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Petitioner

***Your County Court***

in re )

)

***Joe Sixpack***  )

) ***Case No. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_***

)

) )

) ***Supplementary Brief on***

)

) ***”Ratification” of***

)

) ***NON***-***Existent 14th***

)

) ***war*** “***amendment***”

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This Brief, which almost certainly will not, and cannot, be opposed, just like other Briefs presented by Petitioner, including ***Concurrent Jurisdiction, Admission of New States (SBANS)***, and ***Status and Standing*** lays siege, and draws direct attention to, many, if not all, of the violations of multiple provisions of the ***Constitution for the united States {1787-1791}*** establishing the unconstitutionality of the “ratification” of the ***NON***-existent 14th ***war*** “amendment”, a “novel” issue which certainly has ***NOT*** been ruled on by the supreme Court of the united States, which is thus ‘ripe’ for presentation and decision, most particularly by reason of the Court’s own sanctimoniously self promulgated “***Ashwander Doctrine***” for status and standing, found in the decision in ***Ashwander v TVA 297 US 288, 341***, Brandeis et all, JJ concurring, in which the Court opined, among other things, that:

***“The Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in the advance of the necessity of deciding it.”***

***“The Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.”***

Both ‘rules’ apply here since a) the “necessity”, as it were, ***has*** arisen and b) the challenges herein ***easily*** distinguish the instant case from any of a long, and apparently unbroken, line of decisions of the Court for at least 90 years, based on Section 1 of the ***NON***-existent 14th ***war*** “amendment” (***NEFWA***).

***Table of Contents***

***14th Amendment Unconstitutional 5***

***Post-Ratification Issues 12***

***Table of Authorities***

***Constitution for the united States {1787-1791}***

***Article I, Sections 9 &10 19***

***Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 5,12***

***Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 21***

***Article III, Section 2 20***

***Article IV, Section 3 10***

***Article IV, Section 4 22***

***Article V 14***

***9th & 10th Amendments 19***

***Federal Laws***

***8 USC 1401 7***

***26 USC 6305 15***

***26 USC 7408 18***

***42 USC 302(a)(8) 17***

***Civil “Rights” Act of 1866 13***

***Judiciary Act of 1789 20***

***Reconstruction Act of 1867 12***

***Decisional Case Law***

***Ashwander v TVA 297 US 288 2,11***

***Bank of Columbia v Okely 4 Wheat. 235 19***

***Blanton v Las Vegas 489 US 538 22***

***Brailsford v Georgia 2 Dallas 402 23***

***Brown v Mississippi 297 US 278 22***

***Burdine v Johnson 231 Fed. 3rd 950 23***

***Carmichael v South. Coal& Coke 295 US 495 16***

***Coleman v Thompson 501 US 722 23***

***Connecticut Ins. V Johnson 303 US 77 7-10***

***Enochs v Williams 370 US 1 17-18***

***Flemming v Nestor 363 US 603 17***

***Jones v US 137 US 202 15***

***Knowles, Ex Parte 5 Cal. 300 20***

***McCardle, Ex Parte 7 Wall. 506 14***

***McCleskey v Zant 499 US 467 23***

***McKane v Durston 153 US 684 23***

***Minor v Happersett 21 Wall. 162 20***

***Mooney v Holohan 294 US 103 23***

***Powell v McCormack 395 US 486 12***

***Scott v Sandford 19 Howard 393 5,20***

***Snyder v Massachusetts 291 US 97 22***

***Steward Machine v Davis 301 US 548 16***

***US v Lopez 514 US 549 19***

***Van Valkenberg v Brown 43 Cal. 43 20***

***Wickard v Filburn 317 US 111 19***

***Miscellaneous Authorities***

***Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 1859 5***

***The Critical Year: 1866 by Howard Beale 7-8***

***Debate on Civil Rights Act*** -- ***Reverdy Johnson 5-6***

***Federalist Papers No. 52 Madison 21***

***History of the 39th Congress -- William Barnes 11-12***

***Reconstruction & the Constitution John W. Burgess 11***

***Supreme Court in U. S. History Charles Warren 14*** ***14th Amendment Egregiously Unconstitutional***

With multiple ***clear and unambiguous*** violations of provisions of the ***Constitution for the united States {1787-1791}*** involved in the “ratification” process of the ***NON***-existent 14th ***war*** “amendment” (***NEFWA***), it is difficult to know where to start.

Taking them more or less in seriatim, we have:

1. ***Article I, Section 2, Clause 1***, which provides that:

“No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained the age of 25 years and have been seven years a ***citizen of the United States***, and who shall not, when elected, ***be an inhabitant of the State in which he shall be chosen***.”

