced through means for interpreting the very Bible from which the theme and conspiracy are inseparable.

One must not ignore the real forces, though, such as bOne m playing a role in this saga of rural restructuring playing a role in this saga of which are almost obscured by the conspiracy beliefs religion, the Constitution, the mowhich are almost obscured by the control, international trade agreements, monopolies, and morality.

## The Bible

How did the old guard of the antigovernment movement turn rural Americans against a governmHow did the old g that rural Americans had heretofore staunchly supported? The Bible. The most sacred document of rural America was brilliantly used by twiAmerica was brilliantly used by twisting it in the movement, a losing economic war was transfothe movement, a losing economic war was transformed into a the mov soul.

Studies have shown that over 80 percent oStudies have shown that over 80 percent Rural America is predominately Christian, with strong leanings towards Protestant Christianity. The ffoundation for this Christian influence has been laid by our history and supported by such customs as recital oof the of the Pledge of Allegiance ( &one nation, under God & ) and the Lord s Prayer. Given this background, it only makes sense that when the world is crashing down, a Christian explanation is needed.

Various factions, iVarious factions, includVarious factions, including David Koresh and the Branch Davidians, h the Bible justifies or even demands that they rebel against the current Americanthe Bible justifies or even demands that that the Bible demands rebellion compels these rural warriors to see themselves as an armythat the Bible demands rebellion rather than as a treasonous force attempting a coup. They believerather than as a treasonous force attempting a coup. T and that a proper understanding of its prophecies leaves true Christians with little choice but to fight.

People are being tPeople are being taught tPeople are being taught that our founding fathers intended the country to b they wrote the God-inspired Constitution with that in mind. Some groups teach that the Constitution was derived directly from the Bible and is therefore a sacred document. Recruitsderived directly from the Bible and is the Second Amendment (the right to keep and bear arms) for an important reasonSecond Amendment (the right to keep an were to be used to force the government back towards a godly couwere to be used to force the government back toward its Christian underpinnings. Many in their world believe that now is the time for this armed insurrection.

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speciall y educated and trained, were to be used as agents and placed behind the scenes of all governments as experts and specialists. They would advise the top executives to adopt policies which would, in the long run, serve the secret plans of the Illuminati s one world conspiracy, and bring about the destruction of the governments and religions they were elected or appointed to serve.

4. They were to obtain a bsolute c ontrol of the press so that all news and information could be slanted to convince the masses that a one world government is the only s olution to our many and varie d problems. They were a lso to own and control all the national radio and TV chamels.

Source : *Thirst for Justice A Satanic Plot for a One World Government. The World Con spirators: the Illuminati* (visited June 4, 1999) <<http://www.prolognet.qc.ca/clyde/illumin.htm>>.

# THE TRIBULATION 2,000 A.D.?

[In response to the disciples' questions about signs of the end of the world, Jesus said ]

*For nation will rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom, and there will be famines and earthquakes.*

*But things are merely the beginning of birth pangs.*

*Then they will deliver you to tribulation, and will kill you, and then they will deliver you to tribulation, and will kill you on account of My name.*

*And at that time many will fall away and will deliver up one another to another.*

*And many false prophets will arise, and will mislead many.*

*And because lawlessness is increased, most people's love will grow cold.*

Matthew 24:7-12

## The End of the World

Is the Tribulation at hand? It is certain that a holy war is blazing across America. Terrorist bombings in places like Oklahoma City, Atlanta, Los Angeles, Spokane, and Dallas. The holy war is the one described in the Bible or the one started by people who decided the Bible was taking too long to get here does not really matter. The death and destruction are real.

Bible-influenced Freemen groups believe that Jesus will one day return to earth. They also believe the closer we get to that day, the more we will experience pestilence, famine, and war. A summary of one interpretation<sup>11</sup> of the meaning of *Revelation* 20 is as follows:

This is all part of the Tribulation—a time many Christians believe will be defined by the appearance of the appearance of new technologies; by the mark of the Beast (the symbolic number 666) being put on the bodies of those who worshiped Satan (the symbolic number 666) being put on the bodies of those who worshiped Satan; by the creation of a one world government headed by the Antichrist; and by the persecution and murder of Christians.

It is at the end of this period of tribulation that the Battle of Armageddon—the final battle between Jesus' forces of good and Satan's forces of evil—will take place. Satan will be imprisoned in a bottomless pit, and a period of peace known as the Millennium will begin. During the Millennium, the dead souls who had been beheaded for their faith in Jesus (the dead souls who had been beheaded for their faith in Jesus) will live with Jesus. Satan nor accepted his mark) will come to life. The rest of the Millennium. The rest of the dead will live.

At the conclusion of the Millennium, Satan will be released and attempt to deceive the nations and people, and gather an army of followers. The living saints. A fire will come down from Heaven, though, and consume Satan and his followers, and God will cast Satan into a lake of fire forever.

Then, all the dead souls remaining will stand before the throne of Life will be opened and the dead souls will be judged.

<sup>11</sup> We recognize that there are several different interpretations of the end times as described in *Revelation*. The summary we provide appears to us to be the most common.









approaching or has already arrived. Since the end of the world is fast approaching, they believe approaching or has have nothing to lose. Many Common Law courts are meeting with the government is then expected to carry out the sentence of the Bible.

While some fundamentalists and Identity believers disagree with manWhile some fundamentalists and Identity believers these groups have been increasingly able to set aside their disagreements to fulfill their one goal a new Christian government. The theological differences will be sorted out once the existing democratic regime.

The racism that had long been the chief barrier to Identity recruiting effortThe racism that had long been the chief barrier de-emphasized by the Freeman, at least until a new member's movement's long-held concept of a white America has now been given a new, more acceptable mon such as Christian America or Christian Israel.

## Christian Identity Expansion

How did Freeman ever provide the unifying ideology to explain Gordon Kahl, Ruby Ridge, aHow did Freeman ever provide the unifying ideology to explain other current events for the diverse coalitions that Christian Identity teachings.

It has become commonplace for Identity membersIt has become commonplace for Identity members congregation, and slowly over time begin to insert their Identity doctrines into meetings. But pastors of the infected congregations figure out what is going on, it is too late. Either the pastor is converted, the pastor is removed, or a sizeable believers.

Pastors have also been recruited directlyPastors have also been recruited directly While some pastors leave when the Identity message is taught, many others stay While some pastors leave when the teachings to their congregations.

The Identity movement's techniques for spreading its message are working surprisingly well. A great deal of its recent success can be attributed to its the guise of the antigovernment evil enemy theme, Identity followers can now interact with non-Identity people for long periods of time. Given the Identity's explanation of who is destroying rural America, their success is understandable considering the perception that such modern agendas as affirmative action, the environmental movement, global abortion, gun control, school prayer, flag burning and pretty much any other cause taken up by the ACLU.

As Identity spreads, so does the promotion of violence by the Freeman movement. For that reason, it is critical to carefully examine the beliefs of Identity adherents.

## A History of Christian Identity Theology

From the very beginning of colonialism, American Christians have considered themselves chosen nation. They see themselves set above the rest of humanity. Fulfillment of biblical prophecy. Our history is replete with the United States is the culmination of God's unfolding plan for the Manifest Destiny of all nations. English Reformation, the settlement of North America, the wars against the French and the English, the American Revolution, and even the Civil War established that God was powerfully at work in our midst.

This nativist thought arising out of the economic and social changes of the late nineteenth century increasingly defined evil as those who were non-white, non-Protestant, and non-native born. In America, evil did not exist as an abstract force but in a very real world personification.

**Anti-Roman Catholicism.** In the early nineteenth century, the nativist movement focused upon the massive influx of Roman Catholic immigrants, especially the Irish, as a threat to America's internal security. Anti-Catholic sentiments viewed the Catholic Church as the Whore of Babylon, the *Revelation*



Ford sFord s conspiracy theories andFord s conspiracy theories and the popular imFord s conspiracy theories and the pop  
hhand hand of Jewish conspirators influencing history. Following World War II and the Holohand of Jewish consp  
widwidesprewidespreadwidespread audience that had previously accepted this hidden hand message began to wane. But th  
movement continued.

**AfterAfter World War II.** Dr. Wesley Dr. Wesley Swift, Dr. Wesley Swift, an ordained Alabama Methodist  
IdeIdentityIdentity theology, especially Anglo-Israelism, into Christian Defense League rhetoric. In 1946, SIdentity theolo  
foundedfounded the Church of Jesus Christ Christian, which is still in operation in Hayden Lake, Idafounded the Church of Jesu  
Swift,Swift, a former Ku Klux Klan Kleagle, who was to sprSwift, a former Ku Klux Klan Kleagle, who was to spread the to  
KKK and neo-Nazis in the early 1960 s under the auspices of his Church of Jesus Christ Christian.

SwiftSwift expanded on his Identity beliefsSwift expanded on his Identity beliefs by asserSwift expanded on his Identity  
thethe movement and to help establish itthe movement and to help establish its goathe movement and to help establish its  
RangersRangers in the early 1960 s; a group that formed the core of late 1960 s revolutionarRangers in the early 1960 s; a gr  
ThTheThe Minutemen were arrested in 1968 after blowing up a police station and attempting to rob several bThe Minutemen wer  
OneOne of its members, and a member of One of its members, and a member of Swift s churchOne of its members, and a memb  
aa plot to bloa plot to blow up Mara plot to blow up Martin Luther King at the Hollywood Palladium. Other Swift follow  
message throughout the United States.

WhenWhen Swift died in 1970, a SwWhen Swift died in 1970, a SwifWhen Swift died in 1970, a Swift-recruit and  
PresbPresbyterianPresbyterian who received his ordination through the mail) and a handful of his congregation Presbyterian v  
IdahoIdaho near Hayden Lake tIdaho near Hayden Lake toldaho near Hayden Lake to establish a Promised Land a whites-o  
andand continueand continued Identity teacand continued Identity teachings. As a follower of Butler puts it, You have Detroit  
we llwe ll have the Northwe ll have the Northwest for ourwe ll have the Northwest for our Aryans. From this central church  
gospelgospel of Christian Identity would be used to consolidate the splinter groups of the hgospel of Christian Identity would b  
army of God against the evil United States government a.k.a. ZOG Zionist Occupation Government.

RubyRuby Ridge s Randy Weaver is an associate of Richard Bulter and Kevin HarrisRuby Ridge s Randy Weaver is an  
Kahl since high school.

FreemeFreemenFreemen commonly use the word Usurers to describe Jewish bankers whom they claim are ruFreemen co  
our country through ZOG.

## Christian Identity Beliefs 101

ChristianChristian Identity, which is also known as Christian America, Christian Israel, British IsraChristian Identity, which  
Identity,Identity, Anglo-Israelism, or Kingdom of GIdentity, Anglo-Israelism, or Kingdom of God, does not Identity, Anglo-I  
butbut rather believes itself to be a group of orthodox Christians who acceptbut rather believes itself to be a group of orth  
hencehence literally true Word of God. While affirming their belief in God, Jesus, and the Holy Spirit, they  
gengenerallygenerally stop generally stop short of belief in the Trinity. Their belief in the literal truth of the Bible is manifeste  
firmfirm belief in the biblical account of creation afirm belief in the biblical account of creation as described in *Genesis*, the  
returnreturn of Jesus to earth, and the final battle to be fought between the Israel of God and the enreturn of Jesus to earth, and  
FollowingFollowing the tradition of free church Protestantism, two ordinanFollowing the tradition of free church P  
communion are practiced. See the Appendix, at 21-23, for a Christian Identity church s statement of beliefs.

SomeSome Christian Identity groups have also adopted both sabbatharianism and sacreSome Christian Identity groups  
fromfrom Adventism. Joe Jeffers, head of the Kingdom of Yahweh, was possibly the first person to combine a  
beliefbelief in the Identity hypothesis with the keeping of the Sabbath on Saturday and thbelief in the Identity hypothesis with  
of the Hebrew names of the Creator and His Son (Yahweh and Yahshua) in place of God and Jesus.

ChristChristianChristian Identity is most at variance with the larger body of Christian theology with its belief thaChristian Id  
Anglo-Saxon,Anglo-Saxon, CelAnglo-Saxon, Celtic, ScanAnglo-Saxon, Celtic, Scandnavian, Germanic, and related peoples (oft  
thethe direct racial descendantsthe direct racial descendants of the tribethe direct racial descendants of the tribes of Israel and  
thethe true identity of the Jews. As such direct descendants, Christian Identity fthe true identity of the Jews. As such direc  
be God s Chosen People, the heirs of all God s biblical promises to Abraham and his progeny.



migration to the British Isles occurred around 975 B.C., when the ten northern tribes of migration to the British Isles occurred and taken into captivity and taken into captivity by the Assyrians. Two of the ten tribes, Ephraim and Manasse, remained intact through the Caucasus Mountains into northwestern Europe. Ephraim was to become a nation of the British Commonwealth.

TheThe second son of Joseph, Manasseh, was to become a great nation the UnitedThe second son of Joseph, Manasseh, was to become a great nation the United States of America. Inteaches that the Manasseh tribe crossed the Atlantic aboard the Mayflower to America. Inteaches that the Manasseh tribe crossed the Atlantic aboard the Mayflower to America. Inteaches that the Manasseh tribe gavegave them such sacred docugave them such sacred documengave them such sacred documents as the Declaration of Independence. Rights. Thus, the unitRights. Thus, the united States of America is the holy country of the Hebrews. settledsettled it are entitled to the country thsettled it are entitled to the country through divisettled it are entitled to the country through division. fathersfathers are considered sacred and stand in continuity with the covenant of fathers are considered sacred and stand in continuity with the covenant of the Lord. respondrespond to this highrespond to this higher law andrespond to this higher law and morality as defined in the Bible and the writings of our founding fathers.

Inherent in Identity thought is a dualism. A mythological Israel, the highest expression of good, must also construct an evil. Israel, the highest expression of good, must also construct a form of the false children of Israel what we call Judaism. As the Assyrians were transporting the Northern tribes of Israel in the eighth century B.C., the Southern tribes of Judah were conquered by Northern tribes, Babylonians and transported into exile. It is during this period that the Identity movement separated itself from its Old Testament background and transformed itself into a new form. Judah fell under the influence of pagan beliefs and were introduced to the black magic of Satan. The product of this period is the Babylonian Talmud, one of the central documents of the Jewish religion and the foundation of Rabbinical Judaism.

In addition, the people of Judea fell into even greater desecration of their faith. In addition, the people of Judea fell into benevolent King Cyrus and the Persians, the people of Judea rebuild the Holy Temple of Solomon. During this period, with the Edomites (Africans) and began to take on the dark features of the native Africans.

All people not of Northern European extraction are lumped subhumans called mud people. When the people of this mud people, they committed a crime against God by having intercourse with beasts. *Leviticus* 20:15-16.

In order for the second coming of Christ to occur, In order for the second coming of Christ to occur, God s laIn order fo  
aa great batta great battle between goa great battle between good and evil, Amageddon. In this battle, the forces o  
Israelites will Israelites will b Israelites will be pitted aga Israelites will be pitted against the armies of Satan, re  
governngovernment.government. Identity followers will wage an all-out war against ZOG, race traitors, and anyone e  
standsstands in the way of their effort to establish a Christian Identity goverstands in the way of their effort to establish a Chr  
battlebattle is close at hand, Identity adherents advocate keeping a well-sbattle is close at hand, Identity adherents advocat  
survival gear.

Just as with the earlier nativist movement, a shift occurred from a religious conception of race to a racial one. It is the construction of race as a racial one. It is the construction of evil in starkly racial terms. A person recognizes his or her identity as a member of the Nation of Israel; a person recognizes his or her identity as a member of a race. A person acts in a manner consistent with this ideology. A person acts in a manner consistent with this ideology. In the apocalyptic future, biblically destined to come, the Identity movement offers salvation. A salvation by race alone.

[illegible]

These are the end-times and the signs are everywhere apparent to those who have eyes to see. While the threat from Jews, minorities, gays, etc. is very real to Identity believers, the greatest threat is from within the church.

from city-living white Christians and do-gooders who have fought for the rights of these groups. from city-living white who have succumbed to Judeo-Christianity are being led by blindness of the threat that is posed by a Satanic conspiracy to end the white race.

The Jesus of the Identity faith is a member of the House of David and of the true Nation of Israel. *Matthew 15:24*.

The responsibility for the salvation of the struggle to endure and overcome the Tribulation. Identity gospel teaches that those who overcome evil and survive Rahowa (the racial holy war) will be the Elect of the new Kingdom of God. The soldier saviors who have prepared for the Tr stockpiling weapons and supplies, and educating themselves regarding their identity and its ensuing responsibility. As Identity Pastor Richard Butler preached from his pulpit in Hayden Lake

The white youth of this nation shall utilize every method to neutralize and, quite possibly, engage in the wholesale extermination of non-Aryan peoples from the face of the North American continent. Men, women, and children, without appeal, who are of non-Aryan blood shall be terminated or expelled.

Richard Butler, quoted in Simon Winchester *Richard Butler, quoted in Simon Winchester* Tense 14: no. 4, May/June, 1987, at 10.

Life's complexities are rendered negligible within this ideology controlled and manipulated by this hidden and powerful force of the Bible and the coming Battle of Armageddon between good and evil as described in *Revelation* virtually demands a prompt and holy response. Anyone, regardless of intellect, can grasp this simple explanation. That is the appeal of the Identity movement.

## Baal Worship and the Phinehas Priesthood

The Priests of Phinehas (also spelled Phineas) are a very radical fringe of the movement. The priesthood group is highly fanatical, even beyond the wildest tenets of Identity. The Priests especially may well be involved in bombings of abortion clinics and black churches.

The most vile of all evils to a Phinehas Priest is to be biologically (who alone are the true Israelites) mixing bloodlines with the copulation. Priests of Phinehas believe that stopping.



The The Priests defense for their taking violent action against the government refuses to stop is that being the God-given right to violently act as did Phinehas against God-given worthy of judgment.

When the civil authority fails to execute righteous judgment that is, uphold biblical law, given these Priests the authority to execute that judgment, i.e. the unlawful. Though not advocating outright taking of the lives of the ungodly, their writings strongly imply that such action by select private individuals is authorized directly by God.

The Priesthood is divided into two schools of thought: those who believe anyone to become a member; and those who believe that only men of Phinehas lineage from Aaron may become such a priest. Lineage followers concede that there is no way for one to become such a priest. Lineage followers, Aaron, but such a minor problem does not seem to matter. Unless upon sanction of death if one attempts to leave the brotherhood.

The Phinehas Priest movement is apparently of the Phinehas Priesthood, the highest order in the Phinehas brotherhood, a member of Phinehas kill a woman or man who indulged in race mixing, homosexuality or list of mortal sins.

Whether the story of Phinehas proves as Phinehas Priests claim that to act unlawfully by the sword is certainly subject to debate. Mainstream faiths believe that Phinehas to act unlawfully, but rather was acting lawfully as a member of a group specified by Moses to kill the transgressors.

While many in the Christian Identity movement reject the Phinehas Priesthood,<sup>20</sup> most believe that Baal worship is rampant in our sex crazed world. Identity followers make any effort to curb various biblical sins of morality<sup>21</sup> (or for government leaders to act involved in such activities) for which Israel was punished by a severe divine punishment. And conspiracy follows a severe divine punishment that must be rejected.

Such a debate will be left for another forum. Be assured to save Christian Israel, they are entitled to save Christian Israel, they are entitled to who commit blood-mixing with Anglo-Saxons.

## The Washington Monument?

Identity followers offer the Washington Monument as proof that our government is controlled by Rome (i.e. Roman Catholics), who are the Antichrist's agents. Here is their theory:

Roman law overlays the land and is the law of the documents of God's law and of the founding fathers. The monument, punctuated by the erection of the obelisk in Washington's name, a phallic obelisk that copies the one in St. Peter's Square, Rome. The monument by Rome, and represents the shadow of the Egyptian sun god Ra. The obelisk, the circle, St. Peter's Square, which is not a circle, to signify intercourse and the circle, St. Peter's Square.

<sup>20</sup> For an interesting Christian Identity's strong response against the Phinehas Priesthood, see Evangelist Ted R. Weiland, *The Phinehas Hoods: A Biblical Examination of Unscriptural Vigilantism* (visited June 5, 1999) <<http://www.missiontoisrael.org/Phinehas-Hoods.html>>. The article argues that if the sin God punished in *Numbers* 25 was race-mixing, then Moses promoted race-mixing since he spared the Midianite virgins for the Israelite men as permitted by *Deuteronomy* 21:10-14. *Numbers* 31:17-18.

<sup>21</sup> Baal-Peor sexual debauchery include adultery (sexual acts with a person other than your spouse, *Exodus* 20:14, *Leviticus* 20:10, *Proverbs* 6:32, *Jeremiah* 23:14), fornication/whoredom (sexual acts between unmarried persons for pleasure or profit, *Leviticus* 19:29, *1 Corinthians* 6:18), sexual acts between relatives (*Deuteronomy* 27:22-23, *Leviticus* 20:12), homosexuality (*Leviticus* 20:13, *Deuteronomy* 23:17, *Genesis* 13:13, *Genesis* 18:20-21, *Romans* 1:18-32), and bestiality (*Exodus* 22:19, *Leviticus* 18:23, *Leviticus* 20:16, *Deuteronomy* 27:21).







# THE COMMON LAW AND ITS COURTS

Decency, Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe of laws, existence of the government scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omniprescrupulously. Our government is the potent, the it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. it teaches the whole people by its example becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a lawbreaker, it breeds unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in unto himself the end justifies the means to declare that the government may commthe end justifies the means to declare that toto secure the conviction of a private criminal would brto secure the conviction of a private criminal would br that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.

*Olmstead v. United States*, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564, 575, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

At the onset we note our belief that the common denominator before us is Terpstra's failure to grasp the legal principles germane to his brief and reply brief reflect the careful typing effort put into them, but are sound legal arguments supported by persuasive sound legal arguments. We extract a sentence or two from a case containing language that poses the very grave danger of misstating the law or reaching inappropriate legal conclusions. AA since a sincere subjective belief by a party as to the correctness of his argument is not enough to ensure success when, as here, the arguments are contrary to law. Terpstra's lack of trained legal counsel surely contributed to the substantive and procedural flaws evident in his briefs.

*Terpstra v. Farmers and Merchants Bank*, 448 F.2d 749 (Ind.App.3 Dist. 1985) (Terpstra filed numerous Common Law liens against real property owners and bank. Owners and bank brought equitable act to remove cloud from title. Terpstra claimed action was at law, entitling him to remove cloud from title. Terpstra claimed facts supported summary judgment was granted, and T.Facts. Summary judgment was granted, and T.facts. Summary judgment assistance of non-bar association persons.)

## America On Trial

TheThe Freemen movement's Common Law cThe Freemen movement's Common Law coThe Freemen movement's  
watchingwatching people with money get preferential treatment,watching people with money get preferential treatment, while  
offoff to our overflowing prisons and/or havoff to our overflowing prisons and/or have losoff to our overflowing prisons and/o  
TheThe Common Law courts that now exist in alThe Common Law courts that now exist in almoThe Common Law courts th  
forfor one simple reason Common Law proponents claim that their system puts the poor on an equal footing  
with the monied and the powerful.

While our government authorities play catch-up trying to cope with the threat While our government authorities play catch-up trying to cope with the threat movement s militias, Common Law courts have surged past the militias as the most influential and movement s militia growing element of the Freemen phenomenon.

## Sovereign Citizens v. 14th Amendment Citizens

The touchstone of the Free The touchstone of the Freemen moThe touchstone of the Freemen movement is the citizenscitizens can take certain steps to legally remove themselves from the authority of our governmencitizens can take certain is that if the government will not help, then Sovereign Citizens will simply govern themselves.

These self-designated Sovereigns claim that their actions are political, but as with many of the movement's beliefs, they are more rooted in economics. If not, then it is a huge con-



status. Once all 14th Amendment adherence contracts are rescinded and notice of the prepared and served on the proper parties, and so long as you do not res only place seen by Freeman as exclusive federal citizenship), a Common Law court only place seen by Freeman as exclusive recognizing your sovereign citizenship.

If you are male, and white!

## What is the Common Law?

One's attempt to define the Common Law of their system is far from movement have developed their own local versions of the Common Law. Some see it as only the Others see a somewhat expanded view. We will attempt to describe it based on our Freeman experiences.

Freemen call their law Common Law and their courts Court. Common Law is to be distinguished from statutory law, just the term common law, although usually the term common law, although usually the world radically diverges.

Common Law not only trumps statutory law (at least for given law in contrast with statutory manmade law which is not. As Freeman put it, in their ungiven law in contrast with America (a group of sovereign States banded together) the Law (Common Law) prev other United States (one entity with 50 political subdivisions called states), whether United States (one entity with Sovereign Citizens, is a Legislative Democracy with Legislative Courts that apply Statutory Law, Rules Sovereign Regulations.

The Common Law is law pursuant to the Word of God, and Freeman's legal with biblical references and quotations. While Freeman consult the Bible as often as they DICTONARY, the Bible is not, however, the only source of their claim to be the legitimate followers of the law, a law claim adherence to documents we also recognize.

Unfortunately, the Common Law and its courts reveal While every system has weaknesses, they are rarely so vividly apparent purports to judge our State is powerful because it mocks the notion that any law (their courts).

## Overlapping Law Theirs and Ours

The precepts their group considers law overlap in part with ours. This recruiting efforts since our basic legal documents discussed in an underlying basis for their law. The Bill of Rights, for example, is la our courts. On the other hand, their group rejects many, if not most, our courts. On the other hand, their group rejects many

Under their law, the income tax is unconstitutional, the income tax is unconstitutional, state laws requiring licenses to drive (except for those traveling citizenship, state laws requiring Commerce Clause) are a violation of their constitution state court jurisdiction over Sovereign Citizens is invalid.

## The Magna Carta

The Magna Carta was the culmination of a protest against using governmental powers for selfish and tyrannical purposes. On June 15, 1215 using governmental powers for selfish the charter because of the threat of armed might by barons. The document announced the rule of kings, and provided the foundation upon which the entire structure liberties was built. Freeman see the document as God-inspired, and cite to the last article

We have granted moreover to all *free free men* of our *kingdom* for us and our heirs forever  
all the liberties written all the liberties written below, to be had and holden by themselves and their  
and our heirs.

(Italics added.)

The document is replete with discussion about the rights of free men and theirThe document is replete with discussion  
statement that any infringement of liberties granted therein shall be invalid and void.statements that any infringement  
that developed over the centuries due to the Magna Carta is betthat developed over the centuries due to the Magna Carta is bet  
inspired by God.

## The Declaration of Independence

This July 4, 1776 rThis July 4, 1776 revolutionaryThis July 4, 1776 revolutionary document is significant in bot  
references to God as proof of their right to ignore any government that has clearly lost its godly way.

We hold these truths to be selfWe hold these truths to be self-evident: tWe hold these truths to be self-evident: t  
endowed,by their Creator, with certain unalienable rights; thaendowed, by their Creator, with certain u  
liberty,liberty, and the pursuit of happineliberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Thliberty, and the pursuit of  
institutedamong men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; *that*  
*whenever any form of government becomes destructivewhenver any form of government becomes destructive of these en*  
*people to alter or to abolish it, andand to institute aand to institute a new government* &But when a long train  
of of abuseof abuses and usurpof abuses and usurpations, pursing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce  
themthem under them under absolutthem under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw o  
government, and to provide new guards for their future security. &

(Italics addItalics added.) See the Appendix, at 24, for a copy of the Declaration of Independence for the thirte the A  
united States of America. For Freeman, this spelling is vindication of their belief system.

## The United States Constitution We the People &

Second to the Bible, there is no greater iSecond to the Bible, there is no greater influencSecond to the Bible,  
Constitution. As Freeman correctly point out, originally the Constitution. As Freeman correctly point out, origi  
the people (and God), had no title but simply began We the People.

In their united States of America, the Basic Constitution is law, inIn their united States of America, the Basic Con  
andand the first ten amendments but little else. Freeman go to great lengths to point out that the Declaration and the first ten  
IndependenceIndependence and the Constitution were created (Independence and the Constitution were created (thIn  
People, People, i.e. men, for Preamble People, i.e. men, for Preamble PPeople, i.e. men, for Preamble People. Freeman  
class class or lessor beings [note Christian Identity beliefs about minorities], just as the Bible class or lessor beings [note C  
discussed,discussed, this second class (federal) citizenship theory is precisely what Freeman claim discussed, this second class  
the government to minorities with the Civil War Amendments.

The Preamble People s CiThe Preamble People s CitiThe Preamble People s Citizenship was not created nor gr  
CitizenshipCitizenshipCitizenship was won by war with England. This Citizenship existed from the time our government was  
created; a citizenship which cannot be relinquished or forfeited without the Sovereign Citizen s consent.

It is this Basic CoIt is this Basic Constitution that is central to Freeman, as is the division of government in  
branches.branches. Article III describes the judicial branch and the one suprbranches. Article III describes the judicial bra  
congressionalcongressional action constitcongressional action constitutcongressional action constitute Article I Legislative Court  
Court. Indeed, Freeman derive the names for their legitimate courts from the Constitution.

The Constitution of the united States of America, Article III, Section I, states

The The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in *one supreme Court*, and in  
suchsuch inferior Courts as the Congress may from tisuch inferior Courts as the Congress may from time tsuch  
(emphasis added [by the community])

Notice that it states one Notice that it states one supreNotice that it states one supreme Court and separate  
establishestablishedestablished by lestablished by legislative acts of Congress and that those legislatively created Court

inferiorinferior inferior tinferior to the one supreme Court. The one supreme Court being a Constitutional Court of We the People.

[illegible]

FreFreemenFreemen correctly point out that Article VI makes clear that: This Constitution, and the Laws of Freemen cor UnitedUnited States which shall be United States which shall be madUnited States which shall be made in Pursuance there underunder the Authority of the United States, shall be thunder the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme u statestate shall be bound thereby, any Thing in thstate shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution ostate notwithstanding. notwithstanding. So, all actions taken by a State onotwithstanding. So, all actions taken by a State or not Citizen, especially after a Common Law court (the one supreme Court) has granted sovereign citizenship.

Since the one supreme Court was already created by the one supreme Court, the one supreme Court lacked power to create a court with authority over the one supreme Court. The one supreme Court needed to create Congress or the President. Freemen conclude, therefore, that the U.S. Supreme Court, and all other legislatively created courts, must be inferior to the one supreme Court, a Freemen court, as discussed by Article III. Freemen accordingly refer to their courts as constitutional courts, and frequently consider themselves to be constitutionalists.<sup>23</sup>

22 Freeman assert that the U.S. Supreme Court, ordained and established on September 24th, 1789, by an act of Congress when it passed a Judicial Act that created the U.S. Supreme Court, ignored the Constitutional Court provided for in the Constitution.

23 **Constitutional Basis for the Supremacy of the common law jury.** Prior to the war of revolution with England a central government existed which was controlled by the King. The state governments joined together to recreate this form of government to resolve problems arising under the Article of Confederation. The Constitution simply replaced a king with a federal authority. The King was overthrown because he refused to allow the people to be self governing by giving full faith and credit to their common law courts. The Constitution was designed to not only create a central authority but to force this entity to recognize the highest law making body to be a common law jury.

According to the Common Law Court of the United States of America, the following Articles, Sections, lines and Amendments of the Constitution of the government purportedly perform this objective:

1. Article I., Section 9, Clause 2 preserved the right of Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum.
2. Article III., Section 2 made actions at common law when diversity existed in original (but not exclusive) federal subject matter jurisdiction.
3. Article IV, Section 1 stipulated that full faith and credit would be given all common law actions and created the need for rules to enforce these jury decisions.
4. Article IV, Section 4 stipulated that the final rule of law would be a court action.
5. Amendment 1 stipulated that the government may be sued by any individual to redress a grievance.
6. Amendment 2 protected the right of common law (free) states to maintain a militia.
7. Amendment VII, stipulated that common law jury trials are inviolate except for orders of retrial at common law.
8. Amendment IX, protected the rights to the people to change, reorganize and otherwise control their common law.
9. Amendment XI, reaffirmed that the judicial power of the central authority only supplemented common law jury trial by enforcing it's judgements.
10. Amendment XVI, limited the taxing power of the central authority to government controlled states (the several states) and not the free states.

The total effect was to create a central authority that was prosecutable and controlled with actions at common law when a citizen of a free state prosecuted this type of relief. The people (not the individual or the government) when acting as a law making body became the sovereigns in any issue of law or fact.

Source: American Patriot Network, *The Comm on La w Court of the United States of America* (visited May 13, 1999) <<http://www.civil-liberties.com/commonlaw/common.htm>>.

## The Organic Constitution

Within the more radical elements of the Freeman movement, the goal is to return to the original Constitution the original version in which blacks, immigrants, second-class citizenship with no right to vote. As discussed in the Christian Identity section, these people are believed to be soulless subhumans and/or subservient to white males, a status Freeman argue were believed intended by our founding fathers and required by the Bible.

## Amendments to the Constitution

Freemen see the Bill of Rights as part of their Common Law, and the remaining Amendments are listed with a date preceded by either the word adopted (11th and 12th Amendments are listed with the words took effect (the 13th through the 26th the words took effect

BOOK

Took effect is used as there is a great deal of Amendments (common law vs. equity), also whether these last sixteen Amendments (common law vs. equity), legal, how many were ratified correctly, do they create a legal, how many were ratified correctly, do they create to the original, etc. For further studies a good place to begin is with the article Utah Supreme Court on the 14th Amendment, 439 P.2d 266-276.

The Utah case referred to, *Dyett v. Turner*, 439 P.2d 266 (Utah 1968) is a remarkable unanimous opinion in which Justice Ellett of the Utah opinion in which Justice Ellett of the Constitution was not validly adopted and thus is not significant space in the opinion to discuss why the U.S. Supreme Court has so badly erred in its holdings significant space Justice Ellett reaffirmed his views in a concurring opinion in *State v. Phillips*, 540 P.2d 936, 941-43 (Utah 1975), *majority opinion disavowed*, *State v. Taylor*, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983). A copy of 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983). A is in the Appendix, at 25-30.

For Freeman, who frequently cite *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. (Cranch) 137, 17 U.S. (Cranch) 137, 177, (Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and, consequently, the theory of operation of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void. ), all Amendments act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution and must be ignored since they were improperly enacted.

## The Civil War Amendments Creation of an Inferior Citizenship

Freemen make several different arguments concerning the validity of the 13th, 14th Amendments.

Freemen assert that the Amendments were never ratified by the appropriate number of States during peacetime, they are unlawful and in Freeman argue that President Andrew Johnson encouraged the all-white government to reject the 14th Amendment (privileges and immunities, due process they did. The Reconstruction Congress of 1866 then replaced those Southern rule, and allowed the military States to rejoin the Union only upon their acceptance of the 14th Amendment. Since these procedures were not authorized by the Constitution, Freeman assert that the 14th Amendment is void, citing *Marbury v. Madison*.

<sup>24</sup> **Organic Act.** An act of Congress conferring powers of government upon a territory. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1250 (4th ed. 1968).

**Organic Law.** The fundamental law, or constitution, of a state or nation, written or unwritten; that law or system of laws or principles which defines and establishes the organization of its government. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1251 (4th ed. 1968).

FreemenFreemen claim that the privileges and immunities cFreemen claim that the privileges and immunities clause of inferinferioinferiorinferior form of citizenship to guarantee its power, federal citizenship, to be contrasted with sovereign, state citizenship,citizenship, as recognized by the originalcitizenship, as recognized by the original (ancitizenship, as recognized by the original jurisdictionjurisdiction of the federal government and the federal courts. The privileges and immunities clause saysjurisdiction

Our law explains that this clause was a repudiation of Our law explains that this clause was a repudiation of the Negro, Negro, free (granted citizenship by a State) or slave, could institute a lawsuit in federal cou Negro, free (granted citizenship was was not a citizen of the United States when the Constitution was not a citizen of the United States when the Constitution was adopted. 393, 393, 15 L.Ed. 691 (1857) (suit by Scott for his and his family s freedom a 393, 15 L.Ed. 691 (1857) (suit by Scott for his and his family s freedom the the A the A menthe Amendment did not create a federal citizenship because such citizenship was created when the Constitution Constitution was enacted. Rather, the Constitution was enacted. Rather, the Amendment on Constitution was enacted in the *Dred Scott* case.

It is true, every person, and every class and descripIt is true, every person, and every class and description of f  
timetime of the adoption of the Constitution recognized as citizens in the stime of the adoption of the Constit  
becamebecame also citizens ofthis new political bbecame also citizens of this new political body [the Unbecame also  
formedformed by them, and for formed by them, and for them anformed by them, and for them and their posterity, bu  
rightsrights andrights and rights and privileges guarantied to citizens of this new sovereignty were intended to  
embraceembrace those onlembrace those onlyembrace those only who were then members of the several State com  
shouldshould afterwards by birthright should afterwards by birthright or othshould afterwards by birthright  
provprovisionsprovisions of the provisions of the Constitution and the principles on which it was founded. It was  
unionunion of those who were at that time members of distinct and seunion of those who were at that ti  
communitiescommunities into one political family, whose power, focommunities into one political family, whose p  
to extend oto extend over the whole teto extend over the whole territory of the United States. And it gave to each cit  
andand privileges outside of his State which he diand privileges outside of his State which he did not beforeand  
everyevery other Staevery other State upon a perfevery other State upon a perfect equality with its own citizens as to  
rights of property; it made him a citizen of the United States.

*Dred Scott*, 60 U.S. at 406-7.

AsAs for the due process clause of the 14th AmendmenAs for the due process clause of the 14th Amendment, our protectionprotection of the Bill of Rightprotection of the Bill of Rights to prevent protection of the Bill of Rights to prevent duedue process clausdue process clause means that fdue process clause means that federal citizens are not guaranteed the guaranteedguaranteed to Sovereign Citizens because the Bill of Rights was guaranteed to Sovereign Citizens because the E AmendmentAmendment federal citAmendment federal citizensAmendment federal citizenship. Instead, the Amendment grants federalcitizens to protections againsfederal citizens to protections against ifederal citizens to protections against inter thelawsthe laws; a much morthelaws; a much more limited form of freedom. It of course goes without saying th governmentgovernment can regulatgovermment can regulate the privileges it has granted. The result, Freemen argue, is incr governmental control over a federal citizen through our laws, rules and regulations.

Further proof of this dual citizenship can be found in the spelling of the Constitution. When our nation was founded, each of the individual sovereign states had their own Citizens which is always spelled with a capital C in the Constitution. In 1868, citizen is no longer capitalized. Freeman until 1868. After all, look at the definition until 1868. After all, look at the definition.

LAW DICTIONARY

**The Fourteenth Amendment.** The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States.

It became a part of the organic law July 28, 1868, and its special mention. It creates or at least recognizes for the first time a citizenship of the United States, as distinct from that of the states; forbids the any state of any law abridging the privileges and immunities of the States; and secures all persons against any state action without due process of law.

life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denial of the equal laws.

**United States.** This term has several meanings. It may be merely sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of other sovereign nations; it may designate territory over which sonations; it may designate may be collective name of the states which are united by and under the Constitution.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 785, 1703 (4th ed. 1968).

Since the 14th Amendment created a new federal citizenship, Freemen claim have no effect on the class of Sovereign Citizens that exist. Accordingly, Freemen must remove all vestiges of this federal citizenship (passport, social security, etc.), and re-obtain their Sovereign citizenship through a Common Law court, the one supreme Court.

This Freemen argument resonates with their Christian Identity. This Amendment created a lesser form of citizenship reinforces the racist theme Americans not as true men, but as beasts. It also iAmen Constitution was written, state/Sovereign Citizens. Such a readin Constitution was written, state/Sovereign Citizens. community with the Chosen People theme. The 14th Amendment and Christian Identity beliefs assign Freemen a privileged position in relation to others who occupy the same geographical space.

Perhaps most interesting, their reading of the 14th Amendment shows how profoundly Freeman transform the meaning of our documents. In our world, the Reconstruction transform the meaning of our documents two nations on one soil. In the Common Law world, one classes of citizenship, two United States of America.

## The 16th Amendment Income Taxes

Freemen single out income taxation as one of the most abhorrent of the government. Freemen single out income tax federal citizens, a message certainly palatable to any Freemen prospect. Once federal citizens, a message certainly become a Sovereign Citizen, he or she is not obliged to pay either state or federal income taxes.

First, as previously discussed, Freemen claim that all post-Bill First, as previously discussed, Freemen claim that a properly ratified by the appropriate number of states, and are thus unlawful and void. *Marbury v. Madison*.

We will not dwell on the extensive rationale underlying the Freemen's position since a lengthy examination of the IRS Code through Freemen eyes is just not worth our effort here. (Freemen definitions for words in the IRS Code such as may, having income, and must means may, may, having income, and must means may, may, having income, and most of the precepts concerning the sovereignty of Sovereign Citizens have already been discussed.

It is of interest to note, though, that It is of interest to note, though, that State specific Republic since all states with an income tax use one specific Republic since all states with an income prerequisite to state income tax (including prerequisite to state income tax (including 14th Amendment citizen who is required to pay federal income rescind all state adhesion contracts and inform the state taxing authority of the Sovereign status.

