Citations Supportive of Accusations of a Massive Conspiracy to Commit Treason in the U.S.A.

This document is presently "Not Complete";
but it is presently of sufficient detail in order that it's basic purpose may be achieved;
& the editors involved in it's composition expect it top issue in a more completed version soon.
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Citations Group 1: (from page 4)

U.S. Senate Report No. 93.549; Emergency Powers Statutes;
A Brief Historical Sketch of the Origins of Emergency Powers Now in Force; November 19, 1973.

"A majority of the people of the United States have lived all of their lives under emergency rule. For 40 years, freedoms and governmental procedures guaranteed by the Constitution have, in varying degrees, been abridged by laws brought into force by states of national emergency. The problem of how a constitutional democracy reacts to great crisis, however, far antedates the Great Depression. As a philosophical issue, its origins reach back to the Greek city-states and the Roman Republic. And, in the United States, actions taken by the Government in times of great crisis have - from, at least, the Civil War - in important ways shaped the present phenomenon of a permanent state of national emergency.

American political theory of emergency government was derived from John Locke, the English-political-philosopher whose thought influenced the authors of the Constitution. Locke argued that the threat of national crisis - unforseen, sudden, and potentially catastrophic - required the creation of broad executive emergency powers to be exercised by the Chief Executive in situations where the legislative authority had not provided a means or procedure of remedy. Referring to emergency power in the 14th chapter of his Second Treatise on Civil Government as "prerogative", Locke suggested that it: '… should be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power ... since in some governments the lawmaking power is not always in being and is usually too numerous and too slow for the dispatch requisite to executions, and because, also it is impossible to foresee and so by laws to provide for all accidents and necessities that may concern the public, or make such laws as will do no harm, if they are executed with an inflexible rigour on all occasions and upon all persons that may come in their way, therefore there is a latitude left to the executive power to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe. …'"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Report_93-549
http://www.ncrepublic.org/images/lib/SenateReport93_549.pdf
http://barefootsworld.net/war_ep1.html

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Citations Group 2: (from page 5)

"... Nor do I find the wisdom, foresight, and sense of justice exhibited by the framers particularly profound. To the contrary, the government they devised was defective from the start ... . Moral principles against slavery, for those who had them, were compromised, with no explanation of the conflicting principles for which the American Revolutionary War had ostensibly been fought: the self-evident truths "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness." It was not the first such compromise. Even these ringing phrases from the Declaration of Independence are filled with irony, for an early draft of what became that Declaration assailed the King of England for suppressing legislative attempts to end the slave trade and for encouraging slave rebellions. The final draft adopted in 1776 did not contain this criticism. And so again at the Constitutional Convention eloquent objections to the institution of slavery went unheeded ..."

US Supreme Court Judge Thurgood Marshal.
https://get.courtroom5.com/the-two-constitutions-of-thurgood-marshall/

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Citations Group 3: (from page 7)
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th edition:

Provisional Government: One temporarily established in anticipation of and to exist and continue until another more regular or permanent shall be organized and instituted in its stead.

Provisional: Temporary; preliminary; tentative; taken or done by way of precaution or ad interm.

Provisional Remedy: A remedy provided for present need or for the immediate occasion; one adapted to meet a particular emergency. Particularly, a temporary process available to plaintiff in a civil action, secures him against loss, irreparable injury, dissipation, of the property, etc., while the action is pending. Such include the remedies of injunction, appointment of a receiver, attachment, or arrest.

National Emergency: A state of national crisis; a situation demanding immediate and extraordinary national or federal action. Congress has made little or no distinction between a state of national emergency and a state of war. Brown v. Bernstein/ D.C. Pa. 49 F.Supp. 728, 732.

Provisional Court: A federal court with jurisdiction and powers governed by the order from which it derives its authority. A provisional court established in conquered or occupied territory by military authorities, or the provisional government, is a federal court deriving its existence and all its powers from the federal government.

Provost-Marshal: In military law, the officer acting as the head of the military police of any post, camp, city or other place of military occupation, or district under the reign of martial law. He or his assistant may, at any time, arrest and detain for trial, persons subject to military law
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committing offenses, and may carry into execution any punishments to be inflicted in pursuance of court martial.

Provoke: To excite; to stimulate; to arouse. To irritate, or enrage.

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Citations Group 4: (from page 7)

Presumption of Law … : Presumption of law means a legal presumption that a court is required to arrive at if certain facts are established and no contradictory evidence is produced. … It is a uniform, constant rule, with conditions fixed and unvarying. The policy of the law attaches a presumption of law to all men generally. By presumption of law, a criminal defendant is considered innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is also called as legal presumption, artificial presumption, praesumptio juris.

https://definitions.uslegal.com/p/presumption-of-law/

Presumption of Law: a presumption based upon a policy of law or a general rule and not upon the facts or evidence in an individual case.

https://www.dictionary.com/browse/presumption-of-law

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Black's Law Dictionary, 5th edition:

Presumption: A legal inference that must be made in light of certain facts. Most presumptions are rebuttable, meaning that they are rejected if proven to be false or at least thrown into sufficient doubt by the evidence. Other presumptions are conclusive, meaning that they must be accepted to be true without any opportunity for rebuttal.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/presumption

Presumption: n. A rule of law which permits a court to assume a fact is true until such time as there is a preponderance (greater weight) of evidence which disproves or outweighs (rebuts) the presumption. Each presumption is based upon a particular set of apparent facts paired with established laws, logic, reasoning or individual rights. A presumption is rebuttable in that it can be refuted by factual evidence. … https://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=1592

Presumption: In the law of evidence, a presumption of a particular fact can be made without the aid of proof in some situations. The invocation of a presumption shifts the burden of proof from one party to the opposing party in a court trial.