The term “citizen of the United States”, one which has ***NOT*** been altered or amended, means now what it did pursuant to the ***original intent*** of the Framers of the Constitution, as set forth in “***Citizen***” in ***Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1859)*** and held by the supreme Court in ***Scott v Sandford 19 Howard 393***, excerpts as set forth in Petitioner’s Supplementary Brief on Status and Standing incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein (noting that ***Scott*** could ***NOT*** have possibly been “overruled“ by ***NEFWA***.

A more explicit, and more convincing statement on the origin of Citizenship comes from Senator Reverdy Johnson D-Maryland, who was considered one of the leading constitutional authorities of his day and was, indeed, on the winning side in the “infamous” ***Dred Scott*** decision, when he opined, in the debates on the Civil “rights” Bill of 1866, that:

“Now I did suppose and I shall continue to suppose, it to be clear, unless I am met with the almost paramount authority of the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, that citizenship, by way of birth, conferred on a party as far as he and the United States were concerned, is ***not*** a citizenship which entitles him to the privilege of citizenship within a State where he is born; if it be true, and I submit that it is true ***beyond all doubt***, that over the question of State Citizenship ***the authority of the State Government is paramount***.”

“Now the honorable member is confounding the status of a citizen of the United States with the status of a citizen of the United States who as such is a citizen of the State of his residence. Maintaining, as I do, that there is no authority to make anybody a citizen of the United States so as to convert him thereby into a citizen of the State, ***there is no authority in the Constitution for this particular bill***, which says that because he is a citizen of the United States he is to be considered as a citizen of any State in which he may happen to be at any time with reference to the rights conferred by this bill.”

“Mr. Justice Curtis held that the Constitution assumes that citizenship can be acquired by nativity. That is the common law, that is the law of the civilized world, that he who is born in a country and is not made a slave the moment he is born by any municipal regulations, becomes, by virtue of his birth, a citizen; ***but he by no means held that his being a citizen of the United States by virtue of his birth made him a citizen in any State of the United States***.”

“And my opinion is, that under the Constitution of the United States, every free person born on the soil of a State, ***who is a citizen of that State by the force of its Constitution or laws***, ***is also a citizen of the United States***.”

Mark the qualification. It is ***not*** nativity that imparts the character of citizenship alone. There ***must*** be added to the fact of nativity, the other fact, that at the time of his birth he is, ***by the laws of the State in which he is born, a citizen***; and the two things occurring, birth and citizenship, by the laws of the State, he becomes a citizen of the United States.”

“The Constitution, having recognized the rule that persons born within the several States are citizens of the United States, ***one*** of four things must be true.”

What are they ??

1. That the Constitution itself has described what native born persons shall or shall not be citizens of the United States; or,

2. That it has empowered Congress to do so; or,

3. That all free persons born within the several States, are citizens of the United States; or,

4. That it is left to each State to determine what free persons, born within its limits, shall be citizens of the State and ***thereby*** --

what I emphasize is italicized by the judge -- be citizens of the United States.”

Speech of Sen. Reverdy Johnson D-Md.

Citing Justice Curtis’ opinion in ***Dred Scott*** case

and supporting President Andrew Johnson’s veto of

The Civil Rights Act of 1866

***Congressional Globe*** 39th Congress @ pp 1776 !) et seq.

In contradistinction to this exalted membership in the sovereign body politic of the Nation & Republic, any and all “persons” who claim to be “citizens of the United States” as set forth in Section 1 of ***NEFWA*** and/or its statutory progeny at 8 USC 1401, have ‘accepted’, albeit ’courtesy’ of one or another ***fiction of law***, all of the following terms and conditions, to wit:

a. that they were born or naturalized in the “United States” and are “(completely) ***subject*** to the jurisdiction thereof“;

b. that they are, for all apparent intents and purposes, the equivalent of artificial, corporate creatures of the state who owe their ***privileged*** existence to one or another department of the ***de facto national socialist government (DNSG***), which corporate “citizenship” was the real goal, but ***hidden***, agenda of the ***secret*** Committee of 15 on Reconstruction – note the following excerpt from ***The Critical Year*** 1866, and ensuing excerpt from Justice Hugo Black’s cogent and compelling dissent in ***Connecticut Insurance v Johnson 303 US 77***:

“In arguing the case of ***Santa Clara County v SP Railroad*** in 1882, Roscoe Conkling (***Tammany Hall*** stooge and noted ‘radical republican’ -- ed), \*\*\* claimed that the amendment was intended to provide corporations with “congressional and administrative protection against invidious and discriminating state and local taxes … and oppressive and ruinous rules … applied under state laws“. \*\*\* In short, corporations were to be protected by Congress against regulation or interference by states. ***Open avowal of this motive would have defeated the amendment***.”