Lastly, the following disclaimer was noted at the conclusion of a Freemen internet article on this topic after a discussion of the Income Tax Package that could be obtained for \$150

This work is educational in nature, it comes with no guarantee expressed for the good of We the People undertaken with the full and is not to be confused with the practice of Law as purveyed by the various Bar organizations.

## Sovereign Rights Over Corporations and States, And the Right to Contract

FreemenFreemen trace our law through its roots fFreemen trace our law through its roots fromFreemen trace our la  
FreemenFreemen claim that this law recognized, at least until the illegal actions of PresideFreemen claim that this law reco  
CivilCivil War, two classes of men free and unfree. Freeman and slave. *See* the BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY  
definition of freeman at the beginning of our materials, at Footnote 1.

FFreemenFreemen claim that our case law has also made just such a distinction between the indivFreemen claim (Freeman)(Freeman) and the corporation/state (slave) in *Hale v. HeHale v. HenkeHale v. Henkel*, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S.Ct. 370, (1906),(1906), at least(1906), at least until(1906), at least until the death of the Common Law by the Supreme Court in *Erie v. Tor* involvedinvolved a secretary/treasurer (Hale) of a corporation who refused to answer questions or bring docuinvolved a secreta forfor a grand jury investigating Sherman antfor a grand jury investigating Sherman antitrust violatifor a grand jury inve AmendmentAmendment privilege against self incrimination both individually, and on bAmendment privilege against self inc rejecting a corporateFifth Amendment privilege, the court said

...Conceding...Conceding t...Conceding that the...Conceding that the witness was an officer of the corporation under that that he was entitled to assert the rights of corporation with respect that he was entitled to assert the rights of corporation books and papers, we are of the opinion books and papers, we are of the opinion books and papers, we are of the opinion between between an individual and a corporation, and that between an individual and a corporation, and that the submit submit its books and papers for an examination at the submit its books and papers for an examination at the may may stand upon his may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business business in his own way. *His power to contract is unlimited. He owes His power to contract is unlimited state or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors so far as it may tend to criminate him. He owes no such duty to so far as it may tend to criminate him. He receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the right to be secure in his person, his house, his papers, and his property from arrest or seizure except upon just cause, and he owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights.*

Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not, in the exercise of its sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand whether they had been abused, and demand papers for that purpose. The defense which is charged with a criminal offense, such as a refusal to produce its books. To it. While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation protected by a special privilege and franchise, may refuse to show special privilege and franchise abuse of such privileges.

*Hale*, 26 S.Ct. at 378-79. (Emphasis added.)

FreemenFreemen read the aFreemen read the above as a vindication of their Common Law/natural law philosophy  
susuperioritysuperiority of the Sovereign citizen over the state and its corporations. This quote also supposuperiority of the Sove  
comitatuscomitatus view that a Freecomitatus view that a Freemcomitatus view that a Freemen owes nothing to the public, and  
(commit violence against me) unless a Freemen trespasses on another s rights.





States, States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. &

United States Constitution, Article III, § 2.

So, So, by putting *Erie* and the Federal Rules together, we have a story that explains the Common Law insistence that the federal courts possess only admiralty jurisdiction. *Erie* and the Common Law view that the federal courts<sup>25</sup> are trying to foist admiralty law upon the Freeman, the momentous shift of 1938 took place without the consent or knowledge it was in the intricacies of *Erie* and the Federal Rules.

And in 1966 when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to And in 1966 when the Federal Rules between civil actions and suits in admiralty, well, the true nature of the federal courts was court courts of admiralty. One only need to look at the **gold-fringed flag**<sup>26</sup> that is displayed in federal (and state) courts.

While in our world the fringe on the flag story is idiotic, and Christian Identity and filled with hate, many of the other Common Law beliefs discussed herein do and filled with hate, many of the other the legal stories in our world.

In our world people write of the federal Constitution dying with the triumph of the New Deal by which the Reconstruction Amendments became part of our Constitution; and of *Erie* revolutionary shift away from natural law.

It will undoubtedly surprise many that the Freeman community of legal scholars, judges and lawyers, shares so many of the underpinnings, although perhaps not dominant, in our world.

## Public Law vs. Private Law

Freemen believe that Anglo-Saxon law has two separate and distinct branches. The branches are Public Law and Private Law. Public law should properly be called civil law (or civil code) which pertains to government made law. Private law is currently known as private law which pertains to the people acting in a law making capacity expressing divine will.

Public law (law of the United States or the civil code) is generated in the following manner

1. An elected body generates a code or written law.
2. The publication of this law signifies that it is in effect and controlling.
3. Litigation resulting from the implementation of this law results in changes or even abrogation.
4. Subsequent code adopted by vote or litigation may replace this public law if subsequent code adopted law is contrary to the old law.

Private law (common law, natural law or law of the United States of America) is generated in the following manner

1. A self governing people may generate a common law trial by filing in the people's jurisdiction to create a court order which becomes law subject to litigation.

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<sup>25</sup> Presumably, the admiralty label extends to the state courts because state procedure codes mirror the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and because in *Erie*, State law was acknowledged to be other than the Common Law.

Note that in our civil rules, CR 1 and 2 make clear that there is only one form of action (whether a case at law or in equity) known as civil action. Such a statement satisfies a Freeman view that our state courts are acting as admiralty courts.

<sup>26</sup> More on the importance of the flag *infra*.

2. The court order can be modified by further litigation until a point of law is disputed by two or more parties.

3. A jury trial may then settle the dispute.

4. Subsequent trials may then amend, abrogate, modify or suspend this order.

Far superior to either private law or public law is Common Law, defined in this manner

1. It is God's law as imprinted on the hearts and mind of His people.

2. The final formal expression of this law in a The final formal expression of this law and express this knowledge by creating a judgment and express this knowledge by creating a judgment based on principles of right and wrong.

Source: American Patriot Network, *The Common Law Court of the United States of America* (visited May 13, 1999) <<http://www.civil-liberties.com/commonlaw/common.html>>.

## Public Law vs. Private Law Diversity of Jurisdiction

Freemen who have quieted title with respect to their citizenship and adherence to private law instead of public law creates federal court jurisdiction. See United States Constitution Article III United States Constitution believe that the federal court's role in a private law/public law conflict is believe that the federal court's role in a which law will apply.

Freemen must properly raise the diversity issue in state court. The Common Law Court of the United States of America, a Freeman must The Common Law Court of the United States of to obtain a federal court declaration that private law must be applied to the resolution of the case at bar

1. The litigant who claims the wrong law is being applied to the issue.

2. The litigant may use documents generated by the courts of the litigant's domicile.

3. The Federal courts are then properly noticed of the applicable law resulting litigation.

Source: American Patriot Network, *The Common Law Court of the United States of America* (visited May 13, 1999) <<http://www.civil-liberties.com/commonlaw/common.html>>.

To convince a federal court that the law applicable to the case is private law, the Freeman must establish that the following two conditions exist

1. The litigant who claims the dispute exists can prove that a diversity of citizenship exists. This diversity must be that an individual is not a United States citizen.

2. The other court will assume jurisdiction of the litigation (private law judgment).

<sup>27</sup> United States Constitution Article III, § 2 provides that

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

The exact scope of this provision was altered by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. This amendment precludes suits against the states. Const. Amendment XI (The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. ).

*Id.*

Proof sufficient to satisfy both elements can be found in the following facts

1. The litigant making this claim has chosen the applicable citizenship (abrogating US Citizenship) to a private law jurisdiction.
2. A court order exist that establishes this change of domicile.
3. A court with litigation rules exist that establishes this change of domicile.
4. A court with litigation rules exist in which the litigant can obtain private law relief.
5. This private law court system recognizes the original This private law court system recognizes the original the Federal Courts.
6. This private law court system recognizes the supplemental subject matter the US District Courts mandated by operation of the Constitution.

*Id.*

Once the correct law is determined to be common law or private law, it is unclear to continue in a Washington Superior, District or Municipal Court to continue in a Washington Superior, District or Municipal Court closest Common Law Court for trial.

## Non-Violent Freemen Actions

The Common Law distinguishes between moves members should take. Celebrated if taken, celebrated if taken, but are not expected of all. Not surprisingly, the moves it requires of Citizens are nonviolent. Freemen are not oblivious to the State's ability to win most contests of violence. By not demanding violent moves, it helps ensure that the State will not kill all their members who makes room for followers who are not prepared to die for the Freemen movement to dramatically expand.

Instead of violence, Common Law requires giving up one's social security card and one's driver's license; relying on certain sections of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) invoking Common Law court process to declare oneself a Sovereign Citizen.

**Social Security Numbers, Passports, and Driver's Licenses.** After the Constitution was suspended in 1933 by President Roosevelt, the Common Law limped along until 1938 when it was summarily replaced by statutory law/admiralty law/commercial law, a new form of social contract. It is this new and illegitimate social contract that must be disavowed.

No more perfect symbol for this new social contract could be imagined than a federally-issued social security card, concrete evidence of a new government that took over after the New Deal. To accomplish full secession from our United States, Federal welfare payments, must also be renounced.

State governments are as illegitimate as the federal government. So, Freemen contracts with a State must also be renounced. As social security numbers evidence federal control, so to do licenses exhibit State power. And a driver's license requirement is seen as an interference with one's basic constitutional right to free travel, the same for these actions tie one's identity as a Sovereign to the land.

**The Uniform Commercial Code.** Unlike the Bible and the Constitution, it does strike one that the UCC is an unlikely source for a community of radicals. But once one understands that the community has received the State's jurisdiction based on contract law (not the original social contract of the Constitution but some illegitimate contract substituted for the Constitution after 1938), the Freemen's obsession with the UCC begins to make sense. If the task is to extricate oneself from a reign conceived of as based on illegitimate contract law, the UCC is a natural place to look. Freemen do not hold the

UCC sacred, but they do insist that because our community, however wrongly, does worship our UCC, we are bound to follow it.

Thus, Thus, in the Common Law the UCC becomes a central text. Thus, in the Common Law the UCC becomes a central text. In the Common Law that our United States must follow since our law has renounced constitutional law, Common Law, and Equity, leaving only contract law.

**UCC 1-207** explains in the comment that the section is intended for situations where one party is claiming as of right something which the other believes is unwarranted. The State is claiming a right to impose its extra-constitutional, statutory, and regulatory law on the Common Law community, and the community considers that assumption of sovereignty over its members to be unwarranted. So UCC 1-207 takes on enormous significance. Consider this UCC section to provide an outlet for the Comment to the section says

This section provides a machinery for dealing with the contract despite a pending dispute of going ahead with delivery, acceptance, or protest, under reserve, with reservation of all our rights and the like &

Freemen are advised by their law to invoke the phrases listed by UCC authors: State, State, State, including U.D. (under duress), all rights reserved, and without prejudice. So, frequently rely on these phrases when filing documents in our courts.

**UCC 1-103.** The out provided by UCC 1-207 places the Freeman back within the Common Law because UCC 1-103 provides that common law where that law is not specifically displaced by the UCC. Under UCC 1-207, section 1-103 leaves the relation with the State to be determined by Common Law through Common Law courts. Freeman assert that UCC 1-103 compels Common Law as determined by Common Law courts. UCC 1-207.

**UCC 3-501.** This section allows a party to refuse payment of a note if necessary endorsement or otherwise fails to comply with the terms of an agreement or other applicable law or rule. Freeman use this section in response to traffic tickets. Since Freeman have reserved their rights under UCC 1-207 not bound by the State's authority, the presentment process (traffic ticket, criminal complaint, information) is not in compliance with the agreement of the parties. The result is the words refused for cause without dishonor the words refused for cause usually with a cite to UCC 3-501.

**Liens.** Freeman insist on following our law by locating their right to maintain their own law in our State law. However, Freeman argue that our law can only be read as the Common Law dictates (contract law/UCC). This guarantees conflict with our law, since to us it makes no sense to appeal to the UCC as a means of freeing oneself from the reach of federal and state law or courts, just as giving up one's social security card or driver's license appears random and ridiculous.

These nonviolent moves, though, encourage Freeman to flout State law, which encourages violence (filing charges, jail) in response. So, the Common Law must next provide legitimate actions.

A nonviolent Freeman response authorizes Sovereign Citizens to interfere with the proper State agents who attempt to unlawfully enforce State law against Common Law members. Sovereign Citizens file liens (notice the tie to the land) against government actions against such a Citizen. These liens are filed in county offices in our system, and sit









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# The Only True Government

The loss of the American union of states based upon the Constitution for the United States took place on April 15, 1861. Since that date, there has been no legal government in the United States. That is the claim of the Christian Jurist Society, one of the least-known yet most influential of the Freemen movement.

The Christian Jural Society is a logical end product of Freeman's reconstruction of a Christian government throughout the United States by creating small pockets of self-governing Christians who are tied to a national Christian government through their chosen representatives.

JuralJural societies believe that they are the only legitimJural societies believe that they are the only legitimate form of  
AsAs these societies proliferate thrAs these societies proliferate throughout theAs these societies proliferate throughout the co  
core core nonviolent believers deeper into the movement than any previous manifestation of the movement. If  
ththethesethese societies continue to grow and all indications are that they will they could become the most  
powerful force within the Freeman movement.

## Jural Societies Must Remain Anonymous

Jural societies to a large degree have remained unmonitored. OJural societies to a large degree have remained unmonitored. Jural societies shun publicity. Jural societies have a hard-and-fast rule Do not speak with the media.

## A Self-Sufficient Government With All Power at the Local Level

The Christian Jural Society is the brainchild of a religious right think tank. The society's leaders are John Quade, a conservative actor whose film credits include Clint Eastwood's *EVERY WHICH WAY BUT LOOSE* and *EVERY WHICH WAY YOU CAN*, as well as *THE STING* and the miniseries *ROOTS*, serves as the society's spokesperson for the country, holding well-attended seminars on how to establish a jural society.

Regional jural societies are made up of approximately 100 families the number recommended in Regional jural societies manual, THE BOOK OF THE HUNDREDS. Each based somewhat on an updated version of the Posse Comitatus model. Their seminar information states

Since the existing governments are *de fide facde facto* and without true law, once the jural society is formed it becomes the ultimate civil authority in the country. &It is a Christian body, based on God's Law, the *lex non scripta* [Common Law].

The jural societies are completely self-sufficient. Their court system includes the jural societies are completely self-sufficient to handle interpretation of scripture, a **court of assize** to handle civil matters under Common Law, a **grand jury** to investigate charges brought before it. Each jural society has its own enforcement apparatus referred to as the lawful Posse Comitatus, referred to as the lawful Posse Comitatus, or by enforcing sentences.

30 **Jural.** 1. Pertaining to natural or positive right, or to the doctrines or rights and obligations; as jural relations. 2. Of or pertaining to jurisprudence; juristic; juridical. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 989 (4th ed. 1968).

31 See *Jeffry.com* *Dedicated to Restoring the Republic Through God, Information & Technology!* (visited May 26, 1999) <<http://www.jeffry.com>> and its link to *The King s Men of the Christian Jural Society Press, a Christian Common Law Think Tank* (visited May 26, 1999) <<http://jeffry.com/law/law/htm>>.

Jural societies elect officers who serve as their representatives at the state and national societies elect officers who serve society. A local or county jural society is considered to be the most powerful, national being the least powerful.

As the name implies, the Christian Jural Society is designed for Christians. Christians are not allowed to join under any circumstances. To be a voting member of a jural society, a person must file papers terminating all other voter registration. Once a person must file papers terminating thousands have, it becomes the only form of government in his or her life.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>32</sup> The unofficial King's Men website provides the following description of The California Christian Jural Society (visited May 26, 1999) <<http://www.jeffry.com/law/law.htm>>

#### AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CALIFORNIA JURAL SOCIETY

A Jural society is an organized political community and a synonym of nation, state, and county. It is Founded in Law, organized upon the basis of a fundamental Law, and existing for the recognition and protection of Rights. The purpose of The California Jural Society is to reestablish the de jure government of the California Republic through county based houses of delegates duly elected by those Electors who desire a return to a lawful government. Due to the loss of the American Union prior to the war of northern aggression, when the southern states walked out of Congress, resulting in a sine die situation, a de facto government was created after hostilities ceased. The states of the earlier union became franchisees of that de facto national government known as the United States. Today, the result is a government of lawlessness, enforcing code through arbitrary and capricious means, by way of military procedure at the direction of the commander-in-chief. That code, created by executive orders and a militarily conscripted Congress (voted in by the franchised people of the franchised state), is then delegated for enforcement by the various branches of government (departments prior to the Civil War). These administrative agencies are thus operating outside of true positive law and are simply code enforcement services. For these and many other reasons, it is essential for the people of California to return to a proper elector status, become involved with The California Jural Society at their county level, in order to return to the Law that made America a great and prosperous nation.

#### ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION

I. The Jural Society is the ultimate civil authority of the county and wields the same power as the county board of supervisors, and much more. The Jural Society is a Christian organization, based on Biblical principals, common law and the Constitutions, State and National. The Jural Society is comprised of three parts, first, it is the county Grand Jury in de jure venue and jurisdiction, separate of the current de facto government, second, the Jural Society maintains an Assise Court for those who wish to avoid being judged by the ungodly and unbelievers, third, the Jural Society is the civil authority and handles all necessary, day-to-day business within the county as is needed to provide services to the county public at large. Its elected officers are sent as delegates to the State Jural Society to represent their county. At the county level, it has the descetion [sic] to maintain any action to protect the county for the people, as the people dictate in their local

Jural Society to acquire the above mentioned services and the needs of the people as they may desire.

II. The Militia shall be subordinate to the civil authority as per Article 1, Section 12 of the Constitution of California, 1849. The Jural Society extends the civil protection to the Militia, and the Militia extends physical protection to the Jural Society. The Militia is also to be utilized for civil process until such time the proper officers are elected to relieve the Militia of that particular duty. For the time being, the Militia can and will be utilized for the process of the Grand Jury and the Assise Court.

III. The Ecclesiastical Society provides scriptural guidance and influence to the Jural Society and Militia. They maintain social, mental, physical, religious, spiritual, and biblical welfare in the county. They are an independent body that by God's Law must speak out and step in when the Jural Society or the Militia is in the wrong. They provide the proper checks and balances between the Jural Society and the Militia to maintain a proper Republican Form of Government under Gods [sic]

Law. They are utilized to render opinions on biblical matters when it is requested by the Assise Court.

IV. The Assise Court can hear issues brought to it by various methods. The petitioners request the Jural Society to be heard on their matter, and enter it upon the record. When this is done, the petitioners are requested to sign a binding arbitration agreement to abide by the decision of the Assise Court, as per Article 1, Section 10, of The Constitution of the United States of America. After this is done, the petitioners file briefs with the Assise Court. The Assise Court proceeds to adduce the evidence and render a judgment based upon their findings. This process should take less than two (2) weeks.

V. The Grand Jury is a free and independent body that adduces its own evidence and delivers their findings to the Jural Society. If the Grand Jury findings need process of service, the Jural Society directs the Militia to do the Process to bring the man, woman, or evidence before the Court.

VI. The Jural Society, Militia, and Ecclesiastical Society need to redress the de facto government in all of its branches. All three of these de jure government elements must maintain a strong Christian attitude in redressing for grievances. The executive, legislative and judicial branches at the city, county, state and national level must all first be redressed for grievances. We must continue to organize the de jure government and maintain a passive attitude unless and until offered no other avenue.

VII. The Jural Society officers must be elected by the Electors of the county that are not members of the Jural Society. All ballots cast by Electors will not be done in secret as Satan would have it, but by open and public elections. This must be done to have a Republican Form of Government and to establish the Jural Society as a legitimate body politic, de jure. This can be accomplished by canceling one's voter registration as per the current California Code section 700, 701, in order to cast a ballot as an Elector. As it is required to only request the cancellation of the registration by the registered voter. This

## 2,000 A.D. A New Christian Government Now!

TheThe ultimate goal of the jural society is to create The ultimate goal of the jural society is to create a national govThe thethe head of that government. Jural societies believe that this must be accomplished bethe head of that government. Jural s earth.earth. As with the rest of the apocalyptheearth. As with the rest of the apocalyptic Freemearth. As with the rest o urgency to accomplish their goal before the year 2000.

Although it is still unclear just how violent the jural societies will become in their effort to be self-governed, there is evidence that the most radical forces governed, there are them. Several of the jural society members are Christian Identity proponents and a tree.

Ilf jural societies are being controlled by the Freeman s molf jural societies are being controlled by the Freeman s mo  
forfor the execution of judges, prosecutors, and other officials, these societfor the execution of judges, prosecutors, and  
Freemen threat to date.

make s one an Elector, and for those who have never voted or registered, it takes only a signed affidavit statement of the same.

## CONCLUSION

When these three entities are occupied and maintained by Christian men and women, under God's Law, and are operating within this country again, then, and only then, will we have a proper de jure government.

Patrons may write to: Randy Lee.,  
general delivery.  
Canoga Park Post Office.  
Canoga Park, California.  
or call: 818-347-7080 (voice), 818-313-8814 (fax)

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## The Freeman Counselor

It has been our experience that Freeman will not accept any representation by membIt has been our experience Washington Washington StatWashington State Bar Association. Our world prohibits representation by anyone not admitted to the b aa Freeman s counselor cannot be permitted to act in our courts on a Freea Freeman s counselor cannot be permitted activityactivity in our system is to condone a crime the unlawful practice of lawactivity in our system is to condone a crime defendant.

Since Freeman often refuse to an Since Freeman often refuse to answer qu Since Freeman often refuse to answer  
 establishestablish (1) whether the Freeman defendant is indigent, and (2) whether the Freeman defeestablish (1) whether the Fr  
 hishis or her right to counsel. This creates a clear potential appelhish or her right to counsel. This creates a clear potential a  
 aa 6th and 14th Amendment right to the assistanca 6th and 14th Amendment right to the assistance a 6th and 14th Amendm  
 punishedpunished by imprisonment, *see e.g. Gideon v. WainwrGideon v. Wainwright*, 372 U.S. 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792  
 (1963),(1963), and every such defendant also has the right to voluntarily and intelligen(1963), and every such defendant also  
 counsel,counsel, *Faretta v. California*, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Care 4  
 establish a proper record of the Freeman defendant s waiver of this right.

## A Public Defender s Conflict of Interest ?

ButBut what is wrong with our lawyers? Freeman assert But what is wrong with our lawyers? Freeman assert tBut tCitizenCitizen who has properly attained that status from a Common Law coCitizen who has properly attained that status legislative legislative (i.e. derisive) creature of a de facto State established by executive order and military rule, FreemanFreeman posit tFreeman posit that it is obvious such a lawyer has an inherent conflict of interest in arguing before judges who belong and submit to the same State entity.

## Bar Association Approval to Practice Law A Title of Nobility ?

AA person may not appear as an atA person may not appear as an attorney or cA person may not appear as an attorney  
prapracticepractice law inpractice law in this state until becoming an active member of the Washington State Bar Association  
Admission to Practice Rule 1(b).

FreemenFreemen assert that the privilege to practiFreemen assert that the privilege to practice Freeman assert that the the createdcreated State supreme court) is actually a title of nobility mandacreated State supreme court) is actually a title of nobil. is prohibited by Article I ofthe U.S. Constitution

~~§§ 9. &No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States; and no person~~  
office office ooffice of profit oroffice ofprofit or trust under them, shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of  
anyany present, emany present, emoluany present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever, from any king p  
foreign state.

FreemenFreemen argue that to them, de facto Washington State, for exFreemen argue that to them, de facto Washing governmentgovemment act done in cogovernment act done in contgovernment act done in contradiction to the Constitution is thatthat no bar association lawyer holding such a title of nobility can or should be accepthat no bar association lawyer hold condcondoningcondoning an unconstitutional act, and acceptingjurisdiction of the State court over Freemen, somethcondoning a self-respecting Freeman could ever allow.

## The Missing 13th Amendment Lawyers Prohibited From Serving in Government

The Title of Nobility argument discussed previously is based on the missing 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution which would have automatically strip citizenship from anyone who accepted a title of nobility from serving in government employment. The title given to a lawyer (and judge) is as if they were a noble. Thus, it is argued that all lawyers and judges in this country are illegitimate. Thus, it is argued that all lawyers and judges are committing treason by doing so, and may be ignored by a Sovereign Court. The article's discussion is summarized as follows:

**The Thirteenth Amendment.** In 1789, the House of Representatives considered 17 possible Constitutional Amendments, some of which would ultimately become the Bill of Rights. The House proposed seventeen and the Senate reduced the list to twelve. During this process, Senator Tristram Dalton (Mass.) proposed an amendment seeking to prohibit and provide a penalty for any American accepting a title of nobility. This amendment was not passed, this was the first time a title of nobility amendment was proposed.

Twenty years later, in January 1810, Senator Philip Thomas proposed a similar amendment that, after twice being considered by a committee, was passed by the Senate by a vote of 19 to 5. On May 1, 1810, the House approved the amendment by a vote of 87 to 3. This proposed Thirteenth Amendment read as follows:

If any citizen of the United States shall accept, claim, receive or retain any title of nobility or honour, or shall, with intent to accept and retain any present, pension, office or emolument, whatever, from any emperor, king, prince or foreign person, such person shall cease to be a citizen of the United States and be incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under them, or under any of them.

**Historical Context.** To understand the meaning of this amendment, one must understand its historical context. At the time of the American Revolution, King George III and other monarchs of Europe saw democracy as an unnatural, ungodly ideological threat every bit as radical as communism was once regarded by modern western nations.

Even though the Treaty of Paris ended the Revolutionary War, the existence of the United States threatened other monarchies. The United States stood as a heroic model for others who struggled against oppression. The French Revolution (1789-1799) and the Polish national uprising (1794) were in part encouraged by the American Revolution.

Their survival at stake, the monarchies sought to destroy or subvert the American system of government. Knowing they could not do so by more overt methods of political subversion, employing spies and secret agents skilled in bribery and legal deception. Since governments run on money, much of the counterrevolutionary efforts emanated from English banks.

**Banks and Money.** In seeking to destroy the United States, the monarchies sought to destroy the United States' money. In seeking to destroy the United States' money, crimes, including fraud, conversion, and theft. To escape punishment, they formed alliances with the best lawyers and judges money could buy. These alliances

<sup>33</sup> David M. Dodge, *The Missing 13th Amendment* (August 1, 1991) (visited June 6, 1999) <<http://odur.le.t.rug.nl/~usa/E/thirteen/thirteen1.htm>>.

For a stinging rebuke of Dodge's article, see Jol Silver Smith, *The Real Titles of Nobility Amendment FAQ Exposing extremist lies about the Missing Thirteenth Amendment* (June 19, 1997) (visited June 6, 1999) <<http://www.nyx.net/~jsilvers/nobility.html>>.

originally forged in Europe, spread to the colonies and later into the newly formed United States.

Despite their criminal foundation, these alliances generated great wealth and ultimate respectability. The English bankers and lawyers wanted respectability. The English bankers and businessmen so as their fortunes grew the British monarch so as their fortunes grew the British granting them titles of nobility.

**Titles of Nobility.** Historically, the British peerage system referred to knights as Squires and to those who bore the knights' shields as Esquires and to those who bore the knights' shields physical violence gave way to the more civilized physical violence gave way to the more civilized (and more profitable) than the sword, and the clever writer (and more profitable) than the sword, and the clever writer (lawyers) came to hold titles of nobility. The most common title was Esquire (lawyers) came to hold titles today by some lawyers.)

**International Bar Association.** In colonial America, attorneys trained but most held no title of nobility or honor. There was no requirement that one be a lawyer to hold the position of district attorney, attorney general, or to hold the position of district attorney, attorney general choice was not restricted to a lawyer and there were no state or national bar associations.

The only organization that certified lawyers was the International (IBA), chartered by the King of England, headquartered in London, associated with the international banking system. the rank Esquire, a title of nobility. the rank Esquire, a title of nobility. the 13th Amendment sought to prohibit. Why? Because the loyalty was suspect. Bankers and lawyers with an Esquire were suspect. Bankers and lawyers with an Esquire behaved the monarchy; members of any organization whose principle purposes were the monarchy; members of any organization economic.

Article 1, Section 9 of the Constitution<sup>34</sup> sought to prohibit the International Bar Association (or any agency that granted titles of nobility) from operating in America. the Constitution neglected to specify a penalty (loss of citizenship) was proposed meaning of the amendment was to prohibit foreign governments and bankers from voting, to foreign governments skills to subvert the government.<sup>35</sup>

**Honor.** The missing Amendment is referred to as the title but the second prohibition against honour (honor) may be more significant. The archaic definition of honor as used in 1810 meant anyone obtaining or having privilege over another. A contemporary example of an honor granted to only a few Americans is the privilege of being a judge. Lawyers attendant privileges and powers; non-lawyers cannot.

By prohibiting honors, the missing Amendment prohibits any advantage or position that would grant some citizens an unequal opportunity to achieve that would grant some citizens an unequal

<sup>34</sup> ...No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any King whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State...

<sup>35</sup> Silversmith's article, *supra*, asserts that no debates about the proposed amendment survive. One theory is that the amendment was a reaction to the involvement of Napoleon's nephew, Jerome Bonaparte, in American public life a few years earlier. Nathaniel Macon (a Republican from North Carolina) noted that he considered the vote on this question as deciding whether or not we were to have members of the Legion of Honor in this country. The Federalists thus may have introduced the proposal in an attempt to avoid embarrassment about their own associations with the British aristocracy....Another theory is that the amendment reflected the general animosity to foreigners evident before the War of 1812...There is not a shred of evidence to support the extremist theory that the amendment was part of an international banking/legal conspiracy, as claimed by extremists.



## The International Bar Association

Since we are being run by lawyers beholden to an international law, only Admiralty Jurisdiction (international law) exists in our courts, and recognizes no civil rights, no Bill of Rights. And who better to enforce this law than our country's traitorous lawyers under Janet Reno?

Loss of nationality by native-born or naturalized citizen; voluntary action; burden of proof; presumptions

(a) A person who is a national of the United States whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by voluntarily performing any of the following acts with the intention of relinquishing United States nationality

(1) obtaining naturalization in a foreign state upon his own application or upon an application filed by a duly authorized agent, after having attained the age of eighteen years; or

(2) taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof. &

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ByBy flying the flag, the ship owner gave notice to all those who enter into contracts with theBy flying the flag, the mastermaster that he intends the law of that flag master that he intends the law of that flag to regulatmaster that he intends the law of that flag to regulate. This notice has an effect similar to the present day choice of law provisions found in many contractan effect similar to the present day choice of law provisions found in many contracts. However, however, is only one of several factors to be considered in determining law applicable in maritime cases.

## The American Flag of Peace

The United States Code provides that [t]he flag of the United States shall be thirteen stripes, alternate red and white; and the union of the flag shall be forty-eight stars, white in a blue field. 4 U.S.C. § 1, with one star added for each additional state, 4 U.S.C. § 2. A flag that strictly complies with this definition is generally identified by Freeman as the American flag of peace.

## Flag Fringe Velcro Anyone?

The flag that is present in most courtrooms and other governmental buildings is the language of the Code due to the addition of yellow-fringe. This practice first arose in our military branches, which is why Freeman generally call such a flag a flag of war.<sup>39</sup>

39 As explained in one of the recent federal cases addressing a Freeman's claim that a state court that convicted him was deprived of jurisdiction over him by the presence of a fringe flag

In the 1920s, Army Regulation 260-10 required troops in the field to fly flags with a yellow silk fringe. *See* 34 Op. Atty. Gen. 483, 484-85 (1925). The Adjutant General of the Army believed that [t]he War Department... knows of no law which either requires or prohibits the placing of a fringe on the flag of the United States. No Act of Congress or Executive order has been found bearing on the question. In flag manufacture a fringe is not considered to be a part of the flag, and it is without heraldic significance. In the common use of the word it is a fringe and not a border. A ancient custom sanctions the use of fringe on the regimental colors and standards, but there seems to be no good reason or precedent for its use on other flags. *Id.* at 485 (quoting an untitled circular of the Adjutant General dated Mar. 28, 1924). The United States Attorney General concurred, noting that the presence of a fringe on the flag can not be said to constitute an unauthorized addition to the design prescribed by statute. *Id.* The President may, however, determine whether the Army or Navy display or remove fringes from their flags or standards. *Id.* at 485-86. The latest effective executive order, signed by President Eisenhower, himself a military man, did not address this issue. *See* Executive Order No. 10834, 24 Fed. Reg. 6865 (1959), reprinted in 4 U.S.C.A. § 1 notes (1985). Therefore, [the plaintiffs] claims against the above-listed Defendants must be dismissed because his factual predicate is incorrect as a matter of law. Even if the Army or Navy do display United States flags surrounded by yellow fringe, the presence of yellow fringe does not necessarily turn every such flag into a flag of war. Far from it: in the words of the Adjutant General of the Army, [i]n flag manufacture a fringe is not considered to be a part of the flag, and it is without heraldic significance. 34 Op. Att'y Gen. at 485.

If fringe attached to the flag is of no heraldic significance, the same is true a fortiori of an eagle gracing the flagpole. Nor are the fringe or the eagle of any legal significance. Even were [the plaintiff] to prove that yellow fringe or a flagpole eagle converted the state court's United States flag to a maritime flag of war, the Court cannot fathom how the display of a maritime war flag could limit the state court's jurisdiction...

*McCann v. Greenway*, 952 F.Supp. 647, 650-51 (W.D.Mo.1997) (citations and footnotes omitted).





# MONEY

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## Corruption of the Constitution 1933

TheThe Common Law s discussion that is basedThe Common Law s discussion that is based on our undThe Common Law  
ortho dox

TheThe United States Constitution was basically the shackles placed on the federal  
govgovernmentgovernment by a sovereign people. The people possessed God-given rights. Those rigovernment by a so  
werewere only secured by the Constitution. All rights not specifically granted to the  
government were reserved for the people.

ThisThis country started as a constitutional republic, that is, a union of sovereign nation  
states. The federal government was to be an agent of the states.

AsAs a safeguard, the Constitution provides that during times oAs a safeguard, the Constitution provides that during  
presidentpresident may assume all powers. These emergency powerspresident may assume all powers. These emer  
PresidentPresident Lincoln assumed all powers during the Civil War. SiPresident Lincoln assumed all powers during  
rebellion, we may say that he established a constitutional dictatorship.

SinceSince then, however, the definition of emergencies requiring total controSince then, however, the definition  
stretchedstretched to include economic problems, social imbalances, and perceived threats to the  
U.S.U.S. by U.S. by a forU.S. by a foreign country s actions on another continent. When authoritarian control is  
exeexercitedexercited during times other than rebellion or invasion, it is an unconstitutional  
dictatorship.dictatorship. The federal government has overstdictatorship. The federal government has overstepped  
Constitution.

ThroThrouThroughThrough the insidious, yet steady encroachment of emergency powers, the  
governmengovernmentgovernment has now achieved the ability to rule the people by statute or decree, without  
thethe vote or consent of the ruled. Through a mazethe vote or consent of the ruled. Through a maze of political  
powerspowers granted to Franklin D.powers granted to Franklin D. Roosevelt ipowers granted to Franklin D. Roosevelt  
becomebecome part of the U.S. Code as permanent everyday powers. America has continued  
underunder the unconstitutional dictatorship of war and emerunder the unconstitutional dictatorship of war and  
than 60 years later.

EUGENEUGENE SCHRODER AND MICKI NELLIS, CONSTITUONSTITUTION: FACACT OR FICTION (Cleburne: Buffalo Creek, 1995),  
atat 1-2. (Schroder is the movement at 1-2. (Schroder is the movement s most importat 1-2. (Schroder is the movemen  
CommonCommon Law supporters from 32 stateCommon Law supporters from 32 states Common Law supporters from  
Common Law.)

SchroderSchroder makes quite a claim Schroder makes quite a claim unbekSchroder makes quite a claim unbek  
abandonedabandoned by the government through politicalabandoned by the government through political trickeryabandoned  
AmericanAmerican has a dutyAmerican has a duty to doAmerican has a duty to do whatever it takes to restore the land to constituti  
the Revolutionary War and that is why Freemen must fight this one.

BothBoth our systems starBoth our systems started out aBoth our systems started out at the same place. When did our sy  
originaloriginal and righteous destiny anoriginal and righteous destiny and fall from original and righteous destiny and fall fr  
Abraham Lincoln, some Bill Clinton), the most important of these tales looks to the year 1933.

InIn 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt tookIn 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt took oIn 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt took offi  
nation,nation, the Great Depression. Roosevelt felt that the economic calamity facing the countrynation, the Great Depression. .  
threatthreat threat tothreat to our survival as any invasion. So, he decided to invoke the war and emergency powers that the  
Constitution stated were only to be used in times of rebellion or enemy invasion.

HistoryHistory bears out Schroder s version of the story. RooseveHistory bears out Schroder s version of the story. Roo  
thethe country off the gold standard, and established a new bthe country off the gold standard, and established a new ba







*U.S.U.S. v. Greenstreet*, 912 F.Supp. 224, 229 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (U.S. sued two fo 912 F.Supp. 224, 229 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (U. HomeHome AdmHome AdministrHome Administration for declaratory and injunctive relief in response to UCC-1 financing stat byby borrowerby borrowersby borrowers against federal employees who were named as debtors by Common Law court b bborrowersborrowers were never provided with lawful money under the original loans since they werborrowers were never p gold or silver; Held: financing statements fraudulent and void ab initio) (Citations omitted.).

At the center of the money controversy is a gold worth more than quartz or seashells or lead, if all of them are made by God? In our reality, it is gold. This is a societal illusion, a matter of cultural perspective. It always has, and it always will.

But But to Freeman, electronic money is the last But to Freeman, electronic money is the last step in the BiBut to Fr  
(666),(666), a move to place all commerce in the hands of the Antichrist. Free(666), a move to place all commerce in the hand  
even smart cards will be deemed inconvenient. Banks will turn even smart cards will be deemed inconvenient. Banks  
these codes placed directly on our hands. They believe this evolution in money with these codes placed directly on our han  
guise that smart cards can be stolen, but permanent (invisible to the naked eye) marks on ou guise that smart cards can be  
be.

Regardless of whether you see electronic money as progress or prophecy, one undeniable truth is that whoever controls the computers that send out bits and bytes controls the money.

# A NEW BANKING SYSTEM

We the People was a patriot-for-profit group started by Roy Schwasinger, who promise We the People was a patriot that for a mere \$500 they could receive millions from that for a mere \$500 they could receive millions from the followers, looking for answers to their economic woes in the followers, looking for answers to their economic woes in the meeting.

OrganOrganizersOrganizers oOrganizers of We the People claimed they had won a class-action lawsuit against the governmentgovernment that had resulted in a multibgovernment that had resulted in a multibillion dolgovernment that had governmentgovernment had illegally abandoned the gogovernment had illegally abandoned the gold standard.government Schwasinger and his cohorts eventually made off with \$2.5 million that has never been recovered.

The We the People antigovernment message was just what Schweitzer and the Mont We the People antigovernment wanted to hear. They took the We the People teachings and expanded upon them.

nothing more than the debts of the American people. They decided to emulate the Federal Reserve by forming their own banking system. They declared themselves to be a sovereign township, whforming their own banking them from the federthem from the federal gthem from the federal government. In their minds, being a Sovereign separatelgally create a separate banlegally create a separate banking systemlegally create a separate banking system. All they need print.

TheThe Freeman decided to mix justice with banking. They conveThe Freeman decided to mix justice with banking. publpublicpublic officials guilty of treason. As part of their sentences, in addition to the death penaThe Freeman decided to mix justice with banking. publpublicpublic officials guilty of lawlaw courts decided to impose huge liens agaThe Freeman decided to mix justice with banking. publpublicpublic officials guilty of lawlaw courts decided to impose huge liens against the propertlaw courts decided thenthen back the Freeman money orders and checks in their new then back the Freeman money orders and checks in the American people are backed by the Federal Reserve notes.

In other words, if the Freemen filed \$10 million worth of bogus liens against people they had in their one supreme Court, the Freemen were entitled to write \$10 million orders that were now backed by the property of the corrupt officials.

These These Freeman claimed that thThese Freeman claimed that their banking These Freeman claimed that their banking thethe United States had itthe United States had its ownthe United States had its own banking system, the Montana Freeman s na as well.

Since the systems were the same, the Free men would logi Since the system Uniform Commercial Code that are designed to regulate bUnifc when it comes to following the letter of the law and the UCC.

You might ask that if the Freeman believeYou might ask that if the Freeman believeYou might ask that if the Fre  
similar banking system? Expanding on their We the People predecessors, thsimilar banking system? Expanding on thei  
by money but by their political and religious ideologies.

The purpose of the Freeman system of liens and money orders was to take Reserve Notes out of the United States system so that they could then be reconverted into Reserve Notes out of the United States system; and second to provide a form of money the Freeman actually recognize as legitimate); and second to provide a form of money the Freeman actually were losing their property with a means to pay their debt and avoid foreclosure in our system.