There are two types of presumption: rebuttable presumption and conclusive presumption. A rebuttable presumption is assumed true until a person proves otherwise (for example the presumption of innocence). In contrast, a conclusive (or irrebuttable) presumption cannot be refuted in any case. Presumptions are sometimes categorized into two types: presumptions without basic facts, and presumptions with basic facts. In the United States, mandatory presumptions are impermissible in criminal cases, but permissible presumptions are allowed.

An example of presumption without basic facts is presumption of innocence. An example of presumption with basic facts is Declared death in absentia, e.g., the law says if a person has been missing for seven years or more (basic fact), that person is presumed dead.

History: The ancient Jewish law code, the Talmud, included reasoning from presumptions (hazakah), propositions taken to be true unless there was reason to believe otherwise, such as "One does not ordinarily pay a debt before term." The same concept was found in ancient Roman law, … Medieval Roman and canon law graded presumptions according to strength: light, medium or probable, and violent. These gradings and many individual presumptions were taken over into English law in the seventeenth century … .

Specific Presumptions: … The presumption of mailing presumes that a properly addressed letter delivered to the post office or a common carrier was in fact delivered and received by the addressee. The presumption of fraud or undue influence arises where a person in a position of trust over another, such as a guardian or the holder of a power of attorney applies the other person's assets to his or her own benefit. The presumption of validity is another way of expressing a burden of proof: the official acts of courts are presumed valid, and those who would challenge them must overcome this presumption. This is also termed the presumption of regularity. … In the law of the United States, the presumption of constitutionality presumes that all statutes are drafted in accordance with Federal and state constitutional requirements. The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of proof, and any doubts are resolved against that party. If there are two reasonable interpretations of a statute, one of which is constitutional and the other not, the courts choose the path that permits upholding the statute.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presumption

Due Process of Law: Law in its regular course of administration through courts of justice. … A course of legal proceedings according to those rules and principles which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence for the enforcement and protection of private rights. To give such proceedings any validity there must be a tribunal competent by its constitution - that is by the law of its creation - to pass upon the subject matter of the suit … . If any question of fact or liability be conclusively presumed against him, this is not due process of law. …

In Propria Persona: In one's own proper person. It was formerly a rule of pleading that pleas to the jurisdiction of the court must be plead *in propria persona*, because if pleaded by attorney they admit the jurisdiction, as an attorney is an officer of the court, and he is presumed to plead after having obtained leave, which admits the jurisdiction.

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Citations Group 5: (from page 8)
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th edition:

Legal Fiction: Assumption of fact made by a court as basis for deciding a legal question. A situation contrived by the law to prmit a court to dispose of a matter, ...

Fiction of Law: An assumption or supposition of law that something which is or may be false is true, or that a state of facts exists which has never really taken place. An assumption, for purposes of justice, of a fact which does not or may not exist. A rule of law which assumes as true, and will not allow to be disproved, something which is false, … . … Presumption
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distinguished: Fictions are to be distinguished from presumptions of law. By the former, something known to be false or unreal is assumed as true; by the latter, an inference is set up, which may be and probably is true, but which, at any rate, the law will not permit to be controverted. It may also be said that a presumption is a rule … prescribed for the purpose of getting at a certain conclusion, though arbitrary, where the subject is intrinsically liable to doubt from remoteness, discrepancy, or actual defect of proofs. (See "Legal Fiction")

Fictitious: ... pretended, counterfeit. Feigned, imaginary, not real, false, not genuine, nonexistant. Arbitrarily invented and set up to accomplish an ulterior object.

Fictitious Plaintiff: A person appearing in the writ, complaint, or record as the plaintiff in a suit, but who in reality does not exist, or who is ignorant of the suit and of the use of his name in it. It is a contempt of court to sue in the name of a fictitous party.

Legal Fraud: Contracts or acts as, though not originating in actual evil design to perpetuate fraud, yet by their tendency to mislead others or to violate confidence, are prohibited by law. … Breach of duty which has tendency to deceive others and operates to their injury, even though there be no vicious intent. … Misrepresentation of a material fact made willfully to deceive, or recklessly without knowledge, and acted upon by the opposing party to his damages constitutes "legal fraud".