“Though they dared not attack him on this ground, the hatred of Andrew Johnson by Radical Congressmen, representing as they did the ***business interests thus to be protected***, was partly based upon his known opposition to their desire to raise business (/aka/ ***artificial, corporate entities***) ***ABOVE*** regulation by states, for the future of industrial America Johnson’s championship of ***public interest and the common man*** was ***far more dangerous*** than any Southern policy he might conceive.”

“***The Critical Year*** (1866)” page 218

“I do not believe that this California corporate franchise tax has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt to be in violation of the Federal Constitution, and I believe that the judgment of the Supreme Court of California should be affirmed. Traditionally states have been empowered to grant or deny foreign corporations the right to do business within their borders, and "may exclude them arbitrarily or impose such conditions as [they] will upon their engaging in business within [their] jurisdiction." \*\*\*\*

This Court has also frequently sustained the right of a state to impose conditions on foreign corporations in order to favor its own corporations. If a state did not have this privilege, it could not protect the domestic business of its own corporations from undesirable competition by foreign corporations. The state of California has the constitutional right to limit the privileges of its own corporations and to reserve the right to control their privileges and to define and limit their activities. [Footnote 7] If California has the lawful constitutional right (as this Court has many times said it has) to impose conditions upon foreign corporations so as to protect domestic corporations, its own elected legislative representatives should be the judges of what is reasonable and proper in a democracy.

With reference to a corporate tax imposed by the state of Louisiana, this Court has said:

"The appellants, by incorporating in some other state, or by spreading their business and activities over other states, cannot set at naught the public policy of Louisiana [California?]. . . . The policy Louisiana [California?] is free to adopt with respect to the business activities of her own citizens she may apply to the citizens of other states who conduct the same business within her borders, and this irrespective of whether the evils requiring regulation arise solely from operations in Louisiana [California?] or are in part the result of extrastate (?) transactions."

But it is contended that the due process clause of the 14th Amendment prohibits California from determining what terms and conditions should be imposed upon this Connecticut corporation to promote the welfare of the people of California.

***I do not believe the word "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment includes corporations***. "The doctrine of stare decisis, however appropriate and even necessary at times, has only a limited application in the field of constitutional law." This Court has many times changed its interpretations of the Constitution when the conclusion was reached that an improper construction had been adopted. Only recently, the case of West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, expressly overruled a previous interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment which had long blocked state minimum wage legislation. When a statute is declared by this Court to be unconstitutional, the decision, until reversed, stands as a barrier against the adoption of similar legislation. A constitutional interpretation that is wrong should not stand. I believe this Court should now overrule previous decisions which interpreted the 14th Amendment to include corporations.

***Neither the history nor the language of the Fourteenth Amendment justifies the belief that corporations are included within its protection***. The historical purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was clearly set forth when first considered by this Court in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, decided April, 1873 -- less than five years after the proclamation of its adoption. Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the Court, said:

"Among the first acts of legislation adopted by several of the States in the legislative bodies which claimed to be in their normal relations with the Federal government were laws which imposed upon the colored race onerous disabilities and burdens and curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty, and property to such an extent that their freedom was of little value, while they had lost the protection which they had received from their former owners from motives both of interest and humanity. . . ."

"These circumstances, whatever of ***falsehood or misconception*** may have been mingled with their presentation, forced . . . the conviction that something more was necessary in the way of constitutional protection to the unfortunate race who had suffered so much. [Congressional leaders] accordingly passed through Congress the proposition for the fourteenth amendment, and . . . declined to treat as restored to their full participation in the government of the Union the States which had been in insurrection until they ratified that article by a formal vote of their legislative bodies."

***Certainly, when the Fourteenth Amendment was submitted for approval, the people were not told that the states of the South were to be denied their normal relationship with the Federal Government unless they ratified an amendment granting new and revolutionary rights to corporations***. This Court, when the Slaughter House Cases were decided in 1873, ***had apparently discovered no such purpose***. The records of the time can be searched in vain for evidence that this amendment was adopted for the benefit of corporations.