Initially, the Freeman s banking system actually worked. Credit card companies accepted Freeman documents as payment. The IRS accepted Freeman documents as payment. The IRS accepted Freeman mon amount of the tax debt, and promptly sent the group a check for the overpayment.

BuButBut the FreBut the Freeman s ultimate motive was politics, not greed. They ran their school as an effort to establishestablish similar Common Law courts and banking systems across the country in the hope that theiestablish similar Com



## Arraignments Let the Games Begin





## A Freeman s Name Why First Middle, Last?

FreemenFreemen will frequently separate their first and middle names from what we coFreemen will frequently separate the  
i.e.i.e. Johni.e. John Qui.e. John Quincy, Public or John Quincy: of Public. The reason for this practice is that an individ  
owns owns his or her first and m owns his or her first and middle name. owns his or her first and middle name. The las  
thisthis belief, some Freeman will give their mthis belief, some Freeman will give their middle namthis belief, some Freeman wi  
will introduce themselves as John Quincy of the family Public.

FreemenFreemen assert that the Book of Life (God s pre-determined list of thoFreemen assert that the Book of Life (Go  
of of God) lists their appellation as First and Middle foof God) lists their appellation as First and Middle followed of God) list  
previousprevious discussion on the importance and true meaning of our system s desprevious discussion on the impor  
appellation.

SinceSince court caleSince court calendars doSince court calendars do not correctly spell (capitalization) nor use com  
Freemen assert that the person charged with a crime is not the Freeman defendant before the court.

## Capitals Indicate a Corporation?

WeWe have been told that one oWe have been told that one of the style mWe have been told that one of the style m  
namednamed is a corporation. Sinnamed is a corporation. Since Fnamed is a corporation. Since Freeman are human beings and  
be in all capital letters. The source ofthe style manual is unknown.

## Sui Juris

FreemenFreemen ofFreemen often sign Freeman often sign their name followed by the phrase sui juris.<sup>42</sup> While such a c  
impactimpact in our system, Freeman apparently use this moniker to give our system notice timpact in our system, Freeman app  
aa Sovereign Citizen. A similar tactic is employed by Freeman use of the flag on their person or on  
documents presented to our system. *See Trespassing on My Venue The Flag, supra.*

## The Common Law Seal Your Thumbprint

ManyMany Freeman documents have a thMany Freeman documents have a thumbpMany Freeman documents have a  
consideredconsidered a common law seal. *See The American s BThe American s Bulletin*, Vol. 17, Issue 12 at 11 (Decemb  
( Original( Original Affidavits were duly witnessed and lawfully signed by Affiants ( Original Affidavits were duly  
thumbprints or same, constituting common law seal(s). )

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<sup>42</sup> **Sui Juris.** Lat. Of his own right; possessing full social and civil rights; not under any legal disability; or the power of another, or guardianship. Having capacity to manage one s own affairs; not under legal disability to act for one s self. Black s Law Dictionary 1602 (4th ed. 1968).

**Alieni Juris.** Lat. Under the control, or subject to the authority, of another person; *e.g.*, an infant who is under the authority of his father or guardian; a wife under the power of her husband. The term is contrasted with Sui Juris. *Id.*, at 96.

# FREEMEN-SPEAK A REFERENCE CHART

Freemen terminology is often difficult to understand. We hope that the following reference Freemen terminology chart, written from a Freemen perspective of their and our government, will assist you.<sup>43</sup>

| u.S.A.  | U.S.  |
|---|---|
| DESCRIPTION   | DESCRIPTION   |
| In The united States of America   | In the United States  |
| A Republic  | A Corporation of England in 1871<br>[To incorporate means to become a part of something bigger]   |
| Having a de jure form of government (lawful)  | A de facto government (unlawful)  |
| Created by Sovereign Citizens   | Created by merchants and bankers through President Lincoln and his cohorts [by acts of treason]<br>They also forced the South and other States to secede.<br>This Martial Law government is a fiction managing civil affairs. |
| Started with the Declaration of Independence in 1776, the Articles of Confederation in 1778, and the Constitution in 1787   | Started with the Gettysburg Address in 1864, and the Incorporation of the District of Columbia by Act of February 21, 1871, under the Emergency War Powers Act and the Reconstruction Acts                                    |
| The Articles of Confederation are still in operation. The Constitution was added to restrict and limit the federal venue.   | Ruled from the District of Columbia under Masonic Rule.<br>US Titles and Codes call DC the United States  |
| The Constitution for The united States of America   | The Constitution of the United States   |
| I pledge allegiance to The united States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, One nation under God..."  | Emphasizes Democracy which is the next thing to Socialism which is another form of Communism.   |
| Republic means Government of the people   | Democracy means Rule by Queen of England  |
| The rights of the people are its main concern and maintains all states as Republics   | Gives away our rights, land, parks, and streams, over to a foreign government such as the United Nations by Executive Orders or by decree   |
| Government restricted by the Constitution to the 10 miles square called Washington DC, US possessions, such as Puerto Rico, Guam, and its enclaves for forts and arsenals.  | Expands and conquers by deceit and fraud.<br>Uses words of art to deceive the people.   |
| Represents the American Sovereign Citizens and the Republics among nations.   | Represents its own supposed sovereignty among nations.  |
| Sovereign Citizens are created by God and are answerable to their Maker who is Omnipotent. The Bible is the Basis of all Law and moral standards. In 1820, the USA government purchased 20,000 Bibles for distribution. | This government is god. It sets the morals, and values of those in its jurisdiction. These values are ever changing at their whim.  |
| No state of Emergency and is not at war   | US continues to be in a permanent state of national emergency. (Senate report 93-549 (1973))  |

| u.S.A. | U.S. |
|--------|------|
|--------|------|

<sup>43</sup> See Jack Slevko ff, *The Truth as I see it* (visited June 6, 1999) <<http://www.gemworld.com/USAvsUS.htm>>.

|  |  |
|--|--|
| Adjournment of Congress sine die occurred in 1861  | <p>Still existing as long as:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. State of war or emergency exists</li> <li>2. the President does not terminate martial or emergency powers by Executive Order or decree, or</li> <li>3. the people do not resist submission and terminate by restoring lawful civil courts, processes and procedures under authority of the inherent political powers of the people</li> </ol>  |
| <b>GOVERNING BODY</b>  |  |
| <p>Three separate Departments</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Executive</li> <li>2. Legislature can enact positive law</li> <li>3. Judicial</li> </ol>   | <p>The President (a Caesar) rules by Executive Order (unconstitutional)</p> <p>Congress and the Courts are under the President as branches of the Executive Department</p> <p>Congress sits by resolution not by positive law</p> <p>The Judges are actually referees</p>  |
| <b>CITIZENS</b>  |  |
| Natural-born Citizens of a state of the union are Sovereign, Freemen, and Freeborn Unless that right is given up knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily.  | US citizens (Chattel Property) are belligerents in the field and are subject to its jurisdiction (Washington DC)   |
| Born as Sovereigns   | They are 14th Amendment citizens implemented by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 for the newly freed slaves  |
| <p>Judicial Name (Appellation)</p> <p>Flesh and blood name of a living soul</p> <p>John James, Christianson (note upper and lower case; proper by Rules of English Grammar)</p> <p>Christian Name: John James</p> <p>Family Name: Christianson</p> | <p>Prisoner of war name</p> <p>Fictitious nom de guerre name for a non-living entity</p> <p>JOHN DOE (note all caps)</p> <p>John C. Doe (note middle initial, which is no name at all a fiction)</p> <p>First Name: JOHN</p> <p>Middle Initial: C.</p> <p>Last Name: DOE</p> <p>A fictional persona being surety for the debt as a fiction in commerce (look at the name on driver's license s, social security cards, credit cards, deeds, bank accounts, etc.)</p> |
| Vote counts like one on the Board of Directors   | Vote is a recommendation only  |
|  | <p>U.S. citizens were declared enemies of the U.S. by F.D.R. by Executive Order No. 2040 and ratified by Congress on March 9, 1933</p> <p>F.D.R. changed the meaning of The Trading with the Enemy Act of December 6, 1917 by changing the word without to citizens within the United States</p>   |

| u.S.A.   | U.S.   |
|--|--|
|  | <p>People became surety for the debt by a number of different ways. One way is by a Birth Certificate when the baby's footprint is placed thereon before it touches the land. The certificate is recorded at a County Recorder, then sent to a Secretary of State which sends it to the Bureau of Census of the Commerce Department. This process converts a man's life, labor, and property to an asset of the US government when this person receives a benefit from the government such as a driver's license, food stamps, free mail delivery, etc. This person becomes a fictional persona in commerce. The Birth Certificate is an unrevealed Trust Instrument originally designed for the children of the newly freed black slaves after the 14th Amendment. The US has the ability to tax and regulate commerce.</p> |
| STATES   | STATES   |
| state when used by itself refers to the Republics of The united States of America  | In U.S. Titles and Codes State refers to U.S. possessions such as Puerto Rico, Guam, etc.  |
| All of the states are Republics<br>The Republic of Washington Washington republic Washington state or just Washington  | Politicians of each state formed a new government and incorporated it into the federal US government corporation and are therefore under its jurisdiction.<br>State of Washington corporate Washington Washington State  |
| Sovereign Citizens created the states (Republics) and are Sovereign over the states<br>The Republics and the people created the uSA government and are sovereign over the uSA government | The corporate states are controlled by the US government by its purse strings such as grants, funding, matching funds, revenue sharing, disaster relief, etc.  |
| JUSTICE SYSTEM   | JUSTICE SYSTEM   |
| Judicial Department  | Judicial Branch under the President  |
| Separate from all other Departments  | It is not separate   |
| Judicial venue   | Federal (feudal) venue   |
| Common Law Court(s)  | Equity Courts, Municipal Courts, Merchant Law, Military Law, Marshal Law, Summary Court Martial proceedings, and administrative ad hoc tribunals (similar to Admiralty/Maritime) now governed by The Manual of Courts Martial (under Acts of War) and the War Powers Act of 1933   |
| The 7th Amendment guarantees a trial by jury according to the rules of the common law when the value in controversy exceeds \$20   | All legal actions are pursued under the color of law Color of law means appears to be law, but is not  |
| Common Law has two requirements<br>1. Do not Offend Any one<br>2. Honor all contracts  | Covers a vast number of volumes of text that even attorneys cannot absorb or comprehend such as<br>1. Regulations<br>2. Codes<br>3. Rules<br>4. Statutes   |
| Constitution is the Supreme Law of the land  | No stare decisis. No precedent binds any court because they have no law standard of absolute right and wrong by which to measure a ruling what is law today may not be law tomorrow  |
| Lawful or Unlawful   | Legal or Illegal   |
| Council (Lawyer)   | Attorney   |
| In-Laws (like Son-in-law)  | Attorney-at-law (licensed agents of the court)   |

|  |  |
|--|--|
| Must have damaged party  | Compels performance. No damaged property is necessary  |
| <b>u.S.A.</b>  | <b>U.S.</b>  |
| Maintains rights, freedoms, and liberties  | No rights except Civil Rights. Restricts freedoms and liberties  |
| Bill of Rights, Constitutional Rights, unalienable rights, and fundamental rights are all protected  | US citizens are at the mercy of government and courts  |
| Due Process is required<br>Writ of habeas corpus   | Due Process is optional Sometimes Gestapo-like tactics without reservation   |
| Innocent until proven guilty   | Guilty until proven innocent   |
| Jurors judge the law as well as the facts  | The juror judges only the facts. The judge gives the statute, regulation, code, rule, etc.   |
| <b>DEBT</b>  | <b>DEBT</b>  |
| None!  | Trillions of Dollars<br>First bankruptcy was in 1863<br>In 1865, the total debt was \$2,682,593,026.53 <sup>44</sup><br>A portion was funded by 1040 Bonds to run not less than 10 nor more than 40 years at an interest rate of 6%<br>Members of Congress are the official Trustees in the bankruptcy of the US and the re-organization |
| Would it not be nice to be completely out of debt, personally, and have a stash of gold and silver besides?  | All individual Income Tax revenues are gone before one nickel is spent on services taxpayers expect from government. (Ronald Reagan, 1984, Grace Commission Report)  |
| <b>TAXATION</b>  | <b>TAXATION</b>  |
| Limits on taxation   | No limit on taxation   |
| Direct taxes such as Income taxes are unlawful   | Income taxes are legal and ever increasing   |
| Indirect taxes such as excise tax and import duties are lawful   | Other taxation such as inheritance taxes are legal   |
|  | IRS's 1040 forms originated from the 1040 Bonds used for funding Lincoln's War<br>1863 was the first year an income tax was ever used in US history<br>The IRS is a collection arm of the Federal Reserve. It is not listed as a government agency like other government agencies  |
| <b>FLAG</b>  | <b>FLAG</b>  |
| American Flag  | Not an American flag<br>Some say it is a flag of Admiralty/Maritime type jurisdiction and is not supposed to be used on land.<br>Others say it is not a flag at all but fiction  |
| Prior to the 1950's, state republic flags were mostly flown, but when a USA flag was flown it was one of the following:<br>1. Military flag Horizontal stripes, white stars on blue background<br>2. Peace flag Vertical stripes, blue stars on white background last flown before the Civil War | Appears to be an American flag but has one or more of the following:<br>2. Gold fringe along its borders (called a badge)<br>3. Gold braided cord (tassel) hanging from pole<br>4. Ball on top of pole (last cannon ball fired)<br>5. Eagle on top of pole<br>5. Spear on top of pole  |

<sup>44</sup> As of 9:50 PM on June 6, 1999, the national debt was just under \$6 trillion (\$5,827,792,331,337.00). *The U.S. National Debt Clock* (visited June 6, 1999) <<http://www.toptips.com/debtclock.html>>.

| u.S.A.   | U.S.   |
|--|--|
| Although the codes do not apply here, the uSA Military flag is described in Title 4 U.S.C.   | The flag is not described in Title 4 U.S.C. and therefore is illegal on land except for (1) the President since he is in charge of Naval Forces on high seas, and (2) naval offices and yards. President Eisenhower settled the debate on the width of the fringe.<br>The US government is still under an official state of emergency since March 9, 1933, and possibly as far back as the Civil War   |
| BENEFITS   | BENEFITS   |
| <p>Unalienable rights (God given rights)</p> <p>Enjoy:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Life</li> <li>Liberty</li> <li>Pursuit of Happiness</li> <li>Full property ownership</li> </ol> <p>No US benefits Every living soul is responsible for themselves and has the option of helping others.</p> <p>Each living soul gives accordingly to help others in need and receives the credit or gives the credit to his Maker and Provider.</p> <p>No tax burdens or government debt obligations</p> | <p>Government given rights (which can be taken away at any time)</p> <p>So-called benefits include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Social Security (you paid all your working life and there are no guarantees that there will be money for you)</li> <li>Medicare</li> <li>Medicaid</li> <li>Grants</li> <li>Disaster relief</li> <li>Food Stamps</li> <li>Licenses and Registrations (permission)</li> <li>Privileges only, no rights</li> <li>Experimentation on citizens without their consent</li> </ol> <p>Corporate government takes your money and gets credit for helping others. Politicians in return create more such programs to get more votes. Eventually there is no more to collect and give. Everyone becomes takers and there are no givers. The government then collapses from within. That is why democracy never survives.</p> |
| RECORDS  | RECORDS  |
| <p>Ex-officio clerks</p> <p>County Clerk is also Clerk of the superior court (a court of common law) and courts of record</p> <p>Records are also kept by Citizens such as in a family Bible</p>   | <p>County Clerk</p> <p>Recorders Office created by statute to keep track of this government's holdings which are applied as collateral to the increasing debt.</p> <p>Property recorded at the recorder's office makes the corporate de facto government holders in due course</p> <p>Your TV is not recorded there, therefore you are holder in due course for the TV</p>   |
| Record the date family members are born, married, and the date they pass on in the Family Bible  | Birth Certificate is required. It puts one into commerce as a fictional person   |
| <p>Common Law Marriage</p> <p>Married by a minister or living together for more than 7 years constitutes a marriage</p> <p>Pastor may issue a Certificate of Matrimony</p>   | <p>Must file a Marriage License. The Corporate State becomes the third party to your union, and whatever you conceive is theirs and becomes their property in commerce.</p>  |
| PROPERTY   | PROPERTY   |
| <p>Full and complete ownership</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Allodial Title Land Patents Allodial Freeholder</li> <li>Cannot be taxed (only voluntary)</li> <li>You are king of your castle</li> <li>No government intrusion, involvement or controls</li> </ol>  | <p>Privilege to use</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fee title Feudal Title</li> <li>Grant Deed and Trust Deed (GRANTOR and GRANTEE in all caps are fictional persons)</li> <li>Property tax (must pay)</li> <li>Other taxes (such as water, sewer, school)</li> <li>Subject to control by government</li> <li>Vehicle registration (the incorporated State owns vehicles on behalf of US)</li> <li>Property and vehicles are collateral for the government debt</li> </ol>  |

| u.S.A.  | U.S.   |
|---|--|
| MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE  | MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE   |
| Lawful money gold or silver coinage (minted before 1964)  | Legal tender (dollar bills) which are actually units of debt   |
| Has substance   | Has no substance built on credit   |
| Controlled by Treasury of The United States of America  | Controlled by US Treasury  |
| Real Money<br>Most of us were taught to write an S with two lines through it  | Phony Money<br>All computer programs are designed with the \$ having only one line through it  |
| 1. Silver coins* (silver dollar standard unit of value)<br>2. Gold coins*<br>3. Paper currency* redeemable in gold or silver<br>4. Spanish milled dollar<br>*issued by the Treasury Department of The USA (a republic)                      | 1. Federal Reserve Notes (issued by the Federal Reserve Bank, a private corporation owned by foreign bankers)<br>2. Bonds<br>3. Other Notes evidences of debt<br>4. Cashless society electronic banking  |
| Coinage started in 1783. The first paper currency was issued in 1862. Silver Certificates last printed in 1957. Coinage of Silver coins for circulation ended with the 1964 coins. Redemption of Silver Certificates ended on June 24, 1968 | The government must borrow before Federal Reserve notes are printed. The Federal Reserve Bank pays 2½ cents per Federal Reserve note printed whether \$1 or \$1,000. The US in turn pays the Federal Reserve Bank interest indefinitely for each outstanding note or representation of a note. With electronic banking Federal Reserve notes are created out of nothing and nothing being printed. What a deal!! |
| America's wealth would be like a Pot of Gold  | The Greenback Act was revoked and replaced with the National Banking Act in 1863. An Act passed on April 12, 1866 authorizing the sale of bonds to retire currency called greenbacks. Federal Reserve notes were issued in 1914.   |
| ROADWAYS  | ROADWAYS   |
| Sovereigns have a right to use the public ways  | Driver's licenses are required because driving is a privilege  |
| Liberty of the common way   | May lose privilege or have it suspended at the whim of government  |
| A driver's license can only be required for those individuals or businesses operating a business within the rights-of-ways such as chauffeurs, taxi drivers, and truckers   | Must comply with the Motor Vehicle Code and Department of Licensing regulations, which are forever changing<br>Must comply with the Washington State Patrol  |
| MAIL  | MAIL   |
| Non-domestic<br>Mail that moves outside of Washington DC, its possessions and territories   | Domestic<br>Mail that moves between Washington DC, possessions and territories of the US   |
| Zip Code not required and should not be used  | Zip Codes are required when using jurisdictional regions or zones such as WA, ID, OR   |
| 3 cents Sovereign to Sovereign<br>33 cents otherwise  | Cost is 33 cents for first class   |
| Write out the state completely such as Washington or abbreviated Wash.<br>Never use WA for an address to a Sovereign or in your return address  | Must use jurisdictional regions or zones such as WA, ID, OR<br>Purposely used ad nauseum which means no name at all  |

| u.S.A.   | U.S.   |
|--|--|
| <p>John James, Christianson<br/>general delivery<br/>Port Orchard [Main] Post Office<br/>Port Orchard, Washington state [Zip Exempt]<br/>NON-DOESTIC</p> <p>John James, Christianson<br/>c/o 1234 Main Street<br/>Port Orchard, Washington Republic [98366]<br/>Non-Domestic</p> <p>John James, Christianson<br/>c/o 1234 Main Street<br/>Port Orchard, Washington state [Postal zone 98366]<br/>NON-DOESTIC</p> <p>Anything in brackets or boxes is considered to be excluded from the rest of the document</p> | <p>JOHN C. DOE<br/>1234 Main Street<br/>Port Orchard, WA 98366</p> <p>JOHN DOE<br/>1234 Main Street<br/>Port Orchard, WA 98366</p> <p>John C. Doe<br/>1234 Main Street<br/>Port Orchard, WA 98366</p> <p>All caps and/or middle initial makes the name a fiction (a non-living entity)</p>   |
| Patrons receive mail by general delivery at main post office or post offices in existence prior to the creation of corporate government  | Since July 1, 1863, Customers receive free delivery to any location having a mailing address or PO Box (a corporate government benefit)  |
| GUNS   | GUNS   |
| <p>Sovereign Citizens have a right to own and use guns<br/>Right to bear arms against enemies, foreign and domestic</p> <p>The founding fathers knew the importance of citizens protecting themselves from governments who get out of hand.</p>  | <p>This government wants to disarm the Citizens so as to have complete control and power.</p> <p>Every tyrannical government in the past has taken away the guns to prevent any serious opposition or rebellion. History continues to repeat itself because the new generations who come along do not know or tend to forget about the past and will say it will not happen here.</p>  |
| 2nd Amendment protects the Right of the people to keep and bear arms   | <p>Disregards the 2nd Amendment or justifies what weapons should not be legal. Ever changing and ever restrictive</p> <p>Requires registration of guns (and their owners)</p> <p>Any of you who saw the motion picture Red Dawn realize that the enemy finds these lists and then goes door to door collecting all of the guns.</p>  |
| RELIGION   | RELIGION   |
| <p>Churches exist alone</p> <p>No permission of government is required</p> <p>1st Amendment protects against government making a law that would respect an establishment of religion or prohibit the free exercise of religion</p>   | <p>This government wants to control the churches by having them come under their jurisdiction as corporations under Section 501(c)(3)</p> <p>This is to prevent the clergy, pastors, ministers, etc. from having any political influence on its members or the public in general. This government regulates what is to be said and not to be said.</p> <p>These churches also display the gold fringed flag. Their faith is in the government and not in God. They exist by permission of this government not by God alone.</p> <p>They signed away their Birthright for a so-called benefit: Tax-exempt corporation</p> |

# SO WHO IS THE ENEMY?

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Today's Freemen teachings are the result of three factors—fundamentalist interpretations of the Bible; fundamentalist interpretations of the Constitution, and the belief in a one world conspiracy. When all three are mixed together, they paint a terrifying picture of what's going on in the world. The Bible describes the horrific events of the end of the world in somewhat vague and symbolic terms, whereas conspiracy theories conveniently flesh out all the details omitted by the scriptures. The manmade details that drape the biblical framework are designed to explain American culture's most unacceptable events—loss of property; wealth; and individual freedoms—the very losses that most rural people believe they are experiencing as a result of the global restructuring.

Most of the Freemen movement's conspiracy theories are used to explain specific parts of its larger one world government AKA the new world order theory. The major players are as follows—the banks, the Federal Reserve, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the federal government, communism, the United Nations, the Trilateral Commission, the IRS, the multinational corporations, the media, and the world's Jewish population, which acts through various secret organizations such as the Illuminati and Freemasons.

Within the movement, there are many subtle variations on the one world conspiracy. For Christian Identity believers, it is a Jewish conspiracy. For others, such as the more traditional fundamentalists, it is a conspiracy composed of the evil forces of the Antichrist, not necessarily Jews. But for the most part, the conspiracy story is easy to tell and goes like this

A one world government is being formed under the auspices of the United Nations, the Trilateral Commission or some other mysterious quasi-governmental agency that is really controlled by the Illuminati or Freemasons, or both. Conspiracists see the United Nations as usurping the historic independence of the United States and other countries. They believe that it is solidifying its position of power by using the World Bank and the IMF to make huge loans of worthless paper money which are too big to ever be repaid to countries throughout the world.

Once a country falls under the power of this unrepayable debt, it is forced to dance to the tune of the international bankers (who according to the rhetoric are composed of the world's richest Jewish families) or face foreclosure or bankruptcy. The idea is that once all the governments of the world are under the control of the United Nations, the Antichrist will step in and assume power.

Freemen proponents believe that the United States is now one of these controlled countries. They believe that when the United States went off the gold standard as the basis of its monetary system and adopted the current Federal Reserve system, political leaders were really just fulfilling biblical prophecies by giving the forces of the Antichrist the reins of government and instituting a means to take away the property and freedom of the people, actions that will ultimately result in the control of all Christians.

And to make sure that this grand plan goes unopposed, the Satan-infiltrated government is now attempting to take away Freemen's guns, the very firepower that could be used to thwart this enemy within. Those in the movement are quick to point out that this sinister scenario could not have transpired had America adhered to the original intent of the Constitution, or better phrased their interpretation of the Constitution.

# POSTSCRIPT ON THEIR THEORIES

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The Freeman movement began as a response by ardent government supporters, farmers, to the nightmare of farm foreclosure. This economic crisis, fueled by religion and a deep identification with the land, resulted in an incredibly complex and sometimes violent Freeman system.

As our law becomes more complex and punitive economically, the Freeman movement will continue to expand. Recent laws in our world continue to extract severe economic penalties against offenders, often with no possible method available for the offender to start with a clean slate.

Failing to pay a traffic infraction results in economic penalty, which can be especially severe if the driver lacks insurance. If the fine is not paid, the amount often is referred to a collection agency, which adds an additional penalty. The Department of Licensing is also notified of the non-payment. DOL then suspends the person's privilege to drive, and adds a fee for reinstatement of the driving privilege.

Driving while license suspended laws are enforced, so the person now appears in a criminal court, with possible criminal sanctions. Of course, if the person pleads guilty or forfeits bail, a fine is ordered to be paid.

With enough suspended driving convictions, the person's privilege to drive will be suspended in the interests of safety (with a possible gross misdemeanor second degree driving while license suspended charge for future violations within the base suspension period). Ultimately, if the person keeps driving, he or she will be declared to be an habitual traffic offender, with significant jail being imposed upon conviction (a mandatory minimum 10 days in jail for a first conviction of first degree driving while license revoked, 90 days in jail for second conviction, and 180 days in jail for third or subsequent conviction).

The obvious answer for the offender is to not drive until all the financial penalties are paid and a current driver's license obtained. While such a solution might work in a metropolitan area with available mass transit, rural counties like Kitsap offer no such option. Since the offender must work (an admirable societal goal) to provide food and shelter to the family, he or she continues to drive. And the cycle perpetuates.

This economic spiral only continues, with no end in sight for the offender. As the pressure of potential jail for each violation builds, stress creates exactly the same opportunity as the farm crisis created for Freeman recruitment. A system that asserts that the State lacks authority over Sovereign Citizens, and thus cannot require driver's licenses.

And as with farmers, the choice is to continue to violate the law or declare (in this case) a chapter 13 bankruptcy thereby establishing a plan to repay the debt. The shame that such an action engenders should not be ignored.

And now, our legislature has passed a law allowing impound (and increased monetary penalties and possible ultimate loss) of the family vehicle by those driving while suspended licenses. While the social policy of getting unlicensed and uninsured drivers off the road cannot be criticized, the effect of this never-ending economic spiral on the offender will be devastating.

Similar economic penalties, including loss of license, occur with DUI. And the requirement of a loss of one's ability to possess firearms (upon a future penalty of a felony conviction) with domestic violence crimes fuels Second Amendment Freeman arguments.

Most Freeman cases are seen in courts of limited jurisdiction. The defendants are often in economic distress, and cannot understand why the government is being so oppressive. The seeds for the Freeman antigovernment movement are sown with these offenders. Hopefully our system will show more compassion to the average person caught up in an unintended economic nightmare than was shown to our farmers in the 1980's.

Our failure to learn this lesson may well risk paper terrorism escalating to Common Law courts handing out death sentences and warrants of arrest against government officials, and ordering the pipe bombing of government buildings.

The challenge, though, is our correct identification of those seeking martyrdom through nonviolent paper terrorism versus those terrorists willing to use violence as a means to the end of establishing Christian Israel.

Our materials have unintentionally grown beyond all intended length. It is apparent as we continue to research their law that the Common Law is expanding in scope some precepts of which we understand, and other ideas that are just plain bizarre. Since our effort here is already much too long, we will not discuss the following Freeman topics. But they are at least worth mentioning should you have a burning desire to know more

How to dupe an Auditor into accepting a filing (lien)

How to open a bank account without a social security number

How to obtain foreign vehicle identification plates and international motorist qualification (driver's license) from the Grand Turks & Caicos Islands (east of Cuba and north of Haiti)

Jury nullification (a subject being debated in our community as well)

How to order Common Law paperwork on disk (for a fee)

The Right to Bear Arms (constitutionally protected) versus firearms (properly regulated for 14th Amendment citizens)

The Right to Travel

Understanding the adhesion contract called Zip Code and properly addressing your mail (do not submit to Congress trick into federal citizenship, *see* the Federal Reserve, IRS, etc.)

# **Part III**

## **Our Responses**

# WHAT SHOULD LAW ENFORCEMENT DO?

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## First Contact

The first notice that our system is dealing with a Freeman is either is subjected to a plethora of questions on the street concerning the officer's authority, or the officer receives some type of Freeman document purporting to compel the officer to respond or face an economic penalty. Either way, law enforcement should be advised as to how to proceed.

## The Traffic Stop

We have had cases where a Freeman has given a U.S. Supreme Court case as his identification. We have had cases where a Freeman attempted to engage in a lengthy constitutional discussion, has refused to sign an infraction, and has signed the infraction refused for fraud or under duress. No doubt employed by Freeman when having first contact with our system through our law enforcement.

## Obstructing an Officer The Stop and Identify Statute

*Brown v. Texas*, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). Brown was walking away from another person in a high drug crime area when an officer approached and detained Brown. The officer asked Brown to identify himself. Brown refused to do so. At the time, Texas had a stop and identify statute making it a crime to refuse to do so upon an officer's request.

The Supreme Court held that Brown was seized under the 4th Amendment when the officer approached and detained Brown. In reversing Brown's conviction under the stop and identify statute, the Supreme Court held that absent any basis for suspecting that a defendant had committed misconduct, Brown's right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of the individual over the state's interest in law enforcement. *Brown*, 99 S.Ct. at 2641.

Since *Brown*, most states have modified their stop and identify statutes to incorporate misconduct on the part of a citizen wherein he or she willfully obstructs an officer's duties, an act that results in hindering law enforcement.

Washington's stop and identify statute, Washington's stop and identify statute (RCW 9A.76.020) was declared unconstitutional by Washington's Supreme Court in *State v. White*, 97 Wn.2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982) in response to *Brown v. Texas*.

Since then, our legislature has amended the obstructing statute, and created two statutes: one for a person's acts and the other for a person's words.

**RCW 9A.76.020. Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer** (willfully hinder, delay or obstruct officer in discharge of official powers or duties). Gross misdemeanor. Statute is limited to **acts** of a defendant that hinder, delay or obstruct. *State v. Williamson*, 84 Wn.App. 37, 924 P.2d 960 (Div. 2 1996) (defendant lied about his identity, a statement; conviction reversed since obstructing charge only concerns acts; case should have been charged under RCW 9A.76.175)

**RCW 9A.76.175. Making a False or Misleading Statement to a Public Servant** (knowingly make false or misleading material **statement** to public servant; material means a written or oral statement reasonably likely to be relied upon by public servant in discharge of official powers or duties). Gross misdemeanor.

## So You Want to Issue an Infraction?

AA notice of infraction may be issued upon certification by the issuer thA notice of infraction may be issued upon certifi  
toto believe that a person has committed an infraction contrary to law. Infraction to believe that a person has committed an inf  
JurisdictionJurisdiction (IRLJurisdiction (IRLJJurisdiction (IRLJ) 2.2(b). A law enforcement officer may issue a notice of infr  
need not have been committed in the officer s presence, except as provided by statute. IRLJ 2.2(b)(1).

AA notice of infraA notice of infractA notice of infraction shall include the name, address, and date of birth of the person  
infraction.infraction. IRLJ 2.1(b); *State v. Cole*, 73 Wn.App. 844, 848, 871 P.2d 656, *review denied*, 125 Wn.2d  
(Div. 3 1994).

An officer may detain a person stopped for a traffic infraction for a reasonable period of time necessary to identify the person, check for outstanding warrants, check the status of the person's driver's license, vehicle registration, and complete and issue a notice of infraction. *supra*.

Vehicle passengers are not required to cVehicle passengers are not required to ca  
6666 Wn.App. 706, 709, 833 P.2d 241 (1992). A passenger has a duty in response to a66 Wn.App. 70 6, 70 9, 833 P.2d 24 1 (1  
aa traffic infraction against the passenger, though, to idena traffic infraction against the passenger, though, to identifia traf  
acknowledgement of receipt of the notice of infraction. RCW 46.61.021(3); *Cole, supra*.

AA person may be **arrearrested and taken to jaarrested and taken to jail** if he or she refuses to sign the promise to respond to traffic citation. *Port Orchard v. Tilton*, 77 Wn.App. 178, 177 Wn.App. 178, 180, 889 P.2d 77 Wn.App. 178, 180, 889 P.2d charged under municipal code charged under municipal code eqcharged under municipal code equivalent of RCW 46.61.021(3); court reversed notice of infraction under RCW 46.61.021(3); court reversed aa correa correct statement aa correct statement above the person's signature wherein the person promise[d] to respond as directed by this notice but said nothing about a refusal to appear in court for an infraction; unlike a criminal citation, a person has no legal duty to promise to appear in court for an infraction).

AnyAny act relatingAny act relating to oAny act relating to offenses involving traffic, parking, seat belt, pedestrian infraction. A person need not drive a vehicle to commit a traffic infraction. RCW 46.63.020.

Any person who aids or abets another person's commission of a traffic crime or traffic infraction is similarly guilty of the offense. RCW 46.64.048.

## OK, I ll Sign But Only Under Duress

AsAs discuAs discussed As discussed in other parts of these materials, some Freeman actions are worth contesting, and others simply are not. So long as a traffic infraction defendant is willing to sign his or her name on simply are not. So long as a traffic locationlocation on the citation, the Freeman act of putting under duress location on the citation, the Freeman act of putting consequence.consequence. So ignore it, give the Freeman his or her copy of the citation, and file the original with the court.

## **Custodial Arrest on Probable Cause Permitted for Certain Traffic Crimes**

An officer's arrest powers are codified in RCW 10A.01.010 over three pages. It is incumbent on all law enforcement to carefully review the legality of a custodial arrest will stem directly from this statute.

RCW 10.31.100(3) specifically allows arrest on probable cause for driving while license suspended (any degree). *State v. Reding*, 119 Wn.2d 685, 835 P.2d 1019 (1992) (reckless driving); *State v. Thomas*, 89 Wn.App. 774, 950 P.2d 498 (Div. 3 1998) (arrest proper even though jail had policy to cite and release reckless driving offenders).

## Criminal Citation and Notice to Appear in Court

Although not required (some prosecutor's offices require screening; screening; citations are not issued by the police), law enforcement officers have criminal citations. RCW 46.64.015 sets out the process for an officer to issue a criminal citation she chooses to do so.

The statute makes clear that a person is to be detained for no period longer than to issue and serve the citation. But some exceptions are given, specifically if the person refuses to give a written promise to appear in court as required by the citation, or if the person is a nonresident and RCW 10.31.100(3), or when the person is a nonresident and RCW 46.64.035 (nonresident requirement to post security for infraction or criminal traffic citation) exceptions to the cite and release presumption, a person may be arrested. *Thomas, supra.*

## Officer Safety is Number 1

As with any other law enforcement action, an officer's safety is of primary importance. Freeman are frequently heavily armed, and reject our law's authority over them, especially concerning firearms. It makes no sense to engage a Freeman on the street in a discussion about conspiracy or the Tribulation. Officers should act in a different way than any other citizen.

Officers are trained to take control of a scene, and a Freeman wants to write over an infraction or criminal citation, let him or her. The verbiage will not have any effect on the court processing the matter (assuming it is legible, including officer's handwriting).

## When You are Served with a Freeman Document

Freemen are especially adept at serving their Common Law documents on anyone they have come in contact. Officers should accept service of documents from a supervisor and contact the prosecuting attorney. Prosecutors need to review the documents for possible criminal charges.

## AA Lien is Recorded, Involuntary Bankruptcy Filing Received

Officers should immediately notify a supervisor and contact the prosecuting attorney in these situations. These documents can and should be reviewed. Prosecutors are your attorneys, so use them.

## Develop Intelligence and Know Your Freeman

The vast majority of Freeman are paper terrorists seeking martyrdom or intention of becoming violent. But given the religious beliefs in their community, officers and prosecutors must take great care to know what is going on in their community.

Radical Freeman know how to make pipe bombs (leaving them to blow up courthouses (or as a diversion to allow liberation of their money from banks) and believe that the satanic one world conspiracy to eliminate the white race (the Tribulation) for the the satanic one world conspiracy to eliminate the white race. Such beliefs have a dramatic effect on whether a Freeman will be compelled to use violence against evil government officials implementing Satan's will.

Government officials must be ever vigilant in watching Freeman. There can be no doubt that Freeman certainly know who you are and the location of government facilities.

FreemenFreemen can pose numerous problems in a correctional facility. Issues can arise at the original bookingbooking when some Freeman refuse to provibooking when some Freeman refuse to provide their name booking identificationidentification informatiidentification information. Probidentification information. Problems continue with respect non-lawyernon-lawyer Sixth Amendment counsel. Freeman will frequentlynon-lawyer Sixth Amendment counsel. Freeman will frequently resort to hunger strikes in order to protest their continued csome Freeman will resort to hunger strikes in order to protest their continued jurisdiction.

## Identification

**Fingerprints and Photographs.** It is the duty of the sheriff or director of public safety of every county, and the chief of police of every city or town, and of every chief officer of other law enforcement agencies duly operating within this state, to cause the juveniles lawfully arrested for the commission of any criminal misdemeanor. RCW 43.43.735(1).

~~It~~ It is also the duty of the sheriff or director of public safety of every county~~It is also the duty of the sheriff or director o~~  
every~~every city oevery city orevery city or town, and of every chief officer of other law enforcement agencies duly operating wi~~  
state,~~state, to record the fingerprints of all perstate, to record the fingerprints of all persons held in or rstate, to record the fi~~  
crime~~crime as provided for in RCW 43.43.735 for which the penalty of imprisonment might be imcrime as provided for in RC~~  
disseminated~~disseminate and file such fingerprints in the same manner as those rdisseminate and file such fingerprints in the s~~  
~~43.43.735 and 43.43.740. RCW 43.43.745(1).~~

In exercising their duties and authority under RCW 43.43.735 and sheriffs, sheriffs, directors of sheriffs, directors of public safety, chiefs of police, and other chief law officers, officers, may, consistent with constitutional and legal requirements, use such reasonable officers, may, consistent with constitutional and legal requirements, use such reasonable force as is necessary to compel an unwilling person to submit to being photographed as is necessary to compel an unwilling person to submit to being fingerprinted, fingerprinted, or to submit to any other identification procedure, except interrogation fingerprinted, fingerprinted, or to submit to any other identification procedure, except interrogation

|         |   |    |
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|---------|---|----|

which will result in obtaining physical evidence serving to identify such person. No one having the custody of any person shaving the custody of any person suhaving the custody of any person subject to this act, and no one acting in his aid or under his this act, and no one acting in his aid or under his direct this act, publication as is provided for in RCW 43.43.740, publication as is provided for in RCW 43.43.740 criminal, for anything lawfully done in the exercise of the provisions of this act.

The use of force is to be considered as a last resort. Sometimes FreThe use of force is to be considered as a last resort that that they may that they may sign a statement that the photographs and fingerprints were obtained under duress. Such statement allows them, statement allows them, unstatement allows them, under their understanding of the their law, submitted to the jurisdiction of state court.

AA recalcitrant Freeman may also submit to fingerprinting and photographing without the use of force after being ordered to after being ordered to do so by a judge during the Freeman s first appearance in court. The statement that the Freeman is agree like the statement that the Freeman is agreeing under duress like the interpretation of their Common Law that the Freeman has entered into any contractual relation interpretation of their state or that the Freeman has voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of state court.

## Refusal to Leave Cell

Some Freeman defendant s have refused to leave their cell to come to court Some Freeman defendant s have refused to leave their cell to come to court. The options available to it when this happens. In the assessment from the jail of how violent the defendant presently is, how many correctional officers are needed for proper transport, and other security related issues.

## Non-Lawyer Sixth Amendment Counsel

The Sixth Amendment guarantees The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. However, however, does not permit a criminal defendant to be represented by an advocate who is not a lawyer. *United States v. Wheat*, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 100 L.Ed.2d 140, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697 (1988); *see also State v. DeWeese*, 117 Wn.2d 369, 376, 816 P.2d 1 (1991) (a criminal defendant does not have the absolute right to be represented by the individual of his or her choice). Non-lawyer non-attorney as their counsel. As discussed below, non-attorney an inmate than is a member of the public.