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Citations Group 6: (from page 8)
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th edition:

Police Power: Authority conferred by the American constitutional system in the Tenth Amendment, U.S. Const., upon the individual states, and, in turn, delegated to local governments, through which they are enabled to establish a special department of police; adopt such laws and regulations as tend to prevent the commission of fraud and crime, and secure generally the comfort, safety, morals, health, and prosperity of its citizens by preserving the public order, preventing a conflict of rights in the common intercourse of the citizens, and insuring to each an uninterrupted enjoyment of all of the privileges conferred upon him or her by the general laws. The power of the State to place restraints on the personal freedom and property rights of persons for the protection of the public safety, health, and morals; or the promotion of the public convenience and general prosperity.

The police power is subject to limitations of the federal and State Constitutions, and especially to the requirement of Due Process. Police power is the exercise of the sovereign right of a government to promote order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare, within constitutional limits; and is an essential attribute of government.

Police: Branch of government which is charged with preservation of public order and tranquility, the promotion of public health, safety, and morals, and the prevention, detection and punishment of crimes. See also: Internal Police; Peace (Peace Officers); Sheriff.
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Police Justice: A magistrate charged exclusively with the duties incident to with common law office of a conservator or justice of the peace; the prefix "police" serving to distinguish them from justices having also civil jurisdiction.

Police Magistrate: An inferior judicial officer having jurisdiction of minor criminal offences, breaches of police regulations, and the like; so called to distinguish them from magistrates who have jurisdiction in civil also, as justices of the peace.

Police Officer: One of the staff of men employed in cities and towns to enforce the municipal laws and ordinances for preserving the peace, safety, and good order of the community.
Also called "policeman" or "policewoman"; "patrolman" or "patrolwoman".

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Citations Group 7: (from page 8)
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th edition:

Government de facto: A government of fact. A government actually exercising power and control, as opposed to the true and lawful government; a government not established according to the constitution of the nation, or not lawfully entitled to recognition or supremacy, but which has never the less supplanted or displaced the government de jure.

A government deemed unlawful or deemed wrongful or unjust, which, nevertheless, receives presently habitual obedience from the bulk of the community.

There are several degrees of what is called de facto government. Such a government, in its highest degree, assumes a character very closely resembling that of a lawful government. This is when the usurping government expels the regular authorities from their customary seats and functions, and establishes itself in their place, and so becomes the actual government of a country.

… Such a government might be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force, being maintained by active military power against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and obeyed in civil matters by private citizens. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be administered, also, by civil authority, supported more or less by military force.

De facto government: One that maintains itself by a display of force against the will of the rightful legal government and is successful, at least temporarily, in overturning the institutions of the rightful legal government by setting up its own in lieu thereof.

De facto officer: One who, while in actual possession of an office, is not holding such in a manner prescribed by law.

Court: De facto Court: … a court acting under the authority of a *de facto* government.

De facto: In fact, in deed, actually. This phrase is used to characterize an officer, a government, a past action, or a state of affairs which must be accepted for all practical purposes, but is illegal or illegitimate. Thus an office, position or status existing under a claim or color of
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right such as a de facto corporation. In this sense, it is the contrary of de jure, which means rightful, legitimate, just or constitutional. Thus an officer, king, or government de facto is one who is in actual possession of the office or supreme power, but by usurpation, or without lawful title; while an officer, king, or government de jure is one who has just claim and rightful title to the office or power; but has never had plenary possession of it, or is not in actual possession. …

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Citations Group 8: (from page 9)

"Of the Civil-Law and the Common-Law".
Samuel Tyler II,D.; Professor of Law at Columbia College, 1871.

"There have grown up in the history of nations only two great systems of law, the civil law of ancient Rome, & the common law of England. All the most civilized nations in the world are governed by either of these two great schemes of justice. Though the civil law and the common law have much in common, yet in many important particulars they are the opposites of each other. In the course of his studies, the student of law finds so much said, in an incidental way, about the civil law, that is calculated to mislead his judgment in regard to the true character of that scheme of justice, that it is important, at the outset of his walks over the fields of the common law, to give him some account of the civil law, and point out in what it differs essentially from the common law. This is a matter of much importance to every student who aspires to a comprehensive and enlightened knowledge of jurisprudence. ...

... it was under the empire, when the glory of the republic was gone, that the jurists attained their eminence, and in fact became the architects of the great system of Roman law. ... Oratory was no longer, as it had been during the glorious period of the republic, the great art by which men rose to eminence in the state. Its voice was now silent; when to speak of the rights of Roman citizens was treason. …

The administration of the law, too, was subordinate to the imperial authority, not only in theory but in practice, the courts being organized accordingly. Under the republic, the courts were open to the public in both civil and criminal trials. Under the empire, open courts disappeared, and an appeal lay in all cases to the emperor in his imperial court. Thus a perfect system of despotism, disguised under forms of law, was built up on the ruins of the republic. …

If we now turn to the common law of England, we will find that, as far as administrative principles and forms of procedure are concerned, it is the opposite of the Roman civil law as it was molded under the empire. The principle which, in the practical administration of the two systems, marks the primary essential distinction between them, is the relative obligatory force under them of precedent or former decisions. Under the common law, former decisions control the court unconditionally. It is deemed by the common law indispensable that there should be a fixed rule of decision, in order that rights and property may be stable and certain, and not involved in perpetual doubts and controversies.