It is true that, in 1882, twelve years after its adoption and ten years after the Slaughter House Cases, supra, an argument was made in this Court that a journal of the joint Congressional Committee which framed the amendment, ***secret and undisclosed up to that date***, indicated the committee's desire to protect corporations by the use of the word "person." Four years later, in 1886, this Court, in the case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U. S. 394, decided for the first time that the word "person" in the amendment did, in some instances, include corporations. A ***secret purpose*** on the part of the members of the committee, even if such be the fact, however, would not be sufficient to justify any such construction.

The history of the amendment proves that the people were told that its purpose was to protect weak and helpless human beings, and were not told that it was intended to remove corporations in any fashion from the control of state governments. The Fourteenth Amendment followed the freedom of a race from slavery. Justice Swayne said in the Slaughter Houses Cases, supra, that: "By any person' was meant all persons within the jurisdiction of the State. No distinction is intimated on account of race or color." Corporations have neither race nor color. He knew the amendment was intended to protect the life, liberty, and property of ***human beings***.”

c. that by ‘accepting’ this artificial, contrived “citizenship”, the victims now must bear the burden, which includes ***Section 4*** of ***NEFWA***, which provides, in ***relevant*** part here, that:

“The validity of the public debt of the United States, … ***authorized by law***, shall ***NOT*** be questioned”

(this has all the appearances of the infinitesimal ‘authority’ for the ***egregiously evil existence*** of the IRS, but no law school graduate attorneys are apparently willing (or able ?!?) to present such issues, and with the general population ***dramatically dumbed down*** by a ***mandatory*** public “education” system which does ***NOT*** have any ***meaningful*** and ***substantive*** curricula for the study of the Constitution, history and laws of the united States, questions like this have no ***known*** case law decisions, which situation finds a ‘convenient, albeit condescending, corollary in ‘Rule 1’ of the supreme Court‘s promiscuously promulgated “***Ashwander Doctrine***“ for status and standing -- see ***Ashwander,*** supra***;***

d. that the ‘acceptance’ of this ersatz “***shitizenship***” has the apparent effect of divesting those who ***were*** possessed of lawful de jure, jus sanguinis State Citizenship of their heritage and protections of their State Constitutions against usurpations by the ***DNSG***;

e. that the ‘acceptance’ of this ersatz “***shitizenship***” has the apparent effect of being a “***voluntary, knowing*** and ***intelligent***” waiver of State Citizenship and the Several States themselves, ***NOT*** limited to the “States then lately in Rebellion”, a situation dramatically underscored by the fact that ***NO*** department of the ***DNSG*** at any level, recognizes either State Citizenship or the existence of States admitted into “***this Union***”, a ***direct*** violation of ***at least Article IV, Section 3*** which simply cannot even be attempted to be ‘justified’ on any other grounds than the “ratification” of the ***NEFWA*** !

2. ***NO*** quorum in either House of the 39th Congress to propose ***NEFWA****.*

a. the ***treasonous*** record of the 39th Congress clearly shows that ***NONE*** of the lawfully elected Representative and/or appointed Senators from the “States then lately in Rebellion” were admitted to their seats, notwithstanding that President Andrew Johnson had, in his capacity as ***Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces***, declared the rebellion to be at an end, and lawful governments in operation in ***ALL*** such States -- see e.g. “***The History of the 39th Congress***” (1868 !) by William Barnes at ppg 15 et seq. and “***Reconstruction and the Constitution***” (1902) by John Burgess ppg 56 et seq.;

b. President Andrew Johnson had properly issued proclamations that with the cessation of hostilities, the Southern States had been restored to their rightful place in “***this Union“***; with the President having powers to declare such a cessation of hostilities, and the rehabilitation of the States, this was the end of the matter and binding on ***ALL*** other departments of government, since Congress has only the power to declare war, which appears ***NOT*** to have been formally done, and no active role in the termination of such events, save for an advisory power of the Senate to approve Treaties (although research has ***NOT*** disclosed any such Treaty with the ***CSA*** !);

c. accordingly, Speaker ***Shyster*** Colfax, other allied members of the Radical Republican 39th Congress and the clerk of the 39th Congress, acted ***absolutely without any authority*** when they denied seats to the Southern Representatives and Senators, with the only requirements for admission listed in ***Article I, Section 2, Cl. 1*** being age, residence (***domicile*** would have been a more accurate term) and citizenship – accord: ***Powell v McCormack 395 US 486***;

d. ergo, there was ***NO*** quorum to ***at least*** propose Amendments, since a 2/3 majority of each House is required to do so, for ***ALL*** members of Congress from the Southern States would certainly have voted against the 14th ***war*** “amendment”, with very probable support of the likes of Senators ***Thomas Hendricks*** of Indiana, ***Edgar Cowan*** of Pennsylvania, ***Willard Saulsbury*** of Delaware and ***Reverdy Johnson*** of Maryland, among others, thus defeating its proposal;