## Legal Mail

As a general rule, inmates have a lessened expectation of privacy in their incoming and outgoing letters and packages. *See, e.g., Lavado v. Keohane*, 992 F.2d 601, 607 (9th Cir. 1993) (prison officials may open and read prisoner s incoming general mail pursuant to a uniform and evenly applied policy with an eye to inmate safety); *State v. Hawkins*, 70 Wn.2d 697, 425 P.2d 390 (1967), *cert. denied*, 390 U.S. 912 (1968) ( We have upheld the right of jail officials to examine the letters and packages, incoming and outgoing, of all inmates. ); *State v. Hawkins*, 70 Wn.2d 697, 425 P.2d 390 (1967), *cert. denied*, 390 U.S. 912 (1968) ( We said there that there can be no circumstances. ).

Some items of incoming and outgoing mail,<sup>46</sup> such as correspondence between an inmate and an attorney, is subjected to a less stringent examination by prison or jail officials. Instead of routine inspection of correspondence, letters or packages from an inmate s attorney are generally opened and inspected, and any inspection of the package or letter is limited to the detection of contraband.

<sup>46</sup> Federal regulations dealing with mail in federal prisons have identified correspondence received from the following as deserving special treatment: (1) President and Vice President of the United States; (2) Attorneys; (3) Members of the U.S. Congress; (4) Embassies and Consulates; (5) the U.S. Department of Justice (excluding the Bureau of Prisons but including U.S. Attorneys); (6) other Federal law enforcement officers; (7) State Attorneys General; (8) Prosecuting Attorneys; (9) Governors; (10) U.S. Courts (including U.S. Probation Officers); and (11) State Courts. 28 C.F.R. §§ 540.2-540.25 (1992).

ThisThis lesser level of inspection is This lesser level of inspection is deThis lesser level of inspection is design  
attoattorney/clientattorney/client privilege,<sup>47</sup> like all other privileges in Washington, is strictly construed. This means that like all  
prprivilegeprivilege does not apply to non-lawyer counsel. *Cf. Hagan v. Kassler Escrow, Inc.*, 96 Wn.2d96 Wn.2d 443, 6396  
P.2dP.2d 730 (1981). Thus correspondence or packages sent by an inmate to a non-lawyer counsel or to an  
inmate by a non-lawyer counsel may be subjected to the same level of scrutiny as ordinary mail.

## Visitation

ManyMany jails Many jails and prisMany jails and prisons provide for contact visits between attorneys and inmates  
visitationsvisitations visits are frequentlyvisitations are frequently held in special visitation rooms that, if in a department of  
notnot subject to interceptionnot subject to interception and recording not subject to interception and recording under RCW 9.7  
attorneyattorney counsel is not entitled to the benefits of these rules, but should instead be giattorney counsel is not entitled to  
any other civilian visitor.

## Hunger Strikes

AA Freeman inmate may resort to a hunger A Freeman inmate may resort to a hunger strikA Freeman inmate may r  
incarcerationincarceration by a foreign government. The safestincarceration by a foreign government. The safest way  
condition.condition. Careful monitoring of food intake and the inmate s physical condition. Careful monitoring of food  
undertakenundertaken once an inmate announceundertaken once an inmate announces his or hundertaken once an inmate anno  
DivisionDivision of Prisons, Directive DOP 620.100, a copy of which is provided in the Appendix, at 31-Division of Prisons, D  
eexcellenexcellen startiexcellen starting point for any facility that does not already have a procedure in place for dealing w  
hunger strikes.

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<sup>47</sup> The attorney/client privilege is codified at RCW 5.60.060(2)(a). This provision states that [a]n attorney or counselor shall not, without the consent of his or her client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him or her, or his or her advice given thereon in the course of professional employment. *Id.*

## WHAT SHOULD AUDITORS/ASSESSORS DO?

## Allodial Freeholds and Land Patents

The legal concept of holding land by allodial freehold or in allodium<sup>48</sup> traces to the feudal roots of the English system of land tenure. As it operated at the English system of land tenure, the monarch granted tenure to a descending pyramid of lords and vassals. The monarch granted portions of their estates to others. Those lower on the pyramid owed certain obligations, in form of military service, cash, crops, or other services, to the monarch in return for revenues and services with which the monarch maintained his military.

Allo dial and all odium are de fined as fol low s

**Allodial.** Free; not holden of any lord or superior; owned wit Free; not holden of any lord or superior; owned without or fealty; the opposite of feudal.

**Allodium.** Land held absolutely in one's own right, and no Land held absolutely in one's own right, and not of any Lord, and not subject to feudal duties or burdens.

AnAn estate held by absolute ownership without recognizing aAn estate held by absolute ownership without re  
duty is due on ac count thereof.

BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY 100 (4th ed. 1968).

This distinction between property held subject to tenure and in allodoto mere academic interest. The obligations owed by to mere academic interest. The obaa particular number ofknia particular number of knights, were gra particular number of knights, were gradually supersededtenure were initialtentenure were initially importetenure were initially imported to the American colonies (as evidenced by concepts have been abolished with all land, long since held free offeudal obligation.

AA land patentA land patent is a A land patent is a creature of statute whereby the United States government conveys title to a private individual.to a private individual. *FederalLand Bank of Spokane v. Redwine*, 51 Wn.App. 766, 769, 770 (Div. 3 1988).<sup>49</sup>

Presumably, Presumably, a title search to most private property in Washington Presumably, a title search to most private property in Washington from such a patent, usually issued in the from such a patent, usually issued in the nineteenth century. *See Barbizon of Utah, Inc. v. Barbizon of Utah, Inc.*, 471 P.2d 148 (Utah 1970).

<sup>48</sup> Most of the information in this section is taken from two 1996 Washington State Attorney General opinions.

AGO 1996 N o 6 (declaration of allodial freehold ownership does not create an exception from payment of property taxes; a homestead exemption does not bar a foreclosure for unpaid real property taxes); and

AGO 1996 No. 12 (auditor may not refuse to record land patent or non-statutory abatement documents if the documents purpose is to convey or affect title to real estate).

The entire text of the Attorney General opinions is available at the Attorney General's website (visited February 25, 1999).

<[http://www.wa.gov/ago/opinions/opinion\\_1996\\_6.html](http://www.wa.gov/ago/opinions/opinion_1996_6.html)> and <[http://www.wa.gov/ago/opinions/opinion\\_1996\\_12.html](http://www.wa.gov/ago/opinions/opinion_1996_12.html)>.

49 Two months prior to de fault on his mortgage, the de fenda nt exec uted and rec orded a Declara tion of Land Patent, where in the property w as a utomatica lly co nverte d to an alloid ial fre ehold unles s cha llenged by some one in co urt with in 60 days of rec ording. Atta ched to the doc ument was a hard to read doc ument dated Janu ary 6, 1896, and stamped as an official rec ord on file with the Oregon sta te office of the Bureau of Land Management. Defenda nt claimed that this latter doc ument is the original federal patent for the land in ques tion, and that the Declara tion of Land Patent prohib ited the bank from foreclosing.

Division III held that the recording of the Declaration of Land Patent had no effect on title since it was issued by the defendant and not by the United States, and affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the mortgage holder.



Plea in abatement. In practice. A plea which, without disputing jurisdiction, objects to place, mode, or time of asserting it; it allows plaintiff to renew suit in another place of form, or at another time, and does not assume to answer a plea of form, or at another time, and does not deny existence of particular cause of action on which plaintiff relies.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1310 (4th ed. 1968).

**Abatement and Revival. Actions at Law.** As used in reference to an action, abate means that action is utterly dead and cannot be revived except by commencing a new action.

The overthrow of an action caused by the defendant tending to impeach the correctness of the writ of the present, but does not debar the plaintiff from recommending it in a better way.

**Abatement and Revival. Chancery Practice.** It differs from an abatement in that in the latter the action is entirely dead and cannot be revived; but in the former the right to proceed is merely suspended, and may be revived.

In England, declinatory pleas to the jurisdiction and declinatory pleas to the jurisdiction and to the judicature act) sometimes, by analogy to common law, termed abatement.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 16 (4th ed. 1968) (Citations omitted.)

Freemen apparently believe that their sovereigns terminate the action taken by the public official since our courts lack jurisdiction over a Sovereign Citizen. Presumably, the public official is not prohibited from asserting the same position in a Common Law court since the Common Law court has jurisdiction over a Sovereign Citizen.

The Attorney General noted that the Non-Statutory Abatement document General appeared to be a response to an administrative order issued by a county department. This is directed against a named county official, and states that the administrative order is being directed against a named county official because the sender refuses to accept it. AGO 1996 No. 12, at 7-8.

Since the Non-Statutory Abatement document provided to the Attorney regarding title to land or to any ownership or debt interest in real property. *Id.* We suggest, though, that auditors take great care when reviewing a document might have buried in it some claim on title to real property.

## Documents Presented by Individual in Name of Non-Legal Entity

The Attorney General's opinion is clear that an auditor may not rely upon a belief that the entity submitting it is not legally constituted lacks both the statutory authority and duty to determine the substantive validity of an recording. AGO 1996 No. 12, at 8.

## Referring Questions to Prosecutor's Office

A recording cannot be delayed to allow sufficient time for review of the documents by the Attorney General or Department of Revenue because the statute commanding the auditor to record without delay implies that the process must be completed with deliberate speed. 15-16.

However, a caveat to the above concerns possible consultations with the prosecutor.

As the County Prosecutor, you are the legal advisor to the County Treasurer as to matters relating to their official business. RCW 36.27. therefore, reasonable and within the contemplation of the statute that those officers consult with you as to the legal requirements of their officers. Throughout this Opinion we have repeatedly noted the general principle that

and the possibility that future specific transactions on the subjects we have ac could vary as to legally significant facts.

For the reasons stated above, we do not believe that such would justify a lengthy delay. As a general matter, duties to file or process documents must do so, as they [are] received for filing. *Pacific National Bank v. Kramer*, 77 Wn.2d 899, 904, 468 P.2d (1970). If this results in an erroneous officer may correct his [or her] errors and mistakes farther than to make the records and files speak the truth. We do not believe that this limited capacity for decisions that lie beyond the authority of first group of questions. [allodial freehold estate and homestead exemption]

AGO 1996 No. 12, at 16.

If you are in doubt about the proper action to take when prosecutor. But as the Attorney General opinions make clear, the are properly acknowledged and submitted with the proper fees.

## Oaths of Office and Bonds

Freemen frequently challenge the authority of a public official due to the official's failure to file an oath and bond as required by statute. RCW 36.16. concerning the obligations of elected county officials to take an oath are also required to be filed in the same office as required of the elected official.

**36.16.040. Oath of office.** Every person elected to county office shall before he or she enters upon the duties of his or her office take and subscribe an oath or affirmation that he or she will faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of his or her office. The oath, or affirmation, shall be administered and administered, without charge therefor.

**36.16.050. Official bonds.** Every county official before he or she enters upon the duties of his or her office shall furnish a bond conditioned that he or she will faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of his or her office, and that he or she, or his or her executor or administrators, will deliver to his or her successor safe and unharmed all books, records, papers, seals, equipment, and furniture belonging to the county. Bonds of elective county officers shall be as follows:

- (1) Assessor: Amount to be fixed and sureties to be approved by proper county legislative authority;
- (2) Auditor: [not less than \$10,000];
- (3) Clerk: Amount to be fixed in a penal sum not less than amount of money liable to come into his or her hands; approved by the judge or a majority of the court of which he or she is clerk: PROVIDED, That fixed for the clerk shall not exceed in amount that treasurer in a county of that class;
- (4) Coroner: [not less than \$5,000];
- (5) Members of the proper county legislative authority: depends on county population]
- (6) Prosecuting attorney: [\$5,000]
- (7) Sheriff: [not less than \$5,000 nor more than \$50,000, as approved by county legislative authority]



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## Charging Considerations and Proper Penalties

The bringing of charges against a Freeman should never be based upon a disagreement with an individual's beliefs, for as noted by Judge Easterbrook

Some people believe with great fervor preposterous things with their self interest & The government may not prohibit the holding of these beliefs with their self interest & but it may penalize people who act on them.

*Coleman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue*, 791 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1986).

The filing of criminal charges is only appropriate when the delivery of governmental services, otherwise imperil the safety of others, or constitute a violation of government for which prosecution is normally brought.

Charges should not be withheld, though, merely because prosecuting or because the charged person may retaliate by filing liens, etc. against the case.

SomeSome Freeman you encounter do not fully understand the arguments oSome Freeman you encounter do not f  
actions.actions. Hopefullyactions. Hopefully, these indiactions. Hopefully, these individuals will alter their behavior follow  
justicejustice justice system. Prejustice system. Preference should generally be given to an initial non-felony charge in or  
conduct with out unreason ably p unishing.

Some individuals who are initially charged with minor offenses, even agreements, will up the ante by retaliating against every judge who presides over prosecutor who is involved in the case. Additional charges that arise from such retaliation joined to the original charge or filed under a separate cause number after the first prosecution is obtained. The benefit of waiting is that the prosecutor has the opportunity to strategize how the case will alter as a result of prosecution and incarceration.

Individuals who file nuisance suits in a Washington State Court or a proper United States Court without the accompanying liens are more properly dealt with under CR 11<sup>50</sup> or Fed. or Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 and or Fed. motion to limit future in forma pauperis filings.

## Available Charges

Charges that may be brought in response to typical Freeman activity range from the common driving while license suspended, felony elude, harassment, assault, rcommon driving while seldom used. Many seldom used. Many appropriate crimes, such as malicious prosecution, b law,law, will be found outside Chapter 9A RCW. Resort to less colaw, will be found outside Chapter 9A RCW. Reso instructiinstructions in the WPICs instructions in the WPICs will not be available and case law discussing the offense charges that have been utilized in Kitsap County with success are discussed below.

50 A pro se plaintiff may be subject to CR 11 sanctions if three conditions are met: (1) the action is not well grounded in fact; (2) it is not warranted by existing law; and (3) the party signing the pleading has failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the factual or legal basis of the action. *See* CR 11; *Harrington v. Pailthorp*, 67 Wn.App. 901, 910, 841 P.2d 1258 (1992), *review denied*, 121 Wn.2d 1018 (1993); *Lockhart v. Greive*, 66 Wn.A pp. 73-5, 743-44, 834 P.2d 64 (1992).

## Barratry

The crime of barratry is codified at RCW 9.12.010. This statute provides as follows

Every person who brings on his or her own behalf, another to bring any false suit at law or in equity, thereby to distress or harass a defendant in the suit, or who serves or sends a document purporting to be or document purporting to be or resembling a judicial process, is guilty of a misdemeanor; and in process, is guilty of a misdemeanor; and in case the person, is she may, in addition thereto be disbarred from practicing law within this state.

RCW 9.12.010. A violation of the barratry statute is a misdemeanor.

TheThe barratry statuThe barratry statute<sup>51</sup> contain contains two alternative means of committing the offense: (1) com barratry;barratry; and (2) pseudo-judicial process. Common law barratry consists of the filing of obarratry; and (2) pseudo-vexatiousvexatious litigation such as that whivexatious litigation such as that which would engen vexatious litigation such as judicijudiciallyjudicially judicially or legislatively adopted a rule that a prosecution under the common law prong of barratry requ thethe committhe commissithe commission of several acts, *see generally* 14 C.J.S. *Champerty and Maintenance* §§ 27-28, at 16 (1991); 14(1991); 14 Am.Jur.2d, *Champerty and Maintenance* §§ 19-20, at 854-55 (1964). §§ 19-20, at 854-55 (1964). Washington any decisions that discuss the elements of the common law barratry prong.

The pseudo-judicial process prong of the barratry statute is the alternative means under which a plaintiff can establish a claim for barratry. This pseudo-judicial process prong is violated when an individual, who is not in fact a judge or resembling judicial probe or resembling judicial process, the or resembling judicial process, that is not in fact judicial, is used by Kitsap County under this prong for serving writs of habeas corpus. Such as the Supreme Court, Washington State Republic, Common Law Venue and the KING OF THE LORD ECCLESIASTICAL COMMON LAW COURT. Individuals have also been charged under the pseudo-judicial process prong for judicial process prong for judicial process prong for serving law enforcement officers with

<sup>51</sup> RCW 9.12.010 was amended in 1995. The Division III case of *Danzig v. Danzig*, 79 Wn.App. 612, 904 P.2d 312 (Div. 3 1995), *review denied*, 129 Wn.2d 1011 (1996), indicates in dicta that the barratry statute does not apply to non-attorneys. See *Danzig*, 79 Wn.App. at 617-18.

The *Danzig* decision is inapplicable to Freeman prosecutions on a number of grounds. First, the *Danzig* decision was dealing with the common law champerty alternative means portion of Washington's former barratry statute instead of the pseudo-judicial process prong that is at issue in the instant case.

Second, the statute quoted by Division III in *Danzig* differs significantly from the statute that exists today. The current barratry statute does not contain the “every person, being an attorney or counselor at law” clause relied upon by Division III. In fact, the current barratry statute, RCW 9.12.010, only mentions attorneys to single them out for greater punishment than the non-attorneys who are convicted of violating the same statute.

The current barratry statute clearly applies to non-attorneys to the same extent as to attorneys. The current barratry statute appears in Title 9 RCW. This title is devoted to general crimes. Statutes that are generally limited to attorneys are contained in Chapter 2.44 RCW (attorneys at law), and Chapter 2.48 RCW (State Bar Act).

The current barratry statute contains two alternative means of committing the crime: (1) common law barratry or a harassment prong which consists of the filing of engaging in vexatious litigation such as that which would engender sanctions under CR 11; and (2) serving or sending pseudo-judicial process. See RCW 9.12.010. Our courts have long recognized that non-attorneys are subject to the sanctions contained in CR 11. See, e.g., *Harrington v. Pailthorp*, 67 Wn.App. 901, 910, 841 P.2d 1258 (1992), *review denied*, 121 Wn.2d 1018 (1993). Accordingly, there is no reason to judicially exempt non-attorneys from the harassment prong of the current barratry statute. In fact, this Division, in a post-*Danzig* case, has affirmed a barratry conviction obtained against a non-lawyer. See *State v. Knowles*, 91 Wn.App. 367, 957 P.2d 797, *review denied*, 136 Wn.2d 1029 (Div. 2 1998).

<sup>52</sup> Under Washington law, only a judge can order the State to provide a bill of particulars. *See* CrR 2.1(c); CrRLJ 2.4(e). A criminal defendant who seeks a bill of particulars must serve a motion for such upon the prosecuting attorney, not the arresting officers. *See generally* CrR 4.7(d) (defendant can only obtain information from persons other than the prosecuting attorney through a subpoena issued by the court); CrRLJ 4.7(d) (same); CrRLJ 4.8(b).

The granting of a motion for a bill of particulars rests in the sound discretion of the court and is dependent upon whether the available discovery discloses the factual basis for the charges. *State v. Grant*, 89 Wn.2d 678, 575 P.2d 210 (1978); *State v. Devine*, 84 Wn.2d 467, 527 P.2d 72 (1974); *State v. Brown*, 45 Wn.App. 571, 726 P.2d 60 (1986); *State v. Merrill*, 23 Wn.App. 577, 597 P.2d 446, review denied, 92 Wn.2d 1036 (1979).





- (4) Intimidating a public servant is a class B felony.

The intimidating a public servant statute protects a large number of individuals, including

(b) To cause physical damage to the property of a person other than the actor; or











- 
- (3) That the defendant knew M. Karlynn Haberly was a judge;
- (4) That such threat communicated directly or indirectly, an intent to
- (a) accuse M. Karlynn Haberly of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against M. Karlynn Haberly, or
- (b) do any act which is intended to harm substantially M. Karlynn Haberly or another person with respect to that person's health, safety, business, financial condition or personal relationships;
- (5) That the defendant or an accomplice made such threat
- (a) in response to a ruling or decision made by M. Karlynn Haberly in any official proceeding, or
- (b) in an attempt to influence a ruling or decision of M. Karlynn Haberly in any official proceeding; and
- (6) That the acts occurred in the State of Washington.

If you find from the evidence that Elements (1), (2), (3), (6) and either (4)(a) or (4)(b) and either (5)(a) or (5)(b) have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty. Elements (4)(a) and (4)(b) are alternatives and only one need be proved. Elements (5)(a) and (5)(b) are alternatives and only one need be proved. You need not agree as to which of the alternatives is proved.

On the other hand, if, after weighing all of the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to any one of these elements, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.

WPIC 4.21  
RCW 9A.72.160

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NO.

Threat means to communicate, directly or indirectly the intent:

To accuse any person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against any person; or

To do any act which is intended to harm substantially the person threatened or another with respect to that person's health, safety, business, financial condition or personal relationships.

WPIC 2.24  
RCW 9A.04.110(25)  
RCW 9A.72.160(2)(b)

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NO.

Judge means every judicial officer authorized alone or with others, to hold or preside over a court.

RCW 9A.04.110(11)

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NO.

Official proceeding means a proceeding heard before any legislative, judicial, administrative, or other government agency or official authorized to hear evidence under oath, including any referee, hearing examiner, commissioner, notary, or other person taking testimony or depositions.

RCW 9A.72.010(4)

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NO.

If there is evidence which indicates several distinct criminal acts of intimidating a Judge relating to any particular victim, you must unanimously agree that the same criminal act has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order for you to return a verdict of guilty as to a charge relating to that particular victim. You need not unanimously agree that all the acts have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to return a verdict of guilty as to a charge relating to that particular victim.

*State v. Petrich*, 101 Wn.2d 566  
WPIC 4.25 (modified)

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NO.

It is not a defense to the charge of intimidating a judge that:

- (1) the defendant did not cause actual harm; or
- (2) the defendant did not intend to carry out the threat; or
- (3) the defendant could not have carried out the threat.

*State v. Kepiro*, 61 Wn.App. 116, 125-26, 810 P.2d 19 (1991)  
*Smith v. State*, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 2300, 532 So.2d 50, 52 (1988)  
*United States v. Orozco-Santillan*, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265, n. 3 (9th Cir. 1990)

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NO.

It is not a defense to the charge of intimidating a judge that:

- (1) the judge to whom the threat was directed did not feel afraid; or
- (2) that the judge to whom the threat was directed never received the threat.

*State v. Hansen*, 122 Wn.2d 712, 862 P.2d 117 (1993).  
*State v. Kepiro*, 61 Wn.App. 116, 120-21, 810 P.2d 19 (1991)  
*United States v. Natale*, 526 F.2d 1160, 1168 (2d Cir. 1975), *cert. denied*, 425 U.S. 950 (1976)

CAPTION FOR VERDICT FORM

We, the jury, find the defendant, VERYL EDWARD KNOWLES, \_\_\_\_\_ (not guilty or guilty) of the crime of Intimidating a Judge as charged in count one of the information.

DATED this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
PRESIDING JUROR

*If this verdict is guilty please complete special verdict form A.*

CAPTION FOR SPECIAL VERDICT

We, the jury, having found the defendant guilty of Intimidating a Judge as charged in count one of the information, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the court:

With respect to alternative elements (4)(a) and (4)(b) of Instruction No. \_\_\_\_:

1. Was the threat the defendant communicated directly or indirectly an intent to accuse M. Karlynn Haberly of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against M. Karlynn Haberly?

☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ No Unanimous Agreement

2. Was the threat the defendant communicated directly or indirectly an intent to do any act which is intended to harm substantially M. Karlynn Haberly or another person with respect to that person's health, safety, business, financial condition or personal relationships?

☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ No Unanimous Agreement

With respect to alternative elements (5)(a) and (5)(b) of Instruction No. \_\_\_\_

1. Did the defendant make the threat in response to a ruling or decision made by M. Karlynn Haberly in any official proceeding?

☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ No Unanimous Agreement

2. Did the defendant make the threat in an attempt to influence a ruling or decision of M. Karlynn Haberly in any official proceeding?

☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ No Unanimous Agreement

DATED this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
PRESIDING JUROR

WPIC 90.03 (modified)  
WPIC 31.09 (by analogy)

## Malicious Prosecution

The crime of malicious prosecution is defined at RCW 9A.01.010. This statute provides

Every person who shall, maliciously and without probable cause therefor, cause or attempt to cause another to be arrested or proceeded against for any crime of which he or she is innocent:

(1) If such crime be a felony, shall be punished by imprisonment in a state correctional facility for not more than five years; and

(2) If such crime be a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

The felony is unranked.

The Kitsap County Prosecuting Attorney's Office has used this statute when dealing with an individual who sought a citizen complaint charging the elected prosecuting attorney and a chief deputy prosecuting attorney with the crime of unlawful practice of law after charges of unlawful practice of law had been filed against her. There is virtually no case law regarding this crime, but the following jury instructions should be a correct statement of the law.

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NO.

A person commits the crime of Malicious Prosecution when she maliciously and without probable cause therefor, causes or attempts to cause another to be arrested or proceeded against for any crime of which he or she is innocent.

RCW 9.62.010

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NO.

Malice and maliciously mean an evil intent, wish, or design to vex, annoy, or injure another person.

WPIC 2.13

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NO.

A person has probable cause to proceed against another for a crime where the facts and circumstances within the person's knowledge, and of which the person has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.

*Slate v. Gluck*, 83 Wn.2d 424, 426-27, 518 P.2d 703 (1974)

*State v. Sinclair*, 11 Wn.App. 523, 531, 523 P.2d 1209 (1974)

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NO.

To convict the defendant of the crime of Malicious Prosecution as charged in count III, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

(1) That on or about the period beginning on the 6th day of March, 1998, and ending on the 19th day of March, 1998, the defendant caused or attempted to cause Jeffrey J. Jahns to be proceeded against for the crime of Unlawful Practice of Law;

(2) That during this period probable cause did not exist for charging Jeffrey J. Jahns with the crime of Unlawful Practice of Law;

(3) That Jeffrey J. Jahns is innocent of the crime of Unlawful Practice of Law;

(4) That the defendant acted with malice; and

(5) That the acts occurred in the State of Washington.

If you find from the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty.

On the other hand, if, after weighing all of the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to any one of these elements, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.

WPIC 4.21

RCW 9.62.010

## False Representation Concerning Title

The crime of false representation concerning title is defined at RCW 9.38.020. This statute provides

Every person who shall maliciously or fraudulently execute or file for record any instrument, or put forward any claim, by which the right or title of another to any real property is, or purports to be transferred, encumbered or clouded, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.

Stevens County has prosecuted lien filers under this statute in the past. Kitsap County has not prosecuted anyone under this statute because the liens that we have received do not specifically identify any piece of property.

## Unlawful Practice of Law

The crime of unlawful practice of law ( UPL ) is defined by RCW 2.48.180. The current version of RCW 2.48.180, which applies to offenses committed after September 1995, provides in pertinent part

(1) As used in this section:

(a) Legal provider means an active member in good standing of the state bar, and any other person authorized by the Washington state supreme court to engage in full or limited practice of law;

(b) Nonlawyer means a person to whom the Washington supreme court has granted a limited authorization to practice law but who practices law outside that authorization, and a person who is not an active member in good standing of the state bar, including persons who are disbarred or suspended from membership;

(c) Ownership interest means the right to control the affairs of a business, or the right to share in the profits of a business, and includes a loan to the business when the interest on the loan is based upon the income of the business or the loan carries more than a commercially reasonable rate of interest.

(2) The following constitutes unlawful practice of law:

(a) A nonlawyer practices law, or holds himself or herself out as entitled to practice law;

(b) A legal provider holds an investment or ownership interest in a business primarily engaged in the practice of law, knowing that a nonlawyer holds an investment or ownership interest in the business;

(c) A nonlawyer knowingly holds an investment or ownership interest in a business primarily engaged in the practice of law;

(d) A legal provider works for a business that is primarily engaged in the practice of law, knowing that a nonlawyer holds an investment or ownership interest in the business; or

(e) A nonlawyer shares legal fees with a legal provider.

(3) Unlawful practice of law is a crime. A single violation of this section is a gross misdemeanor. Each subsequent violation, whether alleged in the same or in subsequent prosecutions, is a class C felony. &

A felony conviction of UPL is a ranked offense with a seriousness level of II. Felony offenses of UPL, if committed for financial gain, will fall within the definition of criminal profiteering. See RCW 9A.82.010(14)(ee).

The most extensive discussion of UPL is contained in *State v. Hunt*, 75 Wn.App. 795, 880 P.2d 96, review denied, 125 Wn.2d 1009 (1994). This case contains approved jury instructions (discussed in footnotes 13 and 14). Additional jury instructions are set forth below.

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NO.

A person may practice law on his or her own behalf. This is called the pro se rule. Only licensed lawyers, however, may practice law on behalf of others. A person cannot transfer his or her pro se right to practice law to any other person, including a spouse or parent.

*State v. Hunt*, 75 Wn.App. 795, 804, 880 P.2d 96, review denied, 125 Wn.2d 1009 (1994)

*Hagan v. Kassler*, 96 Wn.2d 443, 635 P.2d 730 (1981)

*State v. Stange*, 53 Wn.App. 638, 648, 769 P.2d 873 (1989) (father may not file pro se supplemental brief on behalf of juvenile offender)

*City of Seattle v. Shaver*, 23 Wn.App. 601, 597 P.2d 935 (1979) (layman husband could not represent wife in a prosecution for failure to yield right-of-way)

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NO.

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An individual who is charged with a criminal offense has a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. A criminal defendant's right to the assistance of counsel does not include the right to be represented by an advocate who is not a member of the State Bar.

*United States v. Wheat*, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 100 L.Ed.2d 140, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697 (1988)

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NO.

A power of attorney is an instrument in writing by which one person appoints another as his or her agent and confers upon that person the authority to act in his or her place for the purpose or purposes set forth in the instrument. A power of attorney does not authorize the practice of law.

*State v. Hunt*, 75 Wn.App. 795, 805, 880 P.2d 96, review denied, 125 Wn.2d 1009 (1994)

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NO.

Ignorance of the law does not excuse the unauthorized practice of law.

*Idaho State Bar v. Meservy*, 335 P.2d 62 (Idaho 1959)

NO.

It is not a defense to a charge of Unlawful Practice of Law that the defendant received no payment or fee for the preparation of documents or other activities.

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*Perkins v. CTX Mortgage Company*, 137 Wn.2d 93, 97-98, 969 P.2d 93 (1999)

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# PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF PROSECUTING FREEMEN

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Once typical or atypical charges have been filed, our judicial system and the Freeman defendant are destined for a cultural clash. Dealing with these individuals calls for prior planning on the part of judges, court staff, and prosecutors. An excellent outline prepared by the Honorable Gregory P. Mohr, Justice of the Peace and City Judge of Sidney, Montana, explaining the judicial approach that worked best in the Jordan, Montana Freeman cases is in the Appendix, at 34-36. Please feel free to share this outline with your local courts.

The issues that arise during a Freeman prosecution are obscure and responsive law can be hard to locate. Common arguments are identified below with a short legal response.

## **I am not the Person on the Docket      Correct Name**

Assuming the defendant responds to the summons and appears in court, the first challenge will be that the person before the court is not the person named in the information, citation, or complaint. RCW 10.40.050 allows the prosecution to go forward in both the name listed on the charging document and the name alleged by the defendant to be his or her correct name. Merely add the defendant's preferred spelling to the information, complaint, or citation as an AKA.

## **Call Me Sovereign, Sir or Sire      Preferred Honorific**

When the defendant provides his or her correct name, he or she will frequently ask to be addressed as Sovereign \_\_\_\_\_, Sir \_\_\_\_\_ or with some other similar title. Do not object if the judge allows this request outside of the presence of the jury. If the case proceeds to a jury trial, an objection/motion in limine should be brought pursuant to Const. art. 4, § 16 as the use of the title tends to be a comment on the defendant's sovereign immunity or diplomatic immunity claim.

## **I am not a Person but a Human Being**

The defendant will challenge the court's jurisdiction on the grounds that the criminal code applies to persons and the various statutory definitions of person do not include the phrase human being. *See, e.g.,* RCW 46.04.405; RCW 9A.04.110(17). These statutory definitions, however, all include the phrase natural person. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1028 (5th ed. 1979) defines person, in pertinent part, as follows: In general usage, a human being (*i.e.* natural person), though by statute term may include a firm & . Case law also establishes that a natural person is a human being. *See, e.g., Hogan v. Greenfield*, 122 P.2d 850, 853 (Wyo. 1942).

*See also* *Infractions, infra*, for a more thorough discussion of why Freeman believe traffic laws do not apply to them.

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## **I am not a Citizen of Your Jurisdiction      Jurisdiction Over a Non-Citizen**

A superior court has jurisdiction over any individual regardless of the person's citizenship or residency status if the person commits a crime or traffic infraction, in whole or in part, in the county of the state where the superior court is located. *See generally* RCW 9A.04.030; RCW 9A.04.070; RCW 46.08.190; Const. art. 4, § 6; Const. art. 1, § 22; *State ex rel. Best v. Superior Court*, 107 Wash. 238, 181 P. 688 (1919) ( it requires something more than ingenious and pleasing argument to convince us that the state is powerless to maintain her dignity and enforce her laws as against any individual within her boundaries, no matter what his status may be as to citizenship or lack of it ). The superior court's subject matter jurisdiction is invoked by the filing of an information or indictment. Const. art. 1, § 25; CrR 2.1; RCW 10.37.010. A grand jury indictment is not necessary. *See, e.g., State v. Jeffries*, 105 Wn.2d 398, 423-24, 717 P.2d 722, *cert. denied*, 479 U.S. 922 (1986); *Jeffries v. Blodgett*, 5 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 1993), *cert. denied*, 114 S.Ct. 1294 (1994).

A district court has jurisdiction over any individual regardless of the person's citizenship or residency status if the person commits a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor crime or violates a traffic ordinance, in whole or in part, in the county of the state where the court of limited jurisdiction is located. *See generally*, RCW 9A.04.030; RCW 9A.04.070; RCW 3.66.060; RCW 7.80.010(1); Const. art. 1, § 22; Const. art. 4, § 10; *State ex rel. Best v. Superior Court*, 107 Wash. 238, 181 P. 688 (1919) ( it requires something more than ingenious and pleasing argument to convince us that the state is powerless to maintain her dignity and enforce her laws as against any individual within her boundaries, no matter what his status may be as to citizenship or lack of it ). The district court's subject matter jurisdiction is invoked by the filing of a complaint or citation. Const. art. 1, § 25; CrRLJ 2.1(a); RCW 10.37.010; RCW 10.37.015.

A municipal court has jurisdiction over any individual regardless of the person's citizenship or residency status if the person commits a traffic infraction within the city limits or violates a city ordinance within the city limits. RCW 7.80.010(2); RCW 35.20.030; RCW 3.50.020; *cf. State ex rel. Best v. Superior Court*, 107 Wash. 238, 181 P. 688 (1919) ( it requires something more than ingenious and pleasing argument to convince us that the state is powerless to maintain her dignity and enforce her laws as against any individual within her boundaries, no matter what his status may be as to citizenship or lack of it ). The municipal court's subject matter jurisdiction is invoked by the filing of a complaint or citation. CrRLJ 2.1(a); RCW 10.37.010; RCW 10.37.015.

Cases from other jurisdictions which have expressly rejected claims that a state court lacks jurisdiction because the defendant is freeborn, a citizen of the republic, or similar claim include

*United States v. Hilgeford*, 7 F.3d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1993) (criminal tax case in which defendant claimed that he was a citizen of the Indiana State Republic and, therefore, an alien beyond jurisdictional reach of federal courts);

*United States v. Sloan*, 939 F.2d 499, 501 (7th Cir. 1991) (criminal tax case in which defendant claimed that he was not subject to jurisdictional laws of the United States because he is a freeborn, natural individual, a citizen of the State of Indiana, and a master not a servant of his government ); and

*United States v. Greenstreet*, 912 F.Supp. 224, 228 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (court rejected defendant's claim that he was not subject to the jurisdiction of the court because he is of Freeman Character and of the White Preamble Citizenship and not one of the 14th Amendment legislated enfranchised De Facto colored races and because he is a White Preamble natural sovereign Common Law De Jure Citizen of the Republic/State of Texas ).

## **I am Here Under Duress      Involuntary Presence in the Court**

The presence of the accused before the court gives the court jurisdiction over the accused's person regardless of the validity of the accused's arrest. *State v. Blanchey*, 75 Wn.2d 926, 454 P.2d 481 (1969).

See also *United States v. Alvarez-Machain*, 504 U.S. 655, 119 L.Ed.2d 441, 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992) (respondent's forcible abduction in Mexico does not prohibit his trial in a United States court for violations of this country's criminal laws); *Davis v. Rhy*, 68 Wn.2d 496, 413 P.2d 654 (1966) (power of court to try person is not impaired by fact that he has been brought within court's jurisdiction by reason of forcible abduction).

## **I have Immunity      Diplomatic or Sovereign Immunity**

Diplomatic immunity and sovereign immunity are premised upon recognition by the receiving state; no one is able to unilaterally assert diplomatic immunity. *United States v. Lumumba*, 741 F.2d 12 (2nd Cir. 1984);

Diplomatic Relations Act, §§ 2-6, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 254a-254e; The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, Art. IV, 23 U.S.T. 3227.<sup>63</sup> Diplomatic status only exists when there is recognition of another state's sovereignty by the Department of State.<sup>64</sup> In other words, recognition by the executive branch—not to be second-guessed by the judiciary—is essential to establishing diplomatic status. *Lumumba*, 741 F.2d at 15, citing *Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States* § 461 Commentary at 30 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1983).

Courts have routinely rejected claims of diplomatic and/or sovereign immunity where the defendant has not established that the United States Department of State has recognized the country that the defendant claims to head or to represent as an ambassador. See, e.g.

*United States v. Lumumba, supra* (defendant's claim of immunity from prosecution due to his proclaimed status as Vice President and Minister of Justice of the Provisional Government of the Republic of New Afrika, which is the Nation of Afrikans born in North America as a consequence of...slavery and which encompasses five southern states—Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina, was rejected because there was no showing that the Department of State had recognized this country);

*State v. Crisman*, 123 Idaho 277, 846 P.2d 928, 931 (1993) (defendant's unilateral proclamation that he was an ambassador of the Kingdom of YHWH (Yaweh) did not entitle him to diplomatic immunity from prosecution because there is no evidence that the United States Department of State had recognized that Kingdom as sovereign or had granted the defendant immunity);

*State v. Davis*, 745 S.W.2d 249, 253 (Mo.Ct.App. 1988) (defendant, who claimed he was citizen and ambassador of Kingdom of God, was not entitled to diplomatic immunity in criminal prosecution because there was nothing in record to indicate the organization of which defendant was a member had been recognized as foreign state by executive branch of federal government, or that Department of State had granted immunity status to defendant).

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<sup>63</sup> The protective provisions of the Treaty appear in Articles 29 and 31. Article 29 provides: The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. Article 31 establishes that: A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state.

<sup>64</sup> The United States Department of State produces the Diplomatic List, of missions in the U.S. This list, which is prepared quarterly by the Office of Protocol, contains the names of members of the diplomatic staffs of all missions and their spouses. Members of the diplomatic staff are the members of the staff of the mission having diplomatic rank.

These persons, with the exception of those identified by asterisks, enjoy full immunity under provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The list may be accessed on the State Department's web page at <[http://www.state.gov/www/about\\_state/contacts/diplist/index.html](http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/contacts/diplist/index.html)>.

Hard copies of the Diplomatic List, Department of State Publication 10424, are available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402, Tel: (202) 512-1800, FAX: (202) 512-2250.

Washington case law does not clearly establish whether the judge or the jury decides the issue of sovereign or diplomatic immunity or who bears the burden of establishing sovereign or diplomatic immunity. In one Kitsap County case the issue was submitted to the jury, but the jury instructions were structured to ensure that a finding of immunity would not be an acquittal for purposes of double jeopardy. The instructions used are set forth below

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NO.

Jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine a case. The State of Washington may exercise jurisdiction over an individual who has been charged with a crime regardless of whether the individual is a citizen or resident of the state so long as the offense occurred within the state.

RCW 9A.04.030

*State v. Lane*, 112 Wn.2d 464, 771 P.2d 1150 (1989)

*State ex rel. Best v. Superior Court*, 107 Wash. 238, 181 P. 688 (1919)

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NO.

A grant of diplomatic immunity or sovereign immunity will deprive a state court of jurisdiction to try an individual for any crime. Diplomatic immunity or sovereign immunity cannot be unilaterally asserted by an individual. Diplomatic immunity or sovereign immunity can only be conferred on an individual by the United States Department of State.

The burden is on the defendant to prove the existence of diplomatic immunity or sovereign immunity by a preponderance of the evidence. Preponderance of the evidence means that you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case, that it is more probably true than not true. If you find that the defendant has established that he is entitled to diplomatic or sovereign immunity, it will be your duty to return a verdict of no jurisdiction.