Under the civil law the principles is different. Former decisions have not so fixed and certain an operation, but are considered as only governing the particular case, without establishing as a settled rule the principle involved in it. When a similar case occurs, the judge may decide it according to his personal views of the law, or according to the opinion of some eminent jurist. …

Let anyone, who wishes to examine a specimen of this perplexity in regard to a
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fundamental classification which the civilians make of laws into personal statutes and real statutes, refer to the opinion of the supreme court of Louisiana, by Mr. Justice Porter, in Saul v. His Creditors, in 17 Martins' Reports. After referring to the jurists of the different European countries who have treated of this distinction, Justice Porter says:

"The moment we attempt to discover from these writers what statutes are real and what personal, the most extraordinary confusion is presented. Their definitions often differ; and, when they agree in their definitions, they dispute as to their application."

And Mr. Justice Story, in his "Conflict of Laws," when speaking of the civilians who have treated of the subject of his book, says:

"The civilians of continental Europe have examined the subject in many of its bearings with a more comprehensive philosophy, if not with a more enlightened spirit. Their works, however, abound with theoretical distinctions, which serve little purpose than to provoke idle discussions and metaphysical subtleties, which perplex, if they do not confound the inquirer. * * *

Precedents, too, have not, either in the courts of continental Europe or in the judicial discussions of eminent jurists, the same force and authority which we, who live under the influence of the common law, are accustomed to attribute to them; and it is unavoidable that many differences of opinion will exist amongst them, even in relation to leading principles." Such is the fluctuating wind of doctrine with which the judicial mind is liable to veer under the civil-law institutions where precedents have but little force. …

The common law, in broad contrast to the civil law, has always wholly repudiated anything as authority but the judgments of courts deliberately given in causes argued and decided. "For (says Lord Coke, in the preface to his 9th Report) it is one amongst others of the great honors of the common law that cases of great difficulty are never adjudged or resolved in tenebris or sub silentio suppressis reationibus, but in open court: and there upon solemn and elaborate arguments, ... where they argue ... seriatim, upon certain days openly and purposely prefixed, delivering at large the authorities, reasons, and causes of their judgments and resolutions in every such particular case, ... a reverend and honorable proceeding in law, a grateful satisfaction to the parties, and a great instruction and direction to the attentive and studious hearers."

Nothing less elaborately learned & cautiously considered than such a judgment of a court has a legitimate place in the common law. By such adjudication has that great system of jurisprudence been built up. The opinion of no lawyer has a place in the system of common law. And this wise principle of the common law is never lost sight of by those bred in its spirit. When Lord Coke wrote his commentaries upon certain statutes of England, from Magna Charta to Henry VIII, which are called his II Institutes, he did not give his personal opinions of their meaning, but gave the judicial interpretations of them, which had been made. In the conclusion of the preface to the II Institutes he says:

"Upon the text of the civil law there be so many glosses and interpretations, and again upon those so many commentaries, and all written by doctors of equal degree and authority, and therein so many diversities of opinions, as they rather increase than resolve doubts and uncertainties, and the professors of that noble science say that it is like see full of waves."

"The difference, then, between those glosses and commentaries are written by doctors, and which be advocates, and so in a great manner private interpretations; and our expositions or commentaries upon Magna Charta and other statutes are resolutions of judges in courts of justice in judicial courses of proceeding, either related and reported in our books or extant in

judicial records, or in both, and therefore, being collected together, shall ... produce certainty, the mother and nurse of repose and quietness."

Such is the doctrine of the common law! Nothing but the solemn voice of the law itself, speaking through its constituted tribunals, is of any judicial authority. And how august is that authority, reposing as it does upon the solemn decisions of courts which have administered justice in the very same halls for nearly eight hundred years! In vain shall we search the history of nations for a parallel to this stability of law amidst the fluctuating vicissitudes of empire. It is this stability of law, ruling over the prerogative of the crown and administering equal justice to the high and the low through so many centuries, that vindicates the "frame and ordinary course of the common law" to the consideration of the present times.

It is this primary difference in the principles of practice, under the two systems of law, which gives to the common law its great superiority over the civil law, as a practical jurisprudence regulating the affairs of society. It has the great advantage of producing certainty in regard to all rights and obligations which are regulated by law. But, above all, it excludes private interpretations and controls the arbitrary discretion of judges. In the common law the principles of interpretation are fixed and certain. Rules of interpretation were early adopted, and have never been departed from. Other rules from time to time have been adopted, but when once introduced into practice they become precedents."

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Citations Group 9: (from page 10)

"Civil Law: that part of the law ... opposed to Natural Law."

"Civil: … that branch of law ... outside of criminal practice, pertaining to the rights and duties of persons in contract, tort, etc. ... as opposed to common law.

Barons Law Dictionary; Professor Steven H. Gifts, Rutgers State University of Newark, New Jersey; School of Law, 1984.

"Civil law: ... more properly called municipal law, to distinguish it from the law of nature, & from international law. Laws concerned with civil or private rights & remedies, as contrasted with criminal laws. … The system of jurisprudence held and administered in the Roman empire, … as distinguished from the common law of England ..."