Of course even with the “successful” proposal of the “amendment” it was roundly defeated by the refusals of the lawful legislatures in the Southern States, the same ones which ***ratified*** the 13th Amendment, a ***clear and unambiguous*** recognition by Congress of the termination of the rebellion and restoration of lawful State governments as declared by President Andrew Johnson as ***Commander-in-Chief***.

As if this weren’t enough, New Jersey and Ohio, which had initially ratified the “amendment”, petitioned the then Secretary of State, the Honorable William H. Seward, to withdraw their ratifications when they discovered the ***fraud*** of the corporate “***shitizenship***” inherent in the “amendment”; sadly, alas, Seward dropped the ball by refusing to acknowledge these withdrawals, a matter upon which the Constitution is silent, but the law of frauds is ***NOT*** silent !

And this is assuming arguendo that the 14th ***war*** “amendment” could have been ratified by legislatures, which are composed of mere agents/trustees of “***We the People***”; with an amendment which ***should have been clearly stated*** to have the intent to destroy both the Several States and State Citizenship, both of which can be clearly inferred by the decisions of the supreme Court in construing the “amendment”, only the members of the sovereign body politic of the Nation & Republic /aka/ “***Our*** posterity /aka/ ***Beneficiaries*** of the Trust known as “The United States” would have had the power to ratify the “amendment” in conventions in the States in accordance with ***Art. V***.

Of course these ***clear and unambiguous*** violations of at least ***Article V*** of the ***Constitution for the united States {1787-1791}***, not to mention the ***cardinal*** precept of the American Revolution to secure a government based on the “***CONSENT of the governed***” leave ***NO*** doubt about the status of ***NEFWA*** !

e. while more problematic, the “enactments” of such purported laws as the Civil “Rights” Act of 1866, 14 Statutes 27 and the Reconstruction Act of 1867, 14 Statutes 428, would have been unlikely and almost certainly ***NOT*** have survived President Johnson’s ***cogent, compelling*** and ***patriotic*** vetoes, would never have become law, and remain wide open to challenge based on the ***patently false*** contention of Congress that there were no lawful governments in the Southern States (indeed, the Reconstruction Act was ***HELD*** unconstitutional by the supreme Court in ***Ex Parte McCardle 7 Wall. 506***, but the Justices were ***NOT*** permitted to announce their decision pursuant to an “emergency” Act by the 39th Congress removing the ***appellate*** jurisdiction of the Court -- accord “***The Supreme Court in United States History***”, Vol. 2 ppg 480-482 (1926) by Charles Warren;

***Post “ratification” issues of Constitutional Law***

We begin with the premise that any consequences of ***NEFWA***, whether intended or otherwise, accrued immediately upon the declaration of the ratification of the “amendment”, in which case ***ALL*** of the following are true, to wit:

1. That ***ALL*** of the Several States which were admitted into “***this Union***” were, for all apparent intents and purposes, “legislated” ***OUT*** of existence and relegated to some lesser political status, maybe ***federal*** (***insular*** ?) ***territorial*** possessions, or “appurtenant” to the United States (***Jones v US 137 US 202***);

2. That the same applies to the status of lawful, de jure, ***jus sanguinis*** State Citizenship, the principal, if not ***SOLE***, way to acquire united States Citizenship as set forth in the accompanying and/or available Briefs on Admission of New States and Status -- see excerpts from speech of Reverdy Johnson, supra;

3. That the ***DNSG*** sprang into existence, albeit in nascent form, at the same time, with the power to create “state citizens”, which included freedmen ***AND*** artificial, corporate entities, dictating to the ‘states’ who would comprise their “citizens”, ***ALL*** of whom were ***exclusively***, “***subject*** to the jurisdiction of the United States“;

4. That there is ***NO*** way for any of the Stated admitted into “***this Union***” can remain in existence, stripped of even the right to identify the members making up the sovereign body politic of the State ***AND*** being forced to accept “United States citizens” who are ***subject*** to the ***exclusive*** jurisdiction of the Trust known as “the United States”;