*State v. Moses*, 79 Wn.2d 104, 110, 483 P.2d 832 (1971) (treaty exemption defense to violation of fishing laws must be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence), *cert. denied*, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); *State v. Williams*, 13 Wash. 335, 43 P. 15 (1895) (defendant bears the burden of establishing that he is an Indian by a preponderance of the evidence);

*State v. Courville*, 36 Wn.App. 615, 622, 676 P.2d 1011 (1983) (assertion of treaty rights as an affirmative defense must be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence);

Diplomatic immunity and sovereign immunity are premised upon recognition by the receiving state; no one is able to unilaterally assert diplomatic immunity. *United States v. Lumumba*, 741 F.2d 12 (2nd Cir. 1984);

Diplomatic Relations Act, §§ 2-6, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 254a-254e; The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, Art. IV, 23 U.S.T. 3227

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NO.

Upon retiring to the jury room for your deliberation of this case, your first duty is to select a presiding juror. It is his or her duty to see that discussion is carried on in a sensible and orderly fashion, that the issues submitted for your decision are fully and fairly discussed, and that every juror has an opportunity to be heard and to participate in the deliberations upon each question before the jury.

You will be furnished with all of the exhibits admitted in evidence, these instructions, and five verdict forms and five special verdict forms.

When completing the verdict forms, you will first consider the issue of jurisdiction. If you unanimously agree on a verdict, you must fill in the blank provided on the Special Verdict Regarding Jurisdiction with the word *does* or the words *does not*, according to the decision you reach. If you find that the Court has jurisdiction, you will need to complete the remaining verdict forms.

When completing Verdict Forms A, B, C, D, and E, you must fill in blank provided in each verdict form with the words *not guilty* or the word *guilty*, according to the decision you reach. Since this is a criminal case, each of you must agree for you to return a verdict.

You will also be furnished Special Verdict Forms A, B, C, and D. If you find the defendant not guilty of any particular count of Intimidating a Judge, do not use the Special Verdict Form for that count. If you find the defendant guilty of any count of Intimidating a Judge, you must answer the questions on the Special Verdict Form relating to that count. In order to answer a question on a Special Verdict Form *yes*, you must unanimously be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that *yes* is the correct answer. If you have a reasonable doubt as to the question, you must answer *no*. If you do not unanimously agree then answer *no* unanimous agreement. When you have arrived at the answers, fill in the Special Verdict Form to express your decision on that count.

The presiding juror will sign the Special Verdict Regarding Jurisdiction, Verdict Forms A, B, C, D, and E, and Special Verdict Forms A, B, C, and D, if a verdict has been rendered on these forms and will notify the bailiff, who will conduct you into court to declare your verdicts.

WPIC 151.00 (modified)  
WPIC 160.00 (modified)  
WPIC 31.08 (by analogy)

CAPTION FOR SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING JURISDICTION

We, the jury, find that the Court \_\_\_\_\_ (Write in Does or Does Not ) have jurisdiction  
to try the defendant, VERY L EDWARD KNOWLES, for the crimes charged in the information.

DATED this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
PRESIDING JUROR

*If this verdict is does have jurisdiction please complete the remaining verdict forms.*

## Is this an Admiralty Court? Fringe on the Flag

Washington statutes require that the American flag and the Washington flag be on display in the courtroom. RCW 1.20.015. Case law establishes that

the mere lack of compliance per se with such an administrative provision would not inure to the benefit of a defendant.[] In itself, and in the absence of relevance to some other situation of separate significance involving a defendant's rights, non-compliance with section 753(b) gives no better basis for a new trial than would a similar provision directing judges to wear robes, deputy marshals to wear a particular sort of uniform while on duty, or court criers to use a particular formula, or to station the American flag at a particular place in the courtroom.

*United States v. Sams*, 219 F.Supp. 164, 166 (W.D. Pa. 1963), *aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds*, 340 F.2d 1014 (3rd Cir.), *cert. denied*, 380 U.S. 974 (1965).

Two recent cases contain extended discussions regarding flags with fringes. These cases, *Schneider v. Schlaefer*, 975 F.Supp. 1160 (E. D. Wisconsin 1997), and *Sadlier v. Payne*, 974 F.Supp. 1411 (D. Utah 1997), provide that

- (1) Yellow fringe on a United States flag in a courtroom does not convert a state court into a foreign state power denying due process to a defendant in state criminal proceedings.
- (2) Yellow fringe on a flag does not convert a court into an admiralty jurisdiction court.
- (3) A fringed flag adorning the courtroom does not limit a court's jurisdiction since decor is not a determinant for jurisdiction. *U.S. v. Greenstreet*, 912 F.Supp. 224, 229 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
- (4) Yellow fringe on a flag does not appear to violate 36 U.S.C. § 176(g) which provides that [t]he flag should never have placed upon it, nor on any part of it, nor attached to it any mark, insignia, letter, word, figure, design, picture, or drawing of any nature. Title 36 of the United States Code, commonly referred to as the flag code, moreover, does not proscribe conduct and does not contain any penal sanctions.

## Refusal to Enter Plea

Freemen will generally refuse to enter a plea because they do not recognize the court's jurisdiction. A request should be made that the court enter a not guilty plea on the defendant's behalf pursuant to RCW 10.40.190.

## Refusal for Cause Return of Pleadings

Frequently, citations, informations, complaints and other pleadings that are given to Freemen will be returned with the phrase Refusal for Cause written upon it. As explained by the Federal District Court for Idaho

the defendants' refusal for cause is meaningless. The defendants claim they can refuse presentment of the plaintiff's complaint pursuant to U.C.C. 3-501. Apparently, the defendants are arguing that § 3-501(2)(c)(ii) is a defense which provides for the defendants' refusal of payment or acceptance for failure of the presentment to comply with the terms of the instrument, an agreement of the parties, or other applicable law or rule. The defendants' reliance on Chapter 3 of the U.C.C. is misplaced; Chapter 3 of the U.C.C. by its own definitions is only applicable to negotiable instruments. The complaint filed by the plaintiff is not a negotiable instrument and the Uniform Commercial Code is inapplicable. The defendants do not have the choice of whether or not to be defendants. If properly served, as this court has determined the defendants were, the [defendants] became parties to this lawsuit whether they wanted to be or not.

*United States v. Andra*, 923 F.Supp. 157, 159 (D. Idaho 1996).

## Speedy Trial

The 90/60 day time for trial contained in CrR 3.3 and CrRLJ 3.3 will begin to run when the court enters the not guilty plea on behalf of the defendant if this action occurs within 14 days (CrR 3.3) or 15 days (CrRLJ 3.3) of the defendant's first appearance in court. If the arraignment has been continued for more than 14 or 15 days as has happened in some of our cases when the judge runs out of time and/or patience for dealing with the Freeman at hearing after hearing, make sure that the trial is set within 104/74 days (superior court) or 105/75 days (court of limited jurisdiction) of the first appearance in court.

Also take care in cases filed by criminal citation in courts of limited jurisdiction to comply with *Seattle v. Bonifacio*, 127 Wn.2d 482, 900 P.2d 1105 (1995) (issuance of a citation, regardless of whether it is subsequently filed, starts the speedy trial clock running; Held: prosecution of defendant barred as proceedings did not commence within 110 days [CrRLJ 2.1(b)(3)(iv)'s requirement of filing citation within 20 days of issuance plus 90 day speedy trial rule under CrRLJ 3.3] of issuance of citation even though less than 110 days had elapsed since the filing of a complaint by a city attorney).

## Refusal to Sign Promise to Reappear

Release on personal recognizance can be difficult in these cases because the defendant will frequently refuse to sign the promise to appear for the next hearing. When confronted with a judge who appears willing to impose the \$50,000 cash only bail requested by the prosecutor to ensure the defendant's appearance at the next hearing, the defendant will sign the promise to appear. If this happens, a copy of the signed promise to appear with the words "Refused for fraud, UCC § \_\_\_\_\_, Refused for Fraud F.R.C.P. 9(b), Refusal for cause without dishonor U.C.C. 3-501, or the words "Refused for cause without dishonor and without recourse to me" will be received by the court and/or prosecutor within a matter of days. The defendant, nonetheless, will generally appear at the next hearing.

## Request for a Bill of Particulars

A defendant has a constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him or her to enable the defendant to prepare a defense and to avoid a subsequent prosecution for the same crime.<sup>65</sup>

Our prior cases indicate that an indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future

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<sup>65</sup> The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.

Article 1, §22 of the Washington State Constitution, which contains language almost identical to the federal constitution, provides: [i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

prosecutions for the same offense. It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished. Undoubtedly the language of the statute may be used in the general description of an offence, but it must be accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offence, coming under the general description, with which he is charged.

*Hamling v. United States*, 418 U.S. 87, 41 L.Ed.2d 590, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2907-08 (1974) (citations omitted.)

This constitutional right of a criminal defendant to be apprised with reasonable certainty as to the charges against him is ordinarily satisfied by a charging document which includes all of the statutory and nonstatutory elements of the offense. *State v. Kjorsvik*, 117 Wn.2d 93, 97, 812 P.2d 86 (1991); *State v. Grant*, 89 Wn.2d 678, 686, 575 P.2d 210 (1978); *State v. Merrill*, 23 Wn.App. 577, 580, 597 P.2d 446, review denied, 92 Wn.2d 1036 (1979). The constitution does not require that the prosecuting authority must allege its supporting evidence, theory of the case or whether or not it can prove its case in the charging document. *United States v. Buckley*, 689 F.2d 893 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1086 (1983); *State v. Bates*, 52 Wn.2d 207, 324 P.2d 810 (1958). In fact, the charging document may even list inapplicable alternative means of committing the offense. See *State v. Williamson*, 84 Wn.App. 37, 42, 924 P.2d 960 (1996).<sup>66</sup>

In our system, a defendant may obtain additional clarification of the charging document by bringing a motion for a bill of particulars. See CrR2.1(c); CrRLJ 2.4(e); *State v. Holt*, 104 Wn.2d 315, 320, 704 P.2d 1189 (1985). In determining whether to order a bill of particulars in a specific case, a court should consider whether the defendant has been advised adequately of the charges through the charging document and all other disclosures made by the government. *United States v. Long*, 706 F.2d 1044 (9th Cir. 1983); *United States v. Giese*, 597 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979). The furnishing of a bill of particulars is discretionary with the trial court, whose ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. *State v. Noltie*, 116 Wn.2d 831, 844, 809 P.2d 190 (1991); *State v. Devine*, 84 Wn.2d 467, 527 P.2d 72 (1974).

A bill of particulars is not necessary when the means of obtaining the facts are readily accessible to the defendant or the facts are already known to him or her. See *United States v. Kaplan*, 470 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 966 (1973). In *State v. Paschall*, 197 Wash. 582, 85 P.2d 1046 (1939), the court held that it was not prejudicial error to deny a motion for a bill of particulars when the state's attorney had disclosed to the defendant's attorney practically all of the facts concerning which evidence the government intended to use at trial.

Nor was it error to deny the motions for a bill of particulars and to make the information more definite and certain. It was not made to appear that the state had knowledge of any ultimate facts of which appellants themselves were not cognizant. As a matter of fact, it would appear from the record that, prior even to the filing of the information, the state's attorneys disclosed to appellants or their counsel practically all of the facts concerning which evidence was adduced at the trial. Certainly appellants suffered no prejudice by the denial of the motions.

*Paschall*, 197 Wash. at 588. See also *State v. Dictado*, 102 Wn.2d 277, 286, 687 P.2d 172 (1984) (court denied motion for bill of particulars stating nothing in the record indicates what information, beyond that already provided, the State could have furnished to give additional notice of the charges); *Grant*, 89 Wn.2d at 686-687 (court denied motion for bill of particulars stating the officer's report is about as much as the

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<sup>66</sup> While not implicated at this stage of the proceeding, it is improper to instruct a jury regarding alternate means that are not supported by the evidence. A conviction entered under such circumstances will only be sustained on appeal if the verdict forms clearly indicate that the jury was unanimous as to the factually supported alternative means. See, e.g., *State v. Chester*, 133 Wn.2d 15, 19, n.2, 940 P.2d 1374 (1997); *State v. Ortega-Martinez*, 124 Wn.2d 702, 707-08, 881 P.2d 231 (1994).

court could compel the prosecutor to furnish (the defendant) ); *State v. Clark*, 21 Wn.2d 774, 778, 153 P.2d 297 (1944), *cert. denied*, 325 U.S. 878 (1945) (court denied motion for bill of particulars stating case was based on defendant's confession and a bill of particulars could not provide the defendant with any more information that was not already locked up in defendant's own breast ); *Merrill*, 23 Wn.App. at 580 (court denied motion for bill of particulars where the defendant was made aware through discovery of all the information available to the prosecutor for proving the offense).

In the Freeman culture, a bill of particulars is a lengthy questionnaire similar in nature to interrogatories. The purpose of their request for a bill of particulars is to determine the facts necessary in their legal system for the exercise of its jurisdiction over you.<sup>67</sup> If such a defendant asks the court to order you to provide a bill of particulars you must be very clear to the court that you will provide a bill of particulars as contemplated by CrR 2.1(c) or CrRLJ 2.4(e). The form of any order granting a defendant's request for a bill of particulars should include the limiting language as contemplated by CrR 2.1(c) or CrRLJ 2.4(e).

## The Court has no Jurisdiction Absent a Grand Jury Indictment

The State of Washington abandoned its mandatory grand jury practice some 80 years ago.<sup>68</sup> While grand juries are still convened on rare occasions in Washington, the vast majority of Washington prosecutions are instituted on information filed by the prosecutor. The use of an information is specifically authorized by the Washington Constitution.<sup>69</sup> Numerous cases, both state and federal, establish that a state prosecution does not require a grand jury indictment. *See, e.g., State v. Jeffries*, 105 Wn.2d 398, 423-24, 717 P.2d 722, *cert. denied*, 479 U.S. 922 (1986); *Jeffries v. Blodgett*, 5 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 1993), *cert. denied*, 114 S.Ct. 1294 (1994).

## The Right to an Attorney

The only thing worse than prosecuting a Freeman defendant is having to retry a case because the defendant's right to an attorney was not protected. Absent an adequate *Faretta, infra*, waiver of trial counsel and/or waiver of appellate counsel, an attorney should be appointed by the court.

Reliance upon the defendant's failure to establish indigency is unlikely to shield the conviction from a subsequent challenge. *See generally State v. Nordstrom*, 89 Wn.App. 737, 950 P.2d 946 (1997). The appointment of stand-by counsel will not obviate the need for an adequate *Faretta* waiver. *State v. Barker*, 35 Wn.App. 388, 393, 667 P.2d 108 (1983); *State v. Dougherty*, 33 Wn.App. 466, 655 P.2d 1187 (1982).

A criminal defendant's right to self-representation is guaranteed by the Sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 22, amendment 10 of the Washington State Constitution. *Faretta v. California*, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975); *State v. Hoff*, 31 Wn.App. 809, 811, 644 P.2d 763, *review denied*, 97 Wn.2d 1031, *cert. denied*, 459 U.S. 1093 (1982); *State v. Jessup*, 31 Wn.App. 304, 309, 641 P.2d 1185 (1982).

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<sup>67</sup> Examples of questions that have appeared in many of the 16+ page bill of particulars that have been received by us include

16. What is the true and correct Christian Appellation of the *Defendant* in the Above mentioned Case? true and correct require that you state the complete praenomen, nomen, and cognomen. &

20. Does the Plaintiff claim that the Demandant is an artificial, juristic, or statutory person? &

41. Is the American Bar Association and the Washington Bar Association organized under the power and authority of the Crown of England? Do attorney's owe allegiance to the crown of England's titles of Nobility? Do attorney's have titles of nobility i.e. Esquire?

48. State all facts relied upon which would put the Demandant in any jurisdiction other than that of the common law of the Organic Washington Republic. &

<sup>68</sup> Washington Laws 1909, c. 87.

<sup>69</sup> Const. art. 1, § 25 provides that

Offense's heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment may be prosecuted by information, or by indictment, as shall be prescribed by law.

But unlike the right to assistance of counsel, the right to dispense with such assistance and to represent oneself is guaranteed not because it is essential to a fair trial but because the defendant has the personal right to be a fool. See *State v. Fritz*, 21 Wn.App. 354, 359, 585 P.2d 173, 98 A.L.R.3d 1 (1978), quoting *People v. Salazar*, 74 Cal.App.3d 875, 888, 141 Cal.Rptr. 753 (1977).

*Hoff*, 31 Wn.App. at 811.

To secure the constitutional right of self-representation, a defendant must make a timely request. *State v. Stenson*, 132 Wn.2d 668, 737-40, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1193 (1998). A request is generally considered timely if made prior to jury selection. *Id.*

Granting a request to proceed pro se that is made on or near the date scheduled for trial does not require the court to grant the defendant a continuance. See *State v. Honton*, 85 Wn.App. 415, 932 P.2d 1276, review denied, 133 Wn.2d 1011 (1997) (aggravated first degree murder case).

The wrongful denial of a timely, pre-trial request to proceed pro se requires reversal of any conviction without any showing of prejudice. *State v. Breedlove*, 79 Wn.App. 101, 900 P.2d 586 (1995); *State v. Estabrook*, 68 Wn.App. 309, 317, 842 P.2d 1001, review denied, 121 Wn.2d 1024 (1993).

The exercise of the right to proceed pro se must be requested by the defendant, and the court is not required to advise the defendant of the existence of the right. *State v. Garcia*, 92 Wn.2d 647, 655, 600 P.2d 1010 (1979). The request or demand to defend pro se must be (1) knowing and intelligent and (2) unequivocal. See, e.g., *Hendricks v. Zenon*, 933 F.2d 664, 669 (9th Cir. 1993); *Gomez v. Collins*, 993 F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 1993); *State v. DeWeese*, 117 Wn.2d 369, 376, 816 P.2d 1 (1991); *Breedlove*, 79 Wn.App. at 106; *State v. Barker*, 75 Wn.App. 236, 238, 881 P.2d 1051 (1994); *State v. Sinclair*, 46 Wn.App. 433, 437, 730 P.2d 742 (1986).

To ensure that a waiver of counsel meets these two requirements, the court should conduct a thorough and comprehensive formal inquiry of the defendant on the record to demonstrate that the defendant is aware of the nature of charges, range of allowable punishments and possible defenses, that technical rules exist which will bind the defendant in the presentation of his case, and the other risks of proceeding pro se. *Hendricks*, 993 F.2d at 669-70; *United States v. Merchant*, 992 F.2d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 1993); *DeWeese*, 117 Wn.2d at 378; *Bellevue v. Acrey*, 103 Wn.2d 203, 211, 691 P.2d 957 (1984); *Barker*, 75 Wn.App. at 239; *Vermillion*, 66 Wn.App. at 340, 832 P.2d 95 (1992).

A defendant's refusal to participate in a colloquy requires the court to reject his request to proceed pro se.

Most of the Freeman we have dealt with when asked whether they wish to waive counsel will indicate that they will not be waiving their right to assistance of counsel. This response, however, relates to their desire to be assisted by someone who is not a member of the Washington State Bar Association. If your question is rephrased as whether they wish to proceed with an attorney who is a member of the Washington State Bar, the answer will be an emphatic no.

At this point, the prosecution's concern is obtaining an adequate waiver of attorney. Copies of the waiver forms used in Kitsap County for trial counsel and appellate counsel are reproduced below. While it is preferable to have the Freeman actually fill out the forms, the ensuing battle is generally not worth the fight. A compromise that will still protect the record is to have the judge review the form orally with the defendant.

If a Freeman defendant refuses to participate in an oral or written waiver of attorney, an attorney should be appointed to represent the Freeman **regardless** of his or her economic circumstances. As trial nears, Freeman often become so frustrated with court-appointed counsel's refusal to argue the Freeman view of the law that a colloquy to establish a valid waiver of attorney will become possible.

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CAPTION FOR WAIVER OF TRIAL ATTORNEY

An accused has a constitutional right to represent himself or herself if he or she chooses to do so, but there are potential dangers and disadvantages of representing yourself. The following questions must be filled in so that the Court can determine that your decision to represent yourself is knowingly made.

1. What was the last grade of school you completed? \_\_\_\_\_.
2. What languages do you read and speak fluently? \_\_\_\_\_.
3. Have you ever studied law? \_\_\_\_\_.
4. Have you ever represented yourself or any other defendant in a criminal action? \_\_\_\_\_. If yes, please indicate what the charges were and whether the matter proceeded to trial and/or appeal. \_\_\_\_\_.
5. Do you realize that you are currently charged with one count of Unlawful Practice of Law in violation of RCW 2.48.180 and two counts of Malicious Prosecution violation of RCW 9.62.010? \_\_\_\_\_?
6. Do you realize that the maximum penalty for Unlawful Practice of Law is confinement in the county jail for a term of up to 365 days and/or by a fine of up to \$5,000.00? \_\_\_\_\_. Do you realize that if convicted, the court could also require you to pay restitution to your victim, to pay court costs, and to place certain post-release restrictions on your conduct? \_\_\_\_\_.
7. Do you realize that the maximum penalty for each count of Malicious Prosecution is confinement in the county jail for a term of up to 90 days and/or by a fine of up to \$1,000.00? \_\_\_\_\_. Do you realize that if convicted, the court could also require you to pay restitution to your victim, to pay court costs, and to place certain post-release restrictions on your conduct? \_\_\_\_\_.
8. Do you realize that the sentences imposed on each count can be ordered to be served consecutively, that is one after the other? \_\_\_\_\_.
9. Do you realize that if you represent yourself, you are on your own? \_\_\_\_\_. The Court cannot tell you how you should try your case or even advise you as to how to present your case.
10. Are you familiar with the Rules of Evidence (ER)? \_\_\_\_\_. These rules control what questions can be asked of witnesses, how questions must be phrased, and what documents or other items can be admitted at trial. In representing yourself, you must abide by these rules.
11. Are you familiar with the Criminal Rules for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (CrRLJ)? \_\_\_\_\_. These rules govern the way in which a criminal matter is presented in the municipal court. These rules will apply to you the same as they apply to an attorney. *State v. Smith*, 104 Wn.2d 497, 508, 707 P.2d 1306 (1985).
12. Do you realize that if you decide to take the witness stand, you must present your testimony by asking questions of yourself? \_\_\_\_\_. You cannot just take the stand and tell your story. You must proceed question by question through your testimony.
13. Do you realize that a lawyer would be familiar with the rules governing the presentation of evidence, skilled in following these rules, and could advise you of possible defenses to the pending claims? \_\_\_\_\_.
14. Do you realize that if you proceed pro se that if you do not properly present a defense, subpoena witnesses, or otherwise represent yourself in a competent manner that you will not be able to obtain a reversal of a conviction on the grounds that you received inept representation? \_\_\_\_\_.
15. Why do you not want an attorney? \_\_\_\_\_. If it is because you do not believe that you can afford an attorney, do you realize that an attorney can be appointed at public expense if you are indigent, or if you are partially able to contribute to the cost of counsel. Your eligibility for court appointed counsel is determined by a review of your financial resources. Do you wish to be screened for court appointed counsel? \_\_\_\_\_.
16. Do you realize that once you waive your right to an attorney that it is discretionary with the court whether you may withdraw the waiver? \_\_\_\_\_.
17. Do you realize that while the court may provide you with an attorney as a legal advisor or standby counsel, that you do not have an absolute right to receive this assistance and that you, and not standby counsel must prepare for trial? \_\_\_\_\_.
18. Have any threats or promises been made to induce you to waive your right to an attorney? \_\_\_\_\_.
19. Now, in light of the penalty that you might suffer if you are representing yourself, is it still your desire to represent yourself and to give up your right to be represented by a lawyer? \_\_\_\_\_.
20. Is your decision entirely voluntary on your part? \_\_\_\_\_. I have read and completed this form. I have no questions for the court about the risks of proceeding pro se or about my right to have a lawyer appointed to assist me. I request that the court allow me to represent myself.

DATED this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
DEFENDANT

I find that the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his or her right to a lawyer who is admitted to the practice of law. I will therefore approve the defendant's election to represent herself.

DATED this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
JUDGE

CAPTION FOR WAIVER OF APPELLATE ATTORNEY

An accused has a constitutional right to represent himself or herself if he or she chooses to do so, but there are potential dangers and disadvantages of representing yourself. The following questions must be filled in so that the Court can determine that your decision to represent yourself is knowingly made.

1. What was the last grade of school you completed? \_\_\_\_\_.
2. Have you ever studied law? \_\_\_\_\_.
3. Have you ever represented yourself or any other defendant in a criminal action? \_\_\_\_\_. If yes, please indicate what the charges were and whether the matter proceeded to trial and/or appeal. \_\_\_\_\_.
4. Do you realize that you have been convicted of \_\_\_\_\_ and that you have been sentenced to \_\_\_\_\_ days in custody, a \_\_\_\_\_ fine, plus costs, and restitution? \_\_\_\_\_. Do you realize that if you lose your appeal, this sentence, if stayed, will have to be served? \_\_\_\_\_.

OR

Do you realize that you have been charged with \_\_\_\_\_ and that if convicted of this offense you can be sentenced to up to \_\_\_\_\_ days in custody, a \$ \_\_\_\_\_ fine, plus costs, and restitution? \_\_\_\_\_. Do you realize that if the State prevails on its appeal, that the charge of \_\_\_\_\_ will be reinstated? \_\_\_\_\_.

5. Do you realize that if you represent yourself, you are on your own? \_\_\_\_\_. The Court cannot tell you how you should write your briefs or even advise you as to how to present your arguments.
6. Are you familiar with the Rules for Appeal of Decisions of Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (RALJ)? \_\_\_\_\_. These rules govern the way in which an appeal is presented in the superior court. These rules will apply to you the same as they apply to an attorney. *State v. Smith*, 104 Wn.2d 497, 508, 707 P.2d 1306 (1985).
7. Do you realize that a lawyer would be familiar with the rules governing appeals and the presentation of claims, skilled in following these rules, and could advise you of possible procedural bars and defenses to the pending claims? \_\_\_\_\_.
8. Do you realize that if you proceed pro se that if you do not properly present a claim in the appellate courts that you could be barred from presenting that claim in a subsequent appeal, personal restraint petition or habeas corpus action? \_\_\_\_\_.
9. Do you realize that if you proceed pro se that you do not have an absolute right to present oral argument in the appellate courts or even to be present at the proceedings in the appellate courts? \_\_\_\_\_.
10. Why do you not want an attorney? \_\_\_\_\_. If it is because of a conflict of interest between you and your prior counsel or because there is a complete breakdown of communication, do you wish the court to consider appointing new counsel? \_\_\_\_\_. If the court determines that a substitute attorney should not be appointed, do you understand that your option is to represent yourself or to remain with your current attorney? \_\_\_\_\_.
11. Have any threats or promises been made to induce you to waive your right to attorney? \_\_\_\_\_.
12. Now, in light of the penalty that you might suffer if you are representing yourself, is it still your desire to represent yourself and to give up your right to be represented by a lawyer? \_\_\_\_\_.
13. Is your decision entirely voluntary on your part? \_\_\_\_\_.

DATED this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
DEFENDANT

I find that the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his or her right to an attorney. I will therefore approve the defendant's election to represent himself.

DATED this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
JUDGE

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## Disruptive Behavior of Pro Se Defendant

The right to self-representation does not permit a defendant to disrupt a hearing or trial, nor is it a license for a pro se defendant to not comply with the rules of procedural and substantive law. *State v. Breedlove*, 79 Wn.App. 101, 106, 900 P.2d 586 (1995). A pro se litigant is required to comply with court rules to the same degree that an attorney must comply with the rules. *See, e.g., State v. Smith*, 104 Wn.2d 497, 508, 707 P.2d 1306 (1985); *Batten v. Adams*, 28 Wn.App. 737, 739, *review denied*, 95 Wn.2d 1033 (1981). A disruptive pro se defendant may have his or her right to self-representation terminated. *State v. Jessup*, 31 Wn.App. 304, 312, 641 P.2d 1185 (1982). A disruptive pro se defendant may be removed from the courtroom. *DeWeese*, 117 Wn.2d at 380-81.

A pro se litigant, just like an attorney, must present legal authority in support of his or her objections and motions. Failure to cite legal authority requires the court to assume that, after diligent search, the moving party has found none. In such a case, courts ordinarily will not give consideration to such error unless it is apparent without further research that the assignment of error presented is well taken. *State v. Young*, 89 Wn.2d 613, 625, 574 P.2d 1171 (1978).

## OK, I'll Take Your Attorney      Withdrawal of Pro Se Status

Once a defendant exercises the constitutional right of self-representation and proceeds pro se, he or she does not have the absolute right to thereafter withdraw the request for self representation and receive substitute counsel. *United States v. Merchant*, 992 F.2d 1091, 1095 (10th Cir. 1993); *United States v. Solina*, 733 F.2d 1208, 1211-12 (7th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 469 U.S. 1039 (1984); *DeWeese*, 117 Wn.2d at 376-77; *State v. Canedo-Astorga*, 79 Wn.App. 518, 525, 903 P.2d 500 (1995), *review denied*, 128 Wn.2d 1025 (1996). Instead, the trial court has the discretion to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a pro se waiver. *Canedo-Astorga*, 79 Wn.App. at 526. The trial court's ruling will be upheld on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. *Id.* Judicial discretion is only abused when the court exercises its discretion on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons. *State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker*, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971). In other words, an abuse of discretion occurs where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. *State v. Blight*, 89 Wn.2d 38, 41, 569 P.2d 1129 (1977).

In exercising its discretion, the court may consider all the circumstances that exist when the request for reappointment is made. *Canedo-Astorga*, 79 Wn.App. at 526. A major factor to be considered is the timing of the request. As noted by the Tenth Circuit

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to defend himself; and with rights come responsibilities. If at the last minute he gets cold feet and wants a lawyer to defend him he runs the risk that the judge will hold him to his original decision in order to avoid the disruption of the court's schedule that a continuance granted on the very day that trial is scheduled to begin is bound to cause.

*Merchant*, 992 F.2d at 1095, citing *United States v. Solina*, *supra*. Accord *DeWeese*, 117 Wn.2d at 379 (A defendant may not manipulate the right to counsel for the purpose of delaying and disrupting trial.); *State v. Canedo-Astorga*, 79 Wn.App. at 525.

If a late motion to withdraw a waiver of counsel is granted, the newly appointed attorney may obtain a continuance of the trial over the defendant's objection. *See generally State v. Campbell*, 103 Wn.2d 1, 691 P.2d 929 (1984), *cert. denied*, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985).

## I Want the Assistance of Counsel      Freeman Request for Non-Attorney Counsel

Most of the Freeman we have dealt with when asked whether they wish to waive counsel will indicate that they wish to proceed with their constitutional right to counsel. This right to counsel, in their mind, includes a non-attorney. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. U.S. Const. amend. VI.

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This guarantee, though, does not permit a criminal defendant to be represented by an advocate who is not a member of the bar. *United States v. Wheat*, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 100 L.Ed.2d 140, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697 (1988); *United States v. Nichols*, 841 F.2d 1485, 1504 (10th Cir. 1988); *see also State v. DeWeese*, 117 Wn.2d 369, 376, 816 P.2d 1 (1991) (a criminal defendant does not have the absolute right to be represented by the individual of his or her choice); *United States v. Willie*, 941 F.2d 1384, 1390 (10th Cir. 1991) ( [defendant s] clear expression that he could only work with an attorney who shared his views... [inter alia] constitute[d] a valid implied waiver of his right to counsel ), *cert. denied*, 502 U.S. 1106 (1992).

In Washington, it is a crime for a non-attorney to practice law in Washington. *See* RCW 2.48.180. A pro se exception to this prohibition exists. *See* RCW 2.48.190. The pro se exception permits an individual to act on his or her own behalf with respect to his or her legal rights and obligations without benefit of counsel. *See* RCW 2.48.190. This exception is very limited, and a person may not transfer his or her pro se rights to another. *See, e.g., State v. Hunt*, 75 Wn.App. 795, 805, 880 P.2d 96, *review denied*, 125 Wn.2d 1009 (1994) (statutory power of attorney does not allow an unlicensed person to practice law); *City of Seattle v. Shaver*, 23 Wn.App. 601, 597 P.2d 935 (1979) (layman husband may not represent wife in a prosecution for failure to yield right of way); *Christiansen v. Melinda*, 857 P.2d 345 (Alaska 1993) (statutory power of attorney does not remove agent from prohibition of unlicensed practice of law; principal can only engage agent to practice law on his behalf if agent is licensed attorney); *Gilman v. Kipp*, 519 N.Y.S.2d 314, 315, 136 Misc. 860 (1987) ( The inherent right of a person to appear pro se in legal proceedings cannot be assigned to another by executing the power of attorney. ); *In re Baker*, 85 A.2d 505, 514 (N.J. 1951) (the consequences of a UPL statute cannot be avoided merely by preparing for and having the client execute a document designating the unlicensed practitioner an attorney-in-fact ).

Unauthorized practice of law ( UPL ) statutes have repeatedly been found to be constitutional. *See, e.g., State v. Hunt, supra* (UPL statute not unconstitutionally vague); *Monroe v. Howitch*, 820 F.Supp. 682, 686-87 (D. Conn. 1993), *aff'd*, 19 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1994) (unsupervised paralegal s preparation of documents in divorce action constitutes the practice of law and state statute prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law did not violate paralegal s First Amendment freedom of expression or Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection). Accordingly any request by the defendant that he be represented by a non-attorney counselor must be rejected by the court.

## Hybrid Representation

A criminal defendant does not have a right to both self-representation and the assistance of counsel. *Faretta v. California*, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2540-41 (1975); *United States v. Shea*, 508 F.2d 82 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 423 U.S. 847 (1975); *Lee v. Alabama*, 406 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1968), *cert. denied*, 395 U.S. 927 (1969); *United States v. Swinney*, 970 F.2d 494, 498 (8th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 113 S.Ct. 632 (1992); *State v. Romero*, \_\_\_ Wn.App. \_\_\_, 975 P.2d 564 (Div. 3 April 29, 1999); *State v. Vermillion*, 66 Wn.App. 332, 340, 832 P.2d 95 (1992); *State v. Hegge*, 53 Wn.App. 345, 349, 766 P.2d 1127 (1989).

The right to proceed pro se and the right to assistance of counsel are mutually exclusive. As noted in *Parren*, 523 A.2d at 264: There can be but one captain of the ship, and it is he alone who must assume responsibility for its passage, whether it safely reaches the destination charted or founders on a reef. Thus, [a criminal defendant] is entitled to choose between two alternatives: proceeding pro se or relinquishing his defense to counsel. *State v. Gethers*, 497 A.2d at 415.

*Hegge*, 53 Wn.App. at 349. *Accord Vermillion*, 66 Wn.App. at 340. The determination of whether to allow hybrid representation remains within the sound discretion of the court. *United States v. Halbert*, 640 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1981). In Freeman cases, hybrid representation will frequently be allowed for the convenience of the court.

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## Standby Counsel

A court may appoint standby counsel, even over the objection of the defendant, to assist the accused if and when he or she requests help and to represent the accused in the event that the defendant's self-representation is terminated. *State v. Breedlove*, 79 Wn.App. 101, 106, 900 P.2d 586 (1995). Standby counsel must carefully limit his or her role to ensure that the pro se defendant preserves actual control over the case the Freeman chooses to present to the jury, and to ensure that the jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself or herself is not destroyed. *McKaskle v. Wiggins*, 465 U.S. 168, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122, 104 S.Ct. 944 (1984); *State v. Estabrook*, 68 Wn.App. 309, 317-18, 842 P.2d 1001, review denied, 121 Wn.2d 1024 (1993). The appointment of a legal advisor or standby counsel does not obviate the need for a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. *State v. Barker*, 35 Wn.App. 388, 393, 667 P.2d 108 (1983); *State v. Dougherty*, 33 Wn.App. 466, 655 P.2d 1187 (1982).

## I am in Control Attorney as Mouthpiece

Some Freeman believe that the phrase "assistance of counsel" means they control the proceedings and the attorney who has been appointed to represent them is their assistant. These Freeman will complain bitterly to the court if the attorney does not do their bidding. There are, however, only a few trial decisions which must be made by the accused in criminal proceedings and cannot be made for the accused by counsel. Those decisions include what plea to enter, whether to waive jury trial, and whether to testify. *State v. Hahn*, 106 Wn.2d 885, 892, 726 P.2d 25 (1986) ("basic respect for a defendant's individual freedom requires us to permit the defendant himself to determine his plea"); *State v. Stegall*, 124 Wn.2d 719, 728, 881 P.2d 979 (1994) (right to jury trial may only be waived by defendant); *State v. King*, 24 Wn.App. 495, 499, 601 P.2d 982 (1979) ("defendant has an absolute right to testify on his own behalf which right cannot be abrogated by defense counsel"); see also 1 American Bar Ass'n, *Standards for Criminal Justice*, Std. 4-5.2 at 4-65 (2d ed. 1986).

Legitimate trial tactics such as making or foregoing a motion or objection and deciding which witnesses to call, other than the defendant, are primarily the responsibility of defense counsel. See, e.g., *State v. Garrett*, 124 Wn.2d 504, 520, 881 P.2d 185 (1994); *State v. Hess*, 86 Wn.2d 51, 52, 541 P.2d 1222 (1975); *State v. Allen*, 57 Wn.App. 134, 787 P.2d 566 (1990); *State v. Justiniano*, 48 Wn.App. 572, 740 P.2d 872 (1987). If the court holds firm regarding the proper role of the attorney, the Freeman will eventually enter a *Faretta* waiver and the attorney can then be reassigned to the role of standby counsel.

## Court-Appointed Attorney's Request to Withdraw

Understandably, counsel who is appointed to represent a Freeman defendant over the Freeman's objection is put in a difficult position; a position that is only more uncomfortable when the victims of the charges are local judges or prosecutors.

Many attorneys appointed to represent Freeman will identify for the record the motions the defendant wishes to have heard and that the attorney believes he or she is barred from raising such frivolous motions by RPC 3.1. In such circumstances, the judge may allow hybrid representation or may merely deny the motions because they lack merit.

Some attorneys request permission to withdraw. While these attorneys deserve your sympathy, the same issues will arise with any attorney who is appointed. Agreeing that the motion to withdraw can be granted without first obtaining a proper *Faretta* waiver of attorney will result in repeated delays, and a possible appellate reversal.

A court-appointed attorney's request to withdraw because he or she has been "fired" by a Freeman must be denied because a criminal defendant does not have the absolute right to be represented by the individual of his or her choice. *United States v. Wheat*, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 100 L.Ed.2d 140, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697 (1988); *State v. DeWeese*, 117 Wn.2d 369, 376, 816 P.2d 1 (1991). Case law provides that a defendant may only discharge appointed counsel with court approval and upon a showing of good cause. *State v. DeWeese*, 117 Wn.2d 369, 370, 816 P.2d 1 (1991).

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A court-appointed attorney's request to withdraw because the defendant insists upon pursuing a course counsel finds to be imprudent should be rejected because there are only a few trial decisions which must be made by the accused in criminal proceedings and cannot be made for the accused by counsel. Those decisions include what plea to enter, whether to waive jury trial, and whether to testify. *State v. Hahn*, 106 Wn.2d 885, 892, 726 P.2d 25 (1986) (basic respect for a defendant's individual freedom requires us to permit the defendant himself to determine his plea); *State v. Stegall*, 124 Wn.2d 719, 728, 881 P.2d 979 (1994) (right to jury trial may only be waived by defendant); *State v. King*, 24 Wn.App. 495, 499, 601 P.2d 982 (1979) (defendant has an absolute right to testify on his own behalf which right cannot be abrogated by defense counsel); see also 1 American Bar Ass'n, *Standards for Criminal Justice*, Std. 4-5.2 at 4-65 (2d ed. 1986).

Legitimate trial tactics such as making or foregoing a motion or objection and deciding which witnesses to call, other than the defendant testifying, are primarily the responsibility of defense counsel. See, e.g., *State v. Garrett*, 124 Wn.2d 504, 520, 881 P.2d 185 (1994) (ineffective assistance claim may not be based on the defense attorney's legitimate trial tactics); *State v. Hess*, 86 Wn.2d 51, 52, 541 P.2d 1222 (1975); *State v. Allen*, 57 Wn.App. 134, 787 P.2d 566 (1990); *State v. Justiniano*, 48 Wn.App. 572, 740 P.2d 872 (1987).

A court-appointed attorney's fear of community or judicial backlash due to the representation of a Freeman is not adequate grounds for withdrawal. All qualified trial lawyers should stand ready to undertake the defense of an accused regardless of public hostility toward the accused or personal distaste for the offense charged or the person of the defendant. 1 American Bar Ass'n, *Standards for Criminal Justice*, Std. 4-1.5(b), at 4-19 (2d ed. 1986).

The highest tradition of the American bar is found in the obligation, in the lawyer's oath, never to reject from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed. A lawyer has the duty to provide legal assistance even to the most unpopular defendants. The great tradition of the bar is reflected in the history of eminent lawyers such as John Adams, who defended the British redcoats after the Boston Massacre who have risked public disfavor to defend a hated defendant. The sure way to guarantee adherence to this tradition of denying no defendant competent legal preparation is for all trial lawyers to prepare themselves to act in criminal cases. Consistent with these standards, the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility admonishes lawyers not to decline proffered employment lightly. However, declining to accept a case is justified when the intensity of personal feeling, as distinguished from a community attitude, may impair effective representation of a prospective client.