Municipal Affairs: … it has come to include public service activities … which were once regarded as being of a strictly private nature.

Blacks Law Dictionary; 5th Edition.

"Apollo, History of Rome"; Cyril E. Robinson, 1956, pages 26 & 27:

"Many factors contributed to (Rome's) success; but more important than her military powers, were the political methods where by she contrived to ... conquer. ... In 381, after overcoming the ... town of Tusculm, she ... admitted it to terms ... (under which it was) compelled to pay the war-tax, & ... a town thus treated was known as a muni-cipum or "burden-holder".

Webster's New International Dictionary ; 1950, 2nd Edition;

Municipal District: A subdivision of a region inhabited chiefly by non-Christians.

Municipal: ... *munia* official duties + root capere to take. ... Rom. Hist. Of or pertaining to, or of the nature of, a municipum.
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***Mancipati*.**

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mancipatio

In Roman Law, *mancipatio* ... was a solemn verbal contract by which the ownership of certain types of goods, called *res mancipi*, was transferred. *Mancipatio* was also the legal procedure for … emancipating children from their parents, … . *Res mancipi* were … goods … , like … slaves. … .

The procedure of acquisition of property … is described as follows by Gaius: "Mancipatio is effected in the presence of not less than five witnesses, … and also in the presence of another person of the same condition, who holds a pair of brazen scales and hence is called *Libripens*. The purchaser, taking hold of the thing, says: … (aka) … I affirm that this slave is mine according to quiritary right, and he is purchased by me with this piece of bronze and scales. He then strikes the scales with the piece of bronze, and gives it to the seller as a symbol of the price" (Gaius, *Institutes*, I.119[2][3]).

"All governments are, in a sense, "municipal corporations," including the United States & the several states and various political subdivisions, such as counties, townships, school districts, and road boards, none of which are liable to suit unless made so by statute."

Coffield v. Territory, 13 Haw. 478. ("Words and Phrases", from "West Publishing Co.", section on 'Municipal Corporations'.)

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Citations Group 10: (from page 11)

The 'Seventh Amendment' reads:

"In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."

In the seventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and in the judiciary acts, by "common law" is meant what the Constitution denominated in the third article as "law"; not merely suits which the common law recognized among old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined,

in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized and equitable remedies administered; … ; or where, as in admiralty, a measure of public law and of maritime law and equity was often found in the same suit. … U.S. v. Block, 24 Fed.Cas. 1176, 1179.

... in technical precision the word "law" is usually restricted to the common law, and other words such as "statute" or "act", are applied to legislative provisions. …

Smith v. U.S., 22 Fed.Cas. 694, 696.

"Law" is a statement of circumstances in which public force will be brought to bear on men through the courts. Hafner Mfg. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 172 S.W. 28, 262 Mo. 621.
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Law is the enforcement of justice among men.
McAllister v. Marshall, PA. 338 , 350, 6 Am.Dec. 458.

"Due process of law" requires complete vindication of constitutional guarantee of presumption of innocence, and fair and impartial jury trail. State v . Cole, 155 N.E. 2d 507, 508, 107 Ohio App. 444.

Within the principle that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due course of law, by the phrase "due course of law" is meant a proceeding which the adversary parties have the right to be confronted by the witnesses against them, and to have the issues between them tried by a jury in a due and orderly manner as provided by law.
Nettles v . Sommervell, 25 S.W. 658, 660, 6 Tex.Civ.App 627

"Due process of law" carries with it the right of trial by jury, when trail by jury has been the usual course of administration in the particular class of cases, through the courts of justice to which the one in question belongs. Light v. Canadian County Bank, 37 P. 1057, 1077, 2 Okl 543.

A courts failure to protect accused's constitutional rights to jury trail, to be informed of nature and cause of accusation, confront adverse witnesses, have compulsory process to obtain witnesses, and have counsel's assistance, is denial of "due process of law".
State ex rel. Nenning v. Jameson, 22 N.W.2d 731, 732, 71 S.D. 144.

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(All quotes given in this section are from an encyclopedic collection of case-law related court decisions, all of which are entitled as "Words and Phrases", as published by "West Publishing Co.". A more complete listing of this author's selections trom that large volume of texts is listed on the following web-page:)
https://constitutionalgov.us/Citations-Short/Words%26Phrases-Volumes/DueProcess-Requires-JuryTrial-Words%26Phrases-Citations.pdf

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Citations Group 11: (from page 14)

"Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United States"; by John Dickenson; 1927; by the President and Fellows of Harvard College; 1955.
"The multiplication in recent years of public bodies like public service commissions and industrial accident boards, accompanied by vesting of ampler powers in health officers, building inspectors, and the like, has raised anew for our law, after three centuries, the problem of executive justice. That government officials should assume the traditional function of courts of law, and be permitted to determine the rights of individuals, is a development so out of line with the supposed path of our legal growth as to challenge renewed attention to certain underlying principles of our jurisprudence. …
In the age of Coke such questions as these arose in connection with what has since been called "executive justice." To-day the term "executive" seems fitted to a narrower need, and "administrative justice" suggests itself a better name for the broader current legal development.