5. That all agents of the ***DNSG***, in every department and at every level, ***whether knowingly or not***, were ***immediately*** divested of ***ANY*** status to hold ***ANY*** position of ***honor***, profit and ***trust*** in the organic ***federative, republican*** form of government of ***defined and limited powers***, as ordained and established by “***We the People***” in the ***Constitution for the united States {1787-1791}***, for the purpose of “securing the blessings of liberty to ourselves and ***Our*** posterity”;

6. Such agents have, for all apparent intents and purposes, made a “voluntary, knowing and intelligent” waiver of State Citizenship, at least to those who would otherwise have qualified for it; instead they have chosen to aid and abet those whose goal is the usurpation of the ***Constitution for the united States {1787-1791}*** and the overthrow of the lawful government of the united States, both of which acts are ***treason*** to the Constitution;

7. That all of these facts are true a fortiori since the “enactment” of the Social (in)Security Act of 1935 and the ***serpentine***, ***secret*** agenda of this plainly unconstitutional act (notwithstanding the ***apparent*** approval of the supreme Court in ***Carmichael v Southern Coal & Coke 301 US 495*** and ***Steward Machine v Davis 301 US 548*** in these 5-4 decisions, noting carefully the dissent of the “***Four Horsemen***” discussing the some of the real issues of constitutional law arising in these cases, and the fact that the decisions should be viewed in the context of ***at least*** the disqualification of the supporting votes of Brandeis and Cardozo, Jews, whose “***shitizenship***”, emanating from Section 1 of ***NEFWA***, was as ***NON***-existent as the “amendment” itself, making the vote ***at least*** 4-3 ***against*** the Act);

8. And even assuming arguendo that the decisions could somehow be sustained, yet the ***hidden*** protocols of the Social (in)Security Act, including the following examples of legislative legerdemain, ***NONE*** of which were made known to the “applicant for benefits” at any time in the process can, and would, defeat the Act when “properly” presented to the Court:

a. that the application for “benefits” is 100% ***VOLUNTARY*** (see e.g. 42 USC 302(a)(8) -- no ***known***, relevant case law decisions!

b. that the supreme Court has held that ‘there are no rights cognizable to the Constitution pursuant to the receipt of “benefits”’ (***Flemming v Nestor 363 US 603, 609-10***);

c. that the application for “benefits” is, for all apparent intents and purposes, a “***voluntary, knowing and intelligent***” waiver of several rights secured by the Constitution, including:

1. The right to challenge the assessment and/or collection of taxes in any Article I or Article III court (26 USC 6305(b), a statute which to date, also does ***NOT*** have any ***known***, ***relevant*** case law decisions ?!?)

2. The application process, by some or another ***unknown*** magical power (of which Erich Weiss would no doubt be ***green*** with envy !), makes the applicant a “taxpayer”, an astoundingly ***egregiously evil*** reduction in status which:

a. even the IRS concedes that ‘the Service’s determination that you are a person (“person”), albeit the equivalent of “taxpayer”, required to file a W-4 is ***NOT*** “memorialized in documentary form” (?!?)’ (***Exhibit A***), making one wonder how a prima facie case can be made against an Accused even assuming arguendo that a trial “court” would have jurisdiction in any criminal or civil, case !

b. that the residence of a “taxpayer” can be ‘found’. for all jurisdictional purposes, in the ***District of Columbia*** (26 USC 7408(d), yet another statute without any ***known***, ***relevant*** case law decisions !

c. that a “taxpayer” has a ***ZERO*** (?!?) interest in his time and labor, let alone his ***LIFE***, a ***very*** strong indication that a “taxpayer” is, for all apparent intents and purposes, an artificial, corporate entity /aka/ ***SLAVE***;

d. that the supreme Court has ***held*** that a “taxpayer” can be taxed ***OUT*** of existence without any apparent need for even an ***administrative*** hearing (***Enochs v Williams 370 US 1***, a decision which would have been written by Warren E. ***~~Bastard~~*** Burger had he been on the Court at the time), let alone the ***judicial*** process and ***trial by Jury*** according to the course of the common law, a right secured to Englishmen for 800 years by the Magna Charta, which effectively legislates ***OUT*** of existence ***at least Article I, Sections 9 & 10*** of, and the ***9th & 10th Articles of Amendment*** to, the ***Constitution for the united States {1787-1791}***;

e. that the application for “benefits”, quite possibly in concert with the provision in ***Section 4*** of ***NEFWA*** which provides that:

“The validity of the public debt of the United States … authorized by law, shall ***NOT*** be questioned” (26 USC 6305 ??)