(Footnotes omitted). 1 American Bar Ass'n, *Standards for Criminal Justice*, Std. 4-1.5(b), at 4-20 to 4-21 (2d ed. 1986).

## Challenges to the Legality of the Prosecutor

**Oath.** The prosecuting attorney is a constitutionally created office and is part of the executive branch of government. Const. art. 11, §§ 4 and 5. The constitutional provisions creating the office specifically require the election of the prosecuting attorney on a county-wide basis. Once elected, the prosecuting attorney must take an oath of office prior to assuming office. RCW 36.16.040. This oath must be filed with the county auditor and a bond obtained and filed with the county clerk. RCW 36.16.060. A failure to strictly comply with these requirements is not grounds for removal from office if the irregularities are subsequently cured. See generally *In re Recall of Sandhaus*, 134 Wn.2d 662, 953 P.2d 82 (1998) (delayed filing of bond not grounds for recalling prosecutor). See the Appendix, at 37, for a filed oath.

**De Facto Prosecutor.** Under Washington law, authority of a *de facto* prosecutor, i.e., one in actual possession of the office of prosecutor and exercising its duties and powers under color of title, is not subject to collateral attack. *State v. Carroll*, 81 Wn.2d 95, 500 P.2d 115 (1972); *State v. Gibson*, 79 Wn.2d 856,

490 P.2d 874 (1971); *State v. Britton*, 27 Wn.2d 336, 178 P.2d 341 (1947). As the supreme court has recognized, this rule necessarily mandates the proposition that an accused does not have the right to choose the prosecutor. *State v. Cook*, 84 Wn.2d 342, 350, 525 P.2d 761 (1974).

While RCW 36.27.030 authorizes the court to appoint some qualified person to discharge the duties of prosecuting attorney in the event that the elected prosecuting attorney is disabled or is otherwise unable to perform, most Freeman-asserted irregularities in the prosecutor's oath or bond will not constitute a disability. *In re Recall of Sandhaus*, *supra*.

**Conflict of Interest.** [A] Public prosecutor is a quasi-judicial officer. He represents the state, and in the interest of justice must act impartially. *State v. Huson*, 73 Wn.2d 660, 663, 440 P.2d 192 (1968), *cert. denied*, 393 U.S. 1096 (1969). If a prosecutor's interest in a criminal defendant or in the subject matter of the defendant's case materially limits his or her ability to prosecute a matter impartially, then the prosecutor is disqualified from litigating the matter, and the prosecutor's staff may be disqualified as well. *See generally State v. Stenger*, 111 Wn.2d 516, 520-23, 760 P.2d 357 (1988).

A prosecuting attorney's impartiality to act can be impacted by his or her prior representation of a defendant. *State v. Stenger*, *supra*. A prosecuting attorney's impartiality to act is not considered to be impaired by a defendant's threat to file bar complaints or lawsuits. *See, e.g., United States v. Kember*, 685 F.2d 451, 458 (D.C. Cir.), *cert. denied*, 459 U.S. 832 (1982); *State v. Tyler*, 587 S.W.2d 918, 929 (Mo. App. 1979).

Some Court of Appeals cases have intimated that the appearance of fairness doctrine may apply to a prosecutor's charging decision. *See, e.g., State v. Perez*, 77 Wn.App. 372, 891 P.2d 42 (Div. 3 1995); *State v. Ladenburg*, 67 Wn.App. 749, 754, 840 P.2d 228 (1992) (appearance of fairness doctrine may apply to charging decisions). The Washington Supreme Court, however, has held that the doctrine does not apply to a prosecutor's determination to file criminal charges, to seek the death penalty, or to plea bargain. *State v. Finch*, \_\_\_ Wn.2d \_\_\_, 975 P.2d 967, 1999 WL 274135, \*6 (May 6, 1999).

This does not mean that careful thought does not need to be taken before filing a charge against a Freeman involving a prosecutor victim or one in which a prosecutor is a necessary witness.<sup>70</sup> A primary consideration in whether to retain such a case or to seek the appointment of a special prosecuting attorney is whether the anticipated Freeman defendant is likely to sue or victimize any prosecutor who is assigned to the case. If the Freeman's past behavior will support a finding that whoever is appointed as a special prosecutor will be subject to the same criminal activity as the already victimized office, then the ancient rule of necessity that applies to judges would appear to allow the retention of the case for charging and prosecution. *See generally Filan v. Martin*, 38 Wn.App. 91, 684 P.2d 769 (1984). After all, if all prosecutors will be subjected to the same tactics, why refer the case to another prosecuting authority?

## Applications for Writs of Quo Warranto

A quo warranto proceeding seeks to test the right of an individual to hold title to a public office. *See generally* RCW 7.56.010. The substantive right and procedure for a writ of quo warranto is controlled by statute in Washington. *State ex rel. Carter v. Superior Court*, 18 Wn.2d 130, 132, 138 P.2d 843 (1943). By statute, a quo warranto action

may be filed by the prosecuting attorney in the superior court of the proper county, upon his own relation, whenever he shall deem it his duty to do so, or shall be directed by the court or other competent authority, or by any other person on his own relation, whenever he claims an interest in the office, franchise or corporation, which is the subject of the information.

RCW 7.56.020.

<sup>70</sup> RPC 3.7 discusses the propriety of having a member from the same prosecuting attorney's office that is trying the defendant appear as a witness. *State v. Bland*, 90 Wn.App. 677, 953 P.2d 126, *review denied*, 136 Wn.2d 1028 (Div. 1 1998).

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A mere citizen, a voter or a taxpayer or any person other than the prosecuting attorney may not initiate a quo warranto proceeding unless the person has an interest in the office separate from the common interest of the general public. *State ex rel Dore v. Superior Court*, 167 Wash. 655, 658, 9 P.2d 1087 (1932). *Accord State ex rel. Quick-Ruben v. Verharen*, 136 Wn.2d 888, 893-96, 969 P.2d 64 (1998); *Manlove v. Johnson*, 198 Wash. 280, 285-287, 88 P.2d 397 (1939); *Mills v. State ex rel. Smith*, 2 Wash. 566, 572-73, 27 Pac. 560 (1891). The separate interest that will support a private quo warranto action filed by an individual, as opposed to a public quo warranto action filed by a prosecutor, is the right of that individual to assume the office that will be vacated upon the issuance of the writ. *See Verharen*, 136 Wn.2d at 896-97; *State ex rel. Dore*, 167 Wash. at 657- 59; *Mills*, 2 Wash. at 573.

The Washington Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over a quo warranto action directed toward a state official. Const. art. 4, § 4; RAP 16.2; *Verharen*, 136 Wn.2d at 893. A quo warranto action may be filed in the superior court pursuant to Chapter 7.56 RCW.

## Challenges to the Legality of the Judge

**Oath.** A judge is not subject to disqualification for failing to properly file his or her oath of office. *State v. Stephenson*, 89 Wn.App. 794, 807-09, 950 P.2d 38, *review denied*, 136 Wn.2d 1018 (Div. 2 1998) (a judge is still a public servant even if his or her oath has not been filed with the secretary of state). A judge who has failed to file his or her oath is still acting as an officer de facto.

To constitute a person an officer de facto, he must be in actual possession of the office, exercising its functions and discharging its duties under color of title. *State v. Britton*, 27 Wn.2d 336, 178 P.2d 341 (1947). Color of title distinguishes him from a usurper; active possession, despite a defect in title, distinguishes him from a de jure office holder. As an officer de facto, he must be submitted to as such until displaced by a regular direct proceeding for that purpose. The proper and exclusive method of determining the right to public office is through a quo warranto proceeding. *Green Mountain School Dist. v. Durkee*, 56 Wn.2d 154, 351 P.2d 525 (1960).

*State v. Franks*, 7 Wn.App. 594, 596, 501 P.2d 622 (1972).

**Bias.** A judge is presumed to perform his or her functions regularly and properly without bias or prejudice. *Jones v. Halvorson-Berg*, 69 Wn.App. 117, 127, 847 P.2d 945, *review denied*, 122 Wn.2d 1019 (1993). *See also In re Bochert*, 57 Wn.2d 719, 722, 359 P.2d 789 (1961) (bias or prejudice on the part of an elected judicial officer is never presumed). Compliance with RCW 4.12.050 will be sufficient to overcome the presumption that the judge is free from prejudice. *State v. Belgarde*, 119 Wn.2d 711, 715, 837 P.2d 599 (1992). But once a defendant disqualifies a judge as a matter of right pursuant to RCW 4.12.050, subsequent motions to disqualify the trial judge involve an exercise of sound discretion in passing on the sufficiency of the showing made in support of the motion. *State v. Palmer*, 5 Wn.App. 405, 411-12, 487 P.2d 627, *review denied*, 79 Wn.2d 1012 (1971).

This same rule applies to motions to disqualify a judge brought after the judge makes a discretionary ruling in an action or has presided over the trial. *See, e.g., State v. Belgarde*, 119 Wn.2d 711, 715-17, 837 P.2d 599 (1992) (actual bias must be shown to disqualify a judge from presiding over a retrial following a reversal on appeal); *Howland v. Day*, 125 Wash. 480, 490-91, 216 P. 864 (1932) (actual bias must be shown to disqualify a judge from presiding over a motion for new trial); *State v. Clemons*, 56 Wn.App. 57, 782 P.2d 219 (1989), *review denied*, 114 Wn.2d 1005 (1990) (actual bias must be shown to disqualify a judge from presiding over a retrial following a mistrial). The trial court's decision on a nonmandatory disqualification motion must be upheld absent an abuse of discretion. *Palmer*, 5 Wn.App. at 411-12.

Casual and nonspecific allegations of judicial bias do not provide a basis for recusal. *State v. Cameron*, 47 Wn.App. 878, 884, 737 P.2d 688 (1987). Claims that the trial judge is prejudiced against the defendant based upon the trial judge having rendered prior rulings that were adverse to the defendant, whether in the same case or a different case, is insufficient to force recusal. *See generally, Palmer*, 5

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Wn.App. at 411; *See generally*, Annot., *Disqualification of Judge for Having Decided Different Case Against Litigant*, 21 A.L.R.3d 1369 (1968). This rule exists because the bias and prejudice necessary to disqualify a judge must generally come from an extra-judicial source. *See, e.g., State v. Thompson*, 150 Ariz. 554, 724 P.2d 1223, 1226 (1986); *United States v. Boffa*, 513 F.Supp. 505 (D.C. Del. 1981).

Similarly, claims that the trial judge is biased as a result of a party filing a lawsuit against a judge for a judicial act as to which the judge is immune from suit will not constitute grounds for disqualification. *See, e.g., Matter of Extradition of Singh*, 123 F.R.D. 140, 149 (D.N.J., Jul 29, 1988); *Ronwin v. State Bar*, 686 F.2d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1981), *rev'd on other grounds sub nom Hoover v. Ronwin*, 466 U.S. 558, 80 L.Ed.2d 590, 104 S.Ct. 1989 (1984) (mere filing of lawsuit against judge will not disqualify him or her); *United States v. Grismore*, 564 F.2d 929, 933 (10th Cir. 1977), *cert. denied*, 435 U.S. 954 (1978); *United States v. Bray*, 546 F.2d 851, 857-59 (10th Cir. 1976) (failure to recuse upheld where plaintiff stated, *inter alia*, that he had filed a brief with the court accusing the judge of bribery, conspiracy and obstruction of justice); *United States v. Alberico*, 453 F.Supp. 178, 187 (D. Colo. 1977) (no disqualification where plaintiff's affidavit indicated that judge would be sued); *Filan v. Martin*, 38 Wn.App. 91, 95, 684 P.2d 769 (1984) (rule of necessity allows a judge to remain on a case after being sued for actions performed in his or her judicial role when a defendant has established a propensity for suing all judges).<sup>71</sup> In fact, the *Ronwin* court stated that such an easy method for obtaining disqualification should not be encouraged or allowed. 686 F.2d at 701.

Finally, even a criminal defendant's threat or use of force against a judge in a courtroom does not mandate the recusal of the judge on the grounds of actual or potential bias. *See generally State v. Bilal*, 77 Wn.App. 720, 893 P.2d 674, *review denied*, 127 Wn.2d 1013 (1995).

**Pro Tempore Judge in Courts of Limited Jurisdiction.** The constitution grants sole authority in the Legislature to govern the jurisdiction and powers of inferior courts. The constitution places no restrictions on the Legislature in regard to pro tempore judges in inferior courts, and the supreme court has declined to do so. A defendant has neither a constitutional nor statutory right to withhold consent to the authority of a judge pro tempore in a court of limited jurisdiction. *State v. Hastings*, 115 Wn.2d 42, 793 P.2d 956 (1990).

**Visiting Superior Court Judges.** A duly elected superior court judge has the authority to preside over a case in a county other than the one in which he or she was elected. Const. Art. IV, § 7; RCW 2.08.150.

When in a county other than the one in which he or she was elected, the visiting judge has the same powers as a regularly elected judge of the county. *Demaris v. Barker*, 33 Wash. 200, 203-4, 74 P.2d 362 (1903). A visiting judge's authority to hear a case is not contingent upon the parties' consent. *State v. Holmes*, 12 Wash. 169, 40 P.2d 887 (1895).

## Challenges to the Legality of Courtroom Personnel

**Court Reporters.** Court reporters are required to obtain a certificate. *See generally* RCW 18.145 .010. Official court reporters are individuals who have been appointed to serve a superior court judge or a superior court judicial district pursuant to RCW 2.32.180. All official court reporters are considered to be officers of the court.

Such reporters before entering upon the discharge of his duties shall take an oath to perform faithfully the duties of his office, and file a bond in the sum of two thousand dollars for the faithful discharge of his duties. RCW 2.32.180. The location(s) for filing the oath and the bond are not specified in the statute. It

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<sup>71</sup> The ancient rule of necessity is a common law principle which provides that

although a judge had better not, if it can be avoided, take part in the decision of a case in which he has any personal interest, yet he not only may but must do so if the case cannot be heard otherwise. F. Pollack, *a First Book of Jurisprudence* 270 (6th ed. 1929).

*United States v. Will*, 449 U.S. 200, 213, 101 S. Ct. 471, 480-82, 66 L. Ed. 2d 392 (1980).

is recommended that the bond be filed in the clerk's office and the oath in the county auditor's office. *See generally* RCW 36.16.060; RCW 36.16.070. The cost of the court reporter's bond appears to be a county expense. RCW 36.16.070.

If an official reporter is absent or unable to act, the presiding judge may appoint a competent reporter to act pro tempore. RCW 2.32.270. The reporter pro tempore shall possess the qualifications and take the oath prescribed for the official reporter, and shall file a like bond, and shall receive the same compensation. RCW 2.32.270.

A court reporter may not act in a case in which a personal conflict of interest exists without the consent of the judge and all parties. *Cf.* WAC 308-14-130(6) (Certified shorthand reporters shall & Disclose conflicts, potential conflicts, or appearance of conflicts to all involved parties. ). The most common conflict of interest that will arise in Freeman prosecutions is that a court reporter should not report proceedings in a case in which the reporter is also a witness. Care should be made to ensure that any court reporter who has been endorsed as a prosecution witness in a case does not report any hearings held in that case.

**Court Bailiffs.** Bailiffs are appointed by each court. *See* RCW 2.32.320; RCW 2.32.330. There is no statutory oath or bond requirement for bailiffs. *See State v. Lane*, 37 Wn.2d 145, 150, 222 P.2d 394 (1950).<sup>72</sup> An error in the administration of an oath to a bailiff will not constitute grounds for reversing a conviction absent a timely objection and a showing of prejudice. *Lane*, 37 Wn.2d at 150.

Care should be taken to avoid conflicts of interest and no bailiff should be allowed to care for a jury in a case in which the bailiff will be or has been a witness.

**Court Clerks.** The clerk is required to take an oath and to file the oath with the auditor. RCW 36.16.060. The oaths of deputy clerks are also filed with the auditor. *Id.* The clerk's bond is filed with the treasurer after having first been recorded by the county auditor. *Id.* The amount of the clerk's bond is set by a majority of the judges presiding over the court the clerk serves. RCW 36.16.050(3); RCW 36.23.020.

Care should be taken to avoid conflicts of interest and no clerk should be allowed to serve in the courtroom or to care for exhibits in a case in which the clerk will be or has been a witness.

## Challenges to the Legality of the Revised Code of Washington

**Absence of Enacting Clauses and Titles.** The Revised Code of Washington is a compilation of the session laws and is evidence of the laws of this state. RCW 1.04.020. The Revised Code of Washington is prepared by the code reviser. RCW 1.08.013; RCW 1.08.015. The Revised Code of Washington omits the titles to acts and enacting clauses, but these sections are still part of a session law. RCW 1.08.017. The omissions of these sections from the Revised Code of Washington does not invalidate the session laws. *Id.*

**Need for Exemplified or Certified Copies of the Session Laws.** The State is not required to admit a copy of the statute into evidence and the information/complaint is not required to contain the full text of all statutes. *See, e.g., State v. Tribble*, 26 Wn.App. 367, 369, 613 P.2d 173, review denied, 94 Wn.2d 1024 (1980); RCW 10.37.160. The State need not attach a certified or exemplified copy of a session law to the charging document because a charging document need not contain matters of which judicial notice may be taken. RCW 10.37.150. Evidence Rule 201 authorizes a party to request a court to take judicial notice of adjudicative facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. ER 201(a), (b) and (d). This rule applies at all stages of proceedings, including appeals. ER 201(f); *State v. Royal*, 122 Wn.2d 413, 417-18, 858 P.2d 259 (1993). A court may take judicial notice of session laws. RCW 5.24.010. The trial court, therefore, does not lack subject matter

<sup>72</sup> The *Lane* case talks about an oath having been administered to the bailiff who had care of the jury. Neither the statute regarding the appointment of an officer to take custody of the jury, RCW 4.44.300, nor the court rules regarding the appointment of an officer to take custody of the jury, CrR 6.7(b) and CrRLJ 6.7(b), contain a requirement that such officer take an oath that the officer will faithfully discharge his or her duties.

If such an oath is administered to bailiffs, it is recommended that the oath be filed with the county auditor. RCW 36.16.060.

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jurisdiction solely because the State did not make copies of the legislative titles and enacting provisions of the crimes charged a part of the record.

**Copyright Infringement.** A frequent Freeman objection to prosecutor pleadings is that the prosecution has not established that they have permission to cite or quote copyrighted laws, cases, and court rules. The Freeman concept of copyright law is obviously skewed, but even if correct, Freeman do not have standing to raise the copyright holder's rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (only the legal and beneficial owners of copyright have standing to sue infringers).

## Challenges to the Legality of the Jury

**Number of Jurors.** In *Chaff v. Schnackenberg*, 384 U.S. 373, 16 L.Ed.2d 629, 86 S.Ct. 1523 (1966), the United States Supreme Court determined that crimes carrying penalties up to 6 months do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify as petty offenses. This ruling proscribing the minimum constitutional requirement however, does not prohibit Washington state from providing a greater right to jury. Wash. Const. art. 1, § 21, provides for a right to jury trial in all criminal cases, including misdemeanor offenses. *Pasco v. Mace*, 98 Wn.2d 87, 653 P.2d 618 (1982). The right to jury trial in misdemeanor cases under Washington law, however, is a right to a six person jury. *Seattle v. Hessler*, 98 Wn.2d 73, 83, 653 P.2d 631 (1982).

**Vicinage.** The right to have jurors selected from the place at which the trial is to be held, sometimes called the right of vicinage, was considered to be of great importance both at the common law and by the Founding Fathers. Both the Federal and State Constitutions preserve a right to vicinage. U.S. Const. Amend. VI guarantees an accused a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed and Wash. Const. Art. I, § 22, guarantees a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is charged to have been committed.

In view of the positive vicinage requirements of both the Federal and State Constitutions, it is difficult to see how a jury can be constituted of persons who are not residents of Washington. Such persons, by their residency, are not deemed to be implicitly biased in favor of the State. See, e.g., *Mironski v. Snohomish County*, 115 Wash. 586, 197 P. 781 (1921) (pecuniary interest of taxpayers in action against county for damages is not such as to disqualify them from serving as jurors and necessitate transfer of cause to another county for trial); *State v. Krug*, 12 Wash. 288, 41 P. 126 (1895) (fact that juror is taxpayer is not ground for challenge on trial of public officer charged with embezzlement of public funds); *Rathbun v. Thurston County*, 8 Wash. 238, 35 P. 1102 (1894) (interest of jurors as taxpayers of county in action against county will not disqualify them from serving as jurors to try cause).

## Prosecution Violates Freeman's Constitutional Right to Travel in a Private Vehicle

A common Freeman motion to dismiss in cases involving a motor vehicle is that the instant prosecution infringes upon the Freeman's constitutional right to travel.<sup>73</sup> It has been long established, however, that states may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in the operation upon its highways of motor vehicles, and the state may require the licensing of drivers. E.g., *Hendrick v. Maryland*, 235 U.S. 610, 59 L.Ed. 385, 35 S.Ct. 140 (1915); *State v. Clifford*, 57 Wn.App. 127, 787 P.2d 571, review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1025 (1990); *Spokane v. Port*, 43 Wn.App. 273, 275-76, 716 P.2d 945, review denied, 106 Wn.2d 1010 (1986).

The burden that traffic laws and licensing requirements impose upon a single mode of transportation does not implicate the right to interstate travel. See, e.g., *Miller v. Reed*, \_\_\_ F.3d \_\_\_ (9th Cir. May 24,

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<sup>73</sup> Freeman assert that state traffic laws do not apply to them since they were not involved in interstate commerce, arguing that the Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8) only permits Congress to regulate interstate commerce, and Sovereign Freeman are not bound by any state legislation.

1999); *Monarch Travel Servs., Inc. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, Inc.*, 466 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1972) ( A rich man can choose to drive a limousine; a poor man may have to walk. The poor man's lack of choice in his mode of travel may be unfortunate, but it is not unconstitutional. ); *City of Houston v. FAA*, 679 F.2d 1184, 1198 (5th Cir. 1982) ( At most, [the air carrier plaintiffs ] argument reduces to the feeble claim that passengers have a constitutional right to the most convenient form of travel. That notion, as any experienced traveler can attest, finds no support whatsoever in [the Supreme Court s right of interstate travel jurisprudence] or in the airlines own schedules. ). The Supreme Court of Rhode Island in *Berberian v. Petit*, 374 A.2d 791 (R.I. 1977), put it this way:

The plaintiff s argument that the right to operate a motor vehicle is fundamental because of its relation to the fundamental right of interstate travel is utterly frivolous. The plaintiff is not being prevented from traveling interstate by public transportation, by common carrier, or in a motor vehicle driven by someone with a license to drive it. What is at issue here is not his right to travel interstate, but his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, and we have no hesitation in holding that this is not a fundamental right.

*Berberian*, 374 A.2d at 794 (citations and footnotes omitted).

The ability to enforce traffic laws is not dependent upon whether the defendant is a resident of the state. RCW 46.08.070. See also the following

*Tanner v. Heise*, 672 F.Supp. 1356 (D. Idaho 1987), *aff d in part, rev d in part on other grounds*, 879 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1989) (driver s claim that as an ambassador for the Kingdom of God he was not subject to driver licensing requirements was rejected);

*Jones v. City of Newport*, 29 Ark. App. 42, 780 S.W.2d 338, 340 (1989) (driver s claim that he was exempt from a driver licensing requirement because he was an individual freeman at common law was rejected);

*Parsons v. State*, 113 Idaho 421, 745 P.2d 300 (Idaho App. 1987) (driver s claim that as a free person she was not bound by manmade laws, including driver licensing requirements, absent a contract or agreement in equity with the government rejected); and

*State v. Von Schmidt*, 109 Idaho 736, 710 P.2d 646 (Idaho App. 1985) (driver s claim that as a free man he was not subject to state driver licensing and motor vehicle laws rejected).

The ability to enforce traffic laws is not dependent upon whether the defendant has a Washington driver s license. RCW 46.20.022.<sup>74</sup> As noted by the Idaho Court of Appeals when it rejected a driver s argument that, in the absence of his acceptance of a motor vehicle operator s license, he has not consented to be regulated by the state

[Driver] entered into our society when he began to live in it. He has no right to unilaterally withdraw from that society, rejecting his obligations to that body, while at the same time retaining the advantages of that society advantages for which others have sacrificed part of their liberty.

*State v. Gibson*, 108 Idaho 202, 697 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Idaho App. 1985). See also *Parsons v. State*, 113 Idaho 421, 745 P.2d 300 (Idaho App. 1987) (driver s claim that as a free person she was not bound by man-made laws, including driver licensing requirements, absent a contract or agreement in equity with the government rejected).

The driver s licensing statute applies to non-commercial operators of motor vehicles. *Spokane v. Port*, 43 Wn.App. 273, 277-78, 716 P.2d 945, *review denied*, 106 Wn.2d 1010 (1986); *accord State v. French*, 77

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<sup>74</sup> RCW 46.20.022, which was adopted after Division II s opinion in *Aberdeen v. Cole*, 13 Wn.App. 617, 537 P.2d 1073 (1975), essentially abrogates the holding of *Aberdeen v. Cole*. RCW 46.20.022 provides that

Any person who operates a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state without a driver's license or nonresident privilege to drive shall be subject to all of the provisions of Title 46 RCW to the same extent as a person who is licensed.

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Hawai i 222, 883 P.2d 644 (1994) (rejecting argument that traffic statutes apply only to businesses and State vehicles, not to a sovereign individual who utilizes his vehicle only for personal needs).

## **My Religious Beliefs Prevent Me From Getting a Driver s License**

The State s compelling interest in law enforcement and highway safety justifies licensing of drivers even if it has a coercive effect on an individual s practice of a sincerely held religious conviction. *State v. Clifford*, 57 Wn.App. 127, 787 P.2d 571, review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1025 (1990); see also *Miller v. Reed*, \_\_\_ F.3d \_\_\_, Docket No. 97-17006 (9th Cir. May 24, 1999) (petitioner s § 1983 action claiming that California is violating his religious beliefs by requiring him to disclose his social security number in order to obtain a valid driver s license dismissed as the facially neutral statute is rationally related to California s legitimate interests in locating the whereabouts of errant parents for purposes of carrying out child support programs, collecting tax obligations, and collecting amounts overdue and unpaid for fines, penalties, assessments, bail, and vehicle parking penalties.).

## **Prosecution for Driving While Suspended When Suspension Due to Failure to Pay Tickets is Unconstitutional Imprisonment for a Debt**

Const. art. I, § 17, provides that [t]here shall be no imprisonment for debt, except in cases of absconding debtors. Freemen interpret this section as rendering criminal prosecutions for driving while license suspended in the third degree unconstitutional because such license suspensions are generally the result of failing to pay the fines assessed for traffic infractions.

This interpretation, however, is contrary to decisions rendered by the Washington Supreme Court. See, e.g., *Treffry v. Taylor*, 67 Wn.2d 487, 494, 408 P.2d 269 (1965) (the imposition of a fine or imprisonment for failing to comply with a statute requiring construction contractors to register and post a bond is not imprisonment for debt as proscribed by Const. art. I, § 17, but is a statutory penalty imposed upon any person who knowingly and intentionally violates a lawful mandate of the legislature); *Austin v. Seattle*, 176 Wash. 654, 660-62, 30 P.2d 646 (1934) (a license or excise tax on an occupation does not constitute a debt within Const. art. I, § 17 s prohibition upon imprisonment for debt).

## **I Do Not Trust Your Record I Want My Own Tape or Video Recording**

Frequently Freemen defendants will bring their own tape or video recorder into court. Proceedings in open court are not private communications that require the consent of all the participants in order to record. See generally *State v. Clark*, 129 Wn.2d 211, 226, 916 P.2d 384 (1996); *State v. Slemmer*, 48 Wn.App. 48, 738 P.2d 281 (1987). Nonetheless, the judge has the authority to preclude the use of unofficial recording devices in the courtroom. See, e.g., *Bly v. Henry*, 28 Wn.App. 469, 624 P.2d 717 (1980), review denied, 95 Wn.2d 1020 (1981); RCW 2.28.010; RCW 2.28.060.

Frequently Freemen defendants wish to record every conversation they have with a prosecutor, perhaps surreptitiously. Case law would appear to allow this to occur with or without the prosecutor s permission. Cf. *State v. Flora*, 68 Wn.App. 802, 807, 845 P.2d 1355 (1992) (statements made by police officers when effecting an arrest in their official capacity do not constitute "private conversations" within the meaning of RCW 9.73.030, which makes criminal the recording of private conversations without all parties consent). Statements made by a prosecutor as part of plea negotiations, though, are not admissible in court. See ER 410<sup>75</sup>; *United States v. Robertson*, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir.1978); *United States v. Verdoorn*, 528 F.2d

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<sup>75</sup> ER 410 provides as follows

Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made in connection with, and relevant to, any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer. However, evidence of a statement made in connection with, and relevant to, a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, a plea of nolo contendere, or an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime

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103, 107 (8th Cir.1976); *State v. Woodsum*, 137 N.H. 198, 624 A.2d 1342 (1993); *State v. Davis*, 70 Ohio App.2d 48, 51, 434 N.E.2d 285, 287-88 (1980); *State v. Pearson*, 818 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah Ct.App. 1991).

## Let Me Out of Jail Now!!! Writs of Habeas Corpus

**Jurisdiction.** The superior court, the court of appeals, and the supreme court have concurrent jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings. RCW 7.36.040; *Tolliver v. Olsen*, 109 Wn.2d 607, 610, 746 P.2d 809 (1987). A superior court's jurisdiction over the writ, however, is limited to persons in actual custody in the county in which the superior court is located. Washington Const. art. IV, § 6 ( Said courts and their judges shall have power to issue & writs of habeas corpus, on petition by or on behalf of any person in actual custody in their respective counties ); *Conway v. Cranor*, 37 Wn.2d 303, 233 P.2d 452 (1950), *cert. denied*, 304 U.S. 915 (1951).

**Availability Pre-Trial.** The function of the writ of habeas corpus was to set free people who had been imprisoned illegally. The writ was not a substitute for appeal and the celebrated Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 explicitly excluded from its operation persons convicted of a felony. 31 Car. 2, ch. 2.

In this country, the writ was guaranteed against suspension in the original Constitution. See U. S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2. This clause, however, was well understood to refer to habeas for **federal** prisoners. The First Congress, consisting largely of the same people who wrote and ratified the Constitution, flatly prohibited the issuance of habeas for state prisoners by federal courts, except to bring them into federal court to testify. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 14, 1 Stat. 81. This provision was found to be constitutional. See *Calder v. Bull*, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).

The Washington Constitution also contains a guarantee against the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. See Wash. Const. art. 1, § 13. This provision of the Washington Constitution preserves the writ of habeas corpus as it existed when the constitution was adopted. *In re Personal Restraint of Runyan*, 121 Wn.2d 432, 441, 853 P.2d 424 (1993).

RCW 7.36.130 is derived from a statute passed by the first legislature of Washington Territory. As originally enacted, the statute was a strict limitation on the writ of habeas corpus

No court or judge shall inquire into the legality of any judgment or process whereby the party is in custody, or discharge him when the term of confinement has not expired, in either of the cases following:

1. Upon any process issued on any final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction...
3. Upon a warrant issued by the superior court upon an indictment or information.

Laws of 1854, p. 213, §445 (codified as Remington's Revised Statutes § 1075). This statute remained in effect without amendment for over 90 years. The decisions of the Supreme Court made two points unmistakably clear: R.R.S. § 1075 was constitutional, and it meant what it said.

Shortly after Washington became a state, this statute was unanimously upheld by the Washington Supreme Court. *In re Lybarger*, 2 Wash. 131, 25 P. 1075 (1891). The petitioner in *Lybarger* claimed that R.R.S. § 1075 was unconstitutional because it did not allow the court, in habeas corpus proceedings, to go behind the final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction for any purpose whatsoever. The petitioner claimed that the writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ known to the common law, and that it is this common-law writ that is secured to us by the constitution of the United States and of this state. *Lybarger*, 2 Wash. at 134.

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charged or any other crime, is admissible in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the defendant under oath and in the presence of counsel. This rule does not govern the admissibility of evidence of a deferred sentence imposed under RCW 3.66.067 or RCW 9.95.200 to .240.

While some commentators have questioned whether the phrase "against the person who made the plea or offer" covers statements made by the prosecution, these commentators recognize that such statements would be protected by ER 408. See, e.g., 5 K. Tegland, Wash. Prac., *Evidence Law and Practice* § 138, at 499 (3d ed. 1989).

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The court's opinion was authored by John P. Hoyt, the president of the 1889 constitutional convention that had drafted Const. art. 1, § 13. *See* B. Rosenow, *THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION* (1889; B. Rosenow ed. 1962), at 468. The opinion was concurred in by two other former delegates to the constitutional convention, R. O. Dunbar and Theodore L. Stiles. *Id.*

The Court examined the common law practice, and determined that it had been **more** restrictive than R.R.S. § 1075. Under the common law, a return to the writ of habeas corpus could not be challenged. If the return claimed that the prisoner was held by virtue of process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, further inquiry was precluded: the court would not even decide whether the alleged process **existed**. *Lybarger*, 2 Wash. at 134-36.

Justice Hoyt ruled:

in the absence of a statute authorizing it, the supreme court could not go behind a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction to inquire as to the fact of jurisdiction in a particular case...[and that based upon] an examination of all the cases that we have been able to find we think our statute is constitutional, and that under it we are precluded from questioning a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction fair upon its face.

*Lybarger*, 2 Wash. at 136. Surely these judges understood the constitution that they themselves had adopted two years earlier.

Over the ensuing years, the Washington Supreme Court consistently refused to consider the challenges that were not apparent on the face of the judgment or to determine the validity of a detention upon an untried information. For example, the Court would not consider claims that the judge lacked authority to impose sentence, unless that fact appeared on the face of the judgment. *Compare In re Horner*, 19 Wn.2d 51, 141 P.2d 151 (1943) (claim considered because facts appeared on face of judgment) *with In re Voight*, 130 Wash. 140, 226 P. 482 (1924) (claim not considered because facts did not appear on face of judgment). The Court would not consider a claim that the defendant had been tricked into pleading guilty by the prosecutor's false promises. *In re Gerard*, 25 Wn.2d 237, 170 P.2d 332 (1946). The Court would not even consider a claim that the petitioner had been convicted of violating a statute that did not exist at the time

To say that an unconstitutional law or a repealed law is no law is both logical and sound, but to say that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is no judgment, because some question of law properly before it was decided erroneously, is ... a non sequitur. The rule here announced fully satisfies the constitutional guaranties respecting the writ of habeas corpus, and prescribes an orderly system for the administration of public justice.

*In re Newcomb*, 56 Wash. 395, 404, 105 P. 1042 (1909).

The Court would not consider a claim that a petitioner who was detained pending trial was charged with statutes that had been repealed. *See Ex parte Hamilton*, 56 Wash. 405, 105 P.2d 1046 (1909). The Court would not consider a claim that a petitioner was detained pending trial on an illegal information that charged an unconstitutional statute. *Ex parte Putnam*, 58 Wash. 687, 109 P. 111 (1910).

The Washington Supreme Court reemphasized the scope of the constitutional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in *In re Grieve*, 22 Wn.2d 902, 158 P.2d 73 (1945). The decision was written to make it clear to certain unnamed and unknown advocates that were clogging the motion calendar with improper habeas corpus writs that

the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as a medium to review trial errors, but that its authorized use is limited by law to those cases where it appears that the judgment and sentence, by virtue of which the petitioner is held in confinement, is void on its face.

*Grieve*, 22 Wn.2d at 904.

The Court went on to state that

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In this opinion, we have, in addition to deciding the instant case, endeavored to make it clear that allegations that the petitioner was convicted by a confession secured by third-degree methods, or pleaded guilty upon the promise that he would receive a light sentence, or under a threat of the prosecuting attorney that he would be shot unless he did so, or was convicted because the trial judge refused to suppress evidence secured without a search warrant, all of which allegations, with others of a similar nature, have been hopefully set up as a basis for many of the numerous petitions, hereinabove referred to, furnish no basis for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus by the courts of this state to release a petitioner detained by virtue of a judgment and sentence fair on its face.

*Grieve*, 22 Wn.2d at 911-12.

These restrictions on the scope of habeas corpus were never altered by the Supreme Court; they were changed by the legislature. In 1947, the legislature expanded the scope of review in habeas corpus petitions filed after conviction. See R.R.S. § 1075. The legislature, however, has never removed the restriction applicable to individuals who are detained upon a warrant issued from the superior court upon an indictment or information. Current RCW 7.36.130 provides as follows

No court or judge shall inquire into the legality of any judgment or process whereby the party is in custody, or discharge the party when the term of commitment has not expired, in either of the cases following:

- (1) Upon any process issued on any final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction except where it is alleged in the petition that rights guaranteed the petitioner by the Constitution of the state of Washington or of the United States have been violated and the petition is filed within the time allowed by RCW 10.73.090 and 10.73.100.
- (2) For any contempt of any court, officer or body having authority in the premises to commit; but an order of commitment, as for a contempt upon proceedings to enforce the remedy of a party, is not included in any of the foregoing specifications.
- (3) Upon a warrant issued from the superior court upon an indictment or information.

Thus, Freeman claims that the court lacks jurisdiction over them because of the nature of the flag, the absence of a grand jury indictment, the capitalization of their names, etc., are not cognizable in a pre-trial habeas corpus action.

**Standing.** Neither a federal court nor a state court has jurisdiction over an action unless the litigant demonstrates standing. *Whitmore v. Arkansas*, 495 U.S. 149, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L. Ed. 2d 135, (1990); *Improvement Ass'n. v. Pierce County*, 106 Wn.2d 797, 710, 724 P.2d 1009 (1986). The doctrine of standing requires that a person must have a stake in the outcome of a case in order to bring the action. *Gustafson v. Gustafson*, 47 Wn.App. 272, 276, 734 P.2d 949 (1987). [O]ne seeking relief must show a clear legal or equitable right and a well-grounded fear of immediate invasion of that right. *Id.* It is well settled that a person whose only interest in a legal controversy is one shared with citizens in general has no standing to invoke the power of courts to resolve the dispute. *Casebere v. Civil Service Comm'n.*, 21 Wn.App. 73, 76, 584 P.2d 416 (1978); see also *Vovos v. Grant*, 87 Wn.2d 697, 555 P.2d 1343 (1976).

The doctrine of standing prohibits a litigant from raising another's legal rights. *Omega Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Marquardt*, 115 Wn.2d 416, 432, 799 P.2d 235 (1990); *Haberman v. WPPSS*, 109 Wn.2d 107, 138, 744 P.2d 1032 (1987). One limited exception to this requirement is the doctrine of next friend standing, in which a non-party is allowed to pursue an action (most commonly, a habeas corpus petition) on behalf of the real party in interest. The threshold inquiry in a next friend action does not depend in any way upon the merits of the claims, but instead upon the standing of the friend to file the action on behalf of the real party in interest. *Whitmore v. Arkansas*, 495 U.S. at 163.

There are at least two firmly-rooted prerequisites for next friend standing

First, a next friend must provide an adequate explanation such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability why the real party in interest cannot appear on

his own behalf to prosecute the action....Second, the next friend must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate, ...and it has been further suggested that a next friend must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest.

*Whitmore*, 495 U.S. at 163-64 (citations omitted); *Demosthenes v. Baal*, 495 U.S. 731, 736, 110 S.Ct. 2223, 2225, 109 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1990). The purported next friend bears the heavy burden clearly to establish the propriety of her status. *Baal*, *supra*; *Whitmore*, 495 U.S. at 164; *Wells by Kehne v. Arave*, 18 F.3d 656, 658 (9th Cir. 1994). These limitations on the next friend doctrine are driven by the recognition that [i]t was not intended that the writ of habeas corpus should be availed of, as a matter of course, by intruders or uninvited meddlers, styling themselves next friends. *Whitmore*, 495 U.S. at 164 (quoting *United States ex rel. Bryant v. Houston*, 274 F. 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1921)). In the absence of any meaningful evidence of incompetency, there is no basis for next friend standing, nor is there any reason to hold an evidentiary hearing on the subject. *Baal*, 495 U.S. at 736.

In the context of a state habeas corpus action, a next friend may bring a petition on behalf of an incarcerated individual only when the terms of RCW 7.36.020 are met. This statute provides that

Writs of habeas corpus shall be granted in favor of parents, guardians, limited guardians where appropriate, spouses, and next of kin, and to enforce the rights, and for the protection of infants and incompetent or disabled persons within the meaning of RCW 11.88.010; and the proceedings shall in all cases conform to the provisions of this chapter.

Case law establishes that this statute is only met in the context of criminal cases when the defendant has been established to be mentally incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction. *See generally In re Hews*, 108 Wn.2d 579, 741 P.2d 983 (1987) (court appointed defendant's mother as guardian to litigate a personal restraint petition on behalf of her son who was incompetent to assist counsel).