…

The introduction of administrative justice has encountered in our constitutional doctrine of the "separation of powers" a barrier which has been evaded only by the invention of a new set of glaring legal fictions embodied in such words as "quasi-legislative," "quasi-judicial," and the like. To review the development of these fictions would supply an instructive commentary on an important branch of American constitutional law, but it would not shed helpful light on the more fundamental problems presented by the substitution of administrative justice for adjudication by courts of law. These problems reach below the special limitations of American constitutional law and turn up for inspection some of the deepest principles of the Anglo-American legal system.

In Anglo-American jurisprudence, government and the law have always in a sense stood opposed to each other; the law has been rather something to give the citizen a check on the government than an instrument to give the government control over citizens. There is a famous phrase, which has long been attributed to Bracton, ... that "the king has a superior, to whit, the law; and if he be without a bridle, a bridle ought to be put on him, namely, the law." This "rule of law" as Dicey calls it, or "supremacy of law," in Libeler's phrase, has uniformly been treated as the central and most characteristic feature of Anglo-American juristic habit; and nothing has been held more fundamental to the supremacy of law than the right of every citizen to bring the action of government officials to trial in the ordinary courts of the common law. That government officials, on the contrary, should themselves assume to preform the functions of a law court and determine the rights of individuals, as is the case under a system of administrative justice, has been traditionally felt to be inconsistent with the supremacy of law. It was the ground of attack on the Court of Star Chamber, in the days when the Chancellor was still mainly an administrative officer of the King. Lieber mentions freedom from "government by commissions," and from the jurisdiction of executive courts, as one of the elements of Anglo-American Liberty.

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The orthodox doctrine of the supremacy of law has been stated by Dicey as including two principles: "It means in the first place that no man can lawfully be made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary courts of the land." It means in the second place "that no man is above the law, but that every man, whatever his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm, and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals . . . With us, every official, from the Prime Minister down to a constable or collector of taxes, is under the same responsibility for every act done without legal justification as any other citizen."

"In short, every citizen is entitled, first, to have his rights adjudicated in a regular common-law court, and, secondly, to call into question in such a court the legality of any act done by an administrative official." …

"The substantive difference between administrative procedure and the procedure by law is that the administrative tribunals decide controversies coming before them, not by fixed rules of law, but by the application of governmental discretion or policy.

It is this last point which is of capital interest here. The competition between

administrative & legal justice, is … a phase of the age-old struggle between discretion and fixed rule, between *vouops* and *ekleiakela,* between equity and the strict law."

In so far as administrative adjudication is coming in certain fields to take the place of adjudication by law courts, the supremacy of law as formulated in Dicey's first proposition is overridden. But a possible way of escaping this result is left open by his second proposition. An administrative determination is an act of a governmental officer or officers; and if it be true that all the acts of such officers are subject to be questioned in the courts, it is then possible to have the issue of any questionable administrative adjudication raised and decided anew in a law court, with the special advantages guarantees of the procedure at law. We see here the reason why the question of court review of administrative determinations has become of such central importance and has been the focus of so much discussion since the rise of the administrative procedure. For just so far as administrative determinations are subject to court review, a means exists for maintaining the supremacy of law, though at one remove and as a sort of secondary line of defense. The special advantages of the administrative procedure may be substantially retained, while at the same time, in a given case, the result can be brought to the test of the procedure at law. Administrative justice exists in defiance of the supremacy of law only in so far as administrative adjudications are final and conclusive, and not subject to correction by a law court."

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Citations Group 12: (from page 10)

"He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers. He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, … . He has erected a Multitude of new Offices, and sent hither Swarms of Officers to harrass our People, and eat out their Substance. … He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power. He has combined with others to subject us to a Jurisdiction Foreign to our Constitution, and unacknowledged by our Laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation: … protecting them, by a mock Trial, from Punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States: … depriving us, in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by Jury: … abolishing the free System of English Laws … establishing therein an arbitrary Government, … so as to render it at once an Example and fit Instrument for introducing the same absolute Rules into these Colonies: … abolishing our most valuable Laws, and altering fundamentally the Forms of our Governments: … declaring themselves invested with Power to legislate for us in all Cases whatsoever."

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Citations Group 13: (from page 16)

"Historical Jurisprudence": Guy Carlton, Lee;
Johns Hopkins University 1922; Pages 12, 17, 18, 38-40, 188-189:

The law of Babylonia has had an immense effect upon that of nearly all the countries of Europe ... The literature of Babylon has perished; but the element of culture which has endured was greater than the literature. That element is law, an organized intelligible system of rights & duties enforced by the State. ... The great work of the nation was the production of a system of law, necessary to the extended commercial activity of the city ... The complex Babylonian civilization, which produced a commercial law in advance of any other ancient system ... was ... the product of ... its relations to the other countries of the world.