evidently makes the applicant a “hypothecator of goods and a ***stipulator in the admiralty***” (***Bank of Columbia v Okely 4 Wheat. 235***); if so, this easily accounts for the ***egregiously evil*** ***exponential*** expansion of Congress’ commerce clause powers, to the point today that taking a crap in a “***government funded bathroom***” (?!?) affects interstate commerce (see e.g. ***Wickard v Filburn 317 US 111; U.S. v Lopez 514 US 549***, noting ***carefully*** the concurring opinions of Justices Thomas & O’Connor);

f. that yet another presumption of ‘facts ***NOT*** in evidence’ occurs in that the applicant also becomes a “person” who “owes his birthright ***shitizenship***” to Sec. 1 of ***NEFWA***, a “citizenship” which even ***if*** it validly exists, reverses the relationship of State Citizens (see e.g. ***Scott v Sandford 19 How. 393; Minor v Happersett 21 Wall. 162, Van Valkenburg v Brown 43 Cal. 43, Ex Parte Knowles 5 Cal. 300, Article II, Section 1*** of the ***California Constitution (1849)***) ***from*** a member of the sovereign body politic of the Nation & Republic /aka/ ***Beneficiary*** of the Trust known as “The United States” /aka/ ***Principal*** and agent, ***to*** ***Guardian*** and ***ward*** /aka/ ***Master*** and ***slave***, just as is true in any collectivist, ***altruistic*** government “worthy” of the name;

g. and all of this, individually or in concert, provides cogent and compelling support for the contention that even ***IF***, somehow, the Several States admitted into “***this Union***” (up through the admission of Minnesota in 1859), still exist, that their Courts have ***NO*** jurisdiction over any of their purported citizens, since State Courts are ***flatly prohibited*** from exercising admiralty jurisdiction, a “jurisdiction ***foreign*** to our Constitution and ***unacknowledged*** by our laws” (***Article III, Sec. 2;***

***h. Section 9*** of the ***Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Statutes at Large 73*** et seq.), the abuse of which by King George III was, after all, a ***principal*** cause of the American Revolution;

9. That the Several States, having been relegated to some or another lesser political status, are now in a condition in which the officers of such government are ***required***, at least in the absence of any territorial elections enacted by Congress, to be appointed by the President or, in the alternative, a territorial governor appointed by the President (***Article II, Sec. 2, Para. 2***) yet ***NONE*** of this has happened;

10. And this situation is further exacerbated by the fact that ***WITHOUT*** any of the Several States remaining, it is impossible for the President to be elected at all, since the appointment of Presidential Electors is a matter left ***SOLELY*** in the hands of State legislatures, which ***NO LONGER*** exist; accordingly ***NO*** Electors = ***NO*** Electoral College = ***NO*** Election = ***NO*** President (accord: ***Federalist Papers No. 52*** by ***James Madison***);

11. And there is ***NO*** provision of the ***Constitution for the united States {1787-1791}*** which provides for any ***voting*** representatives in the House, or for ***ANY*** Senators at all from territorial possessions; where then, can we find anything ***REMOTELY*** ***resembling*** a quorum to do business in Congress ??

12. Even the vitality of the supreme Court, the only Court ***specifically*** provided for in the Constitution, is wide open to challenge pursuant to the vacancy in the Office of President and the nullities on Capitol Hill as hereinabove set forth;

13. Indeed, it can be cogently and compellingly argued that an intellectual vacuum has existed at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue for some time, especially considering, with few exceptions, the long train of ***servile serpentine, sphincteresque shysters*** who have resided therein, in Petitioner’s view, extending back to March 4th, ***1869***;

14. ***Republican*** form of government ***supposedly*** secured by ***Article IV, Section 4***, not to mention the ***federative, republican*** form of government of ***defined and limited*** powers ordained and established by the ***Constitution for the united States {1787-1791}*** ?? Fugeddaboutit, as ***ALL*** departments of the ***DNSG*** at any and all levels are controlled ‘behind the curtain’ by the usurpers at 120 Broadway, NY, NY (where is ***Toto*** when you need him ?), and their ***sycophantic, sphincteresque satraps*** in ‘state’ ***BAR*** ***ASS***ociations who do their bidding, and who are usually the ***ONLY*** “persons” qualified to hold certain positions in the ***DNSG*** (“judge“; County Counsel; District Attorney, (territorial) Attorney General, yada, yada, yada.