Note, though, that no one may serve as next friend who has been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. *See* RCW 11.88.020.

**Non-Lawyer Preparation of Pleadings.** Washington prohibits the practice of law by individuals who have not been admitted to the practice of law by the Washington Supreme Court.<sup>76</sup> *See* RCW 2.48.170. An individual who has not been admitted to the practice of law by the Washington Supreme Court who nonetheless practices law is guilty of a crime. *See* RCW 2.48.180.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>76</sup> Only the Supreme Court can authorize an individual to practice law in Washington. Statutes that purport to authorize someone to practice law are unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of power doctrine. *Hagan v. Kassler Escrow, Inc.*, 96 Wn.2d 443, 451-52, 635 P.2d 730 (1981); *State v. Hunt*, 75 Wn.App. 795, 805, 880 P.2d 96, review denied, 125 Wn.2d 1009 (Div. 2 1994).

<sup>77</sup> *See Charging Options How to Fit a Square Peg Into a Round Hole*, *supra*, for basic jury instructions for unlawful practice of law prosecutions. Additional instructions for this situation include

NO.

An individual who is charged with a criminal offense has a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. A criminal defendant's right to the assistance of counsel does not include the right to be represented by an advocate who is not a member of the State Bar.

*United States v. Wheat*, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697 (1988)

NO.

A next friend or guardian is an individual who directs an action for another person. A next friend or guardian may prosecute a habeas corpus petition seeking the release of an incarcerated person only if the incarcerated person has been found to be incompetent or disabled. Next friend or guardian status does not authorize the practice of law.

RCW 7.36.020

*Whitmore v. Arkansas*, 495 U.S. 149, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L. Ed. 2d 135, (1990) (next friend doctrine in the context of habeas corpus litigation requires that the next friend establish an adequate explanation such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action.)

*Demosthenes v. Baal*, 495 U.S. 731, 736, 110 S.Ct. 2223, 2225, 109 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1990) (in the absence of any meaningful evidence of incompetency, there is no basis for next friend standing)

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Although an individual may prepare a habeas corpus petition and related pleadings for himself or herself under the pro se exception to the unauthorized practice of law, *see* RCW 2.48.190, an individual may not transfer his or her pro se rights to another. *See, e.g., Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Great W. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n*, 91 Wn.2d 48, 57, 586 P.2d 870 (1978) (The pro se exceptions are quite limited and apply only if the layperson is acting solely **on his own behalf** [emphasis in the original]); *State v. Hunt*, *supra* (paralegal was not allowed to exercise his client's pro se rights); *Gilman v. Kipp*, 519 N.Y.S.2d 314, 315, 136 Misc. 860 (1987) (The inherent right of a person to appear pro se in legal proceedings cannot be assigned to another by executing the power of attorney. ); *In re Baker*, 85 A.2d 505, 514 (N.J. 1951) (the consequences of a UPL statute cannot be avoided merely by preparing for and having the client execute a document designating the unlicensed practitioner an attorney-in-fact. ).

The pro se exception does not allow a next friend or guardian to practice law on behalf of an incompetent person. *See Chisholm v. Rueckhaus*, 124 N.M. 255, 948 P.2d 707, 709-10, *cert. denied*, 124 N.M. 268, 949 P.2d 282 (1997) (rule allowing representative to sue or defend on behalf of child or one otherwise legally incompetent does not create exception to general prohibition on unauthorized practice of law); *State v. Hunt*, 75 Wn.App. 795, 805, 880 P.2d 96, *review denied*, 125 Wn.2d 1009 (Div. 2 1994) (a statutory power of attorney does not authorize the agent to act pro se in the place of the principal.... Furthermore, to the extent that Washington's statutes allowing use of powers of attorney would allow the unlicensed practice of law, they are unconstitutional.... If the Legislature purported to allow laypersons to practice law, it impermissibly usurped the power of the courts and violated the separation of powers doctrine ); *Christiansen v. Melinda*, 857 P.2d 345, 347-349 (Alaska 1993) (rejecting the argument that because a durable power of attorney allows the agent to act as the principal, and the principal would be able to proceed to court pro se, therefore the agent with a power of attorney can litigate pro se for the principal); *J.W. v. Superior Court*, 17 Cal.App.4th 958, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 527, 529-33 (Ct.App.1993) (neither common law nor guardianship statutes sanction an exception to the State Bar Act prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law in favor of guardians acting for their wards). The pro se exception also does not allow a person to prepare habeas corpus pleadings on behalf of a spouse or child. *See, e.g., State v. Stange*, 53 Wn.App. 638, 648, 769 P.2d 873 (1989) (father may not file pro se supplemental brief on behalf of juvenile offender); *City of Seattle v. Shaver*, 23 Wn.App. 601, 597 P.2d 935 (1979) (layman husband could not represent wife in a prosecution for failure to yield right-of-way). Thus, even if a Freeman can establish next friend status, unless the Freeman is admitted to practice law in Washington, he or she will have to hire an attorney to prepare the legal pleadings and to present argument to the court on behalf of the incompetent detainee.

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*Chisholm v. Rueckhaus*, 124 N.M. 255, 948 P.2d 707, 709-10, *cert. denied*, 124 N.M. 268, 949 P.2d 282 (1997) (rule allowing representative to sue or defend on behalf of child or one otherwise legally incompetent does not create exception to general prohibition on unauthorized practice of law)

*State v. Hunt*, 75 Wn.App. 795, 805, 880 P.2d 96, *review denied*, 125 Wn.2d 1009 (Div. 2 1994) (a statutory power of attorney does not authorize the agent to act pro se in the place of the principal.... Furthermore, to the extent that

Washington's statutes allowing use of powers of attorney would allow the unlicensed practice of law, they are unconstitutional.... If the Legislature purported to allow laypersons to practice law, it impermissibly usurped the power of the courts and violated the separation of powers doctrine. )

*Christiansen v. Melinda*, 857 P.2d 345, 347-349 (Alaska 1993) (rejecting the argument that because a durable power of attorney allows the agent to act as the principal, and the principal would be able to proceed to court pro se, therefore the agent with a power of attorney can litigate pro se for the principal)

*J.W. v. Superior Court*, 17 Cal.App.4th 958, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 527, 529-33 (Ct.App.1993) (neither common law nor guardianship statutes sanction an exception to the State Bar Act prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law in favor of guardians acting for their wards)

NO.

No person is qualified to serve as a next friend or guardian who has been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude

RCW 11.88.020(3)

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## Removal of Action to Federal Court    Diversity   Claims

Federal district courts have been granted original jurisdiction of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, where there is the requisite diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds \$50,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), formerly codified as 28 U.S.C. § 41(1). This grant of jurisdiction has essentially remained unaltered since the adoption of the Judiciary Act of 1911, except for an upward adjustment of the amount in controversy. *Compare* 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) *with* § 24(1), Judiciary Act of 1911, 36 Stat. 1091.

In discussing the scope of the district court's diversity jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act of 1911, the Supreme Court stated that:

In this grant of jurisdiction of causes arising under state as well as federal law the phrase suits of a civil nature is used in contradistinction to crimes and offenses, as to which the jurisdiction of the District Courts is restricted by section 24(2), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(2), to offenses against the United States. Thus, suits of a civil nature within the meaning of the section are those which do not involve criminal prosecution or punishment, and which are of a character traditionally cognizable by courts of common law or of equity. Such are suits upon a judgment, foreign or domestic, for a civil liability, of a court having jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, which were maintainable at common law upon writ of debt, or of indebitatus assumpsit. [Footnote omitted.]

*Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co.*, 296 U.S. 268, 56 S.Ct. 229, 231, 80 L. Ed. 220 (1935).

Removal of state criminal prosecutions to federal court on the grounds of diversity of citizenship are, therefore, properly rejected. In addition, a federal court may not become involved in a state criminal prosecution where, as in Washington courts, there is a mechanism for litigating federal constitutional claims until after the criminal defendant fully exhausts all of his state court remedies. *See generally Harris v. Reed*, 489 U.S. 255, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1989); *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971).

Removal of a state infraction to federal court on a diversity theory is impossible because of the amount in controversy. The amount in controversy on a civil infraction is the amount of the fine plead on the infraction. *See City of Bremerton v. Spears*, 134 Wn.2d 141, 151, 949 P.2d 347 (1998). In general, the amount sought is well under \$500.00. *See generally* IRLJ 6.2; RCW 46.63.110(a) (amount of infractions not to exceed \$250.00).

## You Owe Me Money    Damages Under 42 U.S.C. 1983

It is well-established that a litigant who claims an underlying state court conviction was obtained through unconstitutional conduct must first have his or her conviction overturned on those grounds through a federal or state habeas petition before the litigant may seek damages under Section 1983. *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). A failure by the litigant to establish that he or she was acquitted or that any conviction was subsequently overturned is fatal to such a claim. *See, e.g., Schneider v. Schlaefter*, 975 F.Supp. 1160, 1164-65 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (dismissing civil rights action predicated upon a claim that all prior court proceedings were unconstitutionally conducted under authority of form of flag representing foreign power); *Sadlier v. Payne*, 974 F.Supp. 1411, 1412 (D. Utah 1997) (same).

A Freeman's claims against a judge for damages under Section 1983 are subject to dismissal on grounds of absolute judicial immunity, insofar as the conduct the judges are alleged to have taken fell within their jurisdiction and the scope of their judicial duties. *See Stump v. Sparkman*, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978).

A Freeman's claims against a prosecutor will be subject to dismissal on grounds of absolute prosecutorial immunity, insofar as the conduct the prosecutor is alleged to have taken falls within the scope

of their prosecutorial duties and functions. See *Imbler v. Pachtman*, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); *Kalina v. Fletcher*, 522 U.S. 118, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997).

Actions that are entitled to absolute immunity include: (1) those performed as an advocate for the State such as the initiation of prosecution and the presentation of testimony; and (2) the out-of-court professional evaluation of the evidence assembled by the police and appropriate preparation for its presentation at trial or before a grand jury after a decision to file charges has been made. See, e.g., *Buckley v. Fitzsimmons*, 509 U.S. 259, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993); *Fletcher, supra*.

## Challenges to Payment of Court Obligation with Paper Money

Money as defined in Washington includes gold, silver, and legal tender of the United States of America. RCW 84.04.060. Legal tender is valid under Washington law for the payment of taxes, debts, fines, and other obligations. See generally *Trohimovich v. Labor & Industries*, 73 Wn.App. 314, 319, 869 P.2d 95 (1994); *Federal Land Bank v. Redwine*, 51 Wn.App. 766, 769, 755 P.2d 822 (1988) (land patent filed by Freeman litigant in order to avoid foreclosure of family farm).

## I Want My Property Returned Fingerprints, Etc.

The question of the return or expunction of arrest records spurred a flurry of litigation in the 1970s. In *Eddy v. Moore*, 5 Wn.App. 334, 487 P.2d 211, review denied, 79 Wn.2d 1012 (Div. 1 1971), Division I of the Washington Court of Appeals held that police retention of an exonerated defendant's fingerprints and photograph violated her constitutional right of privacy. Subsequent to the release of the *Eddy* opinion, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion in which the Court rejected an individual's post-dismissal of charges claim that the chief of police's distribution of his name and photograph in an active shoplifter's flyer violated his constitutional right to privacy. *Paul v. Davis*, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976).

Following the Supreme Court's decision in *Eddy*, Division II of the Washington Court of Appeals had an opportunity to revisit the question of whether an exonerated defendant's right to privacy is violated by police retention of fingerprints and booking photographs. In *State v. Adler*, 16 Wn.App. 459, 558 P.2d 817 (Div. 2 1976), review denied, 88 Wn.2d 1011 (1977), Division II held that an individual has no constitutional right to privacy in photograph taken of him in connection with an earlier criminal charge that resulted in acquittal.

Since the *Adler* decision, no other Washington case has addressed the return of fingerprints issue. Our appellate courts, however, have addressed the limits of the court's authority over records held by police agencies. In *State v. Gilkinson*, 57 Wn.App. 861, 790 P.2d 1247 (1990), the Court of Appeals determined that courts lack the inherent authority to delete and expunge criminal records. Rather, any alteration of criminal records may only be conducted pursuant to statute.

While a prior statute<sup>78</sup> permitted the destruction of identifying information held by the Washington State Patrol following an acquittal or the dismissal of charges, no statute currently allows a court to order the purging of fingerprints maintained by a city or county police agency. See generally *State v. Gilkinson*, 57 Wn.App. at 864 n.2 (court's authority to delete or modify non-conviction records under RCW 10.97.060 does not extend to ordering the destruction or expungement of the police records). See also RCW 13.50.050(22) (No identifying information held by the Washington state patrol in accordance with chapter

<sup>78</sup> Former RCW 43.43.730 provided that

When a person, having no prior criminal record, whose fingerprints and/or other identifying data were submitted to and filed at the section, shall be found not guilty of the offense for which the fingerprints and/or other identifying data were sent to the section, or be released without a conviction being obtained, his fingerprints and/or other identifying data and all copies thereof on file at the section shall be destroyed by the section. Provided such person requests said destruction after the finding of not guilty or after the release.

Former RCW 43.43.730(1), quoted in *State v. Adler*, 16 Wn.App. 459, 464, 558 P.2d 817 (Div. 2 1976), review denied, 88 Wn.2d 1011 (1977). This statute only applied to State Patrol records and not to records held by city or county police agencies. *Adler*, 16 Wn.App. at 464.

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43.43 RCW is subject to destruction or sealing under this section. For the purposes of this subsection, identifying information includes photographs, fingerprints, palmprints, soleprints, toeprints and any other data that identifies a person by physical characteristics, name, birthdate or address, but does not include information regarding criminal activity, arrest, charging, diversion, conviction or other information about a person's treatment by the criminal justice system or about the person's behavior. ).

# TRIAL ISSUES

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## Defendant s Clothes

In our experience, most Freeman who have been detained prior to trial will insist upon wearing jail clothing during trial. A defendant s wearing of jail clothing during a jury trial does not violate the defendant s constitutional rights unless the defendant has been compelled to wear such clothing. *Estelle v. Williams*, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976). A defendant s failure to arrange for civilian clothing or to object at the time of trial to the jail garb is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation. *Estelle v. Williams*, 96 S.Ct. at 1697.

The best course to follow when dealing with a pro se Freeman who has been detained prior to trial is to have the jail offer to assist him or her in obtaining civilian clothing for trial. If the defendant rejects the offer, the defendant should be brought before the court to be advised by the judge that the jury might draw adverse inferences from the Freeman s appearance in jail attire, and that the court is willing to assist the Freeman in obtaining civilian clothing for the trial. If the defendant still rejects civilian clothing the colloquy with the court will ensure a knowing and intelligent waiver of any prejudice that might inure to the wearing of jail clothing.

## Defendant s Refusal to Leave the Jail

Some Freeman defendants have refused to leave their cell to come to court. If the hearing is a non-evidentiary one, such as an arraignment, the video conference procedure contained in GR 19 may be used. If video conferencing equipment is not available, the court, essential court personnel, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney, if any, may choose to hold the hearing in the hallway immediately adjoining the defendant s cell. The final option, when a jury is not present, is to bring the defendant under force to court in a wheelchair.

If the defendant refuses to come to court for trial, a colloquy should be conducted by the court with the defendant regarding the fact that the defendant s refusal to attend the proceedings will be deemed to be a knowing and intelligent waiver of the defendant s presence at trial. *See generally State v. Hammond*, 121 Wn.2d 787, 854 P.2d 637 (1993).

The defendant s refusal to answer questions during the colloquy will not bar a court from finding an implicit waiver of the defendant s right to attend the trial so long as there is a record that the detained defendant was personally advised that the trial would be starting at a certain time and his presence is required at that time in the courtroom. *See, e.g., Taylor v. United States*, 414 U.S. 17, 38 L.Ed.2d 174, 94 S.Ct. 194 (1973) (defendant s mid-trial flight from courtroom waived his right to attend the remainder of the trial); *State v. DeWeese*, 117 Wn.2d 369, 380-81, 816 P.2d 1 (1991) (pro se defendant waived his right to be present during trial by engaging in disruptive behavior); *State v. Rice*, 110 Wn.2d 577, 619-20, 757 P.2d 889 (1988), *cert. denied*, 491 U.S. 910 (1989) (capital defendant implicitly waived his right to be present when the special sentencing proceeding verdict was returned by attempting to commit suicide).

## Witness Etiquette

In most state courtrooms, the attorneys are allowed to freely roam the courtroom and no restriction is placed upon where the attorney stands during questioning. Some witnesses have expressed discomfort with how close a pro se Freeman defendant stood next to them while conducting cross-examination. The best practice when dealing with a pro se defendant is to ask the court, pursuant to ER 611(a), to restrict how close any questioner can stand vis-a-vis the witness.

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## Disruptive Defendant

A judge does not have to accept disruptive behavior on the part of a criminal defendant. As noted by the United States Supreme Court

It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country. The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated. We believe trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case. No one formula for maintaining the appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be best in all situations. We think there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstreperous defendant &(1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly.

*Illinois v. Allen*, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44, 25 L.Ed. 2d 353, 90 S.Ct. 1057 (1970). The manner of maintaining order in the courtroom is within the trial judge's discretion, but the least severe remedy to accomplish the result is preferable. *State v. DeWeese*, 117 Wn.2d 369, 380, 816 P.2d 1 (1991); *Burgess v. Towne*, 13 Wn.App. 954, 960, 538 P.2d 559 (1975).

**Summary Contempt.** Supreme Court justices and commissioners, court of appeals judges and commissioners, superior court judges and commissioners, municipal court judges, and district court judges and commissioners may all punish an individual for direct contempt under RCW 7.21.050. See RCW 7.21.020.

A jury is not required, *State v. Hobble*, 126 Wn.2d 283, 892 P.2d 85 (1995), but the sanction that may be imposed is limited to a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or imprisonment in the county jail for not more than thirty days, or both, for each separate incident of contempt. RCW 7.21.050(2).

Any summary contempt order should recite that the contempt was seen or heard by the judge and should recite the facts of the contempt. *Hobble*, 126 Wn.2d at 295; RCW 7.21.050(1). The contemnor must also be provided with an opportunity to speak in mitigation of the circumstances. *Hobble*, 126 Wn.2d at 296; RCW 7.21.050(1).

**Coercive Contempt.** A defendant's refusal to comply with a lawful order of the court can yield a coercive contempt order. Such an order is appropriate when the defendant refuses to affix his or her fingerprints to the judgment and sentence, to provide a handwriting exemplar, or to perform other similar affirmative acts. A coercive contempt order may be summarily imposed. RCW 7.21.050(1). A coercive contempt order for failure to comply with a lawful discovery order will toll the speedy trial period. *State v. Miller*, 74 Wn.App. 334, 344-45, 873 P.2d 1197 (1994).

A coercive contempt order can provide the Freeman, the prosecutor, and the judge with breathing room. Often continuing the matter for a week or two pursuant to a coercive contempt order will result in the loss of the Freeman's audience. Once fellow supporters are absent, the Freeman defendant may be willing to voluntarily affix his or her fingerprints to the judgment and sentence,<sup>79</sup> or may agree to comply with other discovery orders. A coercive contempt order that has been used in a Freeman prosecution follows.

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### CAPTION FOR ORDER RE: CONTEMPT

THIS MATTER having come on for sentencing following the jury's verdict of "guilty" on all counts; the defendant appearing pro se after having previously waived counsel; the State of Washington appearing by and through Patricia M. Stuart and Pamela B. Loginsky, Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys in and for Kitsap County;

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<sup>79</sup> A defendant's continued refusal to affix his or her fingerprints to the original judgment and sentence can be responded to with the use of force. See generally RCW 43.43.750. While the officer who obtains the fingerprints through force has statutory immunity from civil and criminal liability, RCW 43.43.750, it is always preferable for the officer to obtain the fingerprints in open court under the direct order of the judge so that judicial immunity will offer another layer of protection from suit.

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and the court having directly observed VERYL EDWARD KNOWLES refusal to place his fingerprints upon the judgment and sentence as required by RCW 10.64.110, now therefore, enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

I.

The defendant, VERYL EDWARD KNOWLES, has been ordered by the court to place his fingerprints upon the judgment and sentence that has been entered by this court on the 20th day of May, 1996.

II.

The defendant, VERYL EDWARD KNOWLES, refused to obey this direct order of the court in the presence of the undersigned judge.

III.

The defendant's refusal to obey the lawful order of this court constitutes contempt.

IV.

The defendant, VERYL EDWARD KNOWLES, has the power to perform the required act and to purge the contempt.

Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the court enters the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I.

That the above-entitled Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties of this action.

II.

Every original judgment and sentence is required to have the fingerprints of the defendant affixed to it. RCW 10.64.110.

Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court enters the following:

ORDER

I.

The defendant, VERYL EDWARD KNOWLES, is found in contempt of court.

II.

The remedial sanction of incarceration as authorized by RCW 7.21.030(2)(a) is imposed until the defendant, VERYL EDWARD KNOWLES, is willing to affix his fingerprints to the judgment and sentence.

III.

While the defendant is incarcerated pursuant to this contempt order, he shall receive no credit for time served against the judgment and sentence entered in this cause number or against the judgment and sentence entered in Kitsap County cause number 95-1-01138-0.

IV.

The defendant, VERYL EDWARD KNOWLES, may request a hearing at any time in order to advise the court of his willingness to purge the instant contempt.

V.

The defendant, VERYL EDWARD KNOWLES, shall be brought before the court on \_\_\_\_\_, at \_\_\_\_\_ p.m./a.m., and on every \_\_\_\_\_, thereafter, so that inquiry can be made upon whether the defendant is now willing to purge the instant contempt.

**Gagging and binding.** There appears to be only one Washington appellate case in which a disruptive defendant was gagged. While affirming the defendant's convictions, *State v. Crawford*, 21 Wn.App. 146, 150, 584 P.2d 442 (1978), *review denied*, 91 Wn.2d 1013 (1979) does not establish a specific test to be used in determining whether to gag a defendant.

**Removal of Defendant.** If the defendant is removed from the courtroom, efforts should be made to allow the defendant to still observe the proceedings over a video monitor. *See, e.g., State v. DeWeese*, 117 Wn.2d 369, 380, 816 P.2d 1 (1991). The defendant should periodically be provided with an opportunity to return to the courtroom.

If the removed defendant is pro se, he should be provided the opportunity to write out cross-examination questions for the State's witnesses to either be asked by stand-by counsel or the court with a proper instruction to the jury that the questions are those of the defendant and not those of counsel or the court. *See State v. Estabrook*, 68 Wn.App. 309, 313-14, 842 P.2d 1001, *review denied*, 121 Wn.2d 1024 (1993).

## Physical Restraints

The rule that a criminal defendant is entitled to appear at trial free of manacles or bonds is described as ancient and was recognized as early as 1722. *State v. Williams*, 18 Wash. 47, 49, 50 P. 580 (1897); see *Illinois v. Allen*, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970).

This right is based upon the legal principle that a person accused of a crime is presumed innocent until guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. *United States v. Samuel*, 431 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1970).

Courtroom practices that unnecessarily mark the defendant as dangerous or guilty undermine the presumption of innocence. *Samuel*, 431 F.2d at 614. If a defendant is to be presumed innocent, he or she must be allowed the indicia of innocence. *Id.*

Shackling or handcuffing a defendant has also been discouraged because it restricts the defendant's ability to assist his counsel during trial, it interferes with the right to testify in one's own behalf, and it offends the dignity of the judicial process. See *Allen*, 397 U.S. at 344; *State v. Finch*, \_\_\_ Wn.2d \_\_\_, 975 P.2d 967, 1999 WL 274135 (May 6, 1999).

In Washington, the constitutional basis for the rule against using physical restraints on an accused is article I, section 22 (amendment 10), which provides: [i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person[.] This has been held to mean that if a defendant appears in chains or irons, the jury must necessarily conceive a prejudice against the accused, as being in the opinion of the judge a dangerous man, and one not to be trusted, even under the surveillance of officers. *Williams*, 18 Wash. at 51.

This right is balanced against the State's interest in an orderly trial. *State v. Maryott*, 6 Wn.App. 96, 103, 492 P.2d 239 (1971). Consequently, the State may take measures to ensure an orderly trial but the measures should not be imposed upon the defendant until a need has been shown, and the control imposed should insure an orderly trial with the least interference with a defendant's rights. *Id.*; *Loux v. United States*, 389 F.2d 911, 919 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 867 (1968). As a general rule, restraints may be used only when necessary to prevent injury to those in the courtroom, to prevent disorderly conduct at trial, or to prevent escape. *State v. Finch*, \_\_\_ Wn.2d \_\_\_, 975 P.2d 967, 1999 WL 274135 (May 6, 1999).

The extent to which security measures are necessary is within a trial judge's discretion. *State v. Hartzog*, 96 Wn.2d 383, 400, 635 P.2d 694 (1981). That discretion must be founded upon a factual basis set forth in the record. *Id.* To this end, the trial court must conduct a hearing<sup>80</sup> at which the following non-exclusive factors should be considered

- (1) The seriousness of the present charge against the defendant;
- (2) The defendant's temperament and character;
- (3) The defendant's age and physical attributes;
- (4) The defendant's past record;
- (5) The defendant's past escapes or attempted escapes, and evidence of a present plan to escape;

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<sup>80</sup> The exact nature of the hearing is not firmly established in Washington. The North Carolina Supreme Court has noted

While the cases have established no definitive rule as to the exact form of evidentiary hearing to determine whether shackling of the defendant is necessary, the most prevalent conclusion is that the hearing may be informal and that the ordinary rules of evidence need not be observed, although the trial judge may decide, particularly where the need for physical restraint is controverted, to conduct a full evidentiary hearing with sworn testimony and formal findings of fact.

*State v. Tolley*, 290 N.C. 349, 226 S.E.2d 353, 368 (1976).

See also *State v. Flieger*, 91 Wn.App. 236, 955 P.2d 872 (Div. 3 1998), review denied, 137 Wn.2d 1003 (1999) (conviction reversed due to failure of trial court to conduct a hearing on the necessity of using a shock box to physically restrain defendant during trial; trial court incorrectly noted that it was not the one to determine necessary security precautions, preferring to defer to sheriff's office).

- (6) Whether the defendant has made any threats to harm others or cause a disturbance;
- (7) Whether the defendant has demonstrated any self-destructive tendencies;
- (8) The risk of mob violence or of attempted revenge by others;
- (9) The possibility of rescue by other offenders still at large;
- (10) The size and mood of the audience;
- (11) The nature and physical security of the courtroom; and
- (12) The adequacy and availability of alternative remedies.

*Hartzog*, 96 Wn.2d at 400.

It is clear that the existence of one or more factors does not necessarily mean that a defendant should be restrained. Courts must only consider those factors which indicate that compelling circumstances that some measure [is] needed to maintain security of the courtroom. *Duckett [v. Godinez]*, 67 F.3d 734 [at 748 [(9th Cir. 1995)] (citations omitted). The trial court must base its decision to physically restrain a defendant on evidence which indicates that the defendant poses an imminent risk of escape, that the defendant intends to injure someone in the courtroom, or that the defendant cannot behave in an orderly manner while in the courtroom. To do otherwise is an abuse of the trial court's discretion.

*State v. Finch*, \_\_\_ Wn.2d \_\_\_, 975 P.2d 967, 1999 WL 274135, \*33 (May 6, 1999) (reversing death sentence and remanding case for new penalty phase on the grounds that the defendant, who was charged with the aggravated first degree murder of a blind man and of a police officer, was improperly restrained during the trial). Unless the defendant has a past history of escape, has acted out during court proceedings, or has been violent during his pre-trial detention, the use of restraints will probably be error. *Finch, supra*.

If restraints are found necessary, the court should take steps to conceal the restraints from the jury. Placing skirting on the counsel tables, requiring counsel to remain at the tables during questioning of witnesses, and having the defendant take the witness chair out of the presence of the jury are all appropriate steps to take.

### **Conflicts of Interest Due to Courtroom Personnel as Witnesses**

Prosecution of Freeman often involves testimony from judges, bailiffs, court reporters, and court clerks. A witness judge, bailiff, court reporter, or court clerk should not perform any official duties in the cause in which he or she testifies. The prohibition upon serving as a witness and judge in the same action arises in the Code of Judicial Conduct, ER 605, and the appearance of fairness doctrine.

The prohibition upon court reporters serving as a witness in the same action being reported stems from WAC 308-14-130(6) which requires all court reporters to disclose any actual or potential conflicts of interest and from the appearance of fairness doctrine. The prohibition upon other court officers serving in their official role in a case in which they will or have testified lies in the appearance of fairness doctrine.

### **Freemen Request for Subpoenas for Judges and Other Elected Officials**

While a defendant has a constitutional right to compulsory process, this right is not absolute. The Supreme Court limits the right to compel witnesses to those witnesses who are material to the defense. Error from the denial of a request for compulsory process will only be found if the defendant is denied access to a witness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed, and whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense. *State v. Smith*, 101 Wn.2d 36, 41, 677 P.2d 100 (1984), quoting *Washington v. Texas*, 388 U.S. 14, 23, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019, 87 S.Ct. 1920 (1967).

The burden is upon the defendant to establish a colorable need for the person to be summoned. *Smith*, 102 Wn.2d at 41-42. This burden is not met by a desire to have the witness testify to irrelevant or inadmissible

evidence. *State v. Maupin*, 128 Wn.2d 918, 925, 913 P.2d 808 (1996). Pursuant to this authority, the a court may generally reject requests for subpoenas for the governor, president, and other public servants.

A request for a subpoena for a judge is subject to an even higher level of scrutiny.

Only in the rarest of circumstances should a judge be called upon to give evidence as to matters upon which he has acted in a judicial capacity, and these occasions, we think, should be limited to instances in which there is no other reasonably available way to prove the facts sought to be established. A record of trial or a judicial hearing speaks for itself as of the time it was made. It should reflect, as near as may be, exactly what was said and done at the trial or hearing.

*State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker*, 79 Wn.2d 12, 20, 482 P.2d 775 (1971).

## **I Cannot Swear      Challenges to the Witness Oath**

Every person who wishes to testify in court must declare that the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness conscience and impress the witness mind with the duty to do so. ER 603.

The form of the oath may be varied to accommodate a witness religious beliefs, but some form of swearing in a witness is required. *In re Ross*, 45 Wn.2d 654, 277 P.2d 335 (1954). As a general rule, a witness must: (1) agree to tell the truth or understand that the witness must tell the truth; and (2) understand that a failure to tell the truth will subject the witness to prosecution under the jurisdiction's perjury laws. *See, e.g., United States v. Ward*, 989 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1992).

## **You Cannot Ask Me Any Questions      Cross-Examination of Defendants**

Once a criminal defendant takes the stand, the defendant is subject to all rules relating to the cross-examination of witnesses. A criminal defendant's constitutional right to remain silent may not be employed to defeat cross-examination of him as to a subject he has opened on direct examination after voluntarily taking the stand. *State v. Robideau*, 70 Wn.2d 994, 425 P.2d 880 (1967); *State v. Crowder*, 119 Wash. 450, 453, 205 Pac. 850 (1922).

## **I Did Not Intend to Violate Your Laws      Ignorance of the Law and Mens Rea**

A statute may punish conduct alone, without making intent an element of the crime. Strict liability crimes are not unconstitutional. *Smith v. California*, 361 U.S. 147, 80 S.Ct. 215, 4 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1959); *State v. Rivas*, 126 Wn.2d 443, 452, 896 P.2d 57 (1995) (citing *State v. Cleppe*, 96 Wn.2d 373, 378, 635 P.2d 435 (1981), *cert. denied*, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982)); *State v. Stroh*, 91 Wn.2d 580, 583-84, 88 P.2d 1182, 8 A.L.R.4th 760 (1979); *Morissette v. United States*, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L. Ed. 288 (1952)); *State v. Winger*, 41 Wn.2d 229, 248 P.2d 555 (1952). Whether intent is an element of a crime depends upon the intent of the legislature. If intent is not made an element, the doing of the prohibited act constitutes the crime. *Stroh*, 91 Wn.2d at 584.

Where a statute does not specify a mental element, legislative intent may be determined by resort to another body of law generally guiding such an inquiry. Although there is no fixed test, courts have considered several factors in deciding whether a criminal statute provides for a strict liability crime where it does not specify a mental element. Whether a mental element is an essential element of a crime is a matter to be determined by the Legislature. *State v. Bash*, 130 Wn.2d 594, 604, 925 P.2d 978 (1996). Thus, deciding whether a statute sets forth a strict liability crime is a statutory construction question aimed at ascertaining legislative intent.

Numerous statutory crimes which are mala prohibita and which are upheld without proof of an evil intent or any mental element at all are crimes that are generally called public welfare or regulatory offenses.

These public welfare offenses

are not in the nature of positive aggressions or invasions, with which the common law so often dealt, but are in the nature of neglect where the law requires care, or inaction where it imposes a duty. Many violations of such regulations result in no direct or immediate injury to person or property but merely create the danger or probability of it which the law seeks to minimize.

*Morissette*, 342 U.S. at 255-56.

Examples of public welfare laws that are enacted in the exercise of a legislature's police power and which may be enforced as laws mala prohibita include statutes relating to pure food and drugs, labeling, weights and measures, building, plumbing and electrical codes, fire protection, air and water pollution, sanitation, highway safety and numerous other areas. *Bash*, 130 Wn.2d at 607; *State v. Turner*, 78 Wn.2d 276, 280, 474 P.2d 91, 41 A.L.R.3d 493 (1970).

Generally, a Freeman's claim that the prosecution must prove intent is really an argument that no conviction is possible since the Freeman was unaware of the particular law he or she is accused of violating when the acts underlying the charge were committed. The traditional rule in American jurisprudence is, however, that ignorance of the law is no defense to a criminal prosecution. *Cheek v. United States*, 498 U.S. 192, 199, 111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991) (citations omitted); see also *Bryan v. United States*, \_\_\_ U.S. \_\_\_, 118 S.Ct. 1939, 1947, 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998) (traditional rule is that ignorance of the law is no excuse); *Lambert v. People of the State of California*, 355 U.S. 225, 228, 78 S.Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957) (rule that ignorance of the law will not excuse is deeply rooted in American law); *State v. Reed*, 84 Wn.App. 379, 384, 928 P.2d 469 (1997) (ignorance of the law is no excuse....Furthermore, a good faith belief that a certain activity does not violate the law is also not a defense in a criminal prosecution. ).

## **I Was Acting in Self Defense in Response to Your Violence      The Defense of Necessity**

Freemen will frequently contend that they filed a lien, served a bill of particulars, represented a friend, etc. in defense of themselves or others who had been kidnapped by the government (arrest), subject to extortion (bail or plea bargaining), or other similar crime. No Washington case exists that allows an individual to raise a claim of self-defense outside the context of an assault or murder prosecution. To the extent non-assault or murder cases allow a justification defense, the defense is limited to that of necessity. See, e.g., *State v. Jeffrey*, 77 Wn.App. 222, 225-26, 889 P.2d 956 (1995) (necessity defense in unlawful possession of a firearm prosecution); *State v. Niemczyk*, 31 Wn.App. 803, 644 P.2d 759 (1982) (necessity defense to escape charge); *State v. Diana*, 24 Wn.App. 908, 604 P.2d 1312 (1979) (medical necessity defense to marijuana charges); *State v. Pittman*, 88 Wn.App. 188, 943 P.2d 713 (Div. 1 1997) (medical necessity); *State v. Williams*, \_\_\_ Wn.App. \_\_\_, 968 P.2d 26 (Div. 2 1998) (medical necessity).

A necessity defense will rarely be available to a defendant. The defense is available when the physical forces of nature or the pressure of circumstances<sup>81</sup> cause the accused to take unlawful action to avoid a harm which social policy deems greater than the harm resulting from a violation of the law. *Diana*, 24 Wn.App. at 913. But,

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<sup>81</sup> More recent cases hold that the pressure that led to the illegal actions must come from a force of nature and not from people.

See, e.g., *State v. Jeffrey*, 77 Wn.App. 222, 225, 889 P.2d 956 (1995) (necessity defense not available to a defendant who recklessly places himself in a situation where he would be forced to engage in criminal conduct); *State v. Turner*, 42 Wn.App. 242, 247, 711 P.2d 353 (1985), review denied, 105 Wash.2d 1009 (1986) (trial court properly refused to instruct jury on defense of necessity, even though defendant had been threatened with harm to herself and her husband if she refused to carry drugs to husband in penitentiary); *State v. Gallegos*, 73 Wn.App. 644, 871 P.2d 621 (1994) (friend's need for assistance insufficient to support a jury instruction on the necessity defense in an attempt to elude a police vehicle prosecution).

if there [is] a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, a chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm, the defense will fail. LaFave & Scott 379.

*United States v. Bailey*, 444 U.S. 394, 410, 100 S.Ct. 624, 635, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980). *Accord, Diana*, 24 Wn.App. 913-14.

For the defense to succeed, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the defendant believed the commission of the crime was necessary to avoid or minimize a harm, (2) the harm sought to be avoided was greater than the harm resulting from the violation of the law, (3) no legal alternative existed, and (4) the defendant did not recklessly place himself or herself in a situation where the defendant would be forced to engage in criminal conduct. *State v. Jeffrey*, 77 Wn.App. 222, 225, 889 P.2d 956 (1995); *State v. Gallegos*, 73 Wn.App. 644, 651, 871 P.2d 621 (1994). Most Freeman claims of necessity will fail the third and fourth prongs of the test.

## Jury Nullification

Jury nullification<sup>82</sup> is permitted in some jurisdictions, such as Indiana,<sup>83</sup> where the jury decides both the facts and the law. In Washington, however, the jury only decides the facts and the law is provided by the judge. Wash. Const. art. IV, § 16 ( [j]udges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, nor comment thereon, but shall declare the law. ). While juries have the power to ignore the law through their verdicts, courts have no obligation to tell them they may do so. *See, e.g., United States v. Edwards*, 101 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1996); *United States v. Powell*, 955 F.2d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 1991); *United States v. Krzyske*, 836 F.2d 1013 (6th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 488 U.S. 832 (1988); *State v. Meggyesy*, 90 Wn.App. 693, 958 P.2d 319, 322, *review denied*, 136 Wn.2d 1028 (Div. 1 136 Wn.2d 1028 (Div. 1 1998); *State v. Bonisisio*, 92 Wn.App. 789, 964 P.2d 1222 (Div. 2 1998), *review denied*, 137 Wn.2d 1024 (1999) (citing *Meggyesy* with approval).

A party's arguments to the jury regarding the law is limited to the law as defined by the court. *State v. Rice*, 110 Wn.2d 577, 601-02, 757 P.2d 889 (1988), *cert. denied*, 491 U.S. 910 (1989). Accordingly, it is improper for a defendant to argue that the jury may acquit once it finds that the defendant's guilt is clear beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Testimony Regarding the Law

By constitution, the judge is responsible for determining the law that is applicable to a particular case. *See* Wash. Const. art. IV, § 16; *State v. Meggyesy*, 90 Wn.App. 693, 704, 958 P.2d 319, *review denied*, 136 Wn.2d 1028 (Div. 1 1998). It is a usurpation of this obligation for any witness to attempt to establish what the law is in a particular action. *See, e.g., State v. O Connell*, 83 Wn.2d 797, 816, 523 P.2d 872 (1974); *Valley Land Office, Inc. v. O Grady*, 72 Wn.2d 247, 253-54, 432 P.2d 850 (1967); *Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diners Club Inc.*, 550 F.2d 505 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 434 U.S. 861 (1977) (error to allow securities expert to testify as to the legal obligations of the parties to a contract; It is not for witnesses to instruct the jury as to applicable principles of law, but for the judge. As Professor Wigmore has observed, expert testimony on law is excluded because the tribunal does not need the witness judgment. ); 32 C.J.S. *Evidence* § 546 (86), at 314-17 (1964); 7 Wigmore, *Evidence* § 1952 (3d ed. 1940). Thus, neither a Freeman defendant nor any other witness may testify regarding the scope of the law of searches, the validity of any statute, the need for a grand jury indictment, nor whether any actions taken in the prosecution were illegal.

To the extent that the Freeman defendant wishes to get Freeman views about the law before the jury, the appropriate way is through jury instructions. A Freeman defendant's proposed instructions, if they accurately state the law and are relevant to the charges filed, should be tendered to the jury. No instruction

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<sup>82</sup> Andrew D. Leipold, *Rethinking Jury Nullification*, 82 Va. L.Rev. 253 (1996) ( Nullification occurs when the defendant's guilt is clear beyond a reasonable doubt, but the jury, based on its own sense of justice or fairness, decides to acquit. )

<sup>83</sup> Article 1, § 19 of the Indiana Constitution, provides: In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts.

proposed by a Freeman defendant, however, that is inaccurate in any way should be included in the instructions to the jury. *See generally State v. Robinson*, 92 Wn.2d 357, 361, 597 P.2d 892 (1979).