The exercise of judicial functions, at least in matters of commercial law, seems to have been in the hands of the hierarchy. The reasons for this may have been in part those which, in the mediaeval period of European history, threw the control of legal procedure largely into the hands of the ecclesiastics. In Babylon, the custom of documentary evidence in almost all transactions ... & the wide extent to which written contracts were employed, made the notarial & judicial functions of the priests very extensive. But the part taken in business transactions by the priesthood was appropriate for another reason, which perhaps had more influence in the time of the early law, before the purely commercial side had been developed. This was the part which was connected with contractual oaths, which at first were numerous. The contracting parties were obliged in their contracts to swear by the principal god of the country, & by the reigning prince, that they would abide by the conditions of the contract ..."

The Babylonian Law developed to the fullest extent the idea of a Contract. Almost any possible business transaction was reduced to the form of a contract & was executed with the same formalities – i.e., with witnesses, notary, & signature. Thus the points as to deeds, sales, mortgages, loans, & banking are in no respect different in form from the matter of hiring, rent & leases, partnership, testaments, & domestic relations, including adoption. Transactions so very different could be reduced to the same principle, or brought under the one head, only by a highly abstract conception of contract itself. From forms of contract ... we pass to the relations of master and servant, leases, & future delivery of goods.

Sub-scetion A. Master & Servant. ... a man might well make a contract with another whom he hired for a year, or whom he contracted to serve for a year. ... example ... In connection with this contract, it should be noted that Ubarru was regarded as a free agent, hiring himself out. But since he enters into a relation to his master in which he is temporarily in the condition of a slave, he has a representative, or guardian ...

... In the case of a slave the name of the slave's father is never given. The slave is not regarded or spoken of as a man, but as a thing, and is reckoned in the same way as cattle. The actual point of this contract is the transfer of the right to a man's services. Such a transaction is but a part of the whole Babylonian system, whereby every credit or right was passed from one to another by means of contracts. ...

The law was very strict as to the beginning & termination of these contracts. ... If the servant did not appear, he could be arrested & brought to his master, as he was his master's man. ...

This species of ... slavery was of great importance & very customary in Old Babylon.

Babylon(s) ... commercial customs ... became ... the commercial law of the whole known world. Of ... these Rome was ... possessed from the earliest period ... "

https://constitutionalgov.us/Citations-Short/HistrclJrsprdnc-Babylon-ToRome&Normans-GCLee.pdf

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Citations Group 14: (from page 17)
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Revelation 18:

1 And after these things I saw another angel come down from heaven, … 2 And he cried ... Babylon the great is fallen, is fallen, … 3 For all nations have drunk of the wine of the wrath of her fornication, … and the merchants of the earth are waxed rich through the abundance of her delicacies. 4 … Come out of her, my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues. … 8 Therefore shall her plagues come in one day, death, and mourning, and famine; and she shall be utterly burned with fire: for strong is the Lord God who judgeth her. 9 And the kings of the earth, who have committed fornication and lived deliciously with her, shall bewail her, and lament for her, when they shall see the smoke of her burning, … 11 And the merchants of the earth shall weep and mourn over her; for no man buyeth their merchandise any more: 12 The merchandise of gold, and silver, and precious stones, … and horses, and chariots, and slaves, and souls of men. …

15 The merchants of these things, which were made rich by her, shall stand afar off for the fear of her torment, weeping and wailing, … 17 For in one hour so great riches is come to nought. … 24 And in her was found the blood of prophets, and of saints, and of all that were slain upon the earth.

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Citations Group 15: (from page 18)

"Common Law Pleading"; by Joseph H Koffler, Professor of Law, New York Law School, & Alison Reppy, Late Dean & Professor of Law, New York Law School; & published by West Publishing Company, St Paul, Minnesota; in 1969.

Page 5: Chapter 1: Basis of Modern Remedial Law: (footnote 17) ... .

"Common Law Pleading", 10 Harvard Law Review 238, 239. 1896.

Sir Montague Crackenthorpe, O.C., in an address to the American Bar Association, in reference to the utility of the study of Common Law Pleading stated:

"In the hands of those who understood it, the System of Common Law Pleading was infallible in attaining the purpose for which it existed. If all who brought Causes to Trial had possessed a proper acquaintance with this Branch of Law and a reasonable mental alertness, it would never have been hinted that Pleading was a means of turning the decision from of a question 'the very Right of the matter' to immaterial points. But pleaders of inferior and slovenly mental disposition suffered themselves to be misled deliberately, it is to be feared, by their more acute brethren; and the popular mind came to consider the whole system a mere series of traps and pitfalls for the unwary, - an Impediment to Justice that must be abolished. In truth, even these evils might well have been remedied by allowing free liberty of amendment, and reducing to a moderate sum the costs payable on the grant of such privilege. Those concerned in reform movements, however, often loose sight of their real object in a feverish anxiety to 'cut deep' and at once; and this explains why the system for bringing a cause to trial in convenient and exact form was discarded."