15. Right to trial by Jury ?? The supreme Court has ***held*** that “persons” who “owe their birthright ***shitizenship***” to Section 1 of the ***NEFWA*** do ***NOT*** have any right to trial by Jury in ***at least*** a criminal misdemeanor case (***Blanton v Las Vegas 489 US 538***), and perhaps not in a Capital case, either (***Brown v Mississippi 297 US 278; Snyder v Massachusetts 291 US 97***), although this question has not been “squarely” before the Court;

16. And even if one presents his case to a Jury, the jurors, who will ***NOT*** in any event, be peers of a lawful de jure, ***jus sanguinis*** State Citizen, will be instructed by a “judge” to obey their oaths (?!?) and accept the law from the “judge”, a striking, not to mention ***irreconcilable*** and ***unjustifiable*** departure from the trial by Jury according to the course of the common law, where Jurors have the power to rule on the facts ***and the law*** (accord: ***Brailsford v Georgia 2 Dallas 402***), which all but assures that the victim, er Accused, will suffer a ***Directed Verdict of Guilt***; @@

17. And then in seeking an appellate “remedy”, the victim will discover that the supreme Court has ***held*** that there is ***NO*** right to an appeal in ***ANY*** criminal case (***McKane v Durston 153 US 684***), that ***ACTUAL*** innocence (!) is ***NOT*** grounds for the issuance of a statutory Writ of Habeas Corpus (***Mooney v Holohan 294 US 103, Coleman v Thompson 501 US 722, McCleskey v Zant 499 US 467***) and that all errors committed in the trial “court” are “***harmless***” (?!?) errors, including defense (??) counsel ***SLEEPING*** through large parts of a ***capital*** case where the ***DEATH*** penalty was imposed (***Burdine v Johnson 231 Fed. 3rd 950***, for which a “judge” and/or prosecutor has qualified, if not ***absolute***, “judicial” immunity), except, perhaps (!) ***ineffective*** assistance of counsel, ***carefully*** noting here that licensed attorneys, all of whom are ‘state’ ***BAR*** ***ASS***ociation members, have ***NOT*** been appointed by the President and have ***irreconcilable conflicts of interest*** with members of the sovereign body politic of the Nation and Republic, including that ***THEY*** (!) are thus ’practicing law without a license” !

18. And then the victim might well want to know that there is ***NO*** right to (***effective*** ?) assistance of counsel since this “right” is inherently linked to Section 1 of ***NEFWA*** and/or not otherwise available since an attorney is an officer of the “court“ whose ***GENERAL*** appearance “***stipulates***” to the jurisdiction of the “court“ which it could get in ***NO*** other way !!

19. As if this isn’t enough, there is ***NO*** way that the ‘right’ to (***effective*** ?) assistance of counsel can be invoked, since many of the ***structural***, ***jurisdictional*** issues the Accused wishes to present, and has a ***right*** to present will present ***irreconcilable conflicts of interest*** for an attorney, who may or may not understand the issues, which, in any event, challenge, ***directly***, or otherwise, the ***malignant, malevolent monopoly*** on the “practice of law” held by ‘state’ ***BAR*** ***ASS***ociations, this in front of a ***purportedly*** neutral “judge” who is himself a member of the ‘state’ BAR - can you say ***irreconcilable*** conflict of interest !

20. And we haven’t even discussed perhaps the principal ***irreconcilable conflict of interest***, which includes ***ALL*** actors in a “trial”, including Jurors, have ‘agreed’, ***whether knowingly or not***, that they “owe their citizenship” to Section 1 of ***NEFWA***; this being so, the success on the merits of most, if not ***ALL***, of Petitioner’s ***unopposed*** issues will result in the restoration of lawful, de jure, ***jus sanguinis*** State Citizen, and the ***termination*** of ersatz 14th ***war*** amendment ***shitizenship***”, thus leaving the claimants of such “citizenship” reduced to, at best, the status of ***statelessness***, if not an ***undocumented*** (“***enemy***” ?) ***alien***;

21. Now how strong is the “quorum” issue ?? Think about it -- if there were no quorum, let alone any members of Congress possessing the ***requirements*** to hold offices of ***honor***, profit and ***trust*** in government, then ***ANY*** “act of Congress”, such as the Federal Reserve Act, Social (in)Security Act, FRCP, ‘fill in the blank Act’, is ***facially*** unconstitutional, thus killing 2 birds with 1 stone, since this destroys the ‘convenient’ dodge engaged in by “judges”, to continue to evade doing their ***constitutionally mandated*** job, that there is a presumption of constitutionality of a statute which a Petitioner must overcome, which is virtually impossible to do, most particularly in the context of civil “rights” !

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Joe Sixpack/Petitioner

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