### **Juror Protection**

Since most Freeman jury trials will be tried by pro se defendants, the prosecutor has a duty to bring appropriate motions in limine to restrict the areas of inquiry in order to preserve the jurors privacy. A motion to preclude the questioning of jurors about their religious views should almost always be brought. *See Wash. Const. art. I, § 11*. In all felony cases, a juror protective order that restricts both the State and the defendant from initiating any post-verdict contact with the jurors absent specific court approval should be obtained prior to jury selection. *See generally State v. Finch*, \_\_\_\_ Wn.2d \_\_\_\_, 975 P.2d 967, 1999 WL 274135, \*43 (May 6, 1999) (upholding an order restricting the parties or their agents from initiating contact with jurors post-verdict).

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# INFRACTIONS

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## The Infraction Calendar

A common intersection between Freeman culture and our legal culture occurs on the traffic infraction calendar. The concept of traffic laws is foreign to many Freeman and is frequently believed to be a violation of the constitutional right to travel.<sup>84</sup> An additional problem is that the Common Law (following Posse Comitatus dogma) does not recognize non-victim crimes such as speeding which do not result in damage to another individual's person or property. Finally, Freeman, who have signed their driver's licenses with the phrase "refused for fraud" or who have simply returned their driver's license to the Department of Licensing,<sup>85</sup> believe that they have opted out of the state and federal adhesion contracts which allows for the imposition of traffic rules, regulations, and fines.

Many of the issues discussed in the criminal prosecution section of these materials will arise during civil infraction proceedings and will not be repeated here. There are, however, some issues that are unique to traffic infractions because of their civil nature.

Most Freeman will request a contested hearing on an infraction. They will appear promptly and be respectful throughout the proceeding which they will generally lose. The loss will almost certainly be followed by the filing of a RALJ appeal. This is the point at which most prosecutors become involved.

## RALJ Appeal Waiver of Fees

Many Freeman are in economic distress. This means that they will generally be seeking a waiver of the superior court filing fee and other costs of appeal. In responding to this request, it is critical to recall that traffic infractions are civil. *City of Bremerton v. Spears*, 134 Wn.2d 141, 150, 949 P.2d 347 (1998); RCW 46.63.010; RCW 46.63.120(1).

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<sup>84</sup> It has been long established that states may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in the operation upon its highways of motor vehicles and the state may require the licensing of drivers. *E.g.*, *Hendrick v. Maryland*, 235 U.S. 610, 59 L.Ed. 385, 35 S.Ct. 140 (1915); *Spokane v. Port*, 43 Wn.App. 273, 275-76, 716 P.2d 945, review denied, 106 Wn.2d 1010 (1986).

<sup>85</sup> Washington traffic laws apply to everyone who operates a vehicle upon our highways regardless of whether or not they have a driver's license or whether they are a resident of the state. RCW 46.08.070; RCW 46.20.022.

Along with their Common Law sovereignty philosophy, Freeman often assert the following sophomoric statutory analysis in support of their position that Title 46 RCW (Washington's traffic code) does not apply to their activities. Their arguments rely heavily on the use of a thesaurus, and go something like this

RCW 46.20.022 says that Title 46 applies to any person who operates a motor vehicle on public highways regardless of residency or driver's license status.

A Freeman is not a person as defined in RCW 46.04.405 ( Person includes every natural person, firm, copartnership, corporation, association, or organization ) but rather a human being. Thus, Title 46 does not apply. [See also *I am not a Person but a Human Being*, *supra*.]

A Freeman does not operate a motor vehicle as defined in RCW 46.04.370 ( Operator or driver means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. ), but rather runs, pilots, uses, or sets in motion. Thus, Title 46 does not apply.

A Freeman is not operating a vehicle as defined in RCW 46.04.670 ( Vehicle includes every device capable of being moved upon a public highway and in, upon, or by which any persons or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway... ), i.e. a device, but rather a mechanical contraption or conveyance. Thus, Title 46 does not apply.

A Freeman is not operating a motor vehicle as defined in RCW 46.04.320 ( Motor vehicle shall mean every vehicle which is self-propelled... ) because the mechanical contraption is not self-propelled. A human being must use a key to start the contraption and keep it running, and a human being must also put the contraption in gear, depress the gas pedal, and steer it. The contraption is unable to run on its own. Thus, Title 46 does not apply.

There is no constitutional right to appeal in civil cases; the right exists in civil cases when granted by the legislature or at the discretion of the court. *City of Bremerton v. Spears*, 134 Wn.2d 141, 148, 949 P.2d 347 (1998); *In re Dependency of Grove*, 127 Wn.2d 221, 239, 897 P.2d 1252 (1995).

A right to appeal an order entered in a traffic infraction matter has been granted by the legislature. RCW 2.08.020; IRLJ 5.2. This right, however, is not accompanied with legislation authorizing the appeal to be prosecuted at public expense. In fact, the only general legislative grant for public funds for appeals is limited to those occasions for which a litigant has a constitutional right to appeal. See RCW 4.88.330 (limits provision of counsel and other costs to those cases where it has been judicially determined that the indigent party has a constitutional right to obtain review).

Absent legislation that specifically authorizes the expenditure of public funds to allow an indigent citizen to appeal a finding that he or she committed a traffic infraction, no municipal, district, or superior court,<sup>86</sup> can provide public funds for an attorney, preparation of transcripts, or preparation of the record. See, e.g., *Moore v. Snohomish County*, 112 Wn.2d 915, 774 P.2d 1218 (1989) (fees of expert witness appointed by court pursuant to court rule could not be paid out of public funds in the absence of express language authorizing the expenditure); *Honore v. State Board of Prison Terms*, 77 Wn.2d 660, 678, 466 P.2d 485 (1970) (courts have no power over public funds collected for public purposes absent legislative authorization); Const. article 8, § 4 (amendment 11) (no funds can be disbursed from the public treasury except upon appropriation).

This means that the individual who is appealing the finding an infraction was committed must pay the \$40.00 record preparation fee, RCW 3.62.060(7), and the cost of transcripts in order to proceed.

Case law, however, establishes that even in the absence of an express statute, a court has the inherent authority to waive **its own** filing fee. See, e.g., *Ashley v. Superior Court*, 83 Wn.2d 630, 521 P.2d 711 (1974); *O Connor v. Matzdorff*, 76 Wn.2d 589, 458 P.2d 154 (1969).<sup>87</sup> The Washington Supreme Court, however, has refused to

say that, in every action brought or appeal pursued by a poor person, his court fees should be automatically waived. If an action or petition is patently frivolous, or brought for purposes of harassment, the court should not lend its encouragement by waiving its fees. But where a case appears to have been brought in good faith and to have probable merit, the exercise of a sound discretion dictates that a litigant should not be denied his day in court simply because he is financially unable to pay the court fees.

*O Connor*, 76 Wn.2d at 603. A mere finding that an appeal is not patently frivolous is not sufficient to justify waiver of fees. Rather, the judge being asked to approve the waiver must find that the indigent

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<sup>86</sup> The Washington Supreme Court

has the inherent power to waive the fees and costs of litigation in civil cases in those rare cases where justice demands it. *Saylors*, 87 Wn.2d at 742; *O Connor v. Matzdorff*, 76 Wn.2d 589, 458 P.2d 154 (1969). We have held that in such cases, a litigant must prove indigency, good faith in bringing the appeal, probable merit of the issues raised and, further, that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. *In re Lewis*, 88 Wn.2d 556, 559, 564 P.2d 328 (1977); *Saylors*, 87 Wn.2d at 743; *Bowman v. Waldt*, 9 Wn.App. 562, 571, 513 P.2d 559 (1973). Additionally, the court, in determining whether to exercise its inherent power, may properly consider not only the interests of the indigent litigant, but the interest of the general public and other affected individuals as well. *Bowman*, 9 Wn.App. at 571.

*Grove*, 127 Wn.2d at 241.

An example of how compelling a showing of need must be for a court to authorize the expenditure of public funds is demonstrated in the *Grove* case. The third litigant in *Grove*, whose request for public funds was **denied**, was a worker who claimed that exposure to industrial chemicals resulted in an occupation-related illness. Pursuant to RCW 51.52 of the workers compensation statute, the case was appealed first to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals which found in favor of the worker, and then to the superior court where a jury rendered a verdict in favor of the employer. *Grove*, 127 Wn.2d at 237 and 241.

<sup>87</sup> The rule announced in the *Ashley* and *O Connor* cases means that the \$110.00 filing fee, RCW 36.18.020(2)(b), may be waived by the **superior** court. The district or municipal court, however, has no jurisdiction to waive the filing fee of another court. If a court of lower jurisdiction enters such an order, it is worth the effort to bring a CRLJ 60(b) motion to vacate the order to avoid future improper expenditure of public monies.

appellant has a significant chance of prevailing on appeal. *Carter v. University*, 87 Wn.2d 483, 554 P.2d 338 (1976).

In order to obtain a waiver of a filing fee, the Freeman defendant must establish: (1) good faith; (2) indigency; and (3) probable merit. In our experience, the application for waiver of filing fee can generally be opposed under the indigency or probable merit prongs.

### **RALJ Appeal Waiver of Fees Indigency**

The burden of proof of establishing indigency is on the party seeking appellate review. *State v. Clark*, 88 Wn.2d 533, 534, 563 P.2d 1253 (1977). General statements of need are insufficient to satisfy the burden. *Jefferson v. United States*, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 896 (1960) (where affidavits in support of motion of defendant in Court of Appeals for leave to pursue his appeal in forma pauperis recited that defendant was unable to pay costs but failed to state that he could not give security therefor, and did not state defendant's poverty with some particularity, definiteness and certainty, motion would be denied); *Dreyer v. Jalet*, 349 F.Supp. 452, 459 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 479 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1973) (In order to preclude fraudulent or careless motions of poverty, the applicant moving for in forma pauperis status should state with some particularity, definiteness and certainty the facts as to his poverty & Further, when the totality of the circumstances involved are weighed against the applicant's statement of poverty, and the result suggests incongruity, the Court may go beyond the mere statement of income and inquire into additional relevant matters including the applicant's earning capacity and ability. (citations omitted)); *Bay v. Syracuse University*, 155 F.R.D. 413, 92 Ed. Law Rep. 875 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis denied because plaintiffs did not submit an affidavit which the court considered statutorily sufficient).

In order to prevail on a claim of indigency, the Freeman must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the funds to which the Freeman has access, whether in an account in the Freeman's name or in the custody of another, are insufficient to pay the expected costs of litigation and still meet the Freeman's personal needs. *State v. Rutherford*, 63 Wn.2d 949, 953-54, 389 P.2d 895 (1964) (Indigence is a relative term, and must be considered and measured in each case by reference to the need or service to be met or furnished; the burden rests upon a defendant to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court, by affidavit or otherwise, his inability to advance or secure the costs of litigation); *State v. Buelow*, 122 Wis.2d 465, 363 N.W.2d 255, 258 (1984) (to sustain a claim of indigency, defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is financially unable to afford the costs of litigation; a defendant's claim of indigency certainly should be rejected when he puts his own assets into others' names and those assets remain at his disposal); *Braden v. Estelle*, 428 F.Supp. 595 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (because inmates are provided the necessities of life, even small bank accounts may be able to afford the costs of litigation).

Courts have found inmate assets of far less than \$2000.00 to be adequate to fund the costs of litigation. See, e.g., *Temple v. Ellerthorpe*, 586 F.Supp. 848, 851 (D. R.I. 1984) (surveying cases in which in forma pauperis status was denied for prisoners who had access to funds ranging from \$45.00 to \$500.00).

### **RALJ Appeal Waiver of Fees Probable Merit**

Many Freeman applications for waiver of filing fees and/or notice of RALJ appeal will establish a disagreement with the factual determination made by the district or municipal court. The RALJ court, however, is barred from second-guessing the factual determinations of the district court. RALJ 9.1(b). Mere disagreement over factual matters will not, therefore, provide a basis for waiving the filing fee since probable merit on appeal cannot be shown on that basis.

Another common issue identified in an application for waiver of filing fee is the contention that the district or municipal court erred by considering the officer's statement on the citation. This claim will not provide a basis for waiving the filing fee if the district or municipal court record does not contain a timely, written demand by the defendant that the officer attend the hearing. See RCW 7.80.100.

The late filing of the notice of infraction is another frequent situation. IRLJ 2.2(d), however, grants the district or municipal court the discretion to dismiss an untimely notice of infraction without prejudice. Because the burden of establishing an abuse of discretion is so high and because any dismissal is without prejudice which would allow the refiling of the infraction, *see* IRLJ 2.2(b) and (c), this claim will not provide a basis for waiving the filing fee.

The fourth most frequent claim that will be asserted in a Freeman RALJ infraction appeal is that the case should have been dismissed because the plaintiff was not represented at the hearing. This practice, however, is authorized by RCW 7.80.090(3), and will not provide a basis for waiving the filing fee.

### **RALJ Appeal Cost Awards**

If a traffic infraction appeal does proceed, the prevailing party is entitled to certain costs on appeal. If the prosecution was the respondent, the costs will generally be limited to the \$125.00 statutory attorney fees available in civil cases. *See generally* IRLJ 5.2 ( An appeal from a court of limited jurisdiction is governed by the Rules for Appeal of Decisions of Courts of Limited Jurisdiction. ); RALJ 9.3(c)(1) ( Expenses Allowed as Costs &(1) statutory attorney fees allowed for a superior court nonjury trial ); *State v. Obert*, 50 Wn.App. 139, 747 P.2d 502 (1987) (statutory attorney fees are only allowed in civil cases); RCW 4.84.010(6); RCW 4.84.080(1).

RCW 46.63.151 does not preclude this award because RALJ 1.1(d) and (e) make it clear that RALJ 9.3(c)(1) supersedes RCW 46.63.151 since RCW 46.63.151 was adopted after RALJ 9.3, and yet, it does not specifically reference RALJ 9.3(c)(1) by number. In addition, RCW 7.80.140, which specifically applies to civil infraction cases, authorizes the court to award attorney fees.

### **Further Review**

The availability of post-superior court review of traffic infractions is extremely limited. *See generally City of Bremerton v. Spears, supra*. The cost of such an appeal is high, and the procedure for obtaining a waiver of the filing fee is cumbersome. *See* RAP 15.2(b)(3) and (c).

# CITIZEN COMPLAINTS

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## The Citizen Complaint Court Rule Is Unconstitutional

A recent form of retaliation being experienced by prosecutors, judges, law enforcement officers, and other public officials who come into contact with Freeman is the filing of citizen complaints by Freeman. Many of these citizen complaints seek to charge various federal felonies and constitutional crimes. These complaints are generally sent by the Freeman to the local United States Attorney for processing.

Some of the citizen complaints, however, are filed in courts of limited jurisdiction pursuant to CrRLJ 2.1(c). These complaints allege crimes including unlawful practice of law in violation of RCW 2.48.180, official misconduct in violation of RCW 9A.80.010, search without warrant in violation of RCW 10.79.045, corporation doing business without license in violation of RCW 9.24.040, and misprison of treason in violation of RCW 9.82.030.

There is virtually no case law regarding the proper court procedure for dealing with an application for a citizen complaint. Further, the constitutionality of the citizen complaint process, which allows the judicial branch to impinge upon the executive branch's discretionary charging authority, is questionable.

It is the Kitsap County Prosecutor's Office's position that CrRLJ 2.1(c) is a judicial usurpation of a legislative and executive function, and accordingly violates the separation of powers doctrine. We have been successful in getting citizen complaints dismissed by the Kitsap County District Court based on this argument. See *Lorraine Kirtley v. Diane Frost, Carol Rainey, Michael Stowell, and Does 1-100*, Kitsap County District Court No. 980000004. A copy of the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is attached in the Appendix, at 38-44. Our memorandum of authorities regarding the unconstitutionality of CrRLJ 2.1(c) is as follows

THE CITIZEN COMPLAINT RULE IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION BY THE JUDICIAL  
BRANCH OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH'S POWER TO DECIDE WHO IS OR IS NOT CHARGED  
WITH VIOLATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAWS

CrRLJ 2.1(c), governing a request for citizen complaint, provides as follows in pertinent part

**(c)Citizen Complaints.** Any person wishing to institute a criminal action alleging a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor shall appear before a judge empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the State, other than a judge pro tem. The judge may require the appearance to be made on the record, and under oath. The judge may consider any allegations on the basis of an affidavit sworn to before the judge. The court may also grant an opportunity at said hearing for evidence to be given by the county prosecuting attorney or deputy, the potential defendant or attorney of record, law enforcement or other potential witnesses. The court may also require the presence of other potential witnesses.

In addition to probable cause, the court may consider:

- (1) Whether an unsuccessful prosecution will subject the State to costs or damage claims under RCW 9A.16.110, or other civil proceedings;
  - (2) Whether the complainant has adequate recourse under laws governing small claims suits, anti-harassment petitions or other civil action;
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- (3) Whether a criminal investigation is pending;
- (4) Whether other criminal charges could be disrupted by allowing the citizen complaint to be filed;
- (5) The availability of witnesses at trial;
- (6) The criminal record of the complainant, potential defendant and potential witnesses, and whether any have been convicted of crimes of dishonesty as defined by ER 609; and
- (7) Prosecution standards under RCW 9.94A.440.

If the judge is satisfied that probable cause exists, and factors (1) through (7) justify filing charges, and that the complaining witness is aware of the gravity of initiating a criminal complaint, of the necessity of a court appearance or appearances for himself or herself and witnesses, of the possible liability for false arrest and of the consequences of perjury, the judge may authorize the citizen to sign and file a complaint in the form prescribed in CrRLJ 2.1(a). The affidavit may be in substantially the following form &

The separation of powers doctrine is not expressly set forth in either the United States or Washington constitution, but is nonetheless considered a fundamental tenet of our political structure. *In re Juvenile Director*, 87 Wn.2d 232, 237-245, 552 P.2d 163 (1976) (lengthy historical discussion of separation of powers and checks and balances doctrines). The separation of powers doctrine has some different meanings depending upon context, but its core concern is with protecting the powers and duties of the three branches of government. Although some small overlap can occur without violating the doctrine, one branch of government can not assume or exercise the power or duties of another branch, nor act to deprive the others of their lawful powers. *Id.*; *State Bar Association v. State*, 125 Wn.2d 901, 907, 890 P.2d 1047 (1995); *State v. Blilie*, 132 Wn.2d 484, 939 P.2d 691 (1997).<sup>88</sup>

The criminal prosecution function is an executive branch responsibility. Both the county Prosecuting Attorney and the state Attorney General are executive officials. *See, e.g.*, Wash. Const. Art. III, §1 (Attorney General is member of executive branch); *State v. Campbell*, 103 Wn.2d 1, 25-26, 691 P.2d 929 (1984), *cert. denied*, 471 U.S. 1094, 105 S.Ct. 2169, 85 L.Ed.2d 526 (1985) (recognizing prosecuting attorney as executive branch official); *State ex rel. Schillberg v. Cascade District Court*, 94 Wn.2d 772, 781-782, 621 P.2d 115 (1980) (same); *State v. Thorne*, 129 Wn.2d 736, 762, 921 P.2d 514 (1996) (same). The courts, of course, are members of the judicial branch of government. Wash. Const. Art. IV, §1.

The decision to file or not file charges, or the number of such charges, is a matter left to the discretion of the prosecuting attorney. *State v. Ammons*, 105 Wn.2d 175, 713 P.2d 719, 718 P.2d 796, *cert. denied*, 479 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct. 398, 93 L.Ed.2d 351 (1986); *State v. Lewis*, 115 Wn.2d 294, 797 P.2d 1141 (1990). The prosecutor is given wide discretion since he must necessarily consider both the strength of the case and the public interest before making the charging decision. *Bordenkircher v. Hayes*, 434 U.S. 357, 54 L.Ed.2d 604, 98 S.Ct. 663 (1978); *State v. Judge*, 100 Wn.2d 706, 713, 675 P.2d 219 (1984).

The Constitution of this state authorized the Legislature to establish the powers and duties of the county prosecutor. Wash. Const. Art. XI § 5. It has responded by adopting chapter 36.27 RCW. One of the express duties imposed is to Prosecute *all* criminal and civil

<sup>88</sup> Court rulings, including the common law as well as court rules and regulations, are subject to constitutional challenges. *Gossett v. Farmer s Insurance*, 133 Wn.2d 954, 975, 948 P.2d 1264 (1997).

actions in which the state or county may be a party &. RCW 36.27.020(4) (emphasis added). No legislation has been found that grants any portion of that power to the judiciary or to a private citizen of this state.<sup>89</sup> The Legislature however has seen fit to authorize another executive branch officer, the Attorney General, to seek criminal prosecution in some instances. See RCW 43.10.232; RCW 10.01.190.

CrRLJ 2.1 violates the separation of powers doctrine on two levels. First, it appears that the judiciary, through its own rule, is taking on the executive function of filing and prosecuting criminal charges, or is asserting that it can delegate that authority to a private citizen, who may or may not even be an attorney. This is a clear invasion of executive authority. *State v. Lewis, supra*. The Legislature has not seen fit to give this power or oversight to the judicial branch. The judiciary can not assume this power on its own.

Second, if the rule is interpreted to mean that the court can order the prosecutor's office to act upon the newly filed charge, it fails since the court has not been granted such authority by the Legislature, nor does it have inherent authority to do so. *Westerman v. Cary*, 125 Wn.2d 277, 298, 885 P.2d 827 (1994); *Ladenburg v. Campbell*, 56 Wn.App. 701, 784 P.2d 1306 (Div. 2 1990) (district court judge had no power to appoint special prosecutor to handle case that prosecutor refused to proceed with). Indeed, since the power to initiate charges is exclusively an executive one, the courts simply could not claim such authority. *State v. Lewis, supra* (number and nature of charges left to the prosecuting attorney).

The policy argument that a judicial citizen review process is a necessary check on the prosecutor's powers is one which must be addressed to the Legislature, not the courts. See, e.g., *Waggoner v. Ace Hardware*, 134 Wn.2d 748, 755, 953 P.2d 88 (1998). To the extent such a check was seen as necessary, the Legislature has provided for the Attorney General to intervene in appropriate criminal cases. RCW 43.10.232. The Legislature has not seen fit to give the courts that power.<sup>90</sup>

CrRLJ 2.1(c) is a judicial usurpation of a legislative branch decision to delegate to the executive branch the power to decide who is or is not charged with violation of Washington's criminal laws. CrRLJ 2.1(c) violates the separation of powers doctrine, and accordingly is unconstitutional.

The court's usurpation of the charging power presents multiple problems in the Freeman context due to the fact that most citizen complainants will provide the court with a one-sided version of events and the citizen complainants, unlike a prosecuting attorney or an attorney general exercising prosecutorial functions, is not subject to RPC 3.8's duty of fairness to the potential defendant. The following procedure is designed to reduce the potential for harassment of innocent defendants until the constitutionality of CrRLJ 2.1(c) is fully established.

## Model Procedure

Prior to the Kitsap County District Court holding CrRLJ 2.1(c) unconstitutional, the court established the following procedure for dealing with applications for citizen complaints. This procedure allows for ample prosecutor input.

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<sup>89</sup> A territorial statute which survived until modern times authorized an indictment obtained by a private prosecutor and also made the complainant liable for costs if maliciously brought. See former RCW 10.28.160; repealed by c. 67, 1971 ex. Sess., §20. The only case construing that statute arose after a jury acquitted the defendant, assessed costs against the complaining witness, and then jailed him pending payment. *In re Permstick*, 3 Wash. 672, 29 Pac. 350 (1892).

<sup>90</sup> The Legislature knows how to do so when it desires, as can be seen in another statute dating from territorial days, RCW 10.16.110. There the Legislature empowered the superior court to direct a prosecutor to proceed with a case after an indictment has been returned by a grand jury if the court is not satisfied with the prosecutor's written reasons for refusing to prosecute. The Legislature has not seen fit to create a similar check on the prosecutor's decision not to file an information or complaint.

1. A court file is opened that bears the case name [Name], Complainant v. [Name(s)], Potential Defendant(s) and a special citizen complaint cause number is assigned.
2. A summons is sent to the complainant by the court staff for a hearing before an elected judge for the determination of probable cause. Notice of this hearing along with a copy of the application is sent to the county prosecuting attorney and, in appropriate cases, to any public servant who has been listed as a defendant in the application for citizen complaint.
3. At the hearing, the complainant is provided an opportunity to present the facts that will support the charge and reasons why the court should authorize a citizen complaint to be filed. Any potential defendant who wishes to speak to the court is given an opportunity to do so. Finally, the prosecutor's office is given an opportunity to address the adequacy of the showing and the seven factors contained in CrRLJ 2.1(c). Aside from lack of probable cause, the most common grounds for opposing the citizen complaint are: (1) prosecution is contrary to legislative intent, RCW 9.94A.440(1)(a); (2) antiquated statute, RCW 9.94A.440(1)(b); (3) improper motives of complainant, RCW 9.94A.440(1)(g); and (4) unconstitutionality of CrRLJ 2.1(c).
4. If the request for the filing of a citizen complaint is denied, a formal order with findings of fact and conclusions of law should be drafted by the prosecutor and entered. The court's findings should cover every element of crimes the Freeman may have committed in the filing of the citizen complaint (such as malicious prosecution and/or intimidating a judge or public servant). If the request is granted, a complaint will then be ordered to be filed. It is anticipated that such a complaint will be entitled State of Washington ex rel. [Name], Complainant v. [Name(s)], Defendant(s).

Who prosecutes a filed and authorized citizen complaint is far from clear. The ethical obligations of prosecutors may prevent the prosecutor from proceeding with the case if a conviction is unlikely or the prosecution is contrary to the office's standards. *See, e.g.,* RPC 3.8; 1 American Bar Association, *Standards for Criminal Justice* §§ 3.6, 3.7, 3.9 (2d ed. 1980). The citizen/victim may wish to further control the processing of the case and the ultimate sentencing recommendation, even though a victim's wishes, though relevant to a prosecution, is not dispositive. *See, e.g., State v. Garrison*, 71 Wn.2d 312, 315, 427 P.2d 1012 (1967) (the opinion of the victim of a crime regarding whether the defendant is guilty of the offense is irrelevant to the issue of whether there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict); *State v. Haga*, 8 Wn.App. 481, 491-92, 507 P.2d 159, *review denied*, 82 Wn.2d 1006 (1973) (same).

A citizen complaint is not required to be dismissed if the prosecutor does not agree to proceed, and the district court lacks the power to appoint a special attorney. *Ladenburg v. Campbell*, 56 Wn.App. 701, 784 P.2d 1306 (1990); *Eggan v. State*, 4 Wn.App. 384, 481 P.2d 571 (1971). The citizen complainant should, therefore, have to retain his or her own attorney. Public funds, of course, do not exist for such an appointment. *Cf.* Const. art. I, § 35 ( This provision shall not constitute a basis for providing a victim or the victim's representative with court appointed counsel ).

For further discussion on this issue, at least by analogy, *see Westerman v. Cary*, 125 Wn.2d 277, 892 P.2d 1067 (1994) (prosecutor's representation of two public bodies with directly adverse positions ruled a conflict necessitating appointment of a special prosecutor) and *Osborn v. Grant County*, 130 Wn.2d 615, 926 P.2d 911 (1996) (while prosecutor had conflict of interest in representing clerk in a position contrary to commissioners, prosecutor had no duty to bring litigation on behalf of county officer against the county; appointment of special prosecutor improper so superior court award of public monies for attorney's fees reversed).

## Post-District Court Review

At least one individual whose application for citizen complaint was denied has sought review of that decision by the superior court pursuant to a writ of error. The Kitsap County Prosecuting Attorney's Office takes the position that a criminal action is only begun by the actual filing of a complaint. Because the denial of an application for citizen complaint occurs prior to the actual initiation of a criminal proceeding, the case is civil in nature and the aggrieved person's ability to obtain a waiver of the filing fee and/or the preparation of the record is limited to the same degree as any other civil appellant.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> A full discussion of the law concerning indigent civil appeals is contained in the *Infraction* section of these materials, *supra*.

# COPING WITH FREEMEN DOCUMENTS

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The variety of documents that have been filed by Freeman in various state offices is staggering. A non-exhaustive list includes

In a felony theft prosecution: (1) a Part One Non-Statutory Abatement from the supreme Court, Kitsap county, Washington; (2) an Order to Quash and a Part Two Non-Statutory Abatement from the Supreme Court, Washington State Republic, Common Law Venue; (3) a notice of removal of action from the Supreme Court, Washington State Republic, Common Law Venue; and (4) a writ of habeas corpus from in the venue of the Kingdom Of God under the jurisdiction of God s Law, Kingdom Of The Lord Ecclesiastical Common Law Court, Ecclesiastical Court and common law Court with original and exclusive jurisdiction, our one supreme Court, Washington state republic, common law venue in and for the People of the Kingdom Of The Lord located as de jure Washington state republic, Kingdom of God.

A Distress (Bonded) which instructed the bank to distress All of the funds of the Lewis County Treasury, which are held in your case and custody and trust, until this Distress is satisfied.

In a felony theft prosecution: (1) a 31 page document entitled Constructive Notice of Non-Judicial/Pre-Judicial Commercial Process and Intent to File Security Instrument and Commercial/Common Law Lien that was recorded with the Kitsap County Records Department. The Freeman document sought \$7,914,100.00 from two superior court judges, the prosecuting attorney, a deputy prosecuting attorney, and a legal assistant for prosecuting the Freeman lien filer without a grand jury indictment, for causing the issuance of bench warrants, for compelling the defendant to submit samples of his handwriting, and for generally violating their oaths of office; and (2) UCC-2 Fixture Filings and Claims of Commercial Liens against the property of the prosecuting attorney, a deputy prosecuting attorney, and two superior court judges.

A Declaration of Independence which purportedly expatriated the declarant s res in trust to the foreign jurisdiction known as the municipal corporation of the District of Columbia & . This declaration was served by mail upon Ralph Munro, Christine Gregoire, Madeleine Albright, Janet Reno, Queen Elizabeth the Second, and Pope John Paul II. The declarant also paid \$297.06 to have published a legal notice of his Declaration of Independence in the legal newspaper for Thurston County.

A federal citizen complaint charging the prosecuting attorney and a deputy prosecuting attorney with numerous constitutional felonies and asking for an award of \$10,000.00 per count per defendant; received from a Freeman defendant in a misdemeanor barratry prosecution.

A public servant questionnaire that was directed to the sheriff and to various school district personnel after the individual received a written notice pursuant to RCW 28A.635 to stay off school property pending an investigation of an incident that occurred on school property.

An Official Act Reaffirmation of Oath of Office (Non-Statutory) and Private Security Agreement (To Protect and Affirm Unalienable Rights) requesting Kitsap Prosecutor Russell D. Hauge to re-affirm by way of a private security agreement that he will not allow other government officials to knowingly violate the Freeman s rights and to waive any rights of immunity from any civil or criminal prosecution brought by the Freeman to redress any grievances received in a civil infraction case.

A certification of administrative judgment that was recorded with the Kitsap County Records Department after the Kitsap County Clerk refused to accept the document in connection with a prosecution for failing to pay city taxes and for operating a business without a license. This document purported to be an affidavit from a Freeman acting as a Private Administrative Hearings Officer. This Freeman identifies himself as having been certified as qualified, effective 20 May, 1996, to be a

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Judicial Officer in and for STATE OF WASHINGTON by Barbara Durham, Chief Justice, Washington State Supreme Court, and Nancy [sic] McQueen, Administrator of the Courts of STATE OF WASHINGTON\* & \*In Resume: Qualified STATE OF WASHINGTON GR-8 Judicial Officer .<sup>92</sup> This judgment provided that the Freeman defendant had no further duty to attend proceedings in the municipal court and that the municipal court had no authority in law to compel the Freeman defendant s attendance because the Freeman defendant was not a named party to the municipal court action and the prosecutor stipulated to the loss of jurisdiction by not responding to the Freeman defendant s bill of particulars.

A demand for bill of particulars served directly upon law enforcement officers following a traffic stop in cases in which charges had not yet been filed.

These documents are frequently lengthy and often contain a glossary of terms. Careful attention must be paid to the definitions assigned to various words, because these definitions are frequently at odds with our legal system s understanding of the same term.

Each document must be carefully read. Often, buried in the document, will be a reference to the **public disclosure act** or the **freedom of information**. If these words appear, a prompt answer must be sent with a copy of the documents being requested that are in the possession of the office that received the document unless the requested document(s) is exempted from disclosure by RCW 42.17.310. The answer may properly request clarification of exactly what documents are being requested, so long as the clearly identifiable public documents are sent or made available for review.

The document(s) most frequently requested are copies of the oaths of office of the judges and/or prosecutors who have been involved in any manner with the Freeman. A lot of effort and time can be saved by collecting copies of every local judges and prosecutors oath in one place.

If a document has been recorded with the county auditor or recording officer, a decision must be made regarding whether a notice of invalidity should be filed or whether to proceed with a show cause procedure under Chapter 60.70 RCW. The cautious approach is to file a notice of invalidity with every document that names a public official or employee as a defendant or respondent regardless of whether the document uses the word lien or includes a money judgment.

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<sup>92</sup> General Rule 8 establishes a procedure for administering a qualifying examination for lay candidates for judicial office. These judicial officers are limited to practicing in district courts, municipal courts, police courts, and other courts that are inferior to the superior court, and as court commissioners and administrators. An individual who successfully passes the qualifying examination receives a certificate from the Chief Justice of the Washington Supreme Court and the Administrator of the Courts. A successful applicant may then be appointed or elected to certain courts.

GR 8 currently provides no mechanism for licensing such judges. The rule provides no mechanism for disciplining a successful test taker who uses the GR 8 label of approval improperly. An individual who successfully passes the test, but who is not appointed or elected to serve as a judicial officer in a Washington state court is not subject to regulation by the C.J.C.

Individuals who misuse the GR 8 label may be subject to criminal prosecution under a number of statutes, including RCW 9.12.010 (barratry); RCW 40.16.030 (offering false instrument for filing or recording); RCW 9.38.020 (false representation); and RCW 42.20.030 (intrusion into public office).

# CLEARING FREEMEN LIENS

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A lien is an encumbrance which one person places upon the property of another as security for some debt or charge. Rights to a lien on another's property are usually created by statute, through agreement of the parties, or through a court-imposed lien.

A common law lien is one granted under principles developed through judicial case law as distinguished from liens created by the agreement of the parties or by statute. The only common law lien which has been recognized in Washington pertains to personal property and requires that the one claiming the lien have independent and exclusive possession of the property. This type of common law mechanic's lien is issued in favor of persons who by their labor and skill have given additional value to the property in question. *See, e.g., Murray v. Eisenberg*, 29 Wn.App. 42, 627 P.2d 146 (1981) (involving asserted possessory lien upon aircraft for cost of repairs).

Freemen frequently file Common Law liens upon the property of public officials and employees because they are dissatisfied with public officials' or employees' decision. Freemen will also file Common Law liens upon the property of public officials and employees to secure the fines assessed by the Common Law courts for violations of a Freeman's Common Law rights.<sup>93</sup> A few examples of such filings include

A Freeman with the result of state and federal court proceedings, and with the disposition of a complaint before Judicial Conduct Commission, filed purported liens against six state court judges, two prosecuting attorneys and a deputy prosecuting attorney, a federal bankruptcy judge and the court bailiff and two former chairs of the Judicial Conduct Commission:

A Freeman who wanted certain legislation enacted filed liens against nine state senators;

A Freeman who received a speeding ticket filed liens against the state trooper who issued the speeding ticket and the district court judge who upheld the ticket;

Freemen who claimed eight statewide elected officials did not have a right to hold office filed liens against these officials and a number of state representatives and senators.

These non-consensual, Common Law liens create the potential for delays in conveyance of property unless they are stricken by a court order. Although these purported liens are invalid under the provisions of RCW 60.70.030 and the common law of Washington,<sup>94</sup> they can potentially cloud title to property if a title company posts the bogus lien. This can be particularly troublesome because the property owner may not discover that a purported lien has been filed until in the midst of a transaction involving the property.

A person may file a purported lien by simply taking a piece of paper to the recording officer and paying a nominal fee. While county auditors and recording officers are not required to accept such liens for filing,

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<sup>93</sup> The order issued by the Supreme Court, Washington State Republic, Common Law Venue in relationship with the theft prosecution of Veryl Edward Knowles provided in part that

It is further ordered that Sovereign Veryl Edward, Knowles, sui juris, shall be immediately released from the custody of SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON, COUNTY OF KITSAP, and KITSAP COUNTY JAIL;

It is further ordered that all private property taken from Sovereign Veryl Edward, Knowles, sui juris, be immediately returned to him;

It is further ordered that should SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON, COURT OF KITSAP, fail to comply with this order, the JUDGE who is served with this order and fails to comply, will be held in contempt of court and fined one hundred million dollars. Said fine shall be secured by consensual commercial lien upon all property of said JUDGE and payable to the damaged party, Sovereign Veryl Edward, Knowles, sui juris. Failure to comply with this order is consent to lien any and all property of said JUDGE.

*State v. Knowles*, Kitsap County Cause No. 96-1-00235-4, Ex. 5, at 1-2.

<sup>94</sup> *Shutt v. Moore*, 26 Wn.App. 450, 455-56, 613 P.2d 1188 (1980).

they do not have a duty to reject for filing or recording any claim of lien. County staff have indicated that the high volume of filings and the difficulty of ascertaining the legal basis for each filing makes it impossible to decline such filings.

Prior to 1995, once a purported lien was recorded, the document would remain on file as a possible cloud on the title of property until legal action was initiated seeking a court order striking the purported lien. While such an order was liberally given, the legal expenses incurred, the waste of limited judicial resources, the difficulty of locating the individual who filed the lien in order to effect personal service, and the disruption in the personal affairs of the public officials and employees led the Legislature to enact legislation to make it easier to remove the purported liens.

Laws of 1995, Ch. 19, which was codified in Chapter 60.70 RCW, changed existing law in the following way

RCW 60.70.010 was amended to make the definition of nonconsensual common law lien more accurate. The new definition makes clear that a nonconsensual common law lien is any lien that is: (1) not provided for by a specific statute; (2) does not depend upon the consent of the owner to the property affected for its existence; and (3) is not a court-imposed equitable or constructive lien.

RCW 60.70.010 was amended by the addition of definitions for the terms state or local official or employee and federal official or employee.

RCW 60.70.060 was adopted. This section provides an expedited, less expensive judicial procedure for removal of frivolous liens. The expedited procedure is available to any person who believes a claim of Common Law lien is invalid, regardless of whether he or she is a private citizen or public official or employee. The particular features of the expedited procedure include

An expedited show cause procedure that will allow a person whose property is subject to a claim of Common Law lien to have the validity of the lien determined by a court in a time frame as short as six days.

The court may allow for service by mail upon the person who filed the lien.

The filing fee for a petition to strike invalid liens is set at \$35.00.

The court must provide the prevailing party with costs and attorney's fees.

RCW 60.70.070 was adopted. This section clearly states that Washington law does not recognize any claim of lien against a federal, state, or local official or employee based on the performance or nonperformance of that official's or employee's duties, unless based on a specific court order or unless a specific statute authorizes the filing of such lien. This statement that such liens are not recognized will reduce the likelihood that a title company will give any credence to such liens.

A new subsection (3) was added to RCW 60.70.030 to provide that a notice of invalid lien may be filed with the appropriate recording office by an attorney who represents the governmental entity which employs the individual against whom a lien has been filed. The attorney who files the notice of invalid lien is required to mail a copy of the notice to the person who filed the lien to seek to establish the validity of the lien if he or she chooses to do so.

A sample notice of invalid lien and sample show cause forms prepared by the Attorney General's Office are contained in the Appendix, at 45-58.

# FINAL THOUGHTS ON OUR RESPONSES

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Dealing with Freeman has been frustrating at times, and our patience has frequently been exhausted. The following thoughts from David Neiwert should be considered by all public officials and employees

The spirit of respect has been notably absent from most discussions of the Patriots, in large part because the Patriots themselves are so openly contemptuous of everything outside their belief system that it is difficult not to respond in kind. The Movement challenges so many of Americans' everyday assumptions about the core foundations of society that it is often difficult to even begin to respond. But that response ultimately, to be effective, must reflect the very values the Patriots' beliefs most deeply corrode: a public discourse based on mutual respect; a sense of fair play and decency; and an appreciation of the value of community and cooperative action.

David Neiwert, *Ash on the Sills: The Significance of the Patriot Movement in America*, 58 Montana L. Rev. 19, 43 (1997).

The inflammatory nature of the Freeman's pleadings and arguments usually inspires one of two responses: an equally heated counterargument, or stony silence, neither of which is effective.

There is a third course: to respond with respect and courtesy, but firmly, with facts and reality. Point out that there is a legitimate, perfectly rational explanation for literally every piece of evidence the Patriots can produce for their theories that the government is part of a grand conspiracy to destroy the nation. Explain that the legal arguments they present for their constitutionalist beliefs have long been answered by real court rulings, many dating back to the Civil War, and that the web of pseudo-legal theory the Patriots espouse is a sham with no recognizable legitimacy, especially not in the body of law as practiced in America today.

*Id.* at 42.

# Appendix

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