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Citations Group 16: (from page 20)

"… Eisenman divides Palestine of Jesus's time into two power blocks: the rulers and the populists. The rulers were the Romans, and those who obtained power by serving their purposes. They included the Herodian puppet dynasty; the collaborationist pharisees; …

The populists were the demagogues who mobilized against Roman domination by fuelling the zealotry and nationalism of the Jewish people. They included the early Jewish Christians, the Qumran community (writers of the Dead Sea Scrolls), and others (Zadokites, Essenes, Ebionites, Rechabites...) whose delineations and relationships will probably never be clarified. United under the influence if not leadership of James, they formed an "opposition alliance" against the establishment, and launched a revolution against it in AD 66-70 that brought about the Roman siege of Jerusalem and the destruction of the temple. In the aftermath, only the collaborators prospered. From the accomodationist pharisees came Rabbinic Judaism; …

https://web.physics.wustl.edu/alford/reviews/james.html
https://robertheisenman.com/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Eisenman

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The biblical King Jesus was King Izas of Adiabene - the well-known leader of the Jewish Revolt. This is most comprehensive and revolutionary reappraisal of biblical history. This book explains every facet and every character within the New Testament narrative, and places them within a real historical context. …

Contrary to orthodox perceptions, King Jesus and Queen Mary Magdalene were the richest couple in Syrio-Judaea. The Romans wanted to impose taxes on Jesus and Mary, provoking a bitter dispute which became known as the Jewish Revolt. King Jesus fought and lost that war, so he was crucified, reprieved and sent into exile in Roman England. In those remote lands, King Jesus became known King Arthur (the constellation of the Great Bear) and his twelve disciple-knights of the Round Last Supper Table (the Round Table was laid out as a zodiac).

This identification of Jesus as a wealthy, royal, warrior-hero of first century Judaea may sound bizarre, but that is what the texts say. All research and quotations are from original sources, including the New Testament, Tanakh, Talmud, Josephus, Origen, Eusebius, Irenaeus, Herodian, Suetonius, Tacitus, Clement etc:

https://www.kobo.com/us/en/ebook/king-jesus-1

48:15: "The Gospel Story Is About the 'Jewish Revolt'. … Jesus Was the Leader of the Jewish Revolt. … The Talmud Clearly Says that 'Jesus Was the Leader of the Jewish-Revolt'; … & that He Caused the Destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem; & That is Why they Do Not Like Him."

52:20: "Jesus was Crucified in AD-70, and He was the Leader of the Jewish Revolt."

Originally titled as: "LIVE Unslaved Podcast - Islam: The Danger (with Ralph Ellis)"; but that video has been removed from Youtube, but is now available, here:

https://ConstitutionalGov.us/Videos/IslamTheDanger-RalphEllis-UnslavedPodcastLive-MichaelTsarion.mp4

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Citations Group 17: (from page ?)

Black's Law Dictionary, 5th edition:

War: Mixed War: A mixed war is one which is waged on one side by public authority, and on the other by mere private persons.

Special Law. One … operating upon a selected class, rather than upon the public generally. A private law. …

Unlawful Assembly. At common law, the gathering together of three or more persons, to the disturbance of the public peace, and with the intention of co-operating in the forcible and violent execution of some unlawful private enterprise. If they take steps towards the performance of their purpose, it becomes a riot. … An unlawful assembly is of three or more persons with a common plan in mind which, if carried out, will result in a riot. In other words, it is such a meeting with intent to (a) commit a crime by open force, or (b) execute a common design lawful or unlawful, in an unauthorized manner likely to cause persons to apprehend a breach of the peace. …

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Law Dictionary, by John Bouvier; 1868 - 1870

Civil Law:

This term is generally used to designate the Roman jurisprudence, *jus civile Romanorum*. … 10. Its influence in the formation of the common law of England cannot be denied by the impartial inquirer. It was publicly taught in England, by Roger Vacarius, as early as 1149; & all admit that the whole of equity jurisprudence prevailing in England & the United States is mainly based on the civil law.

Civil Remedy:

In practice. The remedy which the party injured by the commission of a tortious act has by action against the party committing it, as distinguished from the proceeding by indictment, by which the wrongdoer is made to expiate the injury done to society.

In cases of treason, felony, and some other of the graver offences, this private remedy is suspended, on grounds of private policy, until after the prosecution of the wrong-doer for the public wrong. (many citations)

Obstructing Process:

The act by which one or more persons attempt to prevent, or do prevent, the execution of lawful process.

2: The Officer must be prevented by actual violence, or by threatened violence accompanied by the exercise of Force, or by those having capacity to employ it, by which the officer is prevented from executing his writ. The officer is not required to expose his person by a physical conflict with the offender. 2 Wash. C.C. 169. See 3 Wash. C.S. 355; 12 Ala. N.s. 199.

3: This is an offence against public justice of a very high and presumptuous nature; and more particularly so where the obstruction is of an arrest upon criminal process. A person
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opposing an arrest upon criminal process becomes thereby *particeps criminis* ; that is, an accessory in felony, and a principal in high treason. 4 Blackstone, Comm. 128; 2 Hawkins, Pl.Cir.c.17, s.1; 1 Russell, Crimes, 360. See 2 Gal. C.C. 15; 2 Chitty, Crim. Law, 145, note *a* ; 3 Vt. 110; 25 *id.* 415; Strobh. So. C. 73; 15 Mo. 486.